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ABSTRACT
T h is  t h e s i s  examines money problems and p o l i c i e s  in  Kuwait ,  a c a p i t a l  
p len ty  economy, dur ing  the pe r iod  s tu d ie d .
Kuwa i t 's  balance o f  payments su rp lus  has al lowed i t  to  cont inue to  cover 
the domest ic no te  I s s u e  by f o r e i g n  r e s e rv e  u n t i l  t o d a y ,  whereas most 
developing economies have found t h i s  a c o n s t ra in in g  ve s t ig e  o f  moneta ry  
a r rangem en ts  1n B r i t i s h  c o l o n ia l  days and have l e g i s l a t e d  to  g ive  t h e i r  
c e n t ra l  banks more f l e x i b i l i t y .
Due to  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  s u r p l u s ,  t h e  com m erc ia l  banks b u i l t  up l a r g e  
ho ld ings o f  f o re ig n  assets  o v e r  th e  p e r i o d  1962 -1980 ,  c h i e f L y  i n  t h e  
form o f  s h o r t - t e r m  money market depos i ts  w i th  banks abroad. Whereas the  
C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kuwait s t a r t e d  implement ing monetary reforms from 1973, 
the  indepemdence o f  t h e  c o m m e rc ia l  banks due p r i n c i p a l l y  t o  t h e i r  
l i q u i d i t y ,  imeant the c e n t r a l  bank had L i t t l e  success 1n c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  
money supp ly  u n t i l  1979, when i t  e x p lo i te d  the growing Leek o f  l i q u i d i t y  
among commercial  banks to  s t rengthen i t s  c o n t r o l  over  t h e i r  reserves.
The a n a ly s i s  o f  the de te rm ina t ion  o f  the growth o f  the s tock o f  money in  
Kuwai t  o v e r  the per iod  1962-BO needs to  take account o f  the roLe o f  the 
commerc ia l  banks and t h e i r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i n  t h e  r a p id  g row th  i n  
lend ing,  which began in  1972. Whereas we f i n d  h ig h -p o w e re d  money an 
impor tant  determinant  o f  the growth o f  the money s toc k ,  the bank reserve 
r a t i o  p lays  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e .
The g row th  o f  t h e  s t o c k  m arke t  i n  Kuwai t  was th e  main cause o f  the  
growth 1n lend ing  a f t e r  1972.  The C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kuwait saw i t s  main 
o b je c t i v e s  as c o n t r o l l i n g  the sp ecu la t io n  and c r e d i t  exp los ion  connected 
w i th  the s tock  market.
The Kuwait i  D inar  was e s ta b l i s h e d  by B r i t a i n  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  K u w a i t ' s  
p o l i t i c a l  independence. The b e n e f i t  t o  a country  l i k e  Kuwait o f  having 
a separate cur rency would  appear  t o  be e x t r e m e l y  L im i ted .  The Kuwait 
government  have f o l l o w e d  a p o l i c y  o f  e x p l o r i n g  p o s s i b l e  m o n e t a r y  
i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  n e ig h b o u r i n g  s t a t e s ,  a l though  we f i n d  t h i S  does not 
answer any s p e c i f i c  enonomic p rob lem i n  Kuwait ,  Meanwhile, the C e n t ra l  
Bank o f  Kuwait has pursued a p o l i c y  o f  maximum s t a b i l i t y  o f  the currency 
throughout  the per iod  under s t u d y ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  m in im i z e  t h e  r i s k s  o f  
c u r re n c y  Loss by th e  f i n a n c i e l  community ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  commercial  
banking system, which had s u b s t a n t i a l  f o r e i g n  asset  h o ld in g s .  Th is  i s  
o f  cons iderab le  importance because the commercial banks do not appear to  
behave in  such a way as to  hedge t h e i r  f o re ig n  currency exposure.
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A SHORT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF KUWAIT
iJ THE EARLY PERIOD fPRE-17731
H i s t o r i c a l  r e c o rd s  on Kuwait on the pe r iod  be fo re  the Second World War 
are u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  in  so f a r  as the economy i s  concerned. 
Neverthe less,  a s h o r t  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  d eve lop m en ts  i n  t h i s  per iod  has 
been p ie c e d  t o g e t h e r  f rom a c o m b in a t io n  o f  p r im a r y  and s e c o n d a r y  
s o u r c e s ,  wh ich w i l l  be u s e f u l  background in  our d iscuss ions  in  coming 
c h a p t e r s  on t h e  s o c i a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  K u w a i t .  
P a r t i c u l a r l y  impor tan t  i n  t h i s  con tex t  i s  the  le rge  share o f  the p r i v e t e  
s ec to r  i n  the economy o f  Kuweit and i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  f i n a n c i e l  
system.
By t h e  seventeenth cen tu ry ,  the Portuguese dominated Persian G u l f  t rade  
u n t i l  1622 when e j o i n t  A n g lo - P e r s i a n  a t t a c k  s e i z e d  th e  Por tuguese  
t r a d in g  base o f  Hormuz as p a r t  o f  a general  campaign by t h e  East I n d i a  
company o f  London to  o u s t  th e  P o r tu g u e s e  f rom  th e  p r o f i t a b l e  t rade  
between In d ia  and t h e  P e r s i a n  G u l f  p o r t s .  A t  t h i s  t im e  Kuwait was a 
summer re s o r t  o f  the Ban i -Kha l id  who were the r u l e r s  o f  Hasa ( t h e  a rea  
f rom p r e s e n t - d a y  Abu Dhabi to  Umm Qasr -  which l i e s  between Kuwait and 
Bas ra ) .
U n t i l  1773 Bandar-Abbas and Gombrun on t h e  P e r s i a n  l i t t o r a l  were the 
main centres  o f  the  East  I n d i a  Company i n  t h e  G u l f .  I n  t h i s  p e r i o d  
there was a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount o f  t rade  between Bandar Abbas, Basra,  Abu 
Shahr and Muscat on the one hand, and Bengal ,  Bombay, Madras and Surat  
on the o t h e r . (1)
The s t r i k i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  t r a d e  between I n d i a  and t h e  G u l f  was t h a t  in  
general  I n d i a ' s  balance o f  t rade  was p o s i t i v e ,  and t h a t  on ly  a few i tems 
reached In d ia  from the G u l f .  Those i tems were a l l  e x p o r t s  f rom Basra 
and th e  Arab ian  l i t t o r a l ,  and cons is ted  main ly  o f  dates and p e a r l s .  In 
1790 re c o rd s  show t h a t  i n  f a c t ,  o f  th e  t o t a l  v a lu e  o f  da te  e x p o r t s  
produced in  the Pasha l iq  o f  Baghdad and exported from B a s ra ,  e s t im a t e d  
a t  1 , 0 0 0 ,0 0 0  Bombay Rupees, a la rge p a r t  went to  I n d i a .  MeanwhiLe the 
t o t a l  v a lu e  o f  t h e  p e a r l s  e s t i m a t e d  a t  500 ,000  Bombay Rupees, and 
exported from Basrah, Kuwait and Bahra in ,  most went t o  I n d i a  ( 2 ) .  Of 
the expor ts  from I n d ia  to  Basra (3 ) ,  on ly  a Lim i ted p a r t  was consumed in  
t h e  P a s h a l i q  o f  Baghdad which was an extremely  impover ished area,  most 
o f  these goods being d i s t r i b u t e d ,  v i a  Baghdad t o  the urban cent res  o f  
the Ottoman Empire (4) and from the re  to  Europe. Basra also  re -expor ted  
some goods to  P e r s i a ,  and p r o v i d e d  an i m p o r t a n t  c e n t r e  f o r  t h e  
c o l l e c t i o n  o f  numerous commodit ies from the G u l f ,  Pers ia  and Europe, f o r  
expor t  to  Ind ia  ( 5 ) .
Whi Le Basra re p re s e n te d  an im por tan t  t r a n s i t  p o r t  and had a favourab le  
balance o f  t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  th e  w o r l d ,  P e r s i a  and th e  Persian 
po r ts  on the o the r  hand represented an i m p o r t a n t  consuming a r e a .  The 
favourab le  balance o f  t rade  o f  In d ia  w i th  the G u l f  cons is ted  main ly  o f  a 
f a v o u r a b l e  b a l a n c e  w i t h  P e r s i a  ( 6 ) ,  and Less s i g n i f i c a n t l y  o f  a 
favourab le  balance w i th  the Ottoman Empire and Europe through Basra and 
Baghdad. A c e r t a i n  C a p ta in  J .  Malco lm p r o v i d e s  us w i t h  t h e  o n l y  
e s t im a t e s  we have o f  th e  G u l f  T rade i n  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  (7 ) .  
Malcolm est im ated ,  in  1800, the v a lu e  o f  the whole o f  the G u l f  t rade  a t  
16,000,000 Bombay Rupees, the  le rg e s t  p e r t  o f  wh ich  covered  t h e  t r a d e  
between I n d i a  and t h e  v a r iou s  pa r ts  o f  the G u l f .  He est imated Persian 
imports from In d ia  a t  2 ,000 ,000  Bombay Rupees w i th  expor ts  to  I n d ia  a t
10
1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0  Rupees in  merchand ise  and 800 ,000  Rupees i n  s p e c i e  and 
b u l l i o n .  He a l s o  e s t im a t e d  the  d e f i c i e n c y  i n  th e  balance o f  t rade  
between Basra and In d ia  a t  1 ,000 ,000  Rupees, also  f inanced  by shipments 
o f  specie and b u l l i o n .  Basra 's  d e f i c i t  was due l a rg e ly  to  re -e x p o r ts  to 
the Ottoman Empire and Europe ra th e r  than domest ic consumption i n  Basra 
and the Pashal iq o f  Baghdad i t s e l f .
The word ' K u w a i t '  o r i g i n a t e s  from ' k u t '  o r  l i t t l e  f o r t  and was p a r t  o f  
Hasa, the lands o f  th e  B a n i - K h a l i d .  I n  th e  h i n t e r l a n d  o f  Hasa, which 
represented most o f  the Eastern L i t t o r a l  o f  the Persian G u l f  e x c e p t  f o r  
Ras A I  Khaimah and Muscat, was the Nejd from which most o f  presen t-day  
K u w a i t i s  o r i g i n a t e .  I t  appears  f rom most o f  t h e  h i s t o r i e s  o f  t h i s  
reg ion  (8) t h a t  a combinat ion o f  drought and t r i b a l  wars fo rced  a s m a l l  
s e c t i o n  o f  the  Onaiza t r i b e  out o f  the Nejd to  p resent-day Qatar,  then 
under the s u z e r a i n t y  o f  t h e  B a n i - K h a l i d .  T h i s  can be sa id  to  be the 
o r i g i n  o f  the Kuwai t i  popu la t ion  o f  today. The Onaiza were no t  so much 
a t r i b e  as a loose  ' n a t i o n '  o f  Arabs s t r e t c h i n g  from the  empty qua r te r  
to  S y r ia  and Trans-Jordan.  The Dahamshah s e c t io n  o f  the Amarat c lan  o f  
the Onaiza was an obscure bedouin  group when i t  a r r i v e d  i n  Q a ta r  and 
then  proceeded to  Kuwait to  ask the Ba n i -K h a l id  f o r  f i s h i n g  and graz ing  
r i g h t s  i n  t h a t  area.  As e a r ly  as 1720 f a m i l i a r  names o f  the wel l -known 
K u w a i t i  f a m i l i e s  c rop  up i n  t h e  r e c o r d s .  We h e a r  o f  A l - S a b a h s ,  
A l - K h a l i f a s ,  A L -Z a y id s  [a g roup ing  in c lu d in g  Al-Ghanims, AL-Saqrs and 
A l -D a b b o u s ] ,  A l - S a l e h s ,  A l - J a l a h i m a s  (wh ich  i n c l u d e s  A l - N u s f  as an 
independent f a m i l y ) ,  the Shamlan and th e  Maawidas.  The p e r i o d  up to  
1773 sees t h i s  group ing o f  bedouin (or the Dahamshah], who l a t e r  became 
known as th e  ' U t u b ' ,  s t i l l  c a r r y i n g  on i t s  n o m a d ic  f u n c t i o n  o f  
sheep-graz ing,  but a lso  beginn ing to  s e t t l e  on the c o a s t  around Kuwa i t  
t o  f i s h ,  and to  c o l l e c t  p e a r l s .  F i s h i n g  was p u r e l y  e s u b s i s t e n c e  
a c t i v i t y ,  but  pearLing had many more im p l i c a t i o n s .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  pea r ls
were an export  commodity wh ich meant t r a v e l l i n g  f a r  to  dispose o f  the 
goods f o r  cash, thereby a l lo w in g  the K u w a i t i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  to  im p o r t  a 
v a r i e t y  o f  n e c e s s i t i e s  and l u x u r i e s .  Secondly,  p e a r l in g  requ i red  the 
use o f  s h ip s  [dhows] and t h e r e f o r e  e n c o u r a g e d  th e  deve lopment  o f  
s h i p b u i l d i n g  as an i n d u s t r y .  The t e a k  and n a i l s  needed f o r  t h e  
c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  ships were imported w i th  the cash made in  the exports  o f  
p e a r l s .  I t  i s  most p r o b a b le  t h a t  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  th e  K u w a i t i s  were 
h ig h l y  dependent on Basra and t h a t  t h e i r  s h i p s  were s t i l l  smal l  and 
p r i m i t i  ve.
i i )  THE FORMATIVE YEARS AND THE MIGRATION OF THE 'UTUB TRIBE TO KUWAIT
The years 1773-1819 are an ext remely  i n t e r e s t i n g  and complex p e r i o d  i n  
t h e  deve lopm en t  o f  K u w a i t .  The f i r s t  i m p o r t a n t  s e t  o f  i n f l u e n c e s  
i n v o l v e d  th e  e x p lo s i o n  o f  t h e  Wahhabi movement i n  Nejd ( C e n t r a l  
A r a b i a ) .  T h i s  area had a lw ays  been t r o u b le s o m e  and t h e  t r o u b l e s  
conce rned  m a in l y  the  ebb ing  f o r t u n e s  o f  t h e  Saud t r i b e  based in  the 
oas is  o f  the A l -D a r iyya  ( 9 ) .  The T u r k s ,  r u l i n g  through the S h e r i f s  o f  
Mecca, had Long been es tab l ishe d  in  Mecca, M ed ina ,  and Jeddah and had 
f o r  some c o n s i d e r a b l e  t ime been invo lved  in  wars w i th  the Saudi t r i b e ,  
which we have seen were p a r t  o f  t h e  reason f o r  t h e  em ig ra t io n  o f  the 
Dahamshah o r  'U t u b '  t r i b e  to  Q a ta r  and th e n  K u w a i t .  Whenever t h e  
S h e r i f s  o f  Mecca were no t  concerned  w i t h  the t h r e a t s  from the Yemeni 
Imams or  th e  Mamluk S u l t a n s  o f  C a i r o ,  they  a t te m p te d  to  c o n s o l id a te  
t h e i r  power over Nejd.
The tu rn in g  p o in t  in  these Long wars was 1744 ( 1 0 ) ,  t h e  year  when t h e  
L i n k  between Muhammad Ib n  Abd Al-Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn -Saud  was 
fo rm ed .  Muhammad I b n  Abd A l -W a h h a b  f o u n d e d  a f o r m  o f  I s l a m i c  
Pur i tan ism .  The extreme form o f  the I s l a m i c  p u r i t a n i s m  t h a t  Muhammad
Ibn  Abd Al-Wahhab p reached s u i t e d  the hard l i f e  o f  Nejd bedouin which 
compared m ise rab ly  w i t h  th e  l u x u r y  o f  l i f e  i n  the  towns o f  Jeddah or  
Bas rah .  The Saudi  t r i b e  th ro u g h  th e  person  o f  Muhammad I b n - S a u d ,  
q u i c k l y  formed an a l l i a n c e  w i th  the r e l i g i o u s  leader o f  t h i s  p u r i t a n i c a l  
d o c t r in e  o f  ' t a u h i d ' ,  who gave h i s  name to  the western term 'Wahhabism'.
The Wahhabi movement began by f i g h t i n g  a Long-drawn out  war aga ins t  the 
B a n i - K h a l i d  o f  Hasa and s u c c e e d e d  t o  u n s e a t  t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  th e  
B a n i -K h a l id  t r i b e .  By the 179 0 's  th e  Wahhabis were p o s in g  a s e r i o u s  
t h r e a t  t o  th e  M u n t a f i q  t r i b e s  o f  Basra (under  th e  suze ra in ty  o f  the 
Pasha o f  Baghdad] and to  K u w a i t ,  t h e  l a s t  o u t p o s t  o f  th e  Ban i -Kha l id  
c o n f e d e r a t i o n .  By 1797 Kuwa i t  j o i n e d  a M u n t a f i q - T u r k i s h  a l l i a n c e  
a g a i n s t  the  Wahhabis ,  and by 1804 the  Wahhabis had i n f l i c t e d  se r ious  
damage on the a l l i a n c e  and i t  looked as i f  they might become the v i c t o r s  
o f  the  war.  Th is  would have been th e  case i f  t h e  emphasis o f  Wahhabi 
expansion had not then changed towards the Hejaz in  Western A r a b i a ,  and 
i f  they had not encountered ser ious  Mamluk o p p o s i t io n  l a t e r  on.
S e c u r i n g  th e  S h e r i f i a n  s t r o n g h o ld s  in  the Hejaz was a p r i o r i t y  o f  the 
Wahhabis f o r  r e l i g i o u s  reasons, and by 1800 Mecca and Medinah had opened 
t h e i r  gates to  the marauding Nejdi  w a r r io rs  o f  Saud Ibn A b d -E l -A z iz .  By 
1819 a c o u n te r -o f fe n s iv e  by the E g y p t i a n  leg ions  o f  the newly -appoin ted 
Su l tan  o f  Egypt, Muhammad A l i ,  had d r iven  the Ne jd is  out  o f  Mecca (1813) 
and ra ised  t h e i r  home-town o f  A l - D a r i y y a  t o  th e  ground ( 1 8 1 9 ) .  T h i s  
d e f e a t  had saved Kuwait  from in vas io n ,  w h i le  Kuwa i t 's  p ro x im i t y  to  the 
Muntaf iq  t r i b e s  and th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a l l y i n g  w i t h  them or  the Turks 
had helped to  keep Kuwait independent t h ro u g h o u t  t h e  Wahhabi r a i d s  i n  
the la te  e igh teen th  cen tu ry .
Kuwa i t  was, t h e r e fo re ,  r i d  o f  i t s  r u le r s  ( the Bani-KhaL id) by 1800, due
to  the Wahhabi invas ions  a l though  i t  was r a r e l y  d i r e c t l y  in vo lve d .  The 
'Ubub t r i b e  o f  Kuwait prospered under t h e i r  new ly  found independence ,  
a c k n o w le d g in g  thoughou t  the n ine teen th  century  on ly  a loose s u ze ra in ty  
t o  t h e  P a s h l i q  o f  Baghdad. The A l - S a b a h  emerged as th e  r u l e r s  o f  
Kuwait ,  e lec ted  by the t r i b e  on t r a d i t i o n a l  Muslim g rounds  o f  L e a rn ing  
and a b i l i t y  to  i n t e r p r e t  the Holy Qur'an and adm in is te r  I s la m ic  j u s t i c e .  
The s e c o n d  s e t  o f  i n f l u e n c e s  t o  have an im p o r t a n t  im pac t  on the  
development o f  Kuw a i t  was th e  m i g r a t i o n  o f  th e  A L - K h a l i f a  f a m i ly  to 
Zubara in  Qatar and t h e i r  consequent in vas ion  o f  B a h ra in  i n  1782 (11 ) .  
I t  appears  t h a t  c e r t a i n  f a m i l i e s  o f  the 'Utub t r i b e  were d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  t h e i r  a l l o c a te d  share o f  the  p e a r l i n g  i n d u s t r y  o f  Kuwait and l e f t  
t o  s e a r c h  f o r  r i c h e r  p e a rL  b e d s .  R e c o rd s  show ( 1 2 )  t h a t  t h e  
AL—Ja lah ima,  o r  p a r t  o f  them, went w i th  t h e  A L - K h a l i f a  t o  Zu b a ra .  In  
f a c t  i n  B a h ra in  th e y  d i s c o v e r e d  p e a r l  beds even r i c h e r  than those o f  
Kuwa i t .  N e v e r t h e le s s ,  d e s p i t e  t h i s  s p l i t  i n  t h e  'U tu b  t r i b e ,  s t rong 
l i n k s  between the f a m i l i e s  remained (13) and A l -S a b a h  and A l - K h a l i f a  
f a m i l i e s  c r e a t e d  a 'U tub  a l l i a n c e  between Kuw a i t  and B a h ra in  which 
a l lowed the 'Utub to  be second o n l y  to  t h e  M u s c a t i s  in  the Arab t rade  
w i t h  I n d ia .
i i i )  THE DECLINE OF EAST INDIA COMPANY TRADE IN THE GULF
East Ind ia  Company ("Company") t rade between In d ia  and the P e rs ian  G u l f  
dec l ined  a f t e r  1773, a t  which t ime they represented the supreme European 
p o w e r  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  and th e  main t r a d e r s  ( 1 4 ) .  East I n d i a  Company 
im por ts  o f  China tea i n t o  England in c r e a s e d  w h i le  expor ts  o f  opium to 
China, main ly  from Bengal, brought la rge p r o f i t s  both to  the Company and 
t o  p r i v a t e  t r a d e r s .  I n  f a c t ,  the  Company n o t  o n l y  s u c c e e d e d  i n  
in c reas ing  i t s  Chinese impor ts  and expo r ts ,  but  i t  aLso created a demand 
f o r  B r i t i s h  m a n u fa c tu re s  i n  C h ina .  I n  1764 th e  Company exported to
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China 1,196 ba les o f  wool len c l o t h ,  i n  1771 the f i g u r e  was 2,359 ba les .  
Th is  amounted to  about h a l f  o f  a l l  Company e x p o r t s  o f  t h i s  commodity .  
By co m p a r is o n ,  b a l e s  so ld  to  the G u l f  dropped from an average o f  1,000 
b a le s  i n  t h e  1 7 5 0 's  t o  an a v e ra g e  o f  200 b a le s  i n  t h e  1 7 7 0 ' s ,  and 
noth ing  a t  a l l  by 1778. Th is  drop in  the sale o f  B r i t i s h  woo l len  goods 
to  t h e  Pe rs ian  G u l f  was a lso  due p a r t l y  to  increased expor ts  o f  wool len 
goods by both England and France to  the merchant community o f  Aleppo. A 
gtance a t  Tab le  1 ; 1 . however ,  shows a r a t h e r  e r r a t i c  p a t t e r n  in  the 
dec l in e  o f  the sa le  o f  wool len goods by the  East I n d i a  Company i n  the  
P e r s i a n  G u l f .  Coin shor tages,  due to  the unfavourab le  balance o f  t rade 
o f  the G u l f  w i th  I n d ia  were p robab ly ,  t h e r e fo re ,  the main reason f o r  the 
un favourab le  t r a d in g  e n v i ro n m e n t  i n  t h e  G u l f  a t  the  t im e .  So ser ious  
was the problem o f  c u r r e n c y  s h o r t a g e  t h a t  new c o n t r a c t s  between the  
Basra  m erchan ts  and th e  Company p r o v id e d  f o r  on ly  p a r t i a l  payment in  
cash. U n t i l  1773,  th e  Company employees a t  Basra  r e c e i v e d  payment 
most ly  in  s i l k ,  Ki rman wool,  V e n e t ia n  ware and p e a r l s ,  d e s p i t e  t h e i r  
r e l u c t a n c e  to  accept b a r t e r i n g .  Currency shor tages were exacerbated by 
p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  I r a n ,  due to  t h e  A fghan i n v a s i o n s  o f  t h i s  
p e r io d ,  which led to  hoard ing o f  s i l v e r  and t o  an even worse P e rs ia n  
balance o f  t ra d e .
By 1773 th e  B r i t i s h  had moved ou t  o f  Bandar-Abbas and Abu Shahr and 
concen t ra ted  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  B a s ra ,  wh ich  had o n l y  been a minor 
o u t p o s t  f o r  th e  Eas t  I n d i a  Company b e f o r e  t h e n .  B a s ra  was more 
l u c r a t i v e  than the Pers ian l i t t o r a l  f o r  t r a d e r s ,  due to  the Pashal iq  o f  
Baghdad's t r a n s i t  t r a d e ,  and i t s  low Leve l  o f  consumption compared to  
P e rs ia .  These f a c t o r s  meant t h a t  the re  was a h ighe r  l e v e l  o f  l i q u i d i t y  
and a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  cur rency in  Basra than in  P e rs ia .  The dec is ion  by 
the East I n d i a  Company t o  move was, however ,  f o l l o w e d  by a P e rs ian  
invas ion  o f  Basrah in  1775 and c o n s e q u e n t l y  by a f u r t h e r  move by the
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East Ind ia  Company to Kuwait .  Th is  was the f i r s t  d i r e c t  contact  between 
B r i t a i n  and t h e  K u w a i t i s .  The East In d ia  Company had f i r s t  t r a n s fe re d  
i t s  desert  m a i l  rou te  through Kuwai t ,  and then, subsequent ly ,  i t s  e n t i r e  
f a c to r y  [o r  o u t p o s t ) .
A l though  by 1800 the  B r i t i s h  had moved back t o  B a s ra ,  and had a lso  
agreed w i th  the Shah o f  I r a n  to  s e r v i c e  th e  P e rs ia n  l i t t o r a l ,  t h i n g s  
were never  q u i t e  the  same t h e r e a f t e r  as f a r  as Kuwait was concerned. 
B r i t i s h  involvement in  t rade  d ropped ,  and the Arab merchants ( i n c lu d in g  
the 'Utub) increased t h e i r  share o f  th e  t r a d e ,  w h i l e  Kuwa i t  became a 
permanent l i n k  i n  the East In d ia  Company's desert  ma i l  rou te  to ALeppo. 
In  the 1780's agreements between Basra and Kuwait i  merchants led a lso  to  
much cargo des t ined  f o r  B a s ra ,  t o  be c h a n n e l l e d  to  Aleppo v ia  Kuwai t ,  
t h e r e b y  s a v in g  s u b s t a n t i a l  Ottoman ta x e s  on cargo ( 1 5 ) .  The 1776 
e p is ode  added t r a n s i t  t r a d e  t o  the  p e a r l  in d u s t r y  as one o f  the main 
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the Kuwai t i  merchants.
1v ) THE DEVELOPMENT OF KUWAIT FROM A TRIBAL SOCIETY TO A PRINCIPALITY
The end o f  Wahhabi in c u rs io n s  i n t o  N o r t h - E a s t  Hasa, and s tab le  T u rk ish  
r u l e  in  the Pashal iq  o f  Baghdad gave Kuwait a background o f  s t a b i l i t y ,  
w i t h i n  wh ich  t o  e x p l o i t  the new advantageous p o s i t i o n  i t  had found f o r  
i t s e l f  in  the a re a 's  t ra d e .  Kuw a i t 's  l i n k  w i th  Basra was c lose .  I t  was 
p a r t  o f  the m e rc a n t i l e  and f i n a n c i a l  system o f  Basra in  l a t e r  p a r t  o f  
the n ine teen th  cen tu ry .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between K u w a i t i  and Basra 
m e r c h a n t s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t r a n s i t  t r a d e ,  w h i c h  g rew  t o  i n c l u d e  
s l a v e - t r a d i n g  from Zanz iba r ,  were s t ro n g .  When Sheikh Mubarrak decided 
to  back the B r i t i s h  i n  th e  F i r s t  W or ld  War and th e  per iod  immediately 
preceeding i t ,  aga ins t  the Turks ,  whom the Munta f iq t r i b e  o f  Basra were 
s uppo r t ing ,  a f u l l - s c a l e  r e b e l l i o n  o f  the merchants in  Kuwait took  place
17
w h ic h  ended i n  t h e i r  L e a d e r  (one o f  th e  A l -G han im  f a m i l y )  b e in g  
imprisoned in  1911. Many o f  th e  o t h e r s  L e f t  f o r  Basra in  t h i s  per iod 
Leading to a ser ious  dec l ine  i n  com m erc ia l  a c t i v i t y  i n  Kuwai t  i n  th e  
pe r iod  1911-1919 (16 ) .
T h i s  a c t i o n  tak en  by Sheikh Mubarrak demonstrated the growing power o f  
the r u l e r  in  the Kuwait i  community  i n  the  n in e te e n th  cen tu ry .  Changes 
in  the mode o f  p roduc t ion  o f  the 'Utub t r i b e  were supposed to  have led  
to  a growing s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  in  Kuwai t i  s o c ie t y ,  which s t i l l  e x i s t s  today 
( 1 7 ) .  Muhammad Rumaihi d iscussed the e v o lu t io n  o f  the p o l i t i c a l  regime 
in  Kuwait from a t r i b a l  s o c i e t y  t o  a p r i n c e l y  d i c t a t o r s h i p  (18) .  The 
t r i b a l  s t r u c tu r e s  which had e x is te d  i n  the e a r ly  pe r iod  a f t e r  the t r i b e s  
s e t t l e d  in  Kuwait invo lved  cont inuous c o n s u l ta t i o n  between the r u l e r  and 
t h e  v a r i o u s  t r i b a l  s e c t i o n s .  An economy wh ich was s t i l l  L a r g e l y  
p a s to ra l  necess i ta ted  widespread c o n s u l t a t i o n ,  because the main economic 
r e s o u rc e  (sheep and goa t  h e r d s ]  couLd not be brought  under the d i r e c t  
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  r u l e r .  The i n c r e a s i n g  im p o r t a n c e  o f  the  p e a r l i n g  
i n d u s t r y  a f t e r  the 1780's in v o lv e d  e f f e c t i v e  power b e in g  c o n c e n t r a t e d  
more and more i n  t h e  hands o f  the r u l e r .  The r u l e r ' s  a b i l i t y  to  draw 
revenue from the  p e a r l i n g  i n d u s t r y  and,  t h ro u g h  h i s  c o n t r o l  over the 
i n d u s t r y ,  to  a f f e c t  the economic w e l l - b e in g  o f  a l l  t h o s e  who worked in  
i t  ensu red  t h a t  w ider  c o n s u l t a t i o n  was not necessary.  Ha could opera te 
by forming s h i f t i n g  a l l i a n c e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  merchants,  never becoming 
dependent  on any one .  The dependence o f  th e  t r a n s i t  t r a d e  on low 
customs charges a lso  requ i red  the g o o d -w i l l  o f  the r u l e r .  J.G. Lor r im er  
(19) shows t h a t  the p ro p o r t io n  o f  the work force employed in  pe a r l in g  was 
f a r  less in  Bahrain and Kuwait than in  o the r  pa r t  o f  the G u l f  ( c i r c a  20% 
as opposed to  40-50%) which p o in t s  to  the g rea te r  involvement o f  Bahrain 
and Ku w a i t  i n  t r a d e  than  o t h e r  a reas  i n  th e  G u l f .  I f  we ta k e  in to  
account the 2,000-odd P e rs ian  w o r k f o r c e  t h a t  used to  m ig ra te  to Kuwait
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f o r  the  p e a r l i n g  season ,  then c l e a r l y  the  Kuwa i t  p o p u l a t i o n  we re  
r e l a t i v e l y  more in vo lve d  i n  the business o f  t r a n s i t  t ra d e  than Bahra in .  
A f t e r  the agreemen ts  o f  1899,  th e  r u l e r ' s  L in k  w i t h  B r i t a i n  f u r t h e r  
r e in fo r c e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  over the Local t r a d in g  community. No democrat ic 
movements were in  evidence except dur ing the merchant r e v o l t s  o f  1938 /9  
wh ich  were d i r e c t l y  connected w i th  the demise o f  the p e a r l in g  i n d u s t r y ,  
and dur ing  per iods  o f  e x t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  t h r e a t  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  the 
pe r iod  immediately a f t e r  1961).
Aside from changing the power o f  the r u l e r  w i t h i n  lo c a l  s o c ie t y ,  Rumaihi 
says th e  p e a r l i n g  i n d u s t r y  a l s o  d e t e r m i n e d  t h e  o v e r a l l  s o c i a l  
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  which i s  in  evidence u n t i l  today (20) .  The d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  ga ins from p e a r l - g a th e r i n g  was based on a Long-estab l i shed p r a c t i c e .  
Th is  p r a c t i c e  gave th e  main p a r t  o f  th e  g a in s  t o  t h e  m erchan ts  who 
f i n a n c e d  th e  p e a r l i n g  t r i p s  and to  the owners o f  the sh ips .  Al though 
the d iv e rs  performed the most d i f f i c u l t  work, t h e i r  share in  the product  
was m in ima l.  The boat i t s e l f  wou ld  be owned by the cap ta in  (nokhudah) 
o r  by a merchant.  The merchants who owned the boats  wou ld  a l s o  be th e  
d e a le r s  f o r  th e  p e a r l s  ( ta w w a s h ) .  The nokhudah and tawwash were the 
dominant c lass  o f  s o c ie ty  and c o n s i s t e d  o f  o n l y  very few. Divers were 
not paid wages, they were given a cut  o f  the p r o f i t s  a t  t h e  end o f  th e  
season ( t igsam) and pocket-money f o r  the o f f -season  pe r iod  ( s a la f i a h )  to 
be deduc ted  f rom  n e x t  y e a r ' s  t igsam.  A l l  o f  these cash advances were 
recorded aga ins t  the d i v e r ' s  name i n  th e  nokhudah 's  logbook but i t  was 
on ly  very r a r e l y  t h a t  a d i v e r  would earn enough t o  c a n c e l  h i s  d eb t  to  
t h e  c a p t a i n .  When a d i v e r  d i d  no t  earn  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c a n c e l  these 
debts ,  the amount ou ts tand ing  was c a r r i e d  fo rward  to  the  f o l l o w in g  year 
and i n t e r e s t  charged upon i t .  U n t i l  re fo rm s  were pu t  t h ro u g h  i n  th e  
1920 's ,  i f  a d i v e r  died  in  deb t ,  h i s  sons and b ro th e rs  would i n h e r i t  the 
debt and would be fo rced  to  c l e a r  the debt by d i v i n g .
The nokhudes themselves were in  debt to  the tawwash, o b ta in in g  f in a n c in g  
f o r  th e  purchase o f  va r ious  p ro v is io n s  and supp l ies  a t  the beginn ing o f  
the season, on which they were charged  i n t e r e s t .  Al though i n t e r e s t  was 
c on t ra ry  to  I s la m ic  Law, the m erchan ts  c i r c u m v e n te d  t h i s  by a system 
known as "m uka labah"  ( tu rnov e r )  where the merchant so ld  to  the nokhuda 
c e r t a in  goods and p ro v is io n s  f o r  a f i x e d  sum and the goods would change 
hands again in  the same t r a n s a c t i o n ,  a t  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p r o f i t  f o r  t h e  
m e rc h a n t .  The c a p t a i n s  o r  nokhudas were themselves almost enslaved by 
the  merchants,  j u s t  as they  i n  t u r n  e n s la v e d  t h e i r  d i v e rs  and p u l l e r s .  
On t r a n s i t  t rade  bus iness,  merchants would g e n e ra l l y  lease  t h e i r  s h i p s  
t o  th e  nokhudas f o r  s u b s t a n t i a l  sums, ra th e r  than share p r o f i t s  as in  
th e  p e a r l in g  i n d u s t r y ,  and wou ld  cLaim any damage o r  losses from the 
nokhuda who c o u ld  th u s  be i n  d e b t  f o r  a l a r g e  c a p i t a l  sum t o  t h e  
m e rc h a n t .  O f t e n ,  however, the merchants d id  have t h e i r  own cargoes on 
the sh ips .  Thus i n  t r a d e ,  i n  p e a r l i n g  and i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  the worker 
was pa id  almost no th ing  and the Large p a r t  o f  the economic s u r p lu s  went  
to  the merchants and the r u l e r .
v) THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE INTER-WAR DEPRESSION
The B r i t i s h  had l o s t  i n t e r e s t  i n  the G u l f  s ince the opening o f  the Suez 
Canal in  1869, and had d i v e r t e d  the In d ia  and China t rade  through Egypt.  
But Germany's inc reased  a t t e m p t s  t o  b re a k  o u t  o f  B r i t a i n ' s  commercial 
g r ip  on eastern t rade  ( the s o - c a l l e d  'Drang Nach O s t e n ' ]  changed t h i s  
a t t i t u d e .  The Deutsche Bank formed the Turk ish  Petroleum Company a f t e r  
the d iscovery  o f  seepages o f  o i l  i n  I r a q  and agreed w i t h  the Ottoman 
government to  b u i l d  a r a i lw a y  between B e r l i n  and Baghdad. B r i t a i n  f e l t  
i n c re a s in g ly  th reatened by the development o f  t h i s  ' a l t e r n a t i v e  rou te  to 
the  E a s t '  by the  Germans, and by t h e i r  o i l  e x p l o r a t i o n  programme in
I r a q .  On 23rd January 1899,  a t r e a t y  was s ig n e d  w i th  Sheikh Mubarak, 
who was seeking p ro te c t io n  from a p o t e n t i a l  Turk ish  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t .
The F i r s t  World War, the t r i b a l  wars between 1920-1930 i n v o l v i n g  th e  
r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  the House o f  Saud in  the Nejd,  the border d isputes  
between the Saudis,  the K u w a i t i s  and th e  I r a q i s ,  and the demise o f  the 
p e a r l  i n d u s t r y  i n  th e  1 9 2 0 's  due to  th e  w o r l d  d e p r e s s i o n  and t h e  
deve lopment  o f  cheaper  Japanese c u l t u r e d  p e a r l s ,  a l l  spe l le d  a bleak 
per iod  f o r  the Kuwait i  economy. Despi te the v i c t o r y  o f  the B r i t i s h  over 
the Germans and the Turks ,  the es tab l ishment  o f  the Hashemite dynasty on 
the throne o f  I r a q ,  and the improved r e l a t i o n s  between Kuwait and Basra 
in  1919, a f t e r  a lmost  e i g h t  y e a rs  o f  severance  between t h e  r u l e r  o f  
Kuwait and the Munta f iq t r i b e s  o f  Basra,  t rade  d id  not improve. C le a r ly  
the main reason f o r  t h i s  was the ex is tence o f  the Suez-Canal which meant 
t h a t  most I n d i a n  and Ch inese  t ra d e  w i th  Europe no Longer came through 
the G u l f .
The f a l l  in  the p r i c e  o f  s i l v e r  r e l a t i v e  to gold du r ing  the la s t  qua r te r  
o f  the n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  led  to  the  d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  th e  Ind ia n  and 
Persian cu r renc ies  which were on the s i l v e r  s ta n d a r d  ( 2 1 ) .  U n t i l  th e  
1 8 9 0 's  Kuwa i t  used th e  s i l v e r  rupee which had been adopted in  1806 by 
th e  East  I n d i a  Company. P r i o r  t o  1 8 0 6 ,  v a r i o u s  d i f f e r e n t  c o i n s  
c i r c u l a t e d ,  which were minted in  va r ious  pa r ts  o f  I n d i a .  The dec l in e  in  
the p r i c e  o f  s i l v e r  between 1870-1920 was due m a in l y  to  s u b s t a n t i a l  
d i s c o v e r i e s  o f  s i l v e r  i n  the U.S.A. ( the Comstock Lode and the Bonanza 
Mine, both in  Nevada). The Austro-Hungar ian Empire adopted a f u l l  go ld  
standard in  1873 and s t a r t e d  s e l l i n g  t h e i r  o l d  s i l v e r  coinage (which 
cons is ted  mainly  o f  the Maria Theresa T h a l e r ]  wh ich then  became l e g a l  
t e n d e r  i n  th e  w e s te rn  and s o u t h e r n  a re a s  o f  th e  A r a b ia n  P e n in s u la .  
Other European c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  went on th e  Gold S ta n d a rd  and f u r t h e r
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a g g ra v a te d  the s i t u a t i o n  (22) .  The s i l v e r  rupee dec l ined from Rs.1 = 2 
s h i l l i n g s  (1873)  to  Rs.1 = 1 s h i l l i n g  3 pence ( 1 8 9 3 ) ,  where Rs. = 
Rupee(s).  The Ottoman c u r re n c y ,  which was on a b i - m e t a l l i c  s ta n d a r d  
based on the r a t i o  i n i t i a l l y  es tab l ished  between gold and s i l v e r  in  1844 
o f  1 : 1 5 . 0 9 ,  was s ub jec t  to  s u b s ta n t ia l  pressure when the Constant inop le  
exchange based t h e i r  f o re ig n  exchange ra tes  on go ld  p r ic es  (23) .
A no less im por tan t  f a c t o r  in  the d ep re c ia t ion  o f  the cu r renc ies  in  area 
was t h e  d e b a s e m e n t  o f  t h e  T u r k i s h  pound and the  P e rs ia n  k ran  by
success ive issues o f  c o i n s  o f  l i g h t e r  w e ig h t  o r  lower f ineness  due to
the  enormous d e f i c i t s  in  the budgets o f  both governments (24) .  S i m i l a r  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  f i n a n c e s  w h ic h  i n  E n g la n d  had Led 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  l a r g e  i n t e r n a l  c a p i t a l  markets 
(2 5 ) ,  led i n  bo th  Tu rkey  and P e r s i a  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  fo re ig n  
banking groups, c h i e f l y  B r i t i s h ,  a l though the Russians became i n v o l v e d  
i n  P e r s i a n  b a n k in g  f o r  a b r i e f  per iod  (26) .  The Im pe r ia l  Ottoman Bank
(27) was founded i n  1863 i n  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e  and the  I m p e r i a l  Bank o f
Pers ia  in  1889 in  Teheran. Quite c l e a r l y  one o f  the pr imary a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  each o f  thes e  banks was t o  make advances t o  th e  respec t ive  lo c a l  
governments  ( 2 8 ) .  I n  Kuw a i t  and Basra i n  th e  p e r i o d  1869-1873 the 
s a r ra f s  were busy exchanging and t r a d i n g  between the  complex co inage  
sys tems o f  t h e  Ottoman Empire  and P e r s i a  and t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s im p le r  
co ins  o f  I n d ia .  The c o i n s  o f  I n d i a  c i r c u l a t e d  as p re fe ra b le  currency 
due to  t h e i r  s t a n d a rd iz a t io n  s ince  1806 and the f a c t  t h a t  they were no t  
debased  compared t o  th e  o t h e r  co inage  a v a i l a b l e .  From A p r i l  1916 
onwards the B r i t i s h  f o r c e s  i n  t h e  G u l f ,  wh ich were adm in is te red  from 
In d ia ,  brought Ind ian  rupee notes and s i l v e r  coins  w i t h  them and these  
r a p id l y  d isp laced  Ottoman currency in  the reg ions  o f  occupat ion (29 ) .
P r i o r  t o  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  the  I m p e r i a l  Ottoman Bank, the s a r ra fs  
were th e  o n l y  fo rm  o f  b a n k in g  i n  t h e  n e a r - e a s t  o u t s i d e  I n d i a .  The 
Im p e r ia l  Ottoman Bank, the Eastern Bank and the Im p e r ia l  Bank o f  P e r s i a  
(and t h e  b ranch o f  th e  Banca di  Roma i n  Baghdad which closed down in  
1940),  even a f t e r  they had been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  were not  r e a l l y  concerned 
w i th  i n t e r n a l  f i n a n c in g ,  on ly  the f in a n c in g  o f  the f o re ig n  t ra d e  s e c t o r  
i n  T u r k e y ,  I r a n  and I ra q  (30 ) .  Th is  i s  a p o in t  o f  importance which we 
b r in g  up again in  our d iscuss io n  o f  cu r rency -boa rd  economies in  Chapter 
3 and wh ich  i s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  argument  t h a t  t h e  money s t o c k  i n  a 
c o l o n i a l  e c on om y ,  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  p re -1 9 4 6  K u w a i t ,  was no t  
independent o f  t rad e  and t h e  b a la n c e  o f  payments.  The lack o f  banking 
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  l o c a l  merchants in  the area o f  Basra led to the expansion 
o f  the  business o f  the s a r ra f s  (money changers) who ac c e p te d  d e p o s i t s ,  
d i s c o u n t e d  b i l l s ,  and gave s h o r t - t e r m  advances a g a in s t  p rope r ty  and 
b u l l i o n  ( 3 1 ) .  M erchan ts  i n  Basra and Kuwa i t  a l s o  gave c r e d i t  among 
t h e m s e lv e s  based on a system o f  " c o m b i a l a s "  ( p r o m i s s o r y  n o t e s ) .  
A l t h o u g h  th e s e  fo rm s  o f  c r e d i t  were rud im en ta ry  and i n s i g n i f i c a n t  by 
comparison w i th  the business o f  th e  branches o f  the f o re ig n  banks, they 
performed a u s e fu l  f u n c t io n  o f  money l e n d in g  wh ich  th e  l a r g e  f o r e i g n  
banks d id  not o f f e r  (32) .
v i )  THE GOLD EXCHANGE STANDARD IN INDIA
The "Gold Exchange Standard" e s ta b l is h e d  by the Ind ia n  government on the 
recommendat ion o f  th e  Fowler Committee in  1898 had s t rong im p l i c a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  t r a d e  o f  K u w a i t  and B a s r a ,  and i n  so f a r  as Kuwa i t  was 
concerned, came a t  a t ime (as we have seen above)  when i t  was s o r e l y  
needed to  boost the economy o f  the Persian GuLf, a l though the b e n e f i c i a l  
e f f e c t s  o f  the Ind ian  re fo rms,  which we descr ibe below, were c l e a r l y  not 
i n t e n t i  ona L.
The d e c l i n i n g  p r i c e  o f  s i l v e r  dur ing  the l a t t e r  h a l f  o f  the n ine teenth  
cen tu ry ,  and I n d i a ' s  s t rong  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n ,  which was on 
the Gold Standard,  meant t h a t  In d ia  had in c re a s in g  p rob lem s  i n  f i n d i n g  
enough s i l v e r  c u r re n c y  to  f inance  t ra d e ,  and consequent ly the exchange 
ra te  o f  the Ind ian  Rupee aga ins t  s t e r l i n g  kept f a l l i n g .  Gold, a l though 
made accep tab le  i n  In d ia  in  1864 f o r  the payment o f  government  b i l l s ,  
was not a v a i l a b le  in  enough supply to  put I n d ia  on a f u l l  Gold Standard.  
The idea  o f  th e  Gold  Exchange S ta n d a rd  was t h a t  g o ld  would  be made 
a v a i l a b le  f o r  f o r e i g n  r e m i t t a n c e s  o n l y ,  w h i l e  rupee no tes  and s i l v e r  
co ins  c i r c u l a t e d  domest ica lLy and were not c o n v e r t i b le  i n t o  g o ld .  T h i s  
a lLowed I n d i a  t o  b e n e f i t  f rom  a s t a b l e  exchange ra te  w i th  o the r  gold 
standard c o u n t r ie s  w i t h o u t  h a v in g  to  m a i n t a i n  a la rge  go ld  reserve to 
back the domestic c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  o f  i t s  cu r rency .
The f a c t  t h a t  the f o re ig n  reserve was t ra n s fe re d  to  London and t h a t  the  
I n d i a n  b a lance  o f  payments was most ly in  su rp lus  u n t i l  1907-8,  and the 
f a c t  a lso t h a t  t h e  b i l l  o f  exchange on London banks became i t s  main 
method o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  payments (33 ) ,  meant t h a t  I n d ia  was in  e f f e c t  on 
a s t e r l i n g  exchange s t a n d a r d .  The s u s p e n s io n  o f  c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  by 
B r i t a i n  i n  1931 and the adopt ion by In d ia  o f  the f u l l  s t e r l i n g  exchange 
standard d id  no t ,  t h e r e fo re ,  change any th ing .
Since 1873, the normal a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  Basra  and Kuwait merchants in  
the f i e l d  o f  spec ie  and b u l l i o n  t r a d e  had l i v e n e d  up w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  
demand f o r  g o l d  coming f rom I n d i a .  By t h e  t im e  t h e  Gold Exchange 
Standard was wo rk ing ,  a s u b s t a n t i a l  premium was be ing paid by Ind ians  
f o r  go ld  which they c o u ld n ' t  ob ta in  through the open m a rke t  ( 3 4 ) .  The 
I n d i a n  government  c o n t i n u e d  t o  m in t  s i l v e r  co ins  f o r  normal i n t e r n a l  
t rad e ,  and s i l v e r  was purchased i n  London w i th  the c o u n t r y ' s  su rp lus  in
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the balance o f  t rade  to  be shipped to  I n d i a  f o r  m i n t i n g .  In  1862 the  
government  had ta k e n  o v e r  t h e  note issue from the p re s id in g  banks and 
paper rupees were c i r c u l a t i n g  a l o n g s i d e  s i l v e r  c o i n s ,  but  due to  the 
conse rva t ive  note issue cover and the d e c l i n i n g  p r i c e  o f  s i l v e r ,  more 
and more c o i n s  had to  be m in te d  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  expand ing  i n t e r n a l  
demand.
The f a c t  t h a t  go ld  was b e in g  demanded a t  a premium and t h a t  the rupee 
was f r e e l y  c o n v e r t i b le  i n t o  s t e r l i n g  a t  a f i x e d  ra te  o f  exchange created 
a p r o f i t a b l e  a r b i t r a g e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  G u l f  m erchan ts  i n  Kuwa i t  and 
Basra who smuggLed g o ld  i n t o  I n d ia  and Pak is tan  aga ins t  Ind ian  rupees 
which were converted i n t o  s t e r l i n g  and used f o r  gold purchases. There 
began another t r a d in g  cy c le .  The b u l l i o n  t r a d e  r e p la c e d  p e a r l i n g  as 
K u w a i t ' s  main a c t i v i t y  a f t e r  t h e  demise o f  p e a r l i n g  i n  t h e  1920 's .  
Between 1920 and 1947, the go ld  t r a d e  i n  f a c t  cou ld  go e i t h e r  way since  
the p r i c e  o f  s i l v e r  had s t a b i l i z e d  and in  some per iods  had s t r e n g th e n e d  
c o n s i d e r a b l y .  A f t e r  19 4 7 ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  p rem ium  on g o l d  was 
re -e s ta b l i s h e d  and led to  Large convers ions  o f  rupees f o r  s t e r l i n g  which 
by 1957 and 1958 c re a te d  a b a la n c e  o f  payments c r i s i s  f o r  the Reserve 
Bank o f  I n d ia .  On May 11, 1959, In d ia  i s s u e d  a c u r r e n c y  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
f o r  use i n  th e  G u l f  -  t h e  GuLf  Rupee ( a t  par  w i t h  t h e  I n d i a n  Rupee 
Rs13.3 = STG.1 = 0.186621 grams o f  g o l d ]  was blue ins tead  o f  the usual  
green and was an o b l i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  Bombay b ranch  o f  t h e  Reserve Bank 
a l o n e .  However,  a lm o s t  a y e a r  l a t e r  Kuw a i t  i s s u e d  i t s  own currency 
(35) .
v i i )  THE DISCOVERY OF OIL
Although the Standard O i l  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  had s t a r t e d  e x p l o i t i n g  f i n d s  in  
Saud i-Arab ia  dur ing the Second World War, and a l t h o u g h  th e  Kuw a i t  O i l
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Company (a j o i n t  venture between the A n g lo - I ra n ia n  O i l  Company and G u l f  
O i l ]  had s t ruc k  o i l  i n  the Burgan in  1938, no o i l  expor ts  were made from 
Kuwait u n t i l  1946 . The Second W or ld  War saw a r e v i v a l  in  commercial 
a c t i v i t y  in  Kuwait and Basra based on the smuggl ing o f  e s s e n t i a l  goods 
i n  w a r t im e  and on m i l i t a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e  by th e  B r i t i s h  fo rces  in  the 
area.  There was no damaging m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  area, al though 
much a n t i - B r i t i s h  f e e l i n g  developed and exploded in  sporad ic  r i o t s  f rom 
t ime to  t ime in  the G u l f  S ta tes .
The Im pe r ia l  Bank o f  I ran  ( fo rm er ly  the Im p e r ia l  Bank o f  Pers ia )  was the 
f i r s t  bank t o  open a branch and opera te  in  Kuwait (1942).  The Eastern 
Bank w i t h  b ranches  i n  B a s ra  and B a h r a i n  was t h e  o n l y  o t h e r  bank 
o p e ra t in g  in  the Persian G u l f  po r ts  be fo re  1942. I n  1948 the  I m p e r i a l  
Bank o f  I r a n  became th e  B r i t i s h  Bank o f  the Middle East (BBME). The 
bank was managed in  London and was th e  banker to  the Kuwait government. 
Since th e  bank had begun by o p e r a t i n g  i n  B a s ra ,  i t  i s  presumed th e  
K u w a i t  government  had deve loped  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h i s  b ra n c h ,  
because when the bank subsequent ly opened i n  Kuwai t ,  i t  q u ic k l y  ob ta ined 
e x c l u s i v i t y  o f  b u s in e s s  w i t h  t h e  gove rnm en t  ( a t  l e a s t  f o r  f o r e i g n  
b a n k s ) .  G u l f  O i l  and A n g l o - I r a n i a n  ( l a t e r  BP) each  p a i d  t h e i r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  th e  government f o r  t h e i r  o i l  p roduc t ion  in to  the BBME 
London, and u n t i l  the Finance Depar tment  o f  Kuwait was created in  1959, 
these  sums were banked d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  r u l e r ' s  name ( 3 6 ) .  These  
paym en ts  were made q u a r t e r l y ,  and, a p a r t  f rom th e  few l o c a l  ta x e s  
r a i s e d ,  made up a lm o s t  a l l  t h e  S t a t e  b u d g e t .  The r u l e r  n o r m a l l y  
budgeted a surp lus  and t ra n s fe re d  t h i s  to  a reserve a c c o u n t  managed i n  
London by the Kuwait Investment Board set  up in  1953, and c o n s is t i n g  o f  
f i v e  London bankers whose names were k e p t  s e c r e t .  The secrecy in  the 
management o f  the  c o u n t r y ' s  f u n d s  was l a t e r  t o  become a bone o f  
c o n t e n t i o n  between the r u l e r  and the new ly -e lec ted  assembly o f  deput ies
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(1962) .
The 1943 company meet ing  o f  the  I m p e r i a l  Bank o f  In d ia  gave the f i r s t
p u b l i c  statement by any bank on Kuwait :
" O u r  o f f i c e  i n  K u w a i t  ha s  j u s t i f i e d  i t s
e s t a b l i s h m e n t .  T h i s  p o i n t  i s  a va luab le  emporium 
f o r  t rade  w i th  the h i n te r l a n d  o f  N.E. A rab ia ,  mainly 
in  goods imported from In d ia "  (37)
There i s  as ye t  no ment ion o f  o i l  o r  p e a r l i n g  which as we exp la ined had
s u f f e r e d  a re lapse ,  merely o f  the c e n t u r i e s - o l d  t r a d e  w i t h  I n d i a  wh ich
had f o r  so long kept Kuwait on the Rupee o r  S t e r l i n g  Standard.  The 1947 
meet ing has a d i f f e r e n t  tone :
"Our branches a t  Kuwait and Bahrain and Dubai in  the 
P e rs ia n  G u l f  a re  p e r f o r m in g  a u s e f u l  f u n c t i o n  in  
t rade  w i th  I r a q ,  I n d i a ,  I r a n  and Saudi A rab ia .  The 
o i l  d e v e lo p m e n ts  a t  K u w a i t  g i v e  a s s u r a n c e  o f  
i n c reas ing  a c t i v i t y  a t  t h a t  prosperous p o r t "  (38)
By comparison very  l i t t l e  i s  sa id  about Bahrain and Dubai a t  a l l ,
1950 t h e  company meet ing o f  the Eastern Bank ment ions something
e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e i r  new b ranch  i n  B a h ra in  was regarded  in  wonder
L oca ls  as th e y  hed neve r  seen som e th ing  l i k e  i t  b e f o r e .  A 
c o n t r a s t  w i th  the s i t u a t i o n  in  Kuwait ,  which b e n e f i te d  from more 
t r a d in g  and p ro x im i t y  to  Basra.
By 1952 the growth i n  t h e  o i l  economy had g i v e n  the  Kuwait i  merchants 
enough reason f o r  them to  found a bank o f  t h e i r  own, the  N a t i o n a l  Bank
and by 
to  the 
by the 
s h a r p  
a c t i v e
o f  K u w a i t .  The f a s t e s t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  made by the o i l  
companies were made between 1946 and 1952,  o i l  p r o d u c t i o n  more than 
doub l ing  in  some years .  The merchants were qu ick  to  v ie  f o r  monopoly o f  
th e  a n c i l l a r y  s e r v i c e s  and i n d u s t r i e s  connec ted  w i t h  o i l ,  and t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ' s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  programmes in c r e a s e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  i t s  
newly- found economic s u r p lu s .  The N a t i o n a l  Bank o f  Kuwait was founded 
(39)  more o r  le s s  i n  t h e  same s p i r i t ,  j u s t  as some m erchan ts  (4 0 )  
c o n v e r t e d  a pp a r tm en t  b l o c k s  w i t h  u rgency  i n t o  what was to  become the 
Kuw a i t  S h e ra ton  H o t e l .  They we re  a l l  measures u n d e r ta k e n  by th e  
merchant community t o  g a in  f rom th e  economy's  p o t e n t i a l  g r o w t h .  No 
s t a t i s t i c s  o f  any v a lu e  a re  a v a i l a b l e  t o  d e m o n s t ra te  t h e  economy's 
growth over t h i s  p e r io d .  S t a t i s t i c s  on ly  o f f i c i a l l y  s t a r t e d  in  1960 and 
i t  was o n l y  u n t i l  1973 t h a t  r e a s o n a b ly  a c c u r a t e  f i g u r e s  began to  be 
recorded in  the va r ious  sec to rs  o f  the economy. Some w r i t e r s  (41 )  have 
e s t im a t e d  th e  o i l  revenues o f  the f i r s t  years g i v in g  us an idea o f  the 
growth o f  the economy in  the per iod  1940-1953:










T he rea f te r  increases stayed a t  between 2.4% and 22.8% w i th  the excep t ion  
o f  1955 (45%), 1972 (71.3%) and 1974 (295 .2% ) .  The rap id  increases in  
1952 and 1953 were d i r e c t l y  due t o  th e  n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  I r a n ' s  o i l  
i n d u s t r y  by Mossadeq, which reduced I r a n ' s  ou tpu t  con s id e ra b ly .  I r a n ' s  
ou tpu t  had been u n t i l  then the h ighes t  in  the wo r ld .
v i i i )  THE LAND ACQUISITION PROGRAMME
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  in  the Kuwait i  economy was among 
t h e  h i g h e s t  in  the Arab world  in  percentage terms by 1970, and t h i s  was 
as a r e s u l t  o f  a p o l i c y  o f  t r a n s f e r  o f  weal th  to  the merchant community 
f rom the r u l e r .  No d i r e c t  t r a n s f e r s  t o  the  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  in  Kuwa i t  
t o o k  p l a c e  b e f o r e  th e  earLy  1 9 5 0 's  ( 4 2 ) .  But t h e r e  i s  p l e n t y  o f  
evidence th a t  by th e  m i d - f i f t i e s  a p o l i c y  o f  land purchases was w e l l  
underway (43) ,  c re a t in g  s u b s t a n t ia l  land specu la t ion  among K uw a i t i s .
"The Mission recognised t h a t  the l e v e l  o f  b u s in e s s  
a c t i v i t y  i n  K u w a i t ,  under  p r e s e n t  c i r cum s ta nces ,
Largely depends on th e  f l o w  o f  p u b l i c  funds to  the 
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  T h e r e f o r e  i t s  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  
c o n te m p la te d  t h a t  the Level o f  t o t a l  expend i tu re  in  
the Kuwait economy dur ing  the next f i v e  years should 
be main ta ined a t  above t h e  1960/61 l e v e l .  However, 
i t  sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  l a n d  by t h e
Government s h o u ld  be reduced t o  abou t  30% o f  the
1960/61 le v e l  by 1963/64" .  (44)
The 1961 World Bank Mission recommendat ion to  reduce the le v e ls  o f  Land 
a c q u i s i t i o n  was i g n o r e d  as we can see i n  t h e  s t a t i s t i c s  on l a n d
purchases by the government i n  Table 1 . 2 .
"A l t h o u g h  th e  Government has ,  p a r t l y  by fo rce  o f  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  th e  c r i s i s  w i t h  I r a q ) ,  
f o l l o w e d  a d i f f e r e n t  cou rse  ( i n c r e a s i n g  c u r r e n t  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  and land p u r c h a s e s ] ,  the expend i tu re  
pa t te rn  suggested by th e  1961 Mission s t i l l  appears
t a b l e  1:2
EXPENDITURES BY THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT ON LAND PURCHASES 





















Source : AnnuaL A b s t ra c t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s .
M in i s t r y  o f  P lann ing (1 978)
sound". (45)
Ths im p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  statement i s  t h a t  the c la im on Kuwait i  t e r r i t o r y  
made by I r a q ' s  new re v o lu t i o n a ry  government in  1961 put pressure  on the  
r u l e r  o f  Kuwa i t  t o  be more dem ocra t ic .  C e r t a in l y  the c re a t io n  o f  the 
N a t io n a l  Assembly was a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  t h r e a t ,  however i t  i s  not  
c l e a r  why the r u l e r  s ta r t e d  th e  land  purchase programme in  t h e  e a r l y  
f i f t i e s .  I f  we f o l l o w  the lo g ic  o f  A l -R um a ih i 's  arguments (46) the o i l  
i n d u s t r y  as a new mode o f  p r o d u c t i o n  shou ld  have c e n t r a l i z e d  power even 
more than p e a r l i n g .
An exp lana t ion  which seems p la u s i b le  has been g i v e n  by A L - N a f i s i  (47) 
and t h a t  i s  t h a t  the very rap id  development in  the 1950's encouraged by 
r i s i n g  o i l  revenues, meant t h a t  t h e  r u l e r  had to  depend on the merchant 
c lasses f o r  the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  the  c o u n t r y  as th e y  were t h e  o n l y  
educa ted  peop le  i n  K u w a i t .  No o th e r  elements o f  a more plebean nature  
w i th  s u f f i c i e n t  e d u c a t i o n  e x i s t e d  t h a t  c o u ld  have been brought in  to  
r e in fo r c e  the r u l e r ' s  p o s i t i o n  v i s - a - v i s  the  merchan t  c l a s s e s .  Some 
w r i t e r s  add th e  f a c t  t h a t  She ikh  A b d u l l a  had an easy-go ing cha rac te r
(48 ) .  Those reasons g iven ,  p lus  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  pressure on the r u l e r  to 
r a l l y  the merchant c lasses behind him in  the face o f  e x t e r n a l  t h r e a t s ,  
led  t o  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t r a n s f e r s  to  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  which began w i th  
the land a c q u i s i t i o n  programme.
A l l  t h ree  o f  the World Bank m is s io n s  (1961 ,  1963 and 1965) discouraged 
land pu rchases  by the  gove rn m e n t .  The main reason g i v e n  f o r  t h i s  
approach was i n e q u i t a b i L i t y : -
" W h a t e v e r  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  o r  d e v e l o p m e n t a l
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  p r a c t i c e ,  the p r i c e s  f i x e d
TABLE 1 : 3
ana ly sis  of government land purchases by s i z e  of transaction
AND DISTRIBUTION ACROSS THE POPULATION 
1971-77
Thousands 
o f  Kuwait i  
Di nars
Number o f  














Ind i  vi  duaIs 
In Each 
Category As 
A % Of T o ta l  
(c)
Below 10 2586 13691 3.09 19.08
10-20 3 800 53124 12.01 28.02
20-30 2793 68510 15.49 20.59
30-40 1665 57288 12.96 12.28
40-50 822 41245 9.35 6.06
50-60 563 30 850 6.98 4.15
60-70 334 21568 4. 88 2.46
70-00 211 15590 3.53 1 .56
80-90 144 12053 2.73 1 .06
90-100 113 15581 2.39 0.83
100-200 281 52440 11 .86 2.81
200-300 78 1 8893 4.27 0 .58
300-400 27 9571 2.16 0.20
400-500 14 6299 1 .42 0.10
Above 500 33 20407 6.88 0 .24
13564 (b) 442209 100.00 100.00
Source : Jassim Al-Saadoun "Fac to rs  A f f e c t i n g  the D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Income 
in  K u w e i t " ,  Journa l ,  o f  G u l f  and Arab P en insu la r  S tud ies  1977 
( in  a r a b i c ) ,  pp.  60-93.
(a) T h i s  does  n o t  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  s a l e s  o f  l a n d  made by 
landowners through r e l a t i o n s  or  f r i e n d s .
(b) N.B. T o ta l  number o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  very sm a l l .
(c) Rows 1 - 4 ,  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  
percentage payments and a f t e r  Row 4 t h i s  i s  reversed.
by the government  f o r  thes e  t r a n s a c t i o n s  and the 
smal l amount thus f a r  c o l l e c t e d  on the resa le  o f  the 
land make the  p u b l i c  land t r a n s a c t i o n s  r a t h e r  an 
i n e q u i t a b l e  way o f  d i s t r i b u t i n g  the o i l  revenues".
(49)
The i n e q u i t a b i L i t y  o f  land purchase t r a n s a c t i o n s  f o r  the per iod  1971-77 
can be seen in  Table 1.3 al though no such f i g u r e s  are a v a i l a b le  f o r  the  
e a r l y  p e r i o d .  I t  would  seem t h a t  s i n c e  th e  mechan ics  o f  t h e  Land 
A c q u i s i t i o n  Department in  the Kuwait M u n ic i p a l i t y  was handled by some o f  
the leading merchant names, i t  wou ld  seem a su re  way f o r  the merchant 
c lasses to  acqu i re  wea l th .  The s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  t h e s is  o f  Al-Rumaihi  (50) 
based on th e  s o c i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  p e a r l i n g  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h  and e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r i e s  i s  Lent s u p p o r t  by these  
f i n d i n g s  (51) .  I n  Tab Le 1 . 4  we f i n d  f u r t h e r  e v idence  to support  the 
argument t h a t  a f t e r  1961 Kuwa i t 's  p o l i t i c a l  system became o l i g a r c h i c .  A 
glance a t  th e  d i r e c t o r s h i p s  o f  c e r t a i n  f a m i l i e s  such as A l - A t e e q i ,  
A l - B a h a r ,  Behbehani , A l -D a b b o u s ,  A l - D u a i j ,  A l - F u l a i j ,  A l - G h a r a b a l l y , 
A l -Ghune im ,  AL-Hamad, A l - H o m a id h i ,  A l - I s s a ,  A l - K a z e m i ,  A L - K h o r a f i ,  
A l - M a ' a r e f i , AL -M arzouq ,  A l -M u ta w a ,  A l - N a f i s i ,  A l - N u s f ,  A l -Q a ta m i  , 
A L -R a s h id ,  A l - R i f a i ,  A l -Roumi , A l -S a le h ,  AL-Sane' ,  A l -S aq r ,  A l -S aye r ,  
AL-Shaye1, A l - S u l t a n ,  A l-Wazzan shows a c l e a r  c o n c e n t ra t io n  o f  power. 
Many o f  the names in  Table 1 .4 which d o n ' t  be long  to  t h i s  l i s t  o f  the  
Large and w e a l t h y  f a m i l i e s ,  tend  to  appear on the boards o f  companies 
w i th  a government  s t a k e ,  and wou ld  a lm o s t  i n v a r i a b l y  r e p r e s e n t  the 
government as a c i v i l  se rvan t .
i x )  THE CREATION OF THE STOCK MARKET
The main reason f o r  th e  W o r ld  Bank m i s s i o n ' s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e
g o v e rn m e n t ' s  Lend e c q u i s i t i o n  programme was t h a t  such a p o l i c y  on i t s  
own encouraged c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s  w i t h o u t  Leading to  the c re a t io n  o f  any 
ind igenous i n d u s t r y : -
" . . .  probably  the la rge s t  share o f  these  funds  a re  
inves ted  abroad, so t h a t  the Land purchase programme 
f a i l s  t o  a c c o m p l i s h  i t s  m a in  o b j e c t i v e  o f  
i n v i g o r a t i n g  the Kuwait economy". (52)
These recommendat ions perhaps  d i d  Lead th e  government  to  reduce the 
o v e r a l l  im p o r ta n c e  o f  land pu rchases  g r a d u a l l y ,  wh ich  t r e n d  we can 
d e t e c t  i n  T a b le  1 : 2  ( a l t h o u g h  in  abso lu te  f i g u r e s  the drop reaL ly  was 
never very much). They p o s s i b l y  a l s o  led  the  government to  g ive  mors 
importance to  and to  begin a c t i v e l y  encouraging, the Kuwait s tock  market 
which by 1960 a l ready  inc luded nine shareholding  companies. The purpose 
o f  such encouragement would be to  use the  s t o c k  m arke t  as a mechanism 
f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  weal th to  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  e i t h e r  alone o r  beside 
the Land a c q u i s i t i o n  programme. The Kuwait s tock market would be a more 
e f f e c t i v e  t o o l  in  promot ing Local e n te r p r i s e  and in d u s t r y  and would he lp  
p reven t  and perhaps  r e v e rs e  th e  o u t fL o w  o f  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h .  I t  was 
probab ly  encouraged  by th e  WorLd Bank a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  no w r i t t e n  
evidence o f  t h i s .
By 1973 th e  M in i s t r y  o f  Commerce a c t u a l l y  began to  c o l l e c t  and organ ise  
data on the s tock  market (such da ta  as s t o c k  p r i c e  movements and d a i l y  
v o lum e ,  f o r  each s h a re )  whereas b e f o r e  t h e n  t h e  m a r k e t  had been 
c o m p le t e l y  i n f o r m a l .  By t h i s  t im e  the  b r o k i n g  community had opened 
o f f i c e s  in  c lose p ro x im i t y  to  one another in  one area o f  Kuwait c i t y  and 
the M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce e v e n t u a l l y  a l l o c a t e d  a s p e c i f i c  a rea  as a 
t r a d in g  f l o o r  f o r  brokers ( in  A p r i l  1977).  Th is  however d id  not preven t
the merchant community from t r a d i n g  between them se lve s  w i t h o u t  u s in g  
b r o k e r s ,  as we s h a l l  see i n  C h ap te r  4 .  The M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce, 
neve r the less ,  was a b le  to  keep r e a s o n a b ly  a c c u r a t e  da ta  based on the 
r e g i s t r a t i o n  o f  share c e r t i f i c a t e s  w i th  company r e g i s t r a r s  subsequent to  
a t r a d e .  A g r e a t  dea l  o f  t r a d i n g  d i d  take  p la c e  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
t e m p o ra ry  notes o f  t i t l e  issued by company r e g i s t r a r s ,  however, pending 
the issue o f  fo rmal share  c e r t i f i c a t e s .  C o m p le te ly  accurate data was 
t h e re fo re  d i f f i c u l t  to  o b ta in .  Apart  from t h i s  r e c o r d in g  f u n c t i o n  th e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce imposed few re g u la t i o n s ,  and, as we s h a l l  see in  
Chapter 4,  those t h a t  i t  d id  impose were ci rcumvented.
The s tock market was a s u c c e s s f u l  mechanism f o r  the  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
wea l th .  Th is  can be i n f e r r e d  from the r e s u l t s  o f  a r e c e n t  s tu d y  wh ich  
concludes t h a t  the Kuwait  s tock  market i s  i n e f f i c i e n t : -
"The r e s u l t s  i n d i c a te  t h a t  share p r i c e s  tend to  move 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  o v e r t i m e .  T h i s  w o u ld  e n a b le  
i n v e s t o r s  t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  " b e a t  t h e  m a r k e t " .  
Consequent ly,  the re  i s  evidence o f  i n e f f i c i e n c y  i n  
p r i c e  d e te rm in a t io n  on the Kuwait i  Stock Market,  as 
might be expected in  a r e l a t i v e l y  t h i n  marke t" .  (53)
The s tu d y  by G andh i ,  S a u n d e r s  and Woodward a rg u e s  t h a t  t h e  more 
sys temat ic  the movement in  share p r i c e s  o v e r  t im e ,  th e  more i m p e r f e c t  
and t h i n  the  s tock market (54) .  The reason f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  sys tem a t ic  
movements i n  p r i c e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  th e  d i s s e m i n a t i o n  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  to  
in v e s to rs  i s  im per fec t  and o p p o r tu n i t i e s  e x i s t  f o r  monopoly p r o f i t s  t o  
be made by c e r t a i n  t r a d e r s .  I f ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  was f u l l y  
disseminated and the market was " e f f i c i e n t " ,  stock  p r i c e s  should fo lLow 
a random w a lk  o v e r  t im e .  The movement o f  s e r i e s  ov e r  t im e  can be
considered random i f : -
vt  = pt  _ pt - i  1 = 1 - • • • - "  
where p t  i s  t h e  s t o c k  p r i c e  a t  t ime t  and pt _^ the stock p r i c e  in  the
prev ious t ime pe r iod  and where p and p . have zero c o r r e la t i o n  when weu b I
re s ta te  the equat ion a s : -
pt  = pt - i  + v t
The r e s u l t s  o f  the study showed t h a t  the amount o f  s e r i a l  c o r r e la t i o n  in  
the Kuwait s tock  market was e x t r e m e l y  h i g h .  By comparison w i th  these 
r e s u l t s ,  th e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  U .K.  and U.S.  random w a lk  t e s t s  have 
f a i l e d  to  p ic k  up any s i g n i f i c a n t  s e r i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n  in  share p r i c e s  in  
those markets.
The im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the Kuwait  s tock  market have im p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
f o r  monetary  deve lopm en ts  i n  Kuwa i t  i n  th e  p e r i o d  under study as we 
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5CHAPTER 2 
THE CHOICE OF A CURRENCY
1) SEIGNORAGE AND THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN INDEPENDENT CURRENCY
There  a r e ,  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  speaking,  th ree  d i s t i n c t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f ac ing  
an economy such as t h a t  o f  Kuwait on the eve o f  Independence In  1961, In 
respect  o f  I t s  cu r rency .  The f i r s t  p o s s i b i l i t y  1s c l e a r l y  t h a t  I t  uses 
another c o u n t r y ' s  cur rency f o r  I n t e r n a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  Examples o f  such 
a system abound.  Panama, L i b e r i a ,  and the B r i t i s h  V i r g in  I s la n d s ,  use 
o r  used u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  t h e  U . S .  d o l l a r .  Botswana,  L e s o th o ,  and 
S w a z i la n d  use o r  used  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  t h e  S o u th  A f r i c a n  Rand .  
Luxembourg uses the  Belg ian Franc.  U n t i l  1961 Kuwait used the Rupee as 
we saw In  the la s t  chap te r .
The second p o s s i b i l i t y  I s  t o  c r e a t e  an Independent  cur rency but form e 
m one ta ry  u n io n  w i t h  o t h e r ,  p resum ab ly  n e i g h b o u r i n g  s t a t e s .  Fewer  
examples a re  a v a i l a b l e  o f  t h i s  k in d  o f  m oneta ry  system. The C.F.A.  
Franc area 1n West A f r i c a  I s  one such example where the  cur rency I s  also 
Linked d i r e c tL y  to  t h e  French F ra n c ,  and a n o th e r  was the  East A f r i c a n  
S h i l l i n g .  But al though monetary I n t e g r a t i o n  has been th e  s u b j e c t  o f  
s e r i o u s  s tu d y  among European c o u n t r i e s ,  La t in  American c o u n t r ie s  and 
Arab c o u n t r i e s  t h e r e  a re  onLy a few h i s t o r i c a l  I n s t a n c e s  o f  a c t u a l  
I n t e g r a t i o n  and most o f  these have not Lasted f o r  long pe r iods  o f  t i m e .  
I n t e r e s t l  ng Ly e n o u g h ,  t h e  G uL f  has been th e  scene o f  many such 
h i s t o r i c a l  Ins tances .  The c u r r e n c y  agreement between Qatar and Dubai 
s ig n e d  on March 21 , 1966,  was one such I n s t a n c e  [ 1 ) .  The t h i r d
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a l t e r n a t i v e  open to  Kuwait was to  c rea te  an Independent cur rency o f  I t s  
own and e i t h e r  f i x  i t s  exchange r a t e  t o  the cur rency o f  ano ther coun try  
o r  manage the exchange ra te  1n any way i t  saw f i t .  C h ap te r  6 de v o te s
i t s e l f  t o  th e  is s u e s  o f  t h e  management o f  th e  exchange r a t e  o f  an
independent cu r rency .  In  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we s h a l l  t r y  to  assess the costs  
and b e n e f i t s  o f  a country  having i t s  own c u r r e n c y  as opposed t o  u s in g  
t h a t  o f  another coun t ry .
G e o f f r e y  Maynard examined the  use o f  the U.S. d o l l a r  i n  L i b e r ia  i n  1970 
( 2 ) .  He does not see any m a jo r  d i s a d v a n ta g e s  f o r  the L ib e r ia n  economy 
o f  u s in g  th e  U.S .  d o l l a r .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  he s e e s  t h e  f o r e i g n  
o w ne rsh ip  o f  banks as s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more d e t r im e n ta l  t o  the progress o f  
the economy:-
" 0 f  g rea te r  Importance ( th a n  us ing  the U.S. d o l l a r )  
i n  t h i s  respect are the c o n s t r a i n t s  Imposed by th e
p r e s e n t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  economy, and by the f a c t
t h a t  ownership and c o n t r o l  o f  p r a c t i c a l l y  the whole 
o f  the p r o d u c t i v e  s e c t o r ,  a t  Least as f a r  as th e  
monetary economy 1s concerned, are in  f o re ig n  hands"
(3)
We s h a l l  be a n a l y s i n g  t h e  r o l e  o f  commerc ia l  banks 1n currency-board  
economies, and the quest ion as to  whether o r  not t h e i r  Lending p r a c t i c e s  
m i t i g a t e  or  emphasise t h e  Im pac t  o f  t h e  ba lance  o f  payments o f  these 
economies on t h e i r  money supp ly ,  1n Chapter 3 ( 4 ) .  Maynard, somewhat in  
t h e  same way as P o lak  ( 5 ) ,  does no t  see t h a t  a s e p a r a t e  c u r r e n c y  
f a c i l i t a t e s  th e  f i n a n c in g  o f  development s ince  t h i s  u l t i m a t e l y  depends 
on the export  performance o f  th e  c o u n t r y  concerned or  i t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e s e r v e s .  He a l s o  shows t h a t  i n  t h e  case o f  L i b e r i a ,  a s e p a r a t e
c u r r e n c y  may p r o v id e  th e  government the a b i l i t y  to  a l t e r  i t s  exchange 
ra te  but t h a t  d e v a lu a t io n s  and r e v a l u a t i o n s  would  not have much o f  an 
im pact  on th e  e x p o r t s  and im p o r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  whiLe i n v a r i a b l y  
occas ion ing disadvantages g rea te r  than the advantages in vo lve d .
Maynard sees t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  c e n t r a L  bank as a separate issue to  
t h a t  o f  the e re c t io n  o f  an Independen t  c u r r e n c y ,  and we have fo l lowed  
the same d i s t i n c t i o n ,  rese rv ing  the issues connected w i t h  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  c e n t r a l  bank c r e d i t  and th e  c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  system f o r  Chapter 3.  
However, i t  i s  not  e n t i r e l y  a separate issue as we s h a l l  see below, when 
d iscuss ing  the s p e c i f i c  ques t ion  o f  seignorage .
A r n o ld  H a rb e rg e r  t r i e s  t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  s e ig n o ra g e  t h e  Panamanian 
government would b e n e f i t  f rom  1 f  i t  s w i t c h e d  t h e  U .S .  d o l l a r s  i n  
c i r c u l a t i o n  1n the  country  to  Panamanian Balboas ( 6 ) .  Seignorage 1s the 
m a in  d i r e c t  b e n e f i t  t o  a g o v e r n m e n t  o f  c r e a t i n g  an Independen t  
currency
"The o r i g i n a l  meaning o f  se igno rage ,  the d i f f e r e n c e  
between the c i r c u l a t i n g  value o f  a co in  and the cos t 
o f  b u l l i o n  and m in t in g ,  in vo lves  a once and f o r  a L l  
gain to  the issue r  on the 1s6ue o f  money" (7]
I n  Panama, H a rb e rg e r  shows t h a t  by the  lo c a l  cen t raL bank ta k in g  over 
the fo re ig n  assets and L i a b i l i t i e s  and I s s u in g  Balboas ( l o c a l  cur rency)  
f o r  the d i f f e r e n c e ,  the Immediate gain t o  t h e  c o u n t r y  i s  t h e  i n t e r e s t  
earned by t h e  government on t h e i r  f o r e i g n  b e la n c e s .  However, 1t  1s 
c l e a r  t h a t  such i n t e r e s t  couLd a l s o  have been earned by t h e  Loca l  
commercial banks, and t h a t  the  o n l y  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  money suppLy t h a t  
wouLd have missed out on earn ing such i n t e r e s t  would have been currency
56
i n  c i r c u l a t i o n .  S im p ly  p u t ,  i f  i n  1965 c u r r e n c y  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  in  
Panama was B/40.5 m i l l i o n  then a t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  ra te  r u l i n g  a t  t h a t  t ime 
f o r  U.S. d o l l a r s  o f  4% per annum f o r  depos i ts  o f  one year or  b e lo w ,  t h e  
b e n e f i t  would have been B / 1 .62 m i l l i o n  per annum.
In  c o n s i d e r i n g  what the b e n e f i t  i s  to  the government from the ex tens ion  
o f  c e n t r a l  bank c r e d i t  t o  th e  gove rnm en t ,  t h e  issues o f  an independent 
c u r r e n c y  and t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a c e n t r a l  bank  become i n t e r t w i n e d .  
H a rb e rg e r  sees t h e t  p r i n t i n g  B/1 m i l l i o n  i s  a b e n e f i t  o f  B/1 m i l l i o n .  
I f  the centraL bank buys a 5% p e r  annum bond, the presen t value o f  t h i s  
ann u i t y  (B/50,000 per annum) discounted a t  5% per annum i s  B/1 m i l l i o n .  
The repayment o f  t h e  bond by the  government ex t ing u ish es  t h i s  b e n e f i t  
and what i s  Le f t  i s  the i n t e r e s t  p a id  on the bonds. However, Harberger 
does not address h im s e l f  to  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  s e i g n o r a g e  t o  w e l f a r e  
g a in s  and Losses t h ro u g h  t h e  issuance o f  cu r rency .  Johnson (8) Looks 
c lo s e ly  a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  He shows t h a t  i n  an e n v i ro n m e n t  o f  monetary 
s t a b i l i t y  and no g r o w t h ,  t h e  s o c i a l  s a v in g  f rom th e  i s s u e  o f  paper  
c u r r e n c y  i s  t h e  r e l e a s e  o f  r e a l  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  can be used f o r  
p ro d u c t i v e  p u r p o s e s .  S e ig n o ra g e  1s th e  command o v e r  r e a l  resources 
occasioned by the  issue o f  paper money by the cent raL bank which i s  then 
i n v e s t e d  i n  p r o d u c t i v e  a s s e t s  when t h e  m oneta ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  have  
e x e r c i s e d  t h e i r  command o v e r  r e a l  resources.  In  a growing economy, a 
f i x e d  money supply would lead to  f a l l i n g  p r i c e s  and the consequent y i e l d  
on money balances and the  r e l a t e d  w e l f a r e  g a in  would correspond t o  the 
amount o f  se ignorage.  But where new money i s  p r i n t e d  to  a l low  a s t a b l e  
o r  r i s i n g  p r i c e  L e v e l ,  t h e r e  i s  a ze ro  o r  n e g a t i v e  y i e l d  on money 
ba lances. The sociaL saving from th e  issuance o f  money t h e r e fo r e  drops 
below the Level o f  seignorage by a f a c t o r  Johnson c a l l s  t h e  " I n f l a t i o n  
t a x " .
I f  K i w a i t  had n o t  had an in d e p e n d e n t  cu r rency  i t  would have lo s t  the 
accumulated i n t e r e s t  on t h e  l e v e l  o f  c u r r e n c y  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  in  the 
Kuwait i  monetary s ys tem ,  s in c e  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank i n  Kuwa i t  has never  
issued currency aga ins t  advances to  the government o f  Kuwait .  Harberger 
d i s c u s s e s  t h e  l e v e l s  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  b a c k in g  o f  high-powered money 
(Reserve Money) i n  v a r i o u s  c o u n t r i e s  between 1960 and 1964, and f i n d s  
t h a t  on ly  S w i tz e r la n d ,  the Nether lands,  I s r a e l  and Tha i land  have g rea te r  
f o re ig n  assets than high-powered money [Reserve Money). Panama, wh ich  
i s  the  o b je c t  o f  h i s  study had a r a t i o  in  1965 o f  0.53 per c en t .  In  the 
same yea r  c e n t r a L  bank fo re ig n  assets  (equal to  net f o re ig n  assets)  in  
Kuwa i t  were KD. 4 4 .3  m i l l i o n  w h i l e  t h e  n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  
commercial banks were KD. 182.5 m i l l i o n .  Reserve Money, as d e f i n e d  i n  
th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary 
Fund, and as used by H a rbe rg e r ,  was KD. 37 .0  m i l l i o n .  The r a t i o  which 
Harberger shou ld have c a lc u la te d  f o r  Kuwait  i n  1965 t h e r e f o r e  was 612 
per  c e n t  (as opposed t o  130 per cent f o r  Thai Land which was the h ighes t  
r e s u l t  i n  h i s  t a b l e ) .  Graph 3 : 3  shows t h e  r a t i o  o f  bank reserves to  
depos i ts  bo th  i n c l u d i n g  and e x c l u d i n g  t h e  ne t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  o f  t h e  
com m erc ia l  b a n k s .  I n  Chapter 3 we s h a l l  analyse the Importance played 
by the net f o r e ig n  assets  o f  the commercial banks i n  the  monetary system 
i n  Kuwai t ,  bu t  f o r  ou r  im m ed ia te  pu rposes  h e r e ,  Graph 3 : 3  shows the 
d i f f e r e n c e  made t o  r e s e r v e s  by n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  com m e rc ia l  
banks i n  Kuwait ,  a l though t h i s  d i f f e re n c e  began to  dec l in e  a f t e r  1972.
The p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t  t o  the Kuwait i  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  seignorage 
from the  c r e a t i o n  o f  an in d e p e n d e n t  c u r r e n c y  was l i m i t e d  due to  the 
s u r p l u s  i n  K u w a i t ' s  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  a n d  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  h i g h  Level o f  fo re ig n  exchange reserves .  The s t a r t i n g  
p o in t  i n  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  s e ig n o ra g e  t o  the 
Kuwai t i  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i s  the  f a c t  t h a t  the commercial banks d id  
not sur render
t h e i r  f o r e i g n  e s s e t s  to  the  c e n t r e l  bank when the  Kuweit i  Dinar was being 
s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  the  Rupee. I f  we im ag ine  t h a t  the CentraL Bank o f  Kuwait 
were to  s u b s t i t u t e  U.S. d o l l a r s  f o r  Kuwait i  D i n a r s ,  i t  wou ld  have had t o  
c a l l  i n  Kuwai t i  D inar  notes and pay out U.S. d o l l a r  notes in  exchange, out 
o f  i t s  f o re ig n  exchange r e s e r v e s .  Le t  us assume th a t  the  t ime chosen f o r  
such an exchange were to  have been the f o u r th  qua r te r  o f  1980, i f  we r e f e r  
t o  TaftLe 5 : 1 . we can see t h a t  the  c e n t r a l  bank would have had to  pay out a 
t o t a l  o f  KD 268.7 m i l l i o n  in  d ina r  notes as replacement o r  KD 251.3 m i l l i o n  
to  the p u b l i c  and KD 17 .4  m i l l i o n  t o  t h e  banks, w h i le  i t s  f o re ig n  exchange 
reserves would have dropped d r a m a t i c a l l y  from KD 1080.8 m i l l i o n  to  KD 812.1 
m i l l i o n .  In TabLe 3 :3  we see t h a t  the average o f  the  d a i l y  q u o t a t i o n s  f o r  
3 month E u r o d o l l a r s  f o r  t h e  l a s t  q u a r te r  i n  1980, was 17.10 per cent per 
annum. T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank wou ld  lose  KD 45 .68  m i l l i o n  
annua l ly  (a t  the above i n t e r e s t  r a t e ) .  I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f e l l  a f t e r  th e  
fo u r th  q u a r te r  o f  1980, so t h i s  loss could have been s l i g h t l y  less .  At the 
same t im e  bank b a la n c e s  h e ld  by t h e  cen t raL  bank were KD 129.5 m i l l i o n ,  
w h i le  CentraL Bank B i l l s  owned by t h e  banks were KD 108.0 m i l l i o n .  These 
balances and b i l l s  were i n t e r e s t  bear ing ,  a t  a ra te  o f  around 5.5  pe r  cen t  
pe r  annum, whi l e  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank was earn ing  a much h igher  ra te  on i t s  
U.S. d o l l a r  reserves a t  the t i m e .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between i n t e r e s t  earned 
and i n t e r e s t  pa id  o u t ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  would be around KD 27 m i l l i o n  and wou ld  
have  a c c r u e d  t o  th e  banks i f  t h e  US d o l l a r  wa6 adop ted  as t h e  l o c a l  
cur rency .  T h i s  e x t r a  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  wou ld  be earned by t h e  banks on an 
amount o f  KD 237.5 m iL L io n ,  wou ld  have made l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e i r  
o v e r a l l  i n t e r e s t  earn ings which were being pa id  by f o re ig n  banks on a t o t a l  
o f  ne t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  o f  KD 745.8 miLLion ou ts tand ing  a t  the end o f  1980. 
The monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  th e m s e lv e s  wou ld  Lose a round  KD 73 miLLion per 
annum, o r  Less than 7 per cent o f  t h e i r  i n v e s tm e n t  income i n  1980 ,  w h i l e  
t h e  c o u n t r y  as a w h o le  w o u ld  l o s e  t h e  i n t e r e s t  earned on t h e  no te  
c i r c u l a t i o n  ( a t  t h e  t im e  o f  ou r  example these  e a r n i n g s  wou ld  have been 
running a t  around KD 45 miLLion per annum).
i
i i ) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT CURRENCY IN KUWAIT
As we saw in  Chapter 1, Kuwait adopted a new currency c a l l e d  the Kuwait i  
D inar  to  rep lace t h e  b lu e  G u l f  Rupee (on 1 s t  A p r i l ,  1961) ( 9 ) .  The 
I n i t i a l  Idea behind the c re a t io n  o f  t h i s  new currency was t h a t  i t  should 
become p a r t  o f  the  S t e r l i n g  Area, and t h a t  1t  should a lso be managed in  
the t r a d i t i o n a l  f ramework o f  C u r re n c y -B o a rd  economies in  the S t e r l i n g  
Area.  In  Chapter 3 we d i s c u s s  t r a d i t i o n a l  moneta ry  a r ra ngem en ts  1n 
B r i t a i n ' s  co lon ies  and p r o te c to ra te s  (10 ) .  However, Kuwa i t 's  ne ighbour ,  
I r a q ,  p r e d a te d  Kuw a i t  1n t h e  es tab l ishment  o f  an independent cur rency 
and to  a c e r t a in  ex ten t  served as an example to  f o l l o w .  The I r a q i  Dinar  
replaced Ottoman c u r r e n c y  and I n d i a n  Rupees on t h e  1 s t  A p r i l ,  1932. 
Under the law t h a t  I n s t i t u t e d  t h i s  change the value o f  t h e  I r a q i  D in a r  
wa6 f i x e d  t o  S t e r l i n g .  The I r a q i  Currency Board I t s e l f  6at  in  London 
and pa id  over the revenues from the investment o f  the c o u n t r y ' s  reserves 
to  the Treasury 1n Baghdad on a y e a r l y  bas is  (11 ) .  The Kuwait Currency 
Boerd was e s ta b l i s h e d  on October 16 th ,  1960, 1n Kuwait 1n advance o f  the 
e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  new c u r r e n c y  t o  p re p a re  t h e  mechan ics  f o r  th e  
management o f  t h e  cu r re n c y .  The balance o f  payments c r i s i s  o f  1959 in  
In d ia  had caused cons ide rab le  embarrassment and the  Bank o f  England was 
concerned t h a t  the Reserve Bank o f  Ind ia  should not again face t h e  same 
p r e s s u r e s  f rom t h e  b u l l i o n  smuggl ing t ra d e .  The c re a t io n  o f  the blue 
"G u L f "  Rupee was i n t e n d e d  as a t e m p o r a r y  m easu re  p r i o r  t o  th e  
es tab l ishment  o f  an Independent cur rency f o r  Kuwait .
The Idee behind the c re a t io n  o f  the Kuwa i t i  D i n a r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  was no t  
t h a t  Kuwa i t  s h o u ld  be a s e p a ra te  cur rency area, but t h a t  i t  should be 
pa r t  o f  a f ixed-exchange system l i n k e d  t o  S t e r l i n g .  The cur rency-board
system was m o r e - o r - l e s s  B r i t i s h  c o L o n la l  p o l i c y  (12) ,  where the  note 
Issue 1n any coun try  under B r i t i s h  I n f l u e n c e  would be comple te ly  backed 
by s t e r l i n g  investments .  Some o f  K u w a i t ' s  r e s e r v e s  were h e ld  i n  g o ld  
bu t  most o f  them were made In  the money markets,  bonds, and "b lue  c h ip "  
e q u i t i e s  1n t h e  London money and c a p i t a l  m a rke ts  ( 1 3 ) .  We saw 1n 
Chapter 1 t h a t  the Kuwait Investment Board (es ta b l i shed  i n  1953) managed 
these Investments .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  Kuwa i t  I n v e s tm e n t  Board  1n 
London meant t h a t  1 t  was not necessary to  f o l l o w  the I r a q i  example and 
the new c u r re n c y -b o a rd  i t s e l f  c o u ld  s u c c e s s f u l l y  be based i n  Kuwait .  
S t e r l i n g  was a reserve cur rency u n t i l  1967 and t h e  m a in tenance  o f  i t s  
v a lu e  was an I m p o r t a n t  aim o f  s u c c e s s i v e  B r i t i s h  g o v e rn m e n ts .  The 
Kuwai t i  government did not t r y  to  d i v e r s i f y  i t s  investments or  t o  hedge 
a g a in s t  t h e  f u t u r e  v a lu e  o f  S t e r l i n g .  D e s p i t e  a L im i t e d  amount o f  
n o n - s t e r l i n g  Investments ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  Kuwait a t  the t ime o f  the c r e a t i o n  
o f  118 c u r r e n c y ,  was e f f e c t i v e l y  a S t e r l i n g  Area member. K u w a i t ' s  
su rp lus  al lowed the C u r renc y  Board e a s i l y  t o  m a in ta in  thB one hundred 
per cent  n o t e - c o v e r  r u l e  w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  economy n e g a t i v e l y .  
Other cur rency-board  economies w i th  scarce cap i taL  were not so f o r t u n a te  
as t h i s  as we s h a l l  see 1n Chapter 3.
The es tab l ishment  o f  a cur rency f o r  Kuwait ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  was, i n  so f a r  as 
th e  K u w a i t i  moneta ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  were concerned, h i s t o r i c a l  a c c id e n t .  
I t  has not been p o l i c y  to  m a i n t a i n  an independen t  cur rency f o r  i t s  own 
sake. On the c o n t ra ry ,  the re  have been a t t e m p t s  a t  u n i t i n g  t h e  G u l f  
c u r r e n c i e s  i n  r e c e n t  y e a rs  c h i e f l y  1n t h e  p e r i o d  a f t e r  1973 and 1n 
p a r t i c u l a r  w i th  the fo rm at ion  o f  t h e  G u l f  Cooperat ion Counc i l  which was 
c r e a t e d  e s s e n t i a l l y  f o r  s e c u r i t y  r e a s o n s  b u t  a l s o  t o  e x p l o r e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  monetary and economic I n t e g r a t i o n  between G u l f  s t a t e s .  
How eve r  a t t e m p t s  a t  m o n e t a r y  i n t e g r a t i o n  have met w i t h  s e r i o u s  
o b s ta c le s .  Not Least among these obs tac les  i s  whether or  not the
monetary u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  G u l f  c u r r e n c i e s  would  b r i n g  the area any 
s o c ia l  or  economic b e n e f i t s .
i i i ) OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA CONSIDERATIONS
I t  wouLd seem a t  f i r s t  g lance t h a t  Kuwait i s  too smal l  t o  be an opt imum 
c u r r e n c y  a r e a .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  th e o r ie s  on the optimum currency area 
prob lem appear  o v e r a l l  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on s i z e  (and i t s  d i f f e r e n t  
economic im p l i c a t i o n s )  as an im por tan t  c r i t e r i o n  i n  d e te rm i  n i  n i  ng th e  
f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r y  hav ing  a separate cu r rency .  The 
smalLer a p a r t i c u l a r  area 1s ,  i t  wouLd seem t h a t  i t  1s eas ie r  f o r  t h a t  
area  t o  a d j u s t  w i t h i n  a common c u r r e n c y  a r e a ,  and th e  g r e a t e r  t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  i t  would have in  e x e rc is in g  Independent command over  monetary 
and exchange ra te  p o l i c i e s .  Let us look a t  the reasons f o r  t h i s  and the 
arguments  f o r  and aga ins t  a smaLl reg ion be long ing to  a common cur rency 
a rea .
The centraL problem suggested i s  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  should occur a payments 
imbalance f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  r e g io n  wh ich  has no In d epe nden t  means o f  
a l t e r i n g  an exchange ra te  v i s - a - v i s  the re s t  o f  the w o r ld ,  unemployment, 
fo rced m ig ra t io n  and a drop in  incomes and wealth r e s u L t .  I t  cou ld ,  Let 
us assume f o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  p u rp o s e s ,  adop t  a new c u r r e n c y  and a l t e r  
r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  and p r i c e s  by d e v a l u i n g  t h e  exchange r a t e  o f  t h a t  
currency aga ins t  a l l  o the r  c u r re n c ie s ,  assuming t h a t  i t  would  f i n d  i t  
d i f f i c u l t ,  i n  t h e  face  o f  a drop in  demand f o r  i t s  p roduc ts ,  to  reduce 
l i v i n g  s t a n d a rd s  t o  a c h ie v e  t h e  same r e s u L t  ( d e f l a t i o n ) .  Even i f  a 
smal l  area d id  ob ta in  monetary autonomy however ,  and was a b le  t o  v a ry  
i t s  e x c h a n g e  r a t e ,  1 t  i s  d u b io u s  w h e the r  t h i s  wou ld  be n e a r l y  as 
success fu l  as i n  the case o f  a La rge r  c o u n t r y .  Of course one argument
i n  favour  o f  exchange r a t e  v a r i a t i o n  by a smaLL c o u n t r y  i s  t h a t  t h e  
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  a s m a l l  r e g i o n ' s  e x p o r t s  should us u a l l y  be 
h ighe r  than f o r  la rg e r  areas.  Despi te a g rea te r  poss ib le  concen t ra t ion  
o f  p rodu c t ion  on a few p r o d u c t s ,  t h a t  c o u n t r y  would g en e ra l l y  speaking 
p rov ide  a smalLer p ro p o r t i o n  o f  wor ld supply and shou ld,  t h e r e fo re ,  f i n d  
i t  ea s ie r  to  d isp la ce  o the r  s u p p l i e r s ,  should i t  lower i t s  export  p r i c e .  
Whether deva lua t ion  1s a c t u a l l y  p re fe ra b le  to  d e f l a t i o n  depends upon the 
f o l l o w i n g  equat ion h oL d in g : -
1 ^  x + ^  ra
1 + - > -------------
m sr) x +A7 m -  1
where (m), i n  t h i s  case, 1s the  marg ina l  p rope ns i t y  to  Impor t ,  l^?x)  the
e x te r n a l  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  the smal l  r e g io n ' s  e x p o r t s  and l ^ m )  
t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  im p o r ts .  ALthough (m) w i l l  be h igher  in  a 
smal l  r eg io n ,  so w i l l  ( ^ x )  be. The va lue  o f  (m) i s  bounded, but I 'V x )  
can r i s e  to  i n f i n i t y .  Th is  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  v a l i d  on th e  assum pt io n  o f  
c o m p l e t e l y  e l a s t i c  s u p p l i e s  o f  g o o d s .  I f  t h e  h i g h e r  e x t e r n a l
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  a s m a l l  c o u n t r y ,  does no t
outwe igh t h e  e f f e c t  o f  i t s  g r e a t e r  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  Im p o r t  than  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t h i s  m ig h t  make d e f l a t i o n  a b e t t e r  method ( i n  te rm s  o f  
m in im iz ing  a drop i n  the s tandard  o f  l i v i n g )  o f  ach iev ing  adjustment to  
a d e f i c i t  1n the b a la n c e  o f  paym en ts ,  than  a d e v a l u a t i o n  ( 1 4 ) .  The 
a b o v e  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  a v a r i a t i o n  on t h e  w e l l  known Marsha I L - L e r n e r  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  i n  exchange r a t e  adjustment  which we d iscuss in  
Chapter 6 .  The MarshalL-Lerner  c o n d i t i o n  says t h a t  f o r  a n o n -p e rv e rs e  
b a la n c e  o f  payments ad justment  to  f o l l o w  upon a deva lua t ion ,  the sum o f  
the average p ro p e n s i t y  o f  w o r l d  demand f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  expor ts  p lus  
the average p rope ns i t y  f o r  do m e s t ic  im p o r t  demand must exceed u n i t y ,  
such t h a t  t h e  c o s t  e f f e c t  o f  a r e l a t i v e  r i s e  1n the p r i c e  o f  impor ts  
v i s - a - v i s  expor ts  does no t  dom ina te  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  the r i s e  o f  exports
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and d e c l i n e  o f  im p o r t s  i n  p h y s i c a l  t e rm s .  The e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  th e  
Ma rsha I L - L e r n e r  c o n d i t i o n  i s ,  x + m ^ 1 .  The e a r l i e r  e x p r e s s i o n  
however, can be reduced to  the f o l l c w i n g : -
1
^ x  + * 7 m ^ ' \ +  -
m
or  m + *2 “  1 1
A r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  change induced by d e v a lu a t i o n  e x e r t s  bo th  income and 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t s  on the t rade  balance. The e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  exports  
and im por ts  can be s p l i t  up i n t o  these two e f f e c t s  by separa t ing  the two 
p a r ts  o f  the  e l a s t i c i t y  equat ions as f o l l o w s : -
^ x  = (dX/dp) P/X 
^ m  = (dM/dp) P/M,
where p i s  the  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  o f  imported goods in  terms o f  im po r tab les ,  
X i s  ex po r ts  and M i s  im po r ts ,  both in  volume terms. From t h i s ,  one can 
deduce t h a t  t h e  Marsha I l - L e r n e r  c o n d i t io n  b o i l s  down to  the f a c t  t h a t  
the sum o f  f o r e ig n  demand f o r  the expor ts  o f  the coun try  i n  ques t ion  and 
i t s  p ro p e n s i t y  t o  import  should exceed u n i t y .
Such a high  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  e x p o r t s  as t o  make a deva lua t ion  
w o r th w h i le ,  does n o t ,  however, seem to  a p p ly  t o  a p e t r o le u m  p r o d u c in g  
s t a t e  i n  t h e  G u l f ,  wh ich has a f a i r l y  h igh i n e l a s t i c  wor ld demand f o r  
i t s  expo r t  p ro d u c t ,  and a h igh  marg ina l  p ropens i ty  t o  im por t .
The above a n a ly s i s  assumes t h a t  a deva lua t ion  in  a coun try  could succeed 
i n  reduc ing  r e a l  wages in  the  s m a l l  r e g i o n .  In  o th e r  words, i t  assumes 
t h a t  th e re  would be a one f o r  one c o r re s pond enc e  between an exchange 
d e p re c ia t io n  and the terms o f  t rad e  worsening f o r  t h a t  coun t ry .  The
h ig h  p r o p e n s i t y  to  im p o r t  o f  a smal l  region (what i s  ge n e ra l l y  c a l l e d  
i t s  openness ]  w i l l  cause any v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  exchange r a t e  t o  be 
rap idLy  r e f l e c te d  i n  a n e a r l y  e q u i v a l e n t  ( i n v e r s e )  s h i f t  i n  p r i c e s .  
Such a l a r g e  and o b v io u s  e f f e c t  o f  deva lua t ion  on re a l  wage ra te s  and 
L i v i n g  s ta n d a rd s  may c a l l  f o r t h  g r e a t e r  r e s i s t a n c e  on th e  p a r t  o f  
labour .  Th is  w i l l  be g rea te r  t h e  more t h a t  s o c i a l  u n i t y  between th e  
area i n  q u e s t i o n  and cont iguous areas, encourages a comparison between 
l i v i n g  standards and prompts peop le  i n  s i m i l a r  occupat ions  in  d i f f e r e n t  
reg ions  to  demand s im iLar  r e a l  l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s .  T h i s  p rob lem wouLd 
r e f l e c t  the absence o f  money i l l u s i o n  among the people o f  the economy in  
q u e s t i o n .  McKinnon (15)  a rgues  t h a t  a h igh  degree o f  openness means 
t h a t  a s m a l l  open economy s h o u ld  no t  use f L e x i b l e  exchange ra te6  to  
c o r re c t  i n s t a b i l i t y  as i t  i s  l i k e l y  to s u f f e r  from a g rea te r  i n s t a b i l i t y  
o f  p r i c e s  and a h igh  Leve l  o f  unemployment s hou ld  be needed on th e  
average  to  maintain overa lL  s t a b i l i t y .  A number o f  smaLl open areas in  
t h i s  co n te x t ,  t ra d in g  w i th  each o the r  wouLd f i n d  i t  b e n e f i c i a l  to  form a 
r e l a t i v e l y  c losed common c u r r e n c y  a r e a .  He a lso  discusses the absence 
o f  money i l l u s i o n  as being an a d d i t i o n a l  obs tac le  i n  th e  way o f  mak ing 
exchange ra te  v a r i a t i o n  e f f e c t i v e  in  c o r re c t i n g  payments imbalances.
There  a re  a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  s t rands  in  the above argument t h a t  need 
separa t ing  out f o r  c l a r i t y ' s  s ak e .  A d j u s t i n g  f o r  the e x te rn a l  balance 
may not be the on ly  macro-economic goaL o f  the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  coun t ry .  McKinnon recognises t h i s  i m p L i c i t l y  by d i s c u s s i n g  
t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  unemployment c o s t  o f  c e r t a i n  p o l i c y  
measures. But c l e a r l y  d e v a lu a t io n  and d e f l a t i o n  need not be cons idered 
as a l t e r n a t i v e s  but as complementary p o l i c y  t o o l s  in  c e r ta in  s i t u a t i o n s .  
Th is  i s  discussed i n  Chapter 3 ( 1 6 ) .  In  the con tex t  o f  optimum cur rency 
area th e o ry ,  however, t h i s  i s  n o t  a d i r e c t l y  r e L e v a n t  p ro b le m .  More 
im p o r t a n t  i s  t h e  assum pt ion  i n  o u r  d i s c u s s io n  o f  the Marsha I L-Lerner
con d i t io n  t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  d e v a l u a t i o n ,  o r  a d e p r e c i a t i o n  o f  the 
exchange r a t e  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y ,  do no t  lead t o  o f f s e t t i n g  
dom es t ic  p r i c e  in c reases .  I t  1s c l e a r ,  however, t h a t  among the e f f e c t s  
o f  a deva lua t ion  1s an unambiguous r e d u c t i o n  in  the standard o f  L iv ing ,  
and, in  t h i s  case, re a l  wage res is tanc e  may pose a s e r i o u s  o b s t a c l e  t o  
com p le te  ad justment  (17 ) .  The Last s t rand o f  argument t h a t  needs to  be 
i s o la t e d ,  i s  the Idea t h a t  openness o f  an economy w i l l  cause an exchange 
ra te  v a r i a t i o n  to be r a p i d l y  r e f l e c t e d  1n a n e a r l y  equ iva len t  inverse  
s h i f t  in  p r i c e s ,  and t h a t  i t  1s t h i s  occurrence which would acce le ra te  a 
s i t u a t i o n  o f  r e a l  wage r e s i s t a n c e .  Two im p o r t a n t  a ssum p t io ns  i n  th e  
McKinnon opt imum c u r r e n c y - t y p e  mode l ,  a re  f i r s t l y ,  t h a t  1n the smal l  
country  case the  terms o f  t r a d e  a re  exogenous,  and t h e r e fo re  t h a t  the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between impor tab les  and expor tab les  i s  not necessary .  They 
can be aggregated i n t o  a " t r a d e d 11 goods ca tegory .  Secondly, i t  1s also 
assumed t h a t  the coun try  1n ques t ion  produces on ly  expo r tab les ,  which i s  
a more r e s t r i c t i v e  a ssum p t io n  th a n  t h e  f i r s t .  The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
non-tradeabLes, i n  which fo re ig n e rs  have a zero p ro p e n s i t y ,  i n t o  such a 
mode l,  would  mean t h a t  the  income e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  1n re a l  wages would 
be s t ronger  than 1n the simple t ra d a b le  goods-modeL (18 ) .
So i t  i s  not  e n t i r e l y  d e a r  f rom t h e  above d is c u s s io n ,  whether a smal l  
open economy should have a separate cur rency or n o t .  We could say t h a t  
i t  depends ,  as we s a id  e a r l i e r ,  on t h e  r e l a t i v e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  e x p o r t s  and i t s  m a r g in a l  
p ropens i ty  to  im p o r t .  Or we cou ld  say 1t  depends on how i n t e g r a t e d  an 
area 1s w i t h i n  a b ro a d e r  s o c i a l  and c u L t u r a l  c o n t e x t ,  c r e a t i n g  the 
absence o f  money i l l u s i o n  and va r ious  demonstrat ion e f f e c t s ,  which wouLd 
act  as se r ious  obs tac les  to  the smooth f u n c t io n i n g  o f  the adjustment o f  
imbalances through exchange ra te  v a r i a t i o n s .  Corden (19)  a rgued t h a t  
M cK innon 's  "ope nnes s "  c r i t e r i o n  was not a general  one. He argues tha t
t h e  openness c r i t e r i o n  a p p l i e s  o n l y  i n  th e  case o f  m ic ro -e c o n o m ic  
changes i n  demand t h a t  t a k e  p l a c e  a t  home and does no t  ap p ly  to  the 
problem o f  macro-economic d is tu rbances  t h a t  occur ab ro a d .  T h i s  can be 
seen a t  once by a casual  anaLysis o f  the assumptions o f  McKinnon's model 
which inc lude  (A) t h a t  the  p r i n c i p a l  need f o r  payments adjustments  a r i s e  
from micro-economic changes in  demand and supply c o n d i t io n s  and (B) t h a t  
p r i c e  s t a b i l i t y  p r e v a i l s  i n  the  re s t  o f  the w o r ld .  I f  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
economy i t s e l f  i s  u n s t a b l e ,  M cK in non 's  c o n c l u s i o n  would  have to  be 
comple te ly  r e v e r s e d ,  because e x t e r n a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  would  be d i r e c t l y  
p rope l le d  through to  the domest ic  economy t h ro u g h  t h e  f i x e d  exchange 
regime.
Kenen (20 ]  shows t h a t  a f a i r l y  smal l  reg ion o f te n  concen t ra tes  upon the 
p roduc t ion  o f  a few goods,  o r  somet imes o n l y  one s tap le  product  ( l i k e  
pet ro leum] so t h a t  i t s  balance i s  bound t o  be f r e q u e n t l y  d i s t u r b e d  by 
m ino r  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t a s te s ,  techno logy ,  o r  1n fo re ig n  com pet i t iveness ,  
w h i l e  a La rge r  c o u n t r y  s h o u l d  f i n d  some o f  t h e s e  somewhat random 
deve lopm en ts  o f f s e t t i n g  each o t h e r .  Such a low degree o f  p r o d u c t  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  i n  K e n a n ' s  v iew  i s  a good reason  f o r  f o r m in g  an 
independent cur rency area.
I t  i s  easy to  see why Kenen's " l o w - d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  c r i t e r i o n "  comes t o  a 
conc lus ion  t h a t  i s  t h e  e x a c t  o p p o s i t e  o f  t h e  c o n c lu s io n  a r r i v e d  a t  in  
the McKinnon "openness c r i t e r i o n " .  Kenen i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  e x t e r n a l  
shocks t o  expor t  p roducts  and not w i th  i n t e r n a l  shocks. We ask whether 
we should conclude t h a t  we lo o k  t o  t h o s e  t h e o r i e s  t h a t  concentra te  on 
macro-economic phenomena and d i s m is s  t h e  r e s t .  H a r b e r l e r  (21)  and 
F lem ing  (22)  sugges t  t h a t  t h e  main cause ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  o f  payments 
imbalances has been d i v e r g e n t  t r e n d s  i n  n a t i o n a l  i n f l a t i o n  r a te s .  The 
arguments pu t  forward by them are re le v a n t ,  but
fundamenta l ly ,  these arguments appear  t o  be c i r c u l a r  and do no t  d e a l  
d i r e c t l y  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  opt imum c u r r e n c y  a r e a s .  D i v e r g e n t  
i n f l a t i o n  ra tes  are the n a t u r a l  consequence o f  separate cu r renc ies  and 
independent monetary p o l i c i e s  pe rm i t ted  by f l o a t i n g  o r  q u a s i - f  l o a t i  ng 
exchange regimes. Currency areas become the exp lana to ry  v a r ia b le  and no 
Longer the exp la ined v a r ia b le  i n  those t h e o r i e s .  As a consequence i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  answer our ques t ions  to  whether we should Look p r im a r i l y  at  
e x t e r n a l  macro -economic  shocks o r  m ic ro -e c o n o m ic  f l u c t u a t i o n s  and 
changes in  the domestic economy as the prime concern.
A conv inc ing  argument f avou r in g  a s e p a ra te  cur rency f o r  smaLl areas can 
be made by Looking c lo s e ly  a t  the r e a l  content  o f  M cK innon 's  a rgum en t .  
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  h i s  a rgument  s h o u ld  a c t u a l l y  be in  the form o f  
Corden's q u a l i f i c a t i o n  (23)  -  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  m a r g in a l  p rope ns i ty  to  
import  f o r  an area,  the less c o s t l y  i t  i s  t o  m a in t a i n  f i x e d  exchange 
r a t e s  1n te rm s  o f  the  r e q u i r e d  i n c r e a s e  1n t h e  unemployment ra te  to  
e f f e c t  the same degree o f  payment im ba lance  improvement as In  economies 
us ing an exchange ra te .  On the o th e r  hand, the h igher  the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  
demand f o r  t h a t  c o u n t r y 's  exp o r ts ,  the narrower i t s  range o f  p r o d u c t s ,  
and t h e  more u n s ta b le  t h e  e x t e r n a l  w o r l d ,  t h e  more c o s t l y  1t  i s  to  
ma in ta in  f i x e d  exchanges. Th is  1s a c o n v in c in g  argument f o r  a separate 
c u r re n c y  f o r  a s m a l l  a rea  1 f  such a s m a l l  a rea  has a h ig h  f o r e i g n  
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  i t s  e x p o r t s  and a r e l a t i v e l y  Low m arg ina l  
p ropens i ty  to  I m p o r t .  T h i s  we s t a t e d  c l e a r l y  1s t h e  oppos i te  o f  the 
case r u l i n g  1n Kuwait .  I f  the problem were t o  be a d ju s tm e n t  w i t h  th e  
G u l f  S t a t e s ,  t h e  o n l y  r e a l  o b s t a c l e  to  t h e  arguments  f a v o u r i n g  a 
separate cur rency i n  the McKinnon approach would be the absence o f  money 
i l l u s i o n .  However, as we s h a l l  see, Kuwa i t 's  main problem i s  adjustment 
v i s - a - v i s  the major i n d u s t r i a l  economies.
So c ia l  u n i t y  and c u L tu r a l  homogeneity could be a much s t ronger  c r i t e r i o n  
than  th e  one o f  s i z e  in  de te rm in ing  whether a s p e c i f i c  area should have 
a separate cu r re ncy .  To some ex ten t  i t  must be considered "academic" to  
ask the ques t ion  whether V i r g i n i a  can be s p u n -o f f  as a separate cur rency 
area, not j u s t  because o f  any p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  but also because i t s  
i n t e g r a t i o n  i n t o  a l a rg e r  n a t i o n - s t a t e  g ives i t  c e r ta in  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
i t  would  no t  have o the rw ise .  The re fo re ,  apar t  from the f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  
more c o s t l y  f o r  a s m a l l  a r e a  t o  a d a p t  t o  im b a la n c e s  than  l a r g e r  
c o u n t r i e s ,  t h o s e  a r e a s  t h a t  have h i s t o r i c a l l y  been i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  
la rge r  n a t i o n - s t a t e s  are a f f e c te d  in  fo u r  d i f f e r e n t  ways:-
i )  C u L t u r a l  and s o c i a l  hom ogene i ty  i m p l i e s  t h e  absence o f  money
i l l u s i o n  and t h i s  a c t s  as an a f f e c t i v e  o b s t a c l e  t o  a r e g io n
managing a separate cu r rency .
i  1) M ig ra t io n  f rom th a t  reg ion  I n to  n e ig h b o u r in g  a reas  i s  p o s s ib L e  
b e in g  s o c i a l l y  a c c e p t a b le  and p o l i t i c a l l y  p o s s ib L e ,  a l lo w in g  
ad justment  t o  imbalances by d i r e c t  means.
i i i )  Any pockets  o f  labour im m o b i l i t y  o r  obs tac les  to  m ig ra t io n  in  the 
fo rm  o f  a l a c k  o f  a n e i g h b o u r i n g  j o b  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  can be 
overcome through f i s c a l  measures t a k i n g  i n t o  accou n t  c o s t s  o f  
f i s c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  F i s c a l  I n t e g r a t i o n  and p o l i t i c a l  
c o o p e r a t i o n  a l l o w s  d e p r e s s e d  a r e a s  t o  r e c e i v e  s u b s i d i e s
encouraging a r e v e rs a l  1n the dec l in e  1n incomes and w e a l t h  due
t o  a r e g io n a l  d e f i c i t .
1 v ) A r e g io n  b e n e f i t s  f rom  th e  i n t e g r a t e d  c a p i t a l  m arke t  o f  i t s  
n a t i o n - s t a t e .  I n te g ra te d  c a p i t a l  markets imply  the a c c e p t a b i l i t y  
o f  any r e g io n ' s  f i n a n c i a l  assets  nat ionwide and the sa le  o f  these 
assets  a l low s  an area t o  f inance  c u r re n t  account imbalances.
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C l e a r l y  i f  the imbalance in  a reg ion i s  ch ron ic  the 
r u n n in g  down o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  w i l l  leed  t o  a 
s e r i o u s  d r o p  i n  w e a l t h  a t  w h i c h  t i m e  f o r c e d  
m i g r a t i o n  i s  i n d u c e d  and f i s c a l  and r e g i o n a l  
s u b s id ie s  have to  take ove r .
The f l o w  o f  c a p i t a l  and Lab o u r  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  a d j u s t m e n t  f a c t o r s .  
Mundel l  (24) chose a high degree o f  f a c t o r  m o b i l i t y  w i t h i n  an a rea  as a 
b a s i s  f o r  c u r r e n c y  u n i f i c a t i o n .  On the assumption t h a t  a demand s h i f t  
i s  the cause o f  balance o f  payments d i s - e q u i  l i b r i a ,  Mundel l focuses on 
the c o n d i t i o n  under which payments adjustment can be made w i t h  minimum 
burden to  the reg ions  a f fe c te d  by the  s h i f t .
" T h i s  seems t o  i m p l y  t h a t  r e g i o n s  oug h t  t o  be
de f ined  so n a r ro w ly  as t o  c oun t  every  minor pocket
o f  unemployment a r i s i n g  f rom labour  im m o b i l i t y  as a 
s e p a r a te  r e g i o n ,  eech o f  wh ich  s h o u ld  a p p a re n t ly  
have a separate cu r rency "  (25)
We face ,  however, c o s t s  o f  c u r r e n c y  c o n v e r s i o n  and u l t i m a t e l y  we are 
lead t o  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  b a r t e r  which negete t h e  s a v i n g s  c r e a t e d  by th e  
use o f  cur rency in  the  f i r s t  p lace .  To balance these f a c to r s  out  we use 
some o f  the arguments developed i n  our d iscuss ion  o f  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
o f  t h e  r e l e t i o n s h i p  between t h e  reg ion  and the n a t i o n - s t a t e  in  p o in t s
( i )  -  ( i v )  above. A compromise, i n  M unde l l ' s  model, can onLy be reached 
i f  we t e l k  abou t  l a b o u r  i m m o b i l i t y  r e L a t | y ^  tp. t h e  a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  
short-fref*qi f o r  the  area to  f inance  cu r re n t  account d e f i c i t s ,  and i n  t h e  
lo n g - t p ^ m . i t s  a b i l i t y  to  summon f i s c a l  a id  and c r e d i t s .  So the smal l  
pockets o f  unemployment c rea ted by le b o u r  im m o b i l i t y  are not a complete 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  c r e a t io n  o f  a separate cu r rency  a r e e ,  bu t  r a t h e r  
f o r  the c re a t io n  o f  c u l t u r a l  o r  L i n g u i s t i c  b locks  or  u l t i m a t e l y
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p o l i t i c a l  b l o c k s  w h ic h  become n a t i o n - s t a t e s  and wh ich  t h e r e f o r e  
e v e n tu a l l y  j u s t i f y  the ex is tence  o f  t h e i r  own cur rency and m i t i g a t e  the 
need f o r  reg io na l  c u r re n c ie s .  Soc ia l  and c u l t u r a l  u n i t y  i s  an o b s t a c l e  
i n  t h e  use o f  exchange r a t e s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  a d ju s tm e n t  bu t ,  as we see 
h e r e ,  i s  a l s o  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  c o n t i n u a n c e  o f  r e g i o n a l  
i n t e g r a t i o n  i n t o  the  common currency area o f  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e .  W h i le  
s e c e s s io n  by a re a s  has been d is c u s s e d  on occas ion w i t h i n  an economic 
con tex t  (Sco t land  and N o r th  Sea O i l )  t h e r e  i s  i n v a r i a b l y  a p o l i t i c a l  
background to  the  ques t ion  (S c o t lan d 's  and England 's  a g e - o l d  r i v a l r y ) .  
Most famous a t tem pts  a t  secession are p o l i t i c a l l y  mot iva ted  (eg. Quebec, 
Basques, I t a l i a n  T y r o l ,  e t c . ) .
W h i le  i t  i s ,  as we have seen,  "a c a d e m ic "  t o  t a l k  o f  r e g i o n s  w i t h i n  
n a t i o n - s ta t e s  s e c e e d in g ,  we n o te  t h a t  many s m a l l  u n i t s  (sm a l le r  than 
V i r g i n i a ,  Texas o r  C a l i f o r n i a ]  a c t u a l l y  run in d e p e n d e n t  c u r r e n c i e s .  
W h i le  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t s ,  i n  te rm s  o f  e x t r a  unemployment ,  fo rced 
m ig ra t io n  and t h e  r e d u c t i o n  o f  incomes and w e a l t h ,  o f  a d j u s t i n g  f o r  
imbalances w i t h a i ^  a v a r ia b le  exchange ra te  seem c le a r  and o b v io u s ;  t h e  
o f f s e t t i n g  g a i n s  t h a t  m ig h t  a t t r a c t  t h e s e  s m a l l e r  u n i t s  i n t o  la rg e r  
cur rency areas a r e  more n e b u lo u s .  The two o b v io u s  p o s i t i v e s  are the 
saving  o f  exchange reserves and the e l im in a t i o n  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  c a p i t a l  
f L o w s ,  bo th  o f  w h ich  a re  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s c e r t a i n  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  as 
b e n e f i t s  b u t  a r e  m a r g in a l  i n  any case .  The most i m p o r t a n t  p o s i t i v e  
aspect would be t h a t  monetary i n t e g r a t i o n  acce le ra tes  f i s c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  
and c a p i t a l  market i n t e g r a t i o n ,  which i s  the  m i r ro r - im age  o f  our e a r l i e r  
argument t h a t  reg ions  b e n e f i t  from membership o f  t h e  n a t i o n - s t a t e  f o r  
f i s c a l  and c a p i t a l  market reasons, among o th e rs .
I t  would seem not on ly  t h a t  s o c ia l  u n i t y  could be a s t rong c r i t e r i o n  f o r  
de te rm in ing  the o p t i m a l i t y  o f  a cur rency area but na t ion -hood  i t s e l f
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cou ld  be sa id  to  be such a c r i t e r i o n .  The p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  
Im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  r i g h t  o f  s e i g n i o r a g e  t o  an Independent government 
r e in fo r c e s  t h i s  r e s u l t .  Both s e i g n i o r a g e ,  t h e  r e la te d  exc lus ive  r i g h t  
t o  Issue cu r rency ,  and the  r i g h t  to  conduct Independent monetary p o l i c y ,  
have been a t  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  o b s t a c l e s  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
mone ta ry  I n t e g r a t i o n .  F i x e d  exchanges Im p ly  a r e l i n q u i s h i n g  o f  the 
r i g h t  to  c o n t r o l  money supply  and t o  v a ry  the  exchange ra te  (26 ) ,  w h i le  
currency union means the currency Issue and I t s  p r i n t i n g  may be based 
ou ts id e  your own borde rs .
Too much e m p h a s is  has been p u t  on s i z e  w i t h  I t s  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
openness and d i v e r s i t y  as a d e t e r m in a n t  o f  t h e  c o s t s  o f  a d ju s tm e n t  
w i t h i n  a s in g le  currency area,  and not enough on s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
u n i t y .  I t  18 d i f f i c u l t  t o  condemm a c o u n t r y  o f  w h a te v e r  s i z e  f o r  
dec id ing  to  adopt an Independent c u r r e n c y  w i t h in  the con tex t  o f  c u r re n t  
t h e o r ie s  and d i f f i c u l t  1n p a r t i c u l a r  In  the case o f  Kuwai t .  Some o f  the 
p o i n t s  1n r e s p e c t  o f  K u w a i t ' s  case can be L i s t e d  b r i e f l y  p r i o r  t o  
reaching a q u a l i f i e d  conc lus ion  on t h i s  s u b j e c t : -
I ]  Kuwa i t  1s a s u r p l u s  e n t i t y  and 1s under no pressure to  a d j u s t .  
Recent e x p e r i e n c e ,  how eve r ,  o f  d r o p p in g  p e t r o le u m  demand and 
d e c l i n i n g  p r i c e s  have brought up the quest ion o f  the Longer- term.
I I ]  Kuwait 18 a tw o - t1 e r  economy as q u i t e  d e a r l y  t h e  management o f  
t h e  exchange r a t e  does n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  p e t r o le u m  m arke t .  The 
p r i c i n g  o f  o1 L has t o  be Looked a t  a l o n g s i d e  th e  management o f  
the  exchange ra te  f o r  an o v e r a l l  assessment o f  Kuw a i t 's  r e l a t i v e  
cos t  and p r i c e  p o s i t i o n .
I I I ]  A l t h o u g h  K u w a i t  and I t s  n e i g h b o u r i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  I r a q ,
S a u d i - A r a b i  a , Q a ta r ,  Bahra in ,  the Uni ted  Arab Emirates and Oman 
[ t o g e th e r  known as th e  " G u l f  S t a t e s " ]  have a Large degree o f  
c u l t u r e l  and s o c i a l  u n i t y ,  the reby  a l l o w i n g  f i s c a l  and c a p i t a l ,  
m a rke t  i n t e g r a t i o n  and c r e a t in g  obs tac les  to  the use o f  r e l a t i v e  
exchanges i n  the G u l f  t o  c o r r e c t  im ba lance s ,  the s i t u a t i o n  does 
have p e c u l i a r i t i e s .  The main p e c u la r i t y  i s  t h a t  these c o u n t r i e s  
h a r d l y  t r a d e  w i t h  one a n o th e r  and have th e  same o n e -p ro d u c t  
economy. I n t e g r a t i o n  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  reduce the average exposure 
o f  each coun t ry  to  e x te rn a l  shocks, and r e l a t i v e  cos ts  and p r i c e s  
w i t h i n  the  G u l f  are always L i k e ly  to  develop i n  the  same f a s h io n  
p r e v e n t i n g  a need f o r  major rea l ignments  between G u l f  cu r renc ies  
(as would not  be the case f o r  European cu r re n c ie s ,  f o r  i n s ta n c e ) .
When d i s c u s s i n g  K u w a i t  as an o p t im u m  c u r r e n c y  a rea i t  i s  a lways  
extremely im por tan t  t o  remember p o in t  ( i i )  above and th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t s  
on ly  export  p roduct  i s  no t  p r ic ed  i n  Kuwait i  Dinars but i n  U.S. D o l l a r s .  
Kenen 's  (27)  model encou rages  a s e p a ra te  c u r r e n c y  f o r  a o n e -e x p o r t  
product  economy l i k e  K u w a i t ,  b u t  we have t o  remember our  p o i n t  t h a t  
success fu l  exchange r a te  v a r i a t i o n  re q u i re s  the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  
the e x p o r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  t o  be h i g h ,  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  s h o u ld  
o u tw e ig h  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  g r e a t e r  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  im p o r t  o f  a smal l  
one-product  economy. In  the  case o f  Kuwait i t  does no t ,  s ince o i l  has a 
h ig h l y  p r i c e - i n e l a s t i c  demand f a c t o r ,  and Kuwa i t  has a high marg ina l  
p ropens i ty  to  impor t  which would make i t  cheaper ( i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  drop 
i n  a b s o r p t i o n  o f  goods) f o r  t h e  coun t ry  to  d e f l a t e .  The s o c i a l  u n i t y  
w i th  ne ighbour ing  s t a t e s  wou ld  a l s o  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  reduce rea l  
wages by d e v a lu a t io n .
T h i s  argument  may p o i n t  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  Ku w a i t  i s  n o t  an op t im um  
currency area.  However, th e re  are the  obvious p o in t s  we made e a r l i e r
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w h ich  make 1 t  n o t  w o r t h w h i l e  f o r  K u w a i t  t o  I n t e g r a t e  w i t h  I t s  
n e i g h b o u r s .  F i r s t l y ,  such I n t e g r a t i o n  would not average out  e x te rn a l  
shocks t o  t h e  economy, s i n c e  a l l  G u l f  6 t a t e s  have r o u g h ly  t h e  same 
one-product economy, and the f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  Im p o r t  a lm o s t  e v e r y t h i n g  
e l s e  a p a r t  f rom  o1L, t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  and p r i c e s  a re  u n l i k e l y  to  
d ive rge  to  a s i g n i f i c a n t  ex ten t  thereby  lead ing to  the need f o r  exchange 
r a te  a d ju s t m e n ts .  M u n d e l l ' e  (28)  l a b o u r  m o b i l i t y  argument  does not 
a rgue  1n f a v o u r  o f  Kuw a i t  j o i n i n g  I t s  n e ig h b o u r s  e i t h e r ,  b e c a u s e  
a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  1s la b o u r  m o b i l i t y  o f  n a t i o n a l s  o f  t h e  G u l f  s t a t e s  
between the s t a t e s ,  t h e  a rea  a6 a whole  1s a la b o u r  d e f i c i t  area and 
Imports  manpower c h i e f l y  from Egypt and t h e  I n d i a n  s u b - c o n t i n e n t ,  and 
t h i s  labour fo rc e  1s not mob i le between the G u l f  c o u n t r ie s  but on ly  from 
t h e i r  c o u n t r y  o f  o r i g i n  ( s t r i c t  I m m ig r a t i o n  b a r r i e r s  p r e v e n t  them 
c ross ing  borders between the G u l f  s t a t e s ) .
I m p l i c i t  1n the  Idea t h a t  one-product areas should In te g ra te  w i th  la rg e r  
areas (If* t h e i r  exp o r t  p r o d u c t s  d o n ' t  have a h ig h  p r i c e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  
demand) and t h a t  so should areas o f  f a c t o r  m o b i l i t y  ( b o th  c a p i t a l  and 
Labour )  a re  themes t h a t  have been common 1n the Arab league c a l l  f o r  
Arab economic I n t e g r a t i o n .  The m o t i v e  o f  t h i s  c a l l  1s p r i m a r i l y  
p o l i t i c a l .  As we showed 1n t h e  p r o c e e d in g  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  c o n c e p ts  
behind optimum currency area th e o ry ,  s o c i a l  and c u l t u r a l  u n i t v  1e a much 
s t ron ge r  c r i t e r i o n  o f  the de te rm ina t ion  o f  an op t im a l  cur rency area than 
s1 ze wh ich  can o n l y  be a seconda ry  argument ,  and which also can on ly  
r e a l l y  s e rv e  as a g e n e r a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  th a n  as a d e f i n i t e  
c r i t e r i o n  (s ince  1 t  doesn ' t  cu t  c l e a r l y  e i t h e r  one way o r  t h e  o t h e r ]  • 
The d r i v e  f o r  Arab u n i t y  1e a concept founded on I s la m ic  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
brotherhood and r e i n f o r c e d  by P r e s i d e n t  Nasser  1n h i s  regime between 
1952-70.  Arab econom is ts  have used economic a rgum en ts  to  back t h l 6  
p o l i t i c a l  man ifes to  (29 ) .  C e r t a in l y  the re  are more arguments 1n favou r
o f  a broad I n t e g r a t i o n  o f  Arab s ta te s  ra th e r  than an I n te g r a t i o n  o f  j u s t  
the G u l f  S ta te s .  Product d i v e r s i t y  and f a c t o r  complementar i ty  leading 
t o  h i g h  f a c t o r  m o b i l i t y  wou ld  be th e  b a s i s  o f  s u c h  I n t e g r a t i o n .  
However,  c l e a r l y ,  t h e  p rob lem  f o r  Kuw a i t  1s adjustment  v1s-a-*v1s the 
m a jo r  I n d u s t r i a l  e c o n o m ie s .  M o n e t a r y  I n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  a l l  Arab 
economies 1s academ ic ,  and w i t h  G u l f  e c o n o m ie s ,  1 t  seems t o  be 
unnecessary.
1v) IMPLICATIONS FOR KUWAIT OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY 
AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE CHOICE OF CURRENCY
Two c r i t e r i a  appear  1n the re le v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  to  determine whether an 
area should have a s e p a ra te  c u r r e n c y  o r  n o t  -  (1 )  s i z e  and (2]  s o c i a l  
u n i t y  w i th  cont lnguous a reas .  The quest ion o f  s iz e  l e a d in g  t o  c e r t a i n  
1ndeterm1nac1 es ,  we conclude t h a t  6oc1al u n i t y  1a a s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more 
Important  c r i t e r i o n  than  s i z e ,  a l t h o u g h  we s t i l l  have to  look a t  the 
e f f e c t  o f  a c o u n t r y ' s  s i z e  on I t s  a b i l i t y  t o  a d j u s t  t o  p a y m e n ts  
Im b a la n c e s  w i t h o u t  a s e p a r a te  c u r r e n c y .  The s m a l l e r  an a r e a ,  th e  
g rea te r  I t s  marg ina l  p rope ns i ty  t o  im p o r t  and the  less c o s t l y  1 t  1s f o r  
1 t  t o  ma in ta in  f i x e d  exchange ra tes  1n terms o f  the  requ i red  Increase 1n 
unemployment, i f  t h e  o r i g i n  o f  t h e  Im ba lan ce  I s  I n t e r n a l  demand and 
s u p p ly  changes .  I f  we a re  conce rned  w i t h  e x t e r n a l  shocks  th e n  the 
smalLer the area and Less d i v e r s i f i e d  1 t  1s,  the more 1 t  w i l l  s u f f e r  on 
the average. The quest ion o f  e x t e r n a l  shocks  t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e s  th e  
ope ra t ion  o f  a separate cur rency 1n the case 1n p a r t i c u l a r  o f  an economy 
w i th  a l o w - d 1 v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  p ro d u c t io n .  Such an economy w i l l  be ab le  
to  s u c c e s s fu l l y  vary an exchange ra te  1n the  face o f  e x te rn a l  s to c k s ,  as 
Long as I t s  e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s  have a pr1 ce -eLas t lc1  t y  o f  demand h ig h e r  
than I t s  marg ina l  p rope ns i t y  t o  Im po r t .
Kuwait 1 a smal l  but  i t  ha6 a h igh  m a r g in a l  p ropens i ty  to Import  and I t s  
on ly  export  product (petro leum) has a low pr1 ce -e  l a s t l  c1 t y  o f  demand.
A l l  t h i s  should p o in t  to  Kuwait being p a r t  o f  a common cur rency area and
not using the exchange ra te  as a t o o l  to  compensate f o r  e x te r n a l  s tocks .  
J . R .  K ing  d e v e lo p s  a model where p r i c e s  and wages are f l e x i b l e  and the
f u l l  e m p lo y m e n t  L e v e l  o f  o u t p u t  can be r e a c h e d ,  end w he re  th e
e q u i l i b r i u m  domest ic p r i c e  le v e l  depends p o s i t i v e l y  on the f o re ig n  p r i c e  
Level and I n v e rs e ly  on the e f f e c t i v e  exchange ra te  (30 ) .  He d i s c u s s e s  
the use o f  the exchange ra te  to  s t a b i l i z e  the domest ic p r i c e  le v e l  1n an 
open economy, and cons iders  t h a t  exchange ra te  p o l i c y  f o r  the  management 
o f  t h e  I n t e r n e t  b a l a n c e ,  1s a n a t u r a l  complement t o  domest ic c r e d i t  
expansion, which can be used f o r  the  management o f  the e x te rn a l  ba lance.  
We s h a l l  d i s c u s s  t h i s  model 1n C h a p te r  3 ,  and I t s  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
exchange r a t e  p o l i c y  1n C h a p t e r s  5 and 6 .  The m a c r o - e c o n o m i c  
I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  K i n g ' s  a n a l y s i s  seem t o  c o n t r a d i c t  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  
opt imum c u r r e n c y  a rea  t h e o r y .  As we saw e a r l i e r ,  how ever ,  p o l i c y  
a l l o c a t i o n  theory  has d i f f e r e n t  concerns to  optimum currency area theory  
(3 1 ) .
S o c ia l  u n i t y  as a c r i t e r i o n  1s t h e o r e t i c a l l y  more d e f i n i t i v e  th a n  s i z e  
1n as f a r  as th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an optimum cur rency 
area,  s ince 1 t  Lays the  ground f o r  re g io na l  adjustment to  bo th  temporary 
and c h r o n i c  payments  I m b a la n c e s .  I n t e g r a t e d  c a p i t a l  m a rk e ts  a l l o w  
reg ions  1n a common c u r r e n c y  a rea  t o  e a s i l y  f i n a n c e  c u r r e n t - a c c o u n t  
Imbalances, w h i le  1n the case o f  ch ron ic  Imbalances c u l t u r a l  t i e s  perm it  
m ig ra t ion  and subs id ise  f o r  depressed a reas .  The s o c i a l  u n i t y  c r i t e r i o n  
wou ld  appear  t o  d e f i n e  K u w a i t  as an a rea  t h a t  shou ld  u n i t e  w i th  I t s  
n e ighbou rs  s i n c e  t h e r e  a re  e x t r e m e l y  s t r o n g  t r i b a l ,  L i n g u i s t i c  and 
r e l i g i o u s  t i e s  between t h e  G u l f  S t a t e s  ( c o m p r i s i n g  o f  I r a q ,  K u w a i t ,
S a u d i  A r a b i a ,  B a h r a i n ,  Q a ta r ,  t h e  U n i t e d  Arab E m i r a te s  and Oman].  
However, the I ron y  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  1s t h a t  t h e  la c k  o f  t rade  between 
t h e s e  a r e a s ,  th e  l a c k  o f  c o m p le m e n ta r i t y  and t h e  s i m i l a r  ec on om ic  
s t r u c t u r e s  make such a u n io n  p o i n t l e s s  s ince  (1) r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  and 
cos ts  between these c o u n t r i e s  a re  u n l i k e l y  t o  d i v e rg e  1n a r e a l  sense 
and (11) the same f a t e  w i l l  always b e fa lL  one area  as w i l l  b e f a l l  a l l  
t h e  o t h e r s  1n respect  o f  e x te rn a l  shocks. Ph i losophers  o f  "Arab u n i t y "  
have s e i z e d  on t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  j u s t i f y  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l L  Arab 
c o u n t r i e s .  They argue t h a t  s ince G u l f  u n i t y  makes no sense, wider  u n i t y  
1s n e ce ssa ry  and t h e r e  1s ,  1n t h e o r y ,  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y  
between the  22 Arab c o u n t r ie s  s t r e t c h i n g  from the A t l a n t i c  to  the Ind ian  
Ocean. Q u i t e  c l e a r l y  t h e  m a rg in a l  p ropens i ty  to  Import  (or  openness] 
c r i t e r i o n  along w i t h  t h e  p r l c e - e l a s t i  c1 t y  o f  e x p o r t s  c r i t e r i o n  (both 
sub -c r1 te r1a  o f  the  s i z e  c r i t e r i o n )  wouLd make 1 t  more e f f i c i e n t  1 f  
Kuwait were p a r t  o f  such a common cur rency area.  But such wide monetary 
I n t e g r a t i o n  1s not re le v a n t  to  the c o ns ide ra t ion s  o f  the  a u t h o r i t i e s  1n 
K uwa i t  and where t h e  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  G u l f  c u r r e n c i e s  fa c e d  s e r i o u s  
p o l i t i c a l  obs tac les  1n respect  o f  soLvIng the probLem o f  the management 
o f  the s in g le  r e s u l t i n g  cu r rency ,  the u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  a l l  Arab c u r re nc ie s  
wou ld  f a c e  t h a t  many more p o l i t i c a l  obs tac les  as more c oun t r ie s  became 
Inv o lv e d .
The major probLem f o r  Kuwait  1s adjustment v1s-a-v1s the  major economies 
and n o t  t h e  G u l f  o r  Indeed  th e  A ra b  economies 1n t h e  w id e r  s e n s e .  
Consequent ly,  the ques t ion  o f  the use o f  the U.S. d o l l a r  as I t s  I n t e r n a l  
cur rency 1s more re le v a n t  than ques t ions  o f  m oneta ry  I n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h  
G u l f  o r  Arab econom ies .  I t  1s a l s o  more Im m e d ia te l y  p r a c t i c a b le  1n 
term8 o f  ease o f  Imp lementa t ion .  We have seen t h a t  the  seignorage gain 
f o r  a c o u n t r y  l i k e  K u w a i t ,  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  I t s  own 
c u r r e n c y ,  1s m in i m a l .  We have also seen t h a t ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y  speaking,
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the ex is tence o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  D i n a r  was t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  B r i t i s h  
p lann ing  and not o f  the Kuwait i  government I t s e l f .  The one I m p o r t a n t  
c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s i n g  t h e  U.S .  d o l l a r  as K u w a i t ' s  
cur rency ,  1s the d i v e r s i f i e d  t r a d e  t h a t  Kuwa i t  has w i th  aL l  the major 
I n d u s t r i a l  economies 1n the w o r ld ,  which we can see 1n Tables 6:1 to  6 :4  
The re fo re ,  adjustment  v1s-a-v1s  I t s  t r a d in g  pa r tne rs  cannot be solved by 
look ing  u n i l a t e r a l l y  a t  t h e  U .S .  d o l l a r ,  bu t  r a t h e r  a t  some k in d  o f  
basket o f  c u r re n c ie s .  The ques t ions  re v o lv in g  around Kuw a i t 's  e f f e c t i v e  
exchange ra te  and the  op t im a l  peg are  reviewed 1n d e t a i l  1n Chapter 6 .
I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  use o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  D i n a r ,  t h e  K u w a i t i  
government and 1n p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  F inance  can be 6een as 
running a sub-economy denominated 1n K u w a i t i  D in a r s  w i t h  t h e  ex p res s  
purpose  o f  c r e a t i n g  an Independent and p rodu c t i ve  p r i v a t e  s e c to r .  The 
government was not s a t i s f i e d  w i th  the  Idea o f  merely e x p o r t in g  petroLeum 
and p ro v id in g  f o r  K u w a i t i  c i t i z e n s  w i t h  t h e  p roceeds ,  but planned f o r  
eventua l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  away f rom p e t r o le u m  by th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  new 
I n d u s t r i e s .  The d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  des i re  was s t rong  enough to  fo rc e  the 
government to  d i l u t e  the Kuwai t i  p o p u l a t i o n  by a l lo w in g  the  Immig ra t ion  
o f  both s k i l l e d  and u n s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  demanded by K u w a i t ' s  I n d ig e n o u s  
e c o n o m ic  g r o w t h .  As we saw 1n C h ap te r  1 t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
government to  t a k e  th e s e  s t e p s  was p a r t l y  p o l i t i c a l .  We also  saw 1n 
Chapter 1 t h a t  the p o l i c y  o f  promot ing the s tock marke t  came a f t e r  t h e  
r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  a t r a n s f e r  o f  weal th  to  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  engineered 
through a land a c q u i s i t i o n  programme was no t  b e n e f i c i a l  to  the  lo c a l  
development o f  I n d u s t r y .  The ex is tence  o f  an Independent c u r r r e n c y  was 
not necessary to  achieve these alms, 1n f a c t  1t  can be seen as a problem 
th a t  has to  be contended w i th  1n o rde r  to  achieve them.
I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  and 1n view o f  the  f a c t  o f  the p a r t i a l  f a i l u r e  o f  the
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Land a c q u i s i t i o n  programme and t h e  Kuw a i t  s t o c k  market to  keep weal th  
accrued to  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  from being exported,  the management o f  the 
Local cur rency was used to  t r y  to  keep Kuwait i  c a p i t a l  Invested a t  home. 
Whether or  not t h i s  was a j u s t i f i a b l e  p o l i c y  1s e d i f f e r e n t  m e t t e r  and 
we deal  w i th  t h i s  a t  the end o f  Chapter 6 .  As we s h a l l  6ee i n  Chapter 6 
(Graph 6 : 1 ] ,  the  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  heve et tempted to  keep the Kuwait i  
D inar  as s ta b le  as poss ib le  among a l l  the major c u r re n c ie s ,  which p o l i c y  
r e q u i r e s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  f l e x i b l e  b a s k e t  t h a t  has been used, given the 
la rge v o l a t i l i t y  o f  c u r r e n c y  exchanges s in c e  f l o a t i n g  exchanges were 
I n s t i t u t e d  1n 1973. But 1t  1s Important  to  understand t h a t  the monetary 
a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  Kuwait  d i d  n o t  c r e a t e  an Ind e p e n d e n t  c u r r e n c y .  They 
I n h e r i t e d  the Kuwait i  D inar  and have t r i e d  to  manage 1t  s e n s ib l y ,  w h i le  
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons th e re  heve been a number o f  I n i t i a t i v e s  taken 1n 
the con tex t  o f  the G u l f  Cooperat ion Counc i l ,  w i th  a v iew to  u n i f y i n g  the 
cu r renc ies  o f  the G u l f  s t a te s ,  a l though as we have seen ,  t h i s  does no t  
so lve any bas ic  problems o f  the Kuwait i  economyTs adjus tment needs.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR HONEY
i ) INTRODUCTION
The aim o f  t h i s  chapter  i s  to  analyse the poss ib le  causes o f  the growth 
o f  the  money supp ly i n  Kuw a i t  f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  under  study (1963-1981) .  
An im por tan t  c o n s id e ra t io n  in  t h i s  an a ly s i s  i s  the impact o f  the  r o le  o f  
the commerc ia l  b a n k in g  sys tem and t h e i r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  on m one ta ry  
d e v e l o p m e n t s .  The h i g h  h i s t o r i c a l  l e v e l s  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  o f  b a la n c e s  w i t h  banks a b ro a d ,  o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  commercial  
banking system i s  c e n t r a l  t o  the  theme o f  t h i s  t h e s is  which concerns the 
na tu re  o f  m oneta ry  deve lopm en ts  (and moneta ry  p o l i c y )  i n  a s u r p l u s  
economy. D e s p i t e  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  bank l i q u i d i t y  in  domest ic c r e d i t  
expension,  however, t h e  r o l e  o f  government  e x p e n d i tu r e  in  the  o v e r a l l  
m one ta ry  p i c t u r e  i s  found  t o  be e q u a l l y  i m p o r t a n t ,  a l t h o u g h  more  
d i f f i c u l t  to  ana lyse .
We b e g in  t h i s  c h a p te r  w i t h  s e c t i o n  ( i i )  which descr ibes the c l a s s i c a l  
no t ions  regard ing  money i n  c l o s e d  economies ,  and we t r y  very summari ly 
to  d iscover  i f  t he re  are any ways i n  wh ich  money c o u ld  be s a i d  t o  be 
endogenous in  the con tex t  o f  the  major economies. Th is  d iscuss ion  w i l l  
make i t  eas ie r  to  move on in  s e c t io n  ( i i i )  t o  discuss some o f  the issues 
i n  t h e  economic l i t e r a t u r e  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  m o n e ta r y  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
deve lop ing economies. T h is  w i l l  a l low  us to  determine more c l e a r l y  what 
the q u e s t i o n s  a re  t h a t  s h o u ld  be asked i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a n a l y z i n g  th e  
p e c u l i a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a h ig h  s u r p l u s  economy such as t h a t  o f  
Kuwait .
i i  ) THE THEORY OF MONEY AND MONETARY EXPERIENCE 
IN DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
"Does Money Mat te r?"  may have been a q u e s t i o n  misplaced in  the debates 
on the t ransm iss ion  o f  monetary p o l i c y .  What s h o u ld  be a t  s t a k e ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  among d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s ,  i s  not the  e f f e c t s  o f  monetary 
p o l i c y  b u t  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  n o m i n a l  s u p p l y  o f  money as an 
independent  p o l i c y  t o o l .  The p o l i t i c a l  t r i u m p h  o f  m one ta r ism  o v e r  
N e o - K e y n e s ia n  e c o n o m ic s  may have  g i v e n  undue  c r e d i b i l i t y  t o  a 
m echan is t ic  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  management o f  the money supp ly  which 
may have a c e r t a in  bas is  i n  the  case o f  a l a r g e  and r e l a t i v e l y  c lo s e d  
economy such as t h a t  o f  the U .S. ,  but  cannot p o s s ib l y  do so in  the case 
o f  smal l  open economies wh ich  a re  th e  s u b j e c t  o f  our an a ly s i s  i n  t h i s  
t h e s i s .  New quest ions about the  "endogene i ty "  o f  the money s tock  or  the 
ex ten t  to  which i t  depends on economic a c t i v i t y  have been as k ed .  To 
s tu d y  t h e  t r a n s m i s s i o n  p ro c e s s  o f  monetary p o l i c y  i s  r a th e r  f u t i l e  i f  
the  s tock  o f  nominal money cannot be considered an exogenous v a r i a b le  in  
our  monetary models. In  the words o f  P h i l l i p  Cagan:-
"The observa t ion  t h a t  changes i n  the money s tock  are 
c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  b o t h  s e c u l a r  a n d  c y c l i c a l  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  e c o n o m ic  a c t i v i t y  i s  o f  l o n g  
s t a n d i n g  . . .  I d e n t i f y i n g  c a u s e  and e f f e c t  i s  
ex tremely  d i f f i c u l t  and hazardous. ( A n ) . . .  approach 
i s  to  examine t h e  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  amount o f  
money s u p p l ie d .  The more they  r e f l e c t  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
i n  b u s i n e s s  a c t i v i t y ,  t h e  le s s  r e l i a n c e  can be 
placed on the im p o r ta n c e  o f  money s to c k  e f f e c t s  i n  
e x p la in in g  observed c o v a r i a t i o n  and c o n v e rs e ly . "  (1)
M i l to n  Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz in  t h e i r  seminal work on t h e  
h i s t o r y  o f  money i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S ta tes  1876-1960 propose an a rche typa l  
mechan is t ic  view o f  a monetary system ( 2 ) .  They developed the approach 
o f  the "prox imate de terminants  o f  the nominal  s tock  o f  money" as t h e i r  
main a n a l y t i c  t o o l  ( 3 ) .  Friedman and Schwartz mainta ined t h i s  approach 
cou ld  exp la in  the i r r e g u l a r  l o n g - te rm  growth o f  the money supp ly in  the 
Uni ted S ta te s .  The l o g ic  o f  t h i s  approach appears  t o  be t h a t  c e n t r a l  
bank l i a b i l i t i e s  (H) im p a c t  on t h e  s t o c k  o f  money (M) accord ing to  a 
s imple f o r m u la : -
M = mH,
where (m) i s  the money m u l t i p l i e r  c o e f f i c i e n t  and where the behaviour o f  
the money m u l t i p l i e r  depends on i t s  components:—
j  + 1
m =  -----------
j  + r
where j  = C/D (which represents  the  p u b l i c ' s  p re ference f o r  ho ld ing  cash 
over depos i ts )  and r  = R/D (which represen ts  the banks' ho ld ings  o f  cash 
reserves aga ins t  t h e i r  d e p o s i t  l i a b i l i t i e s ) .  The c o e f f i c i e n t s  ( j )  and 
( r )  determine,  t h e r e fo r e ,  how much o f  the  s tock  o f  what Fr iedman c a l l s  
" h ig h -p o w e re d  money" i s  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  as cur rency and how much serves 
as reserves f o r  the m u l t i p l e  c r e a t io n  o f  depos i ts  by the banking system. 
High-powered money i s  the asset  c o u n t e r p a r t  o f  c e n t r a l  bank l i a b i l i t i e s  
and the same symbol (H) i s  used f o r  bo th .
Friedman and Schwartz  f i n d  a c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween ,  on t h e  one 
hand, s e c u l a r  and c y c l i c a l  movements i n  the  s tock  o f  money and, on the 
o the r ,  c o r respond ing  movements i n  money income and p r i c e s .  But they
s ta te  c l e a r l y  the p rob lem  i d e n t i f i e d  by P h i l l i p  Cagan, t h a t  a c l o s e  
r e l a t i o n  between changes i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f  money and changes i n  t h e  
economic v a r ia b le s ,  a lone,  t e l l s  n o t h i n g  abou t  the o r i g i n  o f  e i t h e r  or  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  i n f l u e n c e .  Bu t  t h e y  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  m o n e t a r y  
deve lopm en ts  i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  have  o f t e n  been 
in d e p e n d e n t  o f  changes i n  b u s in e s s  c o n d i t i o n s ,  whereas they show the 
reverse not to  be t r u e  al though the re  obv ious ly  are i i n te ra c t io n s
" I f  the predominant d i r e c t i o n  o f  in f lu e n c e  had been 
from bus iness to  money, these and o t h e r  changes i n  
t h e  l i n k s  between b u s in e s s  and money wou ld  ve ry  
l i k e l y  have p r o d u c e d  an a p p r e c i a b l y  d i f f e r e n t  
r e l a t i o n  between movements i n  t h e  two b e f o r e  and 
a f t e r  1 9 1 4 ,  a n d  p e r h a p s  a l s o  f o r  f u r t h e r  
s u b - d i v i s i o n s  o f  t h o s e  p e r i o d s  . . .  w h i l e  t h e  
in f l u e n c e  r u n n in g  f rom  money t o  economic a c t i v i t y  
has been predominant,  the re  have c l e a r l y  a l s o  been 
in f l u e n c e s  running the o the r  way" (4)
A l t h o u g h  we use the  prox imate determinants  as a u s e fu l  h e u r i s t i c  device 
in  our arguments  l a t e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  b e h a v i o u r a l  assumptions 
requ i red  f o r  the Fr iedman-Schwartz model to  be an a c c u r a t e  d e s c r i p t i o n  
o f  f a c t  a re  r a t h e r  r e s t r i c t i v e ,  and as we have i n d i c a t e d  above may 
a c t u a l l y  be a p p l i c a b l e  o n l y  i n  a c o u n t r y  such as t h e  U n i t e d  S ta te s .  
B e fo re  we c o n t i n u e  t o  a n a l y s e  how d e v e l o p i n g  e c o n o m ie s ,  and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  smal l  open economies, d i f f e r  in  t h i s  respect from the United  
S ta tes ,  i t  i s  j u s t  as w e l l  t h a t  we e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  th e re  i s  doubt about 
the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  such m o n e t a r i s t  mode ls  as th o s e  o f  Fr iedman and 
S chw ar tz  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and t h e  Un i ted  Kingdom. We need go no 
f u r t h e r  than to  look a t  the  assum pt ions  o f  the  F r i  edman-Schwartz model.
I f  economists are to  recommend t h e  use o f  moneta ry  p o l i c y  t o  c o n t r o l  
i n f l a t i o n ,  h ig h -p o w e re d  money s h o u ld  be a b le  t o  be considered as an 
exogenous p o l i c y  t o o l .  S p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  assumptions are t h a t  we should 
expec t  t h e  m one ta ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  a re  a b le  t o  i n f l u e n c e  (H) i n  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  t h e y  w i s h ,  t h a t  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  ( j ) be 
p r e d i c t a b le ,  and t h a t  p r o f i t - m a x i m i s i n g  b e h a v io u r  on th e  p a r t  o f  the 
banks keeps the a c tu a l  l e v e l  o f  the c o e f f i c i e n t  ( r )  a t  or  near i t s  lega l  
L i m i t ,  such t h a t  c h a n g e s  i n  ( r )  a r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by 
l e g i s l a t i o n  and not economic a c t i v i t y .  What we have c a l l e d  endogeneity 
o f  the money supply a r i s e s  when e i t h e r  o f  (H),  ( j ) o r  ( r )  are c o r re la te d  
in  some way w i th  economic a c t i v i t y ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  some or  a l l  o f  the 
above c o n d i t i o n s  not being f u l f i l l e d .  I n  f a c t  economic t h o u g h t  s in c e  
1979 (w h ic h  has been a p e r i o d  dom ina ted  by th e  cha irmanship  o f  Paul 
Vo lker  a t  the Federal  Reserve Board )  has in  f a c t  t r i e d  to  r e in s t a t e  (H) 
as an exogenous p o l i c y  t o o l .
The r a t i o  o f  cur rency to  depos i ts  (j ) was shown by Friedman and Schwartz 
t o  be an i m p o r t a n t  d e t e r m in a n t  o f  t h e  money s t o c k  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n  p e r i o d s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  when the p u b l i c  loses 
conf idence in  banks and t r i e s  t o  c o n v e r t  d e p o s i t s  i n t o  cu r rency .  But 
they conclude t h a t  s i n c e  t h e  i n c e p t i o n  o f  f e d e r a l  i n s u r a n c e  on bank 
d e p o s i t s  i n  1934,  ( j )  has not been sub jec t  to  d r a s t i c  changes and w i l l  
not  be in  the f u t u r e .  I t  would a l s o  seem t h a t  i n  the past the r a t i o  o f  
depos i ts  t o  reserves ( r )  has been o f  importance i n  pe r iods  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
d i f f i c u l t y .  Whenever the p u b l i c  has shown d i s t r u s t  o f  banks by seeking 
to  lower the d e p o s i t - c u r re n c y  r a t i o  ( j ) ,  banks have reacted by seeking 
to  s t rengthen t h e i r  reserves .  Friedman and Schwartz m a in ta in ,  however ,  
t h a t  over the Long-term the d e p o s i t - re s e rv e  r a t i o  has main ly  reacted 
to  changes on monetary a r rangements : -
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" I f  a d j u s t m e n t  1s made f o r  c h a n g e s  i n  L e g a l
requi rements ,  the r a t i o  i s  back to  i t s  Level o f  the
Late tw e n t ie s "  (5)
We s h a l l  see in  Chapter 4 t h a t  genera l ised  money s u p p ly  t h e o r i e s  adopt  
the behav ioura l  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s  o f  Friedman and Schwartz and do not take 
i n t o  accou n t  d r a i n s  o f  r e s e r v e s  i n t o  des i red  excess reserves a t  banks 
(a lso  c a l l e d  secondary  r e s e r v e s ) ,  as w e l l  as a d d i t i o n s  t o  re s e rv e s  
through bank bor rowing from the c e n t r a l  bank s in c e  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  
( r )  1s a t  o r  n e a r  i t s  l e g a l  L i m i t  ( 6 ) .  As we s h a l l  see ,  thes e  
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  the s im p le  bank d e p o s i t  m u l t i p l i e r  t h e o r i e s ,  which have 
emanated f rom Fr iedman and S c h w a r t z ,  have a d i r e c t  b e a r i n g  on t h e  
a n a ly s i s  o f  monetary developments i n  Kuwait .
T h e r e  i s  a l s o  a l a c k  o f  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i s m  1n r e c o g n i s i n g  t h e
c o m p l i c a t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between m one ta ry  and f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  The
a b i l i t y  o f  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  c o n t r o l  (H) i s  a d i f f e r e n t  ques t ion  
from the obse rva t ion  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  i t  may be th e  m a jo r  d e t e r m in a n t  
o f  changes i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f  money. P o l i t i c a l  rea l ism  i s  e s s e n t i a l  in  
desc r ib ing  the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p ro c e s s e s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  sec to r  o f  any 
economy s in c e  t h e  obs e rv e d  dependence o f  (H) i n  many economies on 
c e n t r a l  bank c r e d i t  o r  the p u b l i c  sec to r  borrowing requ i rement,  can so 
easi ly  Lead to  i t s  dominat ion by a c t i v i t y  in  o the r  economic s e c to rs .  We 
have seen, f o r  example ,  i n  t h e  case o f  t h e  U . K . ,  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  
1979-81 , a high degree o f  money s u p p ly  g row th  and h ig h - p o w e re d  money 
g row th  due t o  t h e  la rg e  p u b l i c  sec to r  borrowing requi rement (PSBR), in  
p a r t i c u l a r  due to  Large advances t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r i e s  by the 
Treasury ( 7 ) .  L ikewise s ince  money supp ly t a r g e t i n g  by the Federa l  Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) began in  1979, the  U.S. government has faced the  
di Lemma o f  a Large budge t  d e f i c i t  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  need t o  reduce
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  t o  encourage economic a c t i v i t y .  Such a dilemma should 
mean t h a t  unless money supply g row th  i s  running w i t h i n  the t a r g e t  range 
set  by the FOMC, e i t h e r  i t  would not be ab le  to  keep (H) a t  a Leve l  i t  
wou ld  c o n s i d e r  i d e a l  o r  economic g row th  s u f f e r s .  In  o the r  words,  i f  
f i s c a l  p o l i c y  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e )  i s  rende red  
i n f l e x i b l e  by var ious  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e s ,  then  i n  t h e  j a r g o n  o f  th e  
p o I i c y - a L  l o c a t i o n  m ode ls ,  moneta ry  p o l i c y  w i l l  be c h a s in g  s e v e r a l  
d i f f e r e n t  goals ( 8 ) .  The i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  ra th e r  s imple p o in t s  i s  
c l e a r l y  t h a t  some doub ts  can be c a s t  on m o n e t a r i s t  models  and t h e i r  
e x p l i c i t  o r  i m p l i c i t  c o n c l u s i o n s  t h a t  high-powered money (H) (and by 
im p l i c a t i o n ,  in  the c o n t e x t  o f  t h e s e  m ode ls ,  t h e  money supp ly )  can be 
considered an exogenous p o l i c y  t o o l .
i  i  i ) THE THEORY OF MONEY AND MONETARY EXPERIENCE 
IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
The p o t e n t i a l  endogen e i ty  o f  t h e  money s u p p ly  i s  re n d e re d  even more 
p rob lem at ic  i n  develop ing economies by t h e i r  rudimentary  and i n e f f i c i e n t  
I n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  P r i n c i p a l l y ,  deve lop ing economies are o f te n  
fac ed  w i t h  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on d e v e l o p m e n t ,  c r i s e s ,  o r  even p o s s i b l y  
m i l i t a r y  adventures f a r  beyond the  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  t a x a t i o n  
sys tem o r  t h e i r  do m e s t ic  c a p i t a l  markets to  ra is e  funds .  The t o o l  o f  
monetary p o l i c y  i n  t h e s e  economies t h e r e f o r e  becomes th e  p r i n c i p a l  
c ru tch  o f  government and i s  consequent ly  not on ly  im po ten t l y  chasing too 
many goa ls ,  but  a lso c o n s t i t u t e s  a major source o f  development f i n a n c e .  
T h i s  dependence o f  government  on c e n t r a l  bank advances has led t o  the 
w e l l - d o c u m e n te d  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  c r i s e s ,  d e v a l u a t i o n s ,  t r a d e  and 
exchange c o n t r o l s  and i n f l a t i o n ,  wh ich  H a rb e rg e r  sees as t h e  u s u a l  
r e s u l t  o f  such p o l i c i e s  in  deve lop ing economies ( 9 ) .
I f  we r e t u r n  te m p o ra r i l y  to  the f ramework o f  the proximate determinan ts  
approach, high-powered money (H) i t s e l f  i s  e sum o f  separable components 
j u s t  as t h i s  approach wou ld  have t h e  nom ina l  money s t o c k  be. Among 
these components a re  some t h a t  a re  i n f l u e n c e d  by f o r e i g n  t r a d e  and 
c a p i t a l  f l o w s .  On th e  l i a b i l i t i e s  s id e  o f  t h e  b a lanc e  s hee t  o f  a 
c e n t r a l  bank would be c u r r e n c y  i s s u e d  and commerc ia l  bank depos i t s  a t  
the c e n t r a l  bank ,  w h i l e  t h e  a s s e t s  s i d e  would  i n c l u d e  c e n t r a l  bank 
a d v a n c e s  t o  t h e  government  ( o r  government  s e c u r i t i e s )  and f o r e i g n  
exchange r e s e r v e s .  T h i s  i s  a s i m p l i s t i c  p i c t u r e  bu t  one wh ich  i s  
im por tan t  i n  our d iscuss ions  in  the coming sec t ion  which focuses on th e  
v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  s m a l l  open economies t o  e x t e r n a l  s h o c k s .  I n  what 
f o l l o w s ,  i t  w i l l  become c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on d e v e lo p in g  
economies does on balance see the money s t o c k  as endogenous and hence 
o n l y  a s c r i b e s  c e r t a i n  l i m i t e d  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  t h e  use o f  monetary 
p o l i c y  i n  these c o u n t r i e s .
a ) The Impact o f  the BaLance o f  Payments on the Money 
Stock o f  Developing Economies
There are many d i f f e r e n t  types o f  economic l i t e r a t u r e  which are re le v a n t  
to  the  ques t ion  o f  the  i n f l u e n c e  o f  a c o u n t r y ' s  balance o f  payments on 
i t s  money s tock .  We discuss v a r i o u s l y : -
i )  Po lak - type  models,
i i )  p o l i c y - a l l o c a t i o n  models,  and,
i i i )  the currency-board  economy l i t e r a t u r e .
The t h re e  t y p e s  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  w i l l  make up t h e  raw m a t e r i a l  o f  ou r  
t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a ly s i s  i n  t h i s  and the coming chap te rs ,  in  our a n a ly s i s  o f  
Kuwa i t  wh ich i s  a s m a l l  open economy, al though not a t y p i c a l  one. We 
summarize the issues ra ised  i n  the L i t e r a t u r e  in  sub -sec t ion  (c)  below.
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J . J .  P o la k  (10)  d e v e lo p e d  e m o d e l  w h i c h  can be used t o  show th e  
dependence o f  h igh-powered money (H) on the balance o f  payments i n  t h e  
case o f  s m a l l  open economies. The Polak model b a s i c a l l y  shows us t h a t  
l o n g - te rm  money s u p p ly  g row th  can o n l y  be based on an expa n s io n  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e r v e s  as a r e s u l t  o f  e i t h e r  i n c r e a s e d  e x p o r t s  o r  
c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s .  I n  t h i s  m ode l ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  d om es t ic  c r e d i t  
e x pa ns io n  i n  excess o f  t h e  demand f o r  money w i l l  leak  o u t  i n  t h e  
Long-run 1n the form o f  in c rea s ed  I m p o r t s .  I n  a L a te r  a r t i c l e  P o la k  
shows t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s ,  r e s u l t i n g  from the dec l in e  in  
domest ic i n t e r e s t  ra tes  assoc ia ted  w i th  money supp ly expansion, can also 
represent  an im por tan t  e x t e r n a l  le a k  ( 1 1 ) .  However, a t  t h i s  p o in t  our 
i n t e r e s t  i s  l i m i t e d  to  the broad r e la t i o n s h ip s  suggested by t h i s  model 
and t o  t h e i r  p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  P o l a k ' s  a n a l y s i s  i s  s e t  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  a f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r e g i m e ,  w he re  t h e r e  e x i s t s  p e r f e c t  
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  between domest ic and f o re ig n  c u r r e n c ie s  on t h e  s u p p ly  
s id e .
The o r th o d o x  po 11 c y -a  I l o c a t i  on L i t e r a t u r e  (12) c o n s t ru c ts  a general  
p i c t u r e  o f  an economy and d i s c u s s e s ,  i n  t h e o r e t i c a l  te rm s ,  ass ign ing  
p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t s  t o  t h a t  t a r g e t  where th e y  wouLd have a r e l a t i v e  
a d v a n ta g e .  These models  a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  s ho r t - te rm  and Look a t  both 
f i x e d  and f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e  r e g im e s .  In  bo th  cases the  exchange 
ra te  i s  not seen to  be a v a i l a b le  as a p o l i c y  i n s t r u m e n t .  Governments 
are concerned over the Level o f  employment ( the i n t e r n a l  balance t a r g e t )  
and t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  balance o f  payments ( the e x te rn a l  balance t a r g e t )  
and have on ly  two i n s t r u m e n t s  a t  t h e i r  d i s p o s a l :  monetary  and f i s c a l  
p o l i c y .  A l t h o u g h  th e s e  models  a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i  Ly conce rned  abo u t  
d e v e lo p in g  econom ies ,  one o f  t h e i r  assumptions i s  t h a t  the economy in  
quest ion i s  a smal l  open economy. The o t h e r  two major assumptions are
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t h a t  the c u r re n t  account i n  the balance o f  payments i s  d e te rm in e d  o n l y  
by t h e  l e v e l  o f  o u t p u t  and n o t  by the composi t ion o f  o u tpu t ,  and t h a t  
c a p i t a l  f lows a re  i n f l u e n c e d  o n l y  by r e l a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a te s .  I t  i s  
a c t u a l l y  the na ture  o f  c a p i t a l  f lows  t h a t  in f lu e n c e s  the outcome o f  th e  
a s s i g n m e n t  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  a l l o c a t i o n  m ode ls .  I f  c a p i t a l  
m o b i l i t y  i s  low ( i n  o t h e r  words i t s  i n t e r e s t  e l a s t i c i t y  i s  low) then 
these models conclude t h a t  m oneta ry  p o l i c y  s h o u ld  be a s s ig n e d  t o  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  t a r g e t  and f i s c a l  p o l i c y  to  the i n t e r n a l  t a r g e t .  The reverse 
i s  t r u e  i f  c a p i t a l  m o b i l i t y  i s  h ig h .  But what i n t e r e s t s  us p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i s  t h e  work  o f  J .  Marcus F l e m i n g .  F le m in g ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  R obe r t  
Munde l l ,  i s  more concerned t h a t ,  f o r  a given degree o f  c a p i t a l  m o b i l i t y .
"The e x p a n s io n a r y  e f f e c t  o f  a g i v e n  i n c r e a s e  i n  
money s u p p ly  w i l l  always be g re a te r  i f  the boundary 
has a f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e  than i f  i t  has a f i x e d  
r a te "  (13 ) .
In  t h i s  sense, t h e r e fo r e ,  F lem ing 's  paper i s  complementary t o  t h e  work  
o f  P o la k ,  wh ich  i s  conce rned  w i t h  the i n a b i l i t y  o f  monetary p o l i c y  to  
i n f l u e n c e  domestic incomes i n  the  Long-term i f  t he re  i s  e f i x e d  exchange 
r a te .
Where the r e s u l t s  o f  the po I i  c y - a  I l o c e t  i on l i t e r a t u r e  are q u a l i f i e d  by 
the general  na ture  o f  the  assumptions o f  these models, Po lak - type  models 
have more d e f i n i t e  and t h e r e fo r e  u s e fu l  r e s u l t s .  Such r e s u l t s  a re  o n l y  
p o s s i b l e  because o f  the g re a te r  d e t a i l  achieved in  the c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  
the economy we are supposed t o  be a n a l y s i n g  i n  the Po lak s e t t i n g .  The 
v a lu e  o f  th e s e  r e s u l t s  dep ends  p r i n c i p a l l y  upon w h e t h e r  s t a b L e  
p a r a m e t e r s  f o r  t h e  b e h a v i o u r a l  e q u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  P o la k  m ode l ,  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  demand f o r  money and t h e  i m p o r t  f u n c t i o n s  can be
i d e n t i f i e d  from pas t  e x p e r i e n c e  and used w i t h  c o n f i d e n c e  f o r  f u t u r e  
p r e d i c t i o n  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  economy. The nom in a l  s t o c k  o f  money in  
c i r c u l a t i o n  i s  assumed t o  be a c o n s t a n t  f u n c t i o n  o f  income. Th is  i s  
p o s s ib l y  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s h o r t - t e r m  f u n c t i o n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  g i v e n  th e  
s t r o n g  ev idence t h a t  Friedman and Schwartz found f o r  a s t a b le ,  a l though 
c y c l i c a l ,  v e l o c i t y  o f  money. I n  s u b - s e c t i o n  b)  below and l a t e r  on in  
Chapter 3,  however, we s h a l l  be d iscuss ing  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s e c u l a r  
changes i n  t h e  v e l o c i t y  o f  money. C e r t a in l y  i n  the case o f  Kuwait we 
can see a d e c l i n in g  i f  e r r a t i c  t r e n d  i n  t h e  v e l o c i t y  o f  money in  Table 
3 : 5 . The second most im por tan t  assumption o f  t h e  P o la k  model i s  t h e  
s ta b le  r e la t i o n s h ip  between im por ts  and income.
We need,  however ,  t o  lo o k  a t  some e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a rc h  and r e s u l t s  on 
these ques t ions .  J .R. King uses t h e  P o lak  model to  t e s t  data f o r  Kenya 
on the  pe r iod  1963-73 (1 4 ) .  He shows us how a change o f  p o l i c y  i n  1968 
le d  t o  expansionary monetary p o l i c y  which had on ly  temporary b e n e f i c i a l  
r e s u l t s  on economic a c t i v i t y  and Led to  e fo re ig n  exchange c r i s i s .
" . . .  c r e d i t  expansion t o  the  government have on ly  a 
smal l  and temporary e f f e c t  upon p r i c e s  and economic 
a c t i v i t y .  T h a i r  p e r m a n e n t  e f f e c t  i s  upon th e  
fo re ig n  reserve p o s i t i o n .  So i f  the government se ts  
i t s e l f  a minimum t a r g e t  f o r  t h e  l e v e l  o f  f o r e i g n  
r e s e r v e s ,  I t  i s  s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m a t t e r  t o  
c a l c u l a t e  t h e  maximum c r e d i t  expansion t h a t  can be 
sus ta ined "  (15)
Th is  bears out some o f  the  more general  e m p i r i c a l  conc lus ions  reached by 
J . J .  Po lak and L. B o is s o n n e a u I t  i n  t h e i r  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  o f  the Polak 
model (1 6 ) .  Polak and Boi ssonneau I t  found t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  d o m e s t i c
c r e d i t  expansion w i l l  lead to  an equ iva len t  loss o f  reserves a f t e r  th ree  
years ,  and t h a t  dur ing t h a t  per iod  money w i l l  have a temporary e f f e c t  on 
nominal  income.
The lags  d i s c o v e r e d  by P o la k  and Boi ssonneau I t  would imply t h a t  i t  i s  
p o s s ib le  t o  use monetary p o l i c y  i n  a c o n t r a c y c l i c a l  sense, to  o f f s e t  the 
temporary e f f e c t s  o f  changes i n  t h e  e x t e r n a l  b a la n c e  on t h e  nominal 
income o f  a small  open economy. J .R.  King, i n  h i s  study on Kenya, does 
reach t h e  conclus ion t h a t  given the  minimum t a rg e t  f o r  f o re ig n  exchange 
reserves t h a t  i s  s t i p u l a t e d  i n  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kenya A c t ,  the on ly  
safe r u l e  f o r  c r e d i t  e xpa ns io n  i n  t h e  long  run i s  t h a t  none a t  a l l  
s h o u ld  be u n d e r ta k e n .  Th is  conc lus ion  n a t u r a l l y  has to  be read i n  the 
c o n t e x t  o f  a c o n s t a n t  v e l o c i t y  e s s u m p t i o n .  I t  a l s o  i g n o r e s  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c r e d i t  expansion accompany ing a r i s e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e s e r v e s .  N e v e r t h e le s s ,  he does p o i n t  ou t  v e ry  c l e a r l y  t h a t  t h i s  
conc lus ion  does not r u le  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  us ing c r e d i t  expansion 
as an a n t i - c y c l i c a l  d e v i c e ,  w i t h  any b o r r o w in g  i n  a r e c e s s io n  b e in g  
f u l l y  repa id  i n  the recovery phese o f  the c y c le .
The r o l e  o f  con t  ra c y c  Li ca I monetary  p o l i c y  has been discussed in  the 
economic l i t e r a t u r e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  c o l o n i a l  o r  " c u r r e n c y - b o a r d "  
economies. A pure currency-board  economy i s  one where t h e r e  e x i s t s  a 
one hundred per cent note issue cover r u le  which by d e f i n i t i o n  preven ts  
f o re ig n  exchange c r i s e s  a t  the expense o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  the c o u n t r y ' s  
nominal  income. Most o f  th e  d i s c u s s i o n s  abou t  c u r r e n c y  boa rds  t a k e  
p l a c e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  s m e l l  open economies, al though c e r t a i n l y  not 
a l l .  The prob lems o f  t h e  I n d i a n  mone ta ry  system i n  t h e  n in e t e e n t h  
century  which we touched on b r i e f l y  i n  C h ap te r  1 i s  an example o f  an 
e x c e p t i o n .  A g r e a t  d e a l  o f  research i s  a v a i l a b le ,  however, on Malaya 
and Singapore which i s  r e le v a n t  t o  t h e  sm a l l  open economy. The case o f
the smal l  open economy a t t r a c t s  our i n t e r e s t  due to  i t s  d i r e c t  re levance 
t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  K u w a i t ' s  economy. The c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  system 
in v o l v i n g  the hundred per c e n t  no te  i s s u e  cover  ru le  was the system o f  
monetary management w ide ly  a p p l ied  in  the co lon ies  o f  the B r i t i s h  Empire 
du r ing  the n ine teen th  and e a r l y  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu r ie s .  A r t h u r  Hazelwood 
d iscusses t h i s  system and says t h a t : -
" L o c a l  c u r r e n c y ,  such  as West A f r i c a n  pounds,
Jamaican pounds, o r  Malayan d o l l a r s ,  i s  issued by a 
cur rency a u t h o r i t y  i n  exchange f o r  s t e r l i n g  a t  a 
f i x e d  r a t e .  The cu r rency  a u t h o r i t y  also stands to  
pay ou t  s t e r l i n g  i n  exchange f o r  l o c a l  cur rency a t  
the 6ame r a te "  (17)
The p ro p o r t i o n  o f  reserves t h a t  were he ld  as s t e r l i n g  assets as opposed 
t o  b e i n g  i n v e s t e d  i n  g o l d ,  i n c r e a s e d  i n  most o f  t h e  c o l o n i e s  and 
p r o te c to ra te s  o f  B r i t a i n  throughout  the n ine teen th  cen tu ry .
Research on Malaya and S in g a p o re  has shown, however,  t h a t  c o n t ra ry  to  
expe c ta t io ns  a high c o r r e l a t i o n  between the balance o f  payments and t h e  
money s u p p l y  t h a t  i s  t h e  no rm a l  r e s u l t  o f  s t r i c t  cur rency-board  type 
monetary management has never  h e l d  i n  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m .  Wong's model o f  
S ingapore 's  monetary sec to r  shows us f o r  ins tance t h a t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
between t h e  ba la n c e  o f  payments and domestic c r e d i t  expansion depended 
on the behav iour  o f  t h e  banks ( 1 8 ) .  Be tz  d e a ls  w i t h  t h i s  problem in  
more d e t a i l  i n  h i s  study o f  Malaya and Singapore (19 ) .  He d em on s t ra te s  
t h a t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  between the  balance o f  payments and money supp ly 
need not  ho ld  a t  a l l  in  a c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  economy because o f  v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  the behav iou ra l  f u n c t io n s  t h a t  determine t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r .  I n  
our d iscuss ion  o f  the prox imate determinants  these behav ioura l  f u n c t io n s
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were represented by the c o e f f i c i e n t s  ( j )  and ( r ) .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t h e r e fo r e  in  the case o f  Malaya and Singapore,  Betz po in ted  out t h a t  the 
c o e f f i c i e n t  ( r )  o r  the bank reserve r a t i o  and f o re ig n  exchange ho ld ings  
o f  the  commercial  b a n k in g  system c o u ld  be m a n ip u la te d  by the fo re ig n  
banks, which dominated the  banking system.
Drake a lso  discusses the  behaviour  o f  f o r e i g n  banks i n  c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  
economies bu t  i n  a more g e n e r a l  sense (20 ) .  He saw t h a t  i t  was q u i t e  
p o s s ib le  f o r  such banks t o  ex te n d  c r e d i t  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  the fo re ig n  
exchange ho ld ings  o f  the cur rency-board  o f  the coun try  i n  q u e s t i o n .  In  
h i s  research on Malaya and Singapore,  Drake s ta te s  t h a t : -
"The  p r i m e  f a c t o r  i n  money c r e a t i o n  unde r  t h e  
Malayan system has h i s t o r i c a l l y  been the balance o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e c e ip t s  and payments . . .  But t h i s  i s  
not the whole s t o r y .  The money s u p p ly  i s  n e i t h e r  
100 pe r  cen t  backed by f o r e i g n  assets  nor does i t  
represent  a cumula ted  b a la n c e  o f  payments s u rp lu s ,  
because o f  the domest ic  l e n d in g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  
commercial banks" (21)
However, he recognises  t h a t ,  i n  genera l ,  f o re ig n  banks would on ly  extend 
c r e d i t  t o  f o r e i g n  e n t e r p r i s e s .  These e n t e r p r i s e s ,  however ,  wou ld  
h i s t o r i c a l l y  have been c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  f o r e ig n  t rad e  sec to r  o f  the 
coun t ry  i n  ques t ion ,  and t h e r e fo re  t h e i r  c r e d i t  r e q u i r e m e n ts  w ou ld  be 
p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i th  the baLance o f  payments. Again in  the  case 
o f  Malaya and S inga po re : -
" I n  t h e o r y  t h e r e  1s no reason  why t h e  e x p a t r i a t e  
banks c o u ld  n o t  draw s t e r l i n g  r e s e r v e s  i n t o  t h e
system by bor rowing from t h e i r  London o f f i c e s "  (22 ) ,
and
" t h e  Lending o f  e x p a t r i a t e  banks was p o s i t i v e l y  
c o r re la te d  w i th  th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t ra d e "  (23) .
Much more re c e n t ly  i n  the case o f  L i b e r i a ,  G e o f f r e y  Maynard has shown 
s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  and seems to  have a very good reason why fo re ig n  banks 
do not p lay  an impor tan t  p a r t  i n  f in a n c in g  d e f i c i t s  and surp luses  i n  the 
L ib e r ia n  balance o f  payments:-
Foreign owned banks wh ich  may be s t r o n g  enough to 
bear  t h e  Losses a r i s i n g  i n  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  s m a l l  
c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  L i b e r i a  have to  take account o f  the 
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e i r  shareho lders"  (24)
We saw c l e a r l y  i n  C h ap te r  1 i n  t h e  case o f  I r a q  and Ku w a i t  t h a t  the 
fo re ig n  banks would on ly  lend to  the t rade  sec to r  and we s ta te d  evidence 
o f  t h i s  ( 2 5 ) .  The s a r r a f s  ( o r  m oney-changers )  who d i d  g i v e  c r e d i t  
i n t e r n a l l y  i n  I r a q  and the Persian  G u l f  c o u n t r ie s  were an i n s i g n f i c a n t  
f a c t o r  compared to  the f o r e i g n  banks .  Drake and o the rs  have a lso seen 
t h i s  i n  the case o f  most c o l o n i a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  and p r o t e c t o r a t e s : -
"Banking b u s in e s s  i n  t h e  c o l o n i a l  t e r r i t o r i e s  i s  
dominated by branches o f  e x p a t r i a te  banks" (26)
I t  has been m a in ta in e d  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  sys tem ,  ope ra te d  by 
B r i t a i n  in  i t s  co lon ies  and p r o t e c t o r a t e s  was d e f l a t i o n a r y .  Hazelwood
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c la ims t h a t : -
" I t  i s  u n d e r s ta n d a b le  t h a t  c o l o n i a l  gove rnm en ts  
sh o u ld  see an advantage in  having an assured income 
from S t e r l i n g  s e c u r i t i e s  i n s t e a d  o f  the promise o f  
lo c a l  development . . .  But w h i le  such an a t t i t u d e  i s  
understandable,  i t  i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o r r e c t .  The 
s i t u a t i o n  c o u l d ,  p e rh a p s ,  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as one 
where a divergence e x i s t s  between the " p r i v a t e "  and 
the " s o c i a l "  b e n e f i t s  o f  economic development and in  
wh ich  g o v e r n m e n ts  a r e  m o t i v a t e d  by " p r i v a t e "  
c r i t e r i a .  I f  i n  f a c t  no such divergence e x i s t s ,  and 
i f  i t  i s  i n  t h e  " s o c i a l "  i n t e r e s t  o f  a co lony  to  
i n v e s t  i t s  s u r p l u s  fu n d s  i n  s t e r l i n g ,  i t  s u r e l y  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  the co lony  i s  n o t  i n  need o f  c a p i t a l  
from abroad" (27)
Drake d i s c u s s e s  t h e  advantages o f  the currency-board  system. I t  would 
seem to  a l low  a country  th e  en joym en t  o f  t h e  symbol ic  value o f  i t s  own 
cur rency and to  avo id  the  o p p o r tu n i t y  c o s t  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  use o f  
another  currency which we saw in  our d iscuss ion  o f  seignorage in  Chapter 
2 .  The i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r y  now ho ld  l o c a l  notes and 
co in  and the board ho lds the  f o r e i g n  c u r re n c y ,  which has been earned by 
the  net export  o f  goods, s e rv ices  o r  p rope r ty  r i g h t s ,  i e .  by a ba lance  
o f  payments s u r p l u s .  Bu t  whereas the lo c a l  pop u la t ion  would h i t h e r t o  
have h e ld  p h y s i c a l  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  t h a t  earned no i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  
currency-board need not do so. I t  would appear t o  have s u f f i c e d  f o r  the 
currency-board to  have he ld  som e th ing  l i k e  one t h i r d  o f  t h e  c u r r e n c y  
b a c k in g  i n  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  a g a in s t  c o n v e rs io n  con t ingenc ies  (28 ) .  But
Drake then goes on to  agree w i th  Hazelwood t h a t  cur rency-board  economies 
o f  the most r i g i d  form have many d i s a d v a n ta g e s ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  t h a t  tha 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  cannot d i r e c t  the  cur rency reserve In to  l o c a l  asset 
fo rm a t ion  but in s te a d  must be h e ld  i n  t h e  fo rm o f  f o r e i g n  r e s e r v e s .  
O t h e r  r e l a t e d  d i s a d v a n ta g e s  would  seem t o  be t h a t  c o n t r a c y c  I1ca I 
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  c a n n o t  be  e n g i n e e r e d  by any d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
c r e a t i o n / e x t i n c t i o n  o f  money v i a  t h e  c u r r e n c y - b o a r d .  S e c o n d ly ,  th e  
system s u f f e r s  from a b u i l t - i n  d e f l a t i o n a r y  b ias  whenever the ou tpu t  o f  
the  economy expands w i th o u t  any s im u l ta n e o u s  improvement i n  the  balance 
o f  payments .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  f i x e d  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  e m b o d ie d  i n  t h e  
c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  sys tem l i m i t s  t h e  scope f o r  fend ing  o f f  p r i c e  changes 
o r i g i n a t i n g  abroad.
Grove and Exeter d iscuss the  case o f  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e  C en t ra l  Bank Act o f  
June 15, 1948, when the hundred per cent note cover r u l e  was a b o l i s h e d  
and a new f l e x i b l e  r u le  voted i n .  Th is  was an im po r tan t  example o f  the 
end o f  a c u r re n c y -b o a rd  sys tem and th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a new independent 
c e n t r a l  bank. The reason f o r  t h i s  L e g is l a t i o n  in  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  was, 
1n t h e i r  own w ords : -
" t o  accommodate t h e  c r e d i t  needs o f  a v ig o ro u s ly
growing economy" (29 ) .
But a l though  an in d e p e n d e n t  c e n t r a l  bank may s e l e c t  i t s  own asse ts ,  
c r e a t e  money w i t h o u t  l i m i t  by b u y in g  L o c a l  s e c u r i t i e s  o r  m a k in g  
advances ,  h o ld  a l L  th e  n a t io n a l  s tock  o f  fo re ig n  exchange, and c o n t r o l  
the n a t i o n ' s  exchange ra te  by b u y in g  and s e l l i n g  f o re ig n  cur rency as a 
monopo l is t ,  we have seen i n  t h e  re s e a rc h  o f  J . J .  P o la k  and J . R .  K ing  
t h a t  th e  b a lanc e  o f  payments  rem a ins  an i m p o r t a n t  c o n s t r a in t  on the 
o p e r a t i o n s  o f  such a c e n t r a l  bank ,  s h o u ld  i t s  i n t e n t i o n s  be t o  use
management o f  t h e  money s u p p ly  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  o u t p u t  and 
employment in  a cou n t r y .
Drake discusses how in  deve lop ing economies today,  given the c o n s t r a in t s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  research o f  J . J .  Polak and J.R. King,  c e n t r a l  banks 
can be made to  o f f s e t  temporary negat ive  e f f e c t s  o f  the e x te rn a l  balance 
on t h e  economy and t o  overcome t h e  d e f l a t i o n a r y  b i a s  o f  t h e  r i g i d  
cur rency-board regime. He cons iders  i t  must be o b v io u s  t h a t  f o r  many 
c o u n t r i e s  n e i t h e r  extreme r i g i d i t y  nor t o t a l  d i s c r e t i o n  on the p a r t  o f  
the c e n t r a l  bank i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  and t h a t  some compromise i s  the  best 
s o l u t i o n .  His idea o f  a l l o w i n g  mone ta ry  p o l i c y  t o  d e v i a t e  f rom th e  
h u n d r e d  p e r  c e n t  n o t e  i s s u e  c o v e r  r u l e  by a l l o w i n g  t h e  mone ta ry  
a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  i s s u e  n o te s  a g a i n s t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  asse ts ,  
t h e r e b y  i n d u c i n g  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n  i n  t i m e s  o f  n e g a t i v e  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  on t h e  e x t e r n a l  f r o n t ,  wou ld  a l l o w  d o m e s t ic  c r e d i t  
expansion to  o f f s e t  the im pac t  o f  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  payments on the  money 
s u p p l y ,  and t h e r e f o r e  on n om in a l  income.  I n  L ine  w i t h  P o l a k  and 
Boi 'ssoneau I t 1 s r e s e a r c h  (30)  Drake emphasises t h a t  such p o l i c i e s  can 
on ly  be u s e fu l  i n  the s h o r t - t e r m : -
" I t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  a p p r e c i a t e d  t h a t  some
a n t i - c y c l i c a l  monetary p o l i c y  i s  poss ib le  even i n  a
c u r r e n c y  boa rd  c o u n t r y .  The l i n k  between e x te rn a l  
reserves and money makes c o u n t e r - c y c l i c a l  monetary 
p o l i c y  d i f f i c u l t  but  not im p o s s ib le " .  (31)
b) The R e la t io n s h ip  Between Money SuddI v and Growth in  Developing
Economies
A Large l i t e r a t u r e  has grown up p la c in g  a g r e a t  dea l  o f  im p o r ta n c e  on
t h e  r o l e  o f  money and m one ta ry  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  g row th  p r o c e s s .  T h i s
L i t e r a t u r e  has focused on the e q u i l i b r i u m  i n t e r e s t  r a te  i n  a deve lop ing 
economy, bu t  c h i e f l y  i n  c a p i t a l - s c a r c e ,  h ig h  p o p u l a t i o n  d e v e lo p in g  
economies. The no t ion  o f  an e q u i l i b r i u m  i n t e r e s t  ra te  i n  a h ig h - s u r p lu s ,  
low popu la t ion  economy, such as t h a t  o f  Kuwait i s  not o f  concern in  t h i s  
L i t e r a t u r e  a l t h o u g h  i t  may be o f  i n d i r e c t  r e le v a n c e  as we s h a l l  see 
l a t e r .  As we po in ted  o u t  above ,  t h e  poor  re s o u rc e s  o f  governments i n  
deve lop ing  economies wh ich  a re  to o  weak t o  use t a x e s  t o  g e n e r a te  a 
s u r p l u s ,  has made mone ta ry  p o l i c y  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  c ru tc h  (3 2 ) .  In  a 
k i n d  o f  sympathy w i t h  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ,  t h e  " i n f l a t i o n  t a x "  
l i t e r a t u r e  p romotes  t h e  Idea  o f  d e f i c i t  f i n a n c i n g  f o r  d e v e lo p m e n t  
e x p e n d i t u r e  and 1s q u i t e  w e l l  e s ta b l is h e d  (33 ) .  Meanwhile, Newlyn has 
a rgued f o r  t h e  r e l a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  such  d e f i c i t  f i n a n c i n g  i n  
d e v e lo p in g  economies ( 3 4 ) .  However,  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  more  r e c e n t  
s o - c a l l e d  " f i n a n c i a l  r e p r e s s i o n "  l i t e r a t u r e  p o i n t s  out the  cos ts  o f  
pursu ing such p o l i c i e s  ( 3 5 ) .  T h i s  c o n f l i c t  o f  views over  the cos ts  and 
b e n e f i t s  o f  i n f l a t i o n  f o r  a d e v e lo p in g  economy i s  based on d i f f e r e n t  
t h e o r e t i c a l  a p p r o c h e s  t o  t h e  probLem. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  u s u a l  
n e o -c la s s ic a l  approach t o  g row th  i n  d e v e lo p in g  economies f a i l s  to  see 
the c o r re c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between p h y s i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  i n  a 
d e v e l o p i n g  economy,  and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  r e a l  money b a la n c e s  a re  an 
im por tan t  i n p u t  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  o f  an economy ( 3 6 ) .  The 
f i n a n c i a l  repress ion  l i t e r a t u r e  se ts  out to  t r y  and redress t h i s .
E.S. Shaw has w r i t t e n  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  success  o f  t h e  South  Korean 
economy i n  the 1960 's ,  which was a decade o f  fundamental  t ra n s fo rm a t io n  
f o r  t h a t  coun t ry ,  was due t o  u s i n g  t h e  do m e s t ic  c a p i t a l  markets as an 
engine o f  growth.  Th is  had in vo lve d  re le a s in g  the b a n k in g  sys tem f rom 
p r e v i o u s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and a l l o w i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t o  r i s e  t o  
unprecedented le v e ls  ( 3 7 ) .  Gur ley and Shaw showed t h a t  what m at te rs  f o r  
development i s  the ex is tence  o f  c h a n n e ls  through which the resources o f
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su rp lu s  u n i t s  are t ra n s m i t t e d  to  the h ighes t  y i e l d i n g  inves tm en ts  ( 3 8 ) .  
McKinnon deve loped  a model o f  growth where money and c a p i t a l - f o r m a t i o n  
a re  shown t o  be c o m p le m e n ta r y  r a t h e r  t h a n  c o m p e t i t i v e  as i n  th e  
n e o -c la s s ic a l  models o f  growth (39 ) .  Using Gurley and Shaw's concept o f  
" i n s id e  money" McKinnon exp la ined t h a t  the money s tock  i s  a l i a b i l i t y  o f  
the banking systenj, and i s  l e n t  o u t  by banks t o  d e f i c i t  u n i t s  i n  t h e  
economy. I t  cannot on ly  be considered un ique ly  as an asset  o r  "ou ts ide  
money", which i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  a s s e s s in g  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  r e a l  money 
b a la n c e s  as an i n p u t  i n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  e con om y .  
K h a th k a te  (40)  and T h i r l w a l l  (41)  a l s o  d i s c u s s  th e  same prob lem in  
d i f f e r e n t  terms, and coined the  phrase t h a t  money serves as a " c o n d u i t " ,  
where, s ince  inves tmen t  i n  machines i s ,  by i t s  ve ry  na tu re ,  lumpy, i t  
requ i res  the accumulat ion o f  money balances over t ime to  precede the act  
o f  investment.
The im p l i c a t i o n  o f  a l l  t h i s  i s  t h a t  lower i n t e r e s t  r a te s ,  e i t h e r  through 
r e g u la t i o n  o r  an expansionary moneta ry  p o l i c y  a re  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  an 
encouragement  to  increased c a p i t a l  investment.  The condu i t  models show 
th a t  the monet iza t ion  o f  a s u b s i s t e n c e  economy would aLLow the  v i c i o u s  
c i r c l e  o f  s e l f - f i n a n c i n g  to  be broken. As an economy expands, p e r s o n a l  
c o n t a c t s  a re  no lo n g e r  the bas is  f o r  investment and in fo rm a l  o r  d i r e c t  
fo rm s  o f  l e n d in g  and b o r r o w i n g  a r e  s u b s t i t u t e d  by i n d i r e c t  fo rms 
i n v o l v i n g  th e  use o f  money. Replacement  o f  d i r e c t  l e n d in g  by bank 
i n t e r m e d i a t i o n  r a i s e s  t h e  r a t i o  o f  money t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  income and 
th e r e fo re  money c re a t io n  i t s e l f  i s  t h e  channel f o r  sav ings  which Gurley 
and Shaw in d ic a te d  to  be c r u c i a l  f o r  development.
Em p i r i ca l  evidence tends to  suppor t  t h i s  t h e s i s : -
As re g a rd s  t h e  n e o c l a s s i c a l  p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  an
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money- income r a t i o  w i l l  reduce 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i t y  and o u t p u t  growth r a te ,  i t  can be 
mentioned t h a t  the e m p i r i c a l  ev idence  s u g g e s ts  th e  
o p p o s i t e ;  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  s a v in g s  
r a t i o  and the money-i ncome r a t i o  i n  the long run i s  
found to  be p o s i t i v e "  (42 ) .
However, the fundamental  argument here i s  t h a t  re a l  r e s o u rc e s  f r e e d  by 
th e  rep la c e m e n t  o f  d i r e c t  lending by bank in te r m e d ia t i o n ,  r e f l e c t s  the  
r e a l  q u a n t i t y  o f  money h e l d  and c a n n o t  be f o r c e d  by th e  m oneta ry  
a u t h o r i t i e s  s imply  supp ly ing  more nominal  money. The a c c u m u la t io n  o f  
money b a la n c e s  by s a v e rs  t h e r e f o r e  wou ld  seem to  depend on the re a l  
i n t e r e s t  ra te  (a product  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and nominal  i n t e r e s t  
ra tes )  and such money balances s h o u ld ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e s e  m ode ls ,  be 
a l l o c a t e d  by t h e  b a n k in g  system to  the h ighes t  y i e l d i n g  p r o je c t s  such 
t h a t  funds  a r e  e f f i c i e n t l y  e m p lo y e d .  The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  
l i t e r a t u r e  are f a r - r a n g in g ,  but i n  tha con tex t  o f  our d is c u s s io n s  h e r e ,  
the main conc lus ion  1s t h a t  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  deve lop ing economies 
s h o u l d  e v o l d  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p a n s io n a r y  moneta ry  p o l i c y  based on 
government or  p u b l i c  sec to r  bor rowing from the c e n t r a l  bank. The re fo re ,  
apa r t  from the c o ns ide ra t ion s  i n  s u b - s e c t i o n  a ) ,  the long- term goa ls o f  
n o n - i n f l a t i o n a r y  economic growth wouLd t h e r e fo re  seem to  form a f u r t h e r  
m a jo r  c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  use o f  mone ta ry  p o l i c y  i n  the  c o n t r o l  o f  the 
Level o f  ou tpu t  and p r i c e s .
c) A T h e o re t i c e l  Summary o f  the Quest ion R e le t in a  to  Smal l Open 
Economies
The aim o f  t h i s  s u b - s e c t i o n  i s  t o  c r y s t e l l i z e  t h e  main c o n c e p ts  
developed throughout  t h i s  s e c t io n  ( i i i )  i n  symbol ic form and to  b u i l d  an
i n t e l l i g i b l e  l i n k  between the theory  on the monetary e x p e r i e n c e  o f  the  
d e v e lo p in g  econom ies ,  i n  p a r t i c u l s r  o f  sme l l  open economies, end the 
ensuing a n a ly s is  o f  Kuwa i t 's  monetary system.
The standard n a t i o n a l  income i d e n t i t y  1 s : -  
Y = C + I + G + ( X - M )  
where Y = value o f  ou tpu t  
C = consumption 
I  = inves tment
G = government abso rp t ion  o f  goods 
X = va lue o f  expor ts  
M = value o f  Impor ts
Sometimes i t  i s  the  a g g re g a te  s pend ing  by d o m e s t ic  r e s id e n ts  which i s  
emphasised ra th e r  than the components o f  demand such t h a t : -
E 5 C + I  + G
where E = abso rp t ion  by domestic res ide n ts
so we cen rede f ine  Y such t h a t : -  
Y = E + (X -  M)
At  t h i s  p o in t  we need to  look c a r e f u l l y  a t  what we mean by the v a lu e  o f  
o u t p u t .  G ro s s  N a t i o n s l  P ro d u c t  (GNP) i s  t h e  income r e c e i v e d  f o r  
p rodu c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  by d o m e s t i c  r e s i d e n t s  and Gross  Domest ic Product 
(GDP) i s  the value o f  o u t p u t  d o m e s t i c a l l y  p rodu c ed .  The d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  two c o r re s p o n d s  t o  net f a c t o r  payments from abroad, which 
correspond p r i m a r i l y  t o  income from c a p i t a l  ( i n t e r e s t  and d iv idends )  and 
to  Labour income e c c r u i n g  t o  d o m e s t i c  r e s i d e n t s  f rom abroad. In  the  
case o f  Kuwa i t  we use GDP due t o  t h e  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  r e p a t r i e t i o n  o f
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e a r n i n g s  by f o r e i g n  Lab o u r  In  t h e  c o u n t r y  and t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
i n v e s tm e n t  income to  th e  c o u n t r y .  I n  f a c t ,  i t  has become a lm o s t  
standard p r a c t i c e  i n  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  o f  develop ing economies t o  use GDP 
ra th e r  than GNP, a l though the reasons f o r  doing so in  the case o f  Kuwait 
do not apply t o  many o the r  c o u n t r i e s .
Two i m p o r t a n t  s e c t o r a l  b a lanc e  i d e n t i t i e s  can be d e r i v e d  f rom t h e  
n a t io n a l  income i d e n t i t y : -  
Y -  E = X -  M
where the su rp lus  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o v e r  e x p e n d i t u r e  must be equ iva len t  to  
the surp lus  on the balance o f  t rade  and,
(S -  I )  + (T -  G) = X + K -  M 
where S = Y + K - T - C  
T = net taxes
K = net i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r s .
T h i s  i d e n t i t y  says t h a t  t h e  s u r p l u s  on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  payments must equa l  t h e  s u r p l u s  o f  p r i v a t e  s a v in g  o v e r  
investment and t h e  government  budge t  s u r p l u s .  I t  does not r e q u i re  a 
leap o f  the Imag ina t ion  to  deduce t h a t  the cu r re n t  account i n d i c a te s  the 
ra te  a t  which the  economy in  the aggregate i s  adding to  i t s  net e x te rn a l  
asse ts ,  such t h a t : -
(S -  I )  + (T -  G) 5 ANFA
where ANFA = t o t a l  net  f o re ig n  assets  o f  the banking system
Net f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i s  t h e  p o i n t  where we can s t a r t  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  
moneta ry  r e l a t i o n s  o f  s m a l l  open economies.  C le a r l y  the t o t a l  money 
supply 1n an economy equals c la im s  o f  t h e  banking system on the  re s t  o f  
the wor ld  p lus  c la ims on the domestic p r i v a t e  s e c t o r : -  
M2 = NFA + DA
where M2 = broad measure o f  the  supply o f  money
DA = t o t a l  domest ic assets  o f  the banking system
T h i s  l e a d s  us t o  J . J .  P o l a k 1s m a j o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  ( 4 3 ) .  T h i s  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  was,  q u i t e  s i m p l y ,  t h a t  i n  open  economy m o n e t a r y  
a c c o u n t i n g ,  t h e  bank ing  system acqu i res  e x te rn a l  assets  as the balance 
between monetary expans ion  and d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  expansion.  The re fo re ,  
changing the above i d e n t i t y  around and ta k in g  f i r s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  we g e t : -  
ANFA = AM2 -  ADA
D omest ic  c r e d i t  expans ion  can be s u b - d 1 v i d e d  I n t o  c l a i m s  on t h e  
government and cla ims on the p r i v a t e  s e c t o r : -  
DA = DAg + DAp
where DAg = c la ims on the government by the banking system
DAp = c la ims on the p r i v a t e  sec to r  by the  banking system
The d e f i c i t  i n  the  government  budge t  can t h e r e f o r e  be expressed as 
f o l l o w s : -
G -  T = ADAg -  ANFAg 
which can g ive us th e re fo re ,
ANFA = (T -  G -  ANFAg) + (AM2 -  ADAp )
An i n c r e a s e  i n  e x t e r n a l  a s s e t s  w o u ld  seem t o  be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  an 
increased Indebtedness o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  o r  a government  budge t  
d e f i c i t  f inanced by the domestic banking system.
I t  i s  t im e  t o  look  a t  m oneta ry  r e l a t i o n s  i n  a smal l  open economy in  a 
le s s  m e c h a n ic a l  manner, and p e r h a p s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  some b e h a v i o u r a l  
r e l a t i o n s .  In  our d iscuss ion  o f  cu r rency-board  economies (44 ) ,  we were 
look ing  a t  an economy w i th  a f i x e d  exchange r a te ,  where the  money supp ly
was determined by the  balance o f  payments, represented by changes in  the 
l e v e l  o f  n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  and d om es t ic  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n .  I n  a 
s t r i c t ,  but  p o s s ib l y  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  economy, the hundred 
percen t note cover r u le  in  a specie economy would  Im p ly  t h a t  ADA = 0 .  
I n  a more advanced monetary economy w i th  banks and lo c a l  lend ing ,  t h i s  
i s  not the case, but i t  i s  a rgued t h a t  ADA i s  c o r r e l a t e d  c lo s e ly  w i th  
ANFA, s ince NFA represents  the reserves o f  the banking system under  t h e  
hundred per cent note cover r u le .
Wong (45)  and B e tz  (46) argue, however, t h a t  in  the case o f  Malaya and 
S ingapore  ADA and ANFA e m p i r i c a l l y  do n o t  seem to  be mov ing i n  any 
r e la te d  fa s h io n .  We have seen t h a t  t h e r e  a re  some arguments  t o  t h e  
e f f e c t  t h a t  domest ic c r e d i t  expansion cou ld  take pLace w i th ou t  the need 
f o r  an expansion i n  NFA, and o the r  arguments, such as t h a t  f o re ig n  banks 
would o n l y  lend  t o  t r a d e - r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t y ,  wh ich  wou ld  j u s t i f y  the 
t h e s i s  t h a t  ADA and ANFA w e re  c o r r e l a t e d ,  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
cur rency-board  economies. I f  t h i s  was the case then money supp ly  wou ld  
c o n t r a c t  c o n s i d e r a b l y  i f  t rade  c on t rac te d .  But we have seen a lso  t h a t  
independent c e n t r a l  banks can p l a y  a s t a b i l i z i n g  r o l e  by making ADA 
o f f s e t  any ANFA (4 7 ) .  Po lak and Bo lssoneaul t  (48) have e s t im a t e d  t h a t  
i t  wou ld  take  th re e  years f o r  ADA to  have an e x a c t l y  oppos i te  e f f e c t  on 
ANFA. Given these lags,  i t  was conc lude d  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  monetary p o l i c y  
sh o u ld  be a b le  t o  be used i n  a c o n t r a c y c L i c a I  sense t o  o f f s e t  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  the balance o f  payments on nominal income in  the s h o r t - t e rm ,  
even i f  t h e r e  does e x i s t  a r i g i d  l i n k  between e x t e r n a l  rese rves  end 
money supp ly under the hundred per cent note issue cover  r u l e .  C l e a r l y  
even an independent c e n t r a l  bank, however, i s  r e s t r i c t e d  in  the p o s s ib le  
success o f  i t s  monetary p o l i c i e s .
In  t h e  case o f  Kuwait the  high e x te rna l  su rp lus  has a l lowed the  coun t ry
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t o  run th e  hundred per  c e n t  n o te  c o v e r  r u l e ,  w i t h o u t  meny edve rse  
e f f e c t s .  In  e d d i t i o n  the benking system i s  independent and as we s h a l l  
s e e ,  t h e r e  has been L i t t l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between d o m e s t ic  c r e d i t  
expansion and net f o re ig n  asse ts .
An issue o f  importance in  look ing  a t  a monetary system in  any develop ing 
economy i s  the r e la t i o n s h ip  between t h e  c e n t r a l  bank and the commercial 
banks. C le a r l y  the e x p re s s io n : -  
ANFA = AM2 -  ADA,
can be s p l i t  up i n t o  the components b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank and 
those be long ing to  the commercial banks such t h a t : -  
ANFAcb +  ANFAg = AH + AD -  ADAC0 -  ADAg
where the s u b s c r ip t  CB = c e n t r a l  bank
the s u b s c r ip t  B = commercial banks
H = h igh powered money
D = depos i ts  o f  the banking system
As we have  seen  ( 4 9 )  i n  a c l a s s i c a l  c lo s e d  economy model we can 
c h a ra c te r i z e  the de te rm ina t ion  o f  the  money suppLy as f o l l o w s : -  
H = C + R
C = currency in  c i r c u l a t i o n  
R = bank reserves
The money s u p p l y  i s  l i n k e d  t o  h i g h - p o w e r e d  money v i a  t h e  money 
m u l t i p l i e r  (m)
M2 = m H
j  + 1
where m = ----------
j  + r
where J = C/D 
r  = R/D
D = t o t a l  depos i t s  o f  the banking system
By c o n t r o l l i n g  i t s  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  assuming t h a t  they correspond reasonably 
c lo s e ly  w i th  the assets  o f  the commercial banks, in  o the r  words t h a t  the 
c e n t r a l  bank can c o n t r o l  t h e  r e s e r v e s  o f  th e  com m erc ia l  banks, the 
c e n t r a l  bank cou ld  then c o n t r o l  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  expansion and t h e r e fo re  
the money supp ly .  In  the open economy, i f  f o re ig n  exchange ho ld ings  are 
c e n t r a l i z e d  w i th  the  c e n t r a l  bank and NFAg = 0 ,  the c e n t r a l  bank may not 
be ab le  to  in f l u e n c e  H in  the d i r e c t i o n  i t  wishes in  o rder  to  c a r r y  o u t  
i t s  moneta ry  p o l i c y  due t o  unexpec ted  changes in  NFA^g. I f  f o re ig n  
exchange ho ld ings  are not c e n t r a l i z e d  w i t h  the  c e n t r a l  bank, as i n  the 
case o f  Kuwait ,  then the  supposed l i n k  between h ig h -p o w e re d  money (H) 
and M2 i s  more tenuous. Also i f  bank reserves under the  c o n t r o l  o f  the 
c e n t r a l  bank (R) a r e  v e ry  s m a l l  r e l a t i v e  t o  o t h e r  r e s e r v e s ,  such as 
l i q u i d  f o re ig n  asse ts ,  as i s  a lso the case i n  K u w a i t ,  t h e  l i n k  may be 
even more tenuous.
As we saw a t  t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  debate ,  "does money 
m a t te r? "  between th e  Keynes ians  and M o n e t a r i s t s  c o n c e n t ra te d  on the 
demand f o r  money f u n c t i o n ,  ra th e r  than,  as we in d ic a te d  might have been 
more r e a l i s t i c ,  on the problems o f  us ing monetary p o l i c y  in  a smal l  open 
economy. The m one ta r is t  f u n c t io n  i s  used in  most Po lak - type  m ode ls : -  
M2 = k Y
t h i s  c o n s t a n t  v e l o c i t y  assum pt io n  i s  based on t h e  M i l t o n  F r iedman 
e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s  showing s t a b i l i t y  i n  th e  demand f o r  money, and the 
consequence o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
changes o f  t h e  money s u p p ly  on t o t a l  expend i tu re  and income. C e r ta in  
r e s u l t s  f o r  Kuwait  show h ig h  i n t e r e s t  i n e l a s t i c i t y  o f  the demand f o r  
money (50) ,  a l though our es t imates f o r  the v e l o c i t y  o f  money i n  K u w a i t ,  
which show a high degree o f  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  cannot be r e l i e d  upon due to
the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  c a l c u l a t i n g  accurate  GDP f i g u r e s .
The e x te rn a l  leak t h a t  domest ic c r e d i t  expansion causes in  o rder  to  have 
a n e g a t i v e  im pac t  on net f o re ig n  asse ts ,  takes  place through a r i s e  in  
im p o r t s  and p o s s i b l y  a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s .  The im p o r t  
f u n c t io n  used in  Po lak - type  models 1 s : -  
M = z Y
so t h a t  im p o r t s  a re  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  in c o m e .  G e n e r a l l y  
s p e a k in g  the  cor respond ing balance o f  payments fu n c t io n  i s  w r i t t e n  such 
t h a t  : -
NFA = X -  M + K
where the bar on top o f  K in d ic a te s  t h a t  c a p i t a l  f lows are assumed to  be 
exogenous. I t  w i l l  be cons ide red ,  l a t e r  on 1n the a n a ly s i s ,  whether i t  
would be b e t t e r  to  make c a p i t a l  f lows I n t e r e s t  s e n s i t i v e .  I n  t h e  case 
o f  K u w a i t ,  however, as we s h a l l  see (51 ) ,  r i g i d  domestic i n t e r e s t  ra tes  
means t h a t  what p a r t  o f  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  i s  i n t e r e s t  s e n s i t i v e  depends on 
e x te rn a l  i n t e r e s t  ra te  developments.  Consequent ly,  the assumpt ion t h a t  
c a p i t a l  f lows are exogenous i s  kep t .
I n  t h e  f i x e d - e x c h a n g e  r a t e  reg ime o f  P o l a k - t y p e  models,  expor ts  are 
assumed to  be exogenous. J .R.  King, however, develops a Po lak - type  model 
which a lso  develops the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  e f f e c t i v e  exchange ra te  
and the e q u i l i b r i u m  l e v e l  o f  do m e s t ic  p r i c e s  ( 5 2 ) .  In  t h i s  model the  
e f f e c t i v e  exchange ra te  becomes a u s e fu l  p o l i c y  t o o l ,  s ince the p r i c e  o f  
goods absorbed  d o m e s t i c a l l y  depends p o s i t i v e l y  on p r i c e s  i n  w o rL d  
m a r k e t s ,  and i n v e r s e l y  on t h e  e f f e c t i v e  exchange r a t e ,  where th e  
exchange r a te ,  i s  f i x e d  exogenously by th e  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s .  As we 
s h a l l  see in  Chapter 6,  a f i x e d  exchange ra te  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  conce p t  t o  
grapp le  w i th  and t h a t  i n  the  exper ience o f  Kuwai t ,  a l though the Kuwait i
Dinar  has been ex t re m e ly  s t a b l e  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  U.S.  d o l l a r ,  i t  has not 
been as s ta b le  when measured in  terms o f  any o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  an 
e f f e c t i v e  exchange r a t e .
i v )  THE DETERMINATION OF THE MONEY STOCK IN KUWAIT AND THE
"PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS" APPROACH OF FRIEDMAN AND SCHWARTZ
The p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  o u t l i n e d  some o f  the problems connected w i th  the 
theory  o f  money and in  p a r t i c u l a r  as i t  r e l a t e s  to  deve lop ing economies. 
The problem o f  endogenei ty was o u t l i n e d  and i t s  consequences f o r  p o l i c y  
i n  those c o u n t r i e s .  The c la im s o f  Friedman and Schwar tz  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
r o l e  o f  h i g h -p o w e re d  money i n  the de te rm ina t ion  o f  the  money s tock  and 
regard ing the a b i l i t y  to  use m oneta ry  p o l i c y  in  general  may be Lim i ted 
to  the case o f  the Un i ted  S ta tes  and be t o t a l l y  I r r e l e v a n t  i n  t h e  case 
o f  s m a l l  open economies.  Some o f  our d iscuss ions  above have in d ic a te d  
th a t  even i n  the case o f  a l a r g e l y  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  economy such as t h a t  
o f  the Uni ted  S ta tes  those c la im s may s t i l l  not  be t r u e .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  
w i l l  t r y  t o  assess  whet  i t  i s  t h a t  d e te r m in e s  th e  money s u p p ly  1n 
Kuwait ,  and w i l l  beg in by a n e ly s in g  t h e  methodology and the  s t a t i s t i c a l  
problems connected t h e r e w i th .
a) The "Proximate Dete rm inants "  Approach
The proximate de terminan ts  approach deve loped  by M i l t o n  F r iedman and 
Anna Jacobson S c h w a r tz  t h a t  we have a l ready  b r i e f l y  perused (53) i s  a 
u s e fu l  h e u r i s t i c  f rem ew ork  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  the 
s tock o f  money i n  an economy. T h i s  approach  i n v o l v e s  p a r t i t i o n i n g  
changes in  the s e r ie s  f o r  the  s tock  o f  money (M) between th ree  d i f f e r e n t  
exp lana tory  f a c t o r s : -
1.  the p u b l i c ' s  cash pre ference r a t i o  ( j ) ,
2.  the hanks'  reserve r a t i o  ( r ) ,
3.  and high-powered money (H).
The epproach  f i r s t  deve loped  by Fr iedman and Schwartz was adapted by
Betz (54] and Cagan (55 ]  t o  be used f o r  g e n e r a l i z e d  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s .
For our pu rpo ses  we use Cagan 's  m e thodo logy  ( 5 6 ] .  Cagan 's  a l g e b r a
d i f f e r s  f rom t h a t  o f  Fr iedman and Schwartz on ly  m a rg in a l l y .  From the
e q u a t i o n : -
H = C + R
Cagan der ives
H C R C R
-  =  -  +
M M D M O
where R = bank reserves
C = cur rency In c i r c u l a t i o n
D = depos i t s  o f  the banks
M = money supply
which shows the  change in  money s u p p ly  d i r e c t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  to  each o f  
the th ree  proximate de term inan ts .
Betz uses the  Friedman and Schwartz equat ion ( 5 7 ) : -  
M C/D + 1 j  + 1
H C/D + R/D j  + r
which express ion ,  a f t e r  n a t u r a l  l o g a r i t h m s  a re  t a k e n ,  1s t r a n s f o r m e d  
such t h a t : -
InM = InH + In (J + 1) -  In ( j  + r )
T h i s  ex p re s s io n  has to  be expanded 1n o rde r  to  enable us to  I s o l a t e  the 
th ree  separate terms,  two f o r  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  each o f  ( j ) ,  ( r )  and 
another term represen t ing  t h e i r  I n t e r a c t i o n .  Cagan's a lgebra approaches 
the problem d i f f e r e n t l y  and o r g a n i s e s  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  te rm s  f rom  th e  
o u t s e t  as we have  seen .  H is  o r i g i n a l  e x p r e s s i o n  1s th e n  made t o  
descr ibe the ra te s  o f  change o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  by f i r s t  ta k in g  n a t u r a l
l o g a r i t h m s : -
C R C R
LnM = LnH -  In [ -  + -----  ( - . - ) ]
M D H D
or  us ing c o e f f i c i e n t  fo rm s : -
InM = LnH -  l n ( c  + r  -  c r )  
and then d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  w i th  respect  t o  t l m e : -
dlnM dlnH M d ( - c )  M d ( - r )
  =   + -  (1 -  r )    + -  (1 -  c)-----------
dt  dt  H dt  H dt
The f a c t o r s : -
M M
-  (1 -  r )  and -  (1 -  c)
H H
in  the second and t h i r d  terms can be approximated by us ing  t h e i r  average 
values over  each pe r iod  f o r  which the  ra tes  o f  changes are computed, o r  
by c a l c u l a t i n g  ave rage  v a lu e s  a t  t h e  b e g in n in g  and t h e  end o f  each 
p e r io d .  Al though t h i s  l a t t e r  method does expose us to  an " e r r o r "  term,  
we found i t  smal l  and I n s i g n i f i c a n t  1n the case o f  t h e  m one ta ry  s e r i e s  
i n  Kuwa i t  1 9 6 2 -8 1 ,  and we c o n s e q u e n t l y  adop ted  t h i s  procedure.  The 
" e r r o r "  term can be seen 1n TabLe 3:1  and 1s the d i f f e r e n c e  between the  
f i r s t  column (LNM2) and the second (EST. LNM2).
The t e r m s : -
dlnM dlnH d ( - c )  d (—r )
t  ——  , ' 9
dt  d t  dt  dt
are approximated f o r  a f i n i t e  pe r iod  by n u m e r i c a l  changes 1n ( - c )  and 
C-r ]  and 1n the n a t u r a l  logar i thm  o f  (M) and (H) (such t h a t  the ra te s  o f  
these l a t t e r  two v a r ia b le s  are made to  compound I n s ta n ta n e o u s ly ) .
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high-powered money, and t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  we employ n a t u r a l  loga r i thm s,  
r a th e r  than t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  q u a n t i t i e s .  The reason f o r  t h i s  1s t h a t ,  
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  m o n e t a r y  s e r i e s  f o r  K u w a i t  1 9 6 2 -8 1 ,  t h e  
e x t ra o rd in a ry  u p t r e n d  1n q u a n t i t i e s  ov e r  t h e  p e r i o d  tends  to  obscure 
s h o r t - t e r m  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  Our p r o p o s e d  m e t h o d o l o g y  c o m p l e t e l y  
n e u t r a l i z e s  t h i s  f a c t o r .  The c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  p rox im a te  
de terminants  t o  the  de te rm ina t ion  o f  the money supply In  Kuwait over  the 
p e r i o d  1963-81 a re  c a l c u l a t e d  1n s u b - s e c t i o n  ( c )  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  
Before g o in g  on t o  t h i s ,  however ,  i t  1s nece ssa ry  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  t h e  da ta  we s h o u ld  be u s i n g  f o r  high-powered money (H] and 
bank reserves  (R).
bJ Monetary Ser ies  f o r  Kuwait 1962-81 and the Importance 
o f  Foreign  Assets  as Bank Reserves
The C e n t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait p r o v i d e s  moneta ry  data to  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Monetary Fund (IMF) on a q u a r t e r l y  b a s i s ,  and t h e  IMF p u b l i s h e s  t h i s  
da ta  1n a fo rm  wh ich  1s w ldeLy  used throughout  the  w o r ld .  I f  the two 
I d e n t i t i e s  a re  c o n s id e r e d  wh ich  fo rm  th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  IMF monetary  
s t a t i s t i c s  ( i n  t h e i r  p u b l i c a t i o n  ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s '  
( IFS ) )  we have the f o l l o w i n g  two bas ic  e x p re s s io n s : -  
H = C + R 
M = C + D
where H = "Reserve Money" (Row 14)
C = "Currency ou ts id e  Banks" (Row 14a)
R = "Reserves" (Row 20)
The row numbers be s id e  each v a r ia b le  In d ic a te  where they  are placed 1n 
the most recent  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  IFS and t h e  names are those used In  the 
IFS. The f i r s t  two v a r i a b l e s  (H) and (C) come under  t h e  hea d in g  o f  
" C e n t r a l  Bank" and t h e  l a s t  under  t h e  heading o f  "Commercial Banks".  
(0) represen ts  t o t a l  depos i ts  b u t  appea rs  1n the IFS as d iv ided  between
"demand d e p o s i t s "  and " t im e and savings d e p o s i t s " .
At  f i r s t  s ig h t  the  standard na ture  o f  the  above e x p r e s s i o n s  r a i s e s  no 
a l a r m s .  However i t  w i l l  become c l e a r  t h a t  s h o u ld  one f o l l o w  these 
c a te g o r i s a t i o n s  and the  approach o f  IFS t o  K u w a i t ' s  monetary s e r ie s  1n 
the pe r iod  under s tudy ,  i t  would be imposs ib le  to  c a tc h  th e  e s s e n t i a l s  
o f  the work ings  o f  the Kuwait i  monetary s e c to r .
We have to  ask what k ind  o f  economy Kuwait became a f t e r  the d iscovery  o f  
o i l .  As we saw in  Chapter 1,  the es tab l ishment  o f  banks 1n Baghdad and 
Basra from 18% and o f  a b ranch  o f  t h e  I m p e r i a l  Bank o f  I r a n  1n Kuwait 
1n 1942 meant t h a t  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  became a f a c t o r  i n  t h e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  money s u p p l y .  Ws d is c u s s e d  t h e  b e h a v io u r  o f  
B r i t i s h  banks i n  the c o l o n ie s  wh ich  we saw were the dominant f a c t o r  1n 
the monetary s ec to r  o f  these economies ( 5 8 ) .  These banks wou ld  have 
been a b le  t o  v a r y  t h e i r  Loca l  L i a b i l i t i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  genera l  
L i q u i d i t y  o f  the  bank as a w h o le ,  w i t h o u t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f e r r i n g  to  any 
i n t e r n a l  coun t ry  l i m i t s  ( 5 9 ) .  We saw, however ,  t h a t  t h a l r  Lend ing  
wou ld  have f o l l o w e d  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  1n f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  Drake (60) 
showed t h a t  B r i t i s h  banks tended  t o  1n g e n e r a l  r e s t r i c t  t h e i r  lend ing 
a c t i v i t i e s  t o  f o re ig n  e n t e r p r i s e s  w i t h  s t r o n g  b i a s  to w a rd s  t r a d e  and 
re p o r ts  by B r i t i s h  Naval I n t e l l i g e n c e  conf i rmed t h i s  i n  the case o f  I r a q  
and t h e  P e r s i a n  G u l f  c o u n t r ie s  (61 ) .  Before 1961 1n Kuwait ,  t he re  was 
l i t t l e  a c t i v i t y  o u ts id e  th e  o i l  s e c t o r  and most o f  the  a c t i v i t y  o f  the 
Im p e r ia l  Bank o f  I r a n  ( l a t e r  the BBME) centered on t h i s  sec to r  (6 2 ) .
The es tab l ishment  o f  the Kuweit Currency-Boerd  i n  1960 d i d  n o t  change 
th e  monete ry  regime a g rea t  deal  (6 3 ) .  As a currency-board  economy the  
money supply and n o m in a l  Income i n  Kuwa i t  wou ld  have v a r ie d  w i th  the 
balance o f  payments, not  Least because o f  the  na ture  o f  c o l o n i a l  banking
117
we d e s c r i b e d  e b o v e ,  b u t  e l s o  c l e a r l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  
cur rency-board  management o f  the  cu r rency .  The hundred per cent f o re ig n  
e x cha nge  c o v e r  was s t i l l  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  th e  c o u n t r y ' s  new d om es t ic  
c u r r e n c y  i n  1961 ( 6 4 ) .  However,  K u w a i t  was r a p i d l y  d e v e lo p in g  an 
independent banking system. Th is  process began w i th  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Bank o f  K u w a i t  i n  1952  and c u l m i n a t e d  i n  t h e  
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Bank o f  the Middle East in  1971 and the 
t o t a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  f o re ig n  banking i n  the country  (6 5 ) .
The independent l o c a l l y - c o n t r o l l e d  banking system t h a t  grew between 1952 
and 1971, c l e a r l y  had d i f f e r e n t  g o a ls  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  banks. N a t iona l  
banks led to  rap id  growth o f  I n t e r n a l  f i n a n c i n g : -
" Ins tead  o f  accum u la t ing  more cash t o  f i n a n c e  I t s  
g ro w in g  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  r e l i e d  on 
t h e  b a n k in g  system t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
needs ,  and i n v e s t e d  a b r o a d  more o f  i t s  L i q u i d  
resources"  (66)
But i r o n i c a l l y  t h e s e  n a t i o n a l  banks were 1n p r i n c i p l e  i n  a s i m i l a r  
r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  to  the lo c a l  economy as the B r i t i s h  banks used to  be. 
The reason f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e i r  la rge  fo re ig n  exchange re s e r v e s  gave 
them independence  from the  lo c a l  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and the a b i l i t y  
t o  expand d o m e s t ic  a s s e t s  a t  w iL L .  The economy's  s u r p l u s  gave the  
c e n t r a l  bank no m o t i v e  f o r  c l a i m i n g  a monopoly on f o r e i g n  exchange 
d e a l i n g .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h e  government  app roved  the  growth o f  the  
n a t i o n a l  banks which in c lu d e d : -
" . . .  banning the  o p e r a t i o n  o f  f o re ig n  banks . . .  and 
c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on d e v e lo p in g  la rg e  and p o w e r f u l
n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which w i l l  handle 
the p la c in g  and investment  o f  i t s  own enormous funds 
abroad" (67)
Again in  the language o f  t h e  P o la k  model ( 6 8 ) ,  d e s p i t e  the f a c t  t h a t  
domestic c r e d i t  expansion (ADA) would tend to  lead to  an e q u i v a l e n t  and 
o p p o s i t e  change i n  reserves (AB) w i t h in  a pe r iod  es t imated to  be th ree  
years (69) ,  so Long as B 1s p o s i t i v e  a p o s i t i v e  ADA i s  p o s s ib le .  I n  the 
case o f  Kuwait B has h i s t o r i c a l l y  been h ig h  enough in  the pe r iod  under 
study to  a l low  a p o s i t i v e  ADA f a r  i n  excess o f  the needs o f  the  d e f i c i t  
s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  economy. T h is  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  has n a t u r a l l y  meant 
t h a t  t o  expect any k ind  o f  c o r r e l a t i o n  between ADA and AB or  between the 
money supp ly and the  ba la n c e  o f  peyments 1s m ean ing less .  As we s h a l l  
see Later the banks in  Kuwait responded t o  an I n c r e a s e  i n  Loan demand 
which was not connected w i th  the  t rade  sec to r  (7 0 ) .
The h ig h  Leve l  o f  government  expend i tu re ,  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f o r e ig n  
exchange r e s e r v e s  a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  b an k  and t h e  Lack  o f  i n t e r n a l  
i n v e s tm e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  compared w i t h  t h e  l i q u i d i t y  g e n e r a te d  by 
government  e x p e n d i t u r e  1n the  economy a t  la rge ,  led to  a high le v e l  o f  
f o re ig n  assets i n  the balance sheets o f  the commercial banks. The banks 
a b i l i t y  t o  lend  were f a r  beyond t h e  needs o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  d e f i c i t  
s e c to rs .  In  Chapters 4 and 5 i t  w i l l  become In c re a s in g ly  apparen t  t h a t  
the  Im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  such a s i t u a t i o n  has made the c e n t r a l  problem o f  the 
management o f  K u w a i t ' s  economy one o f  c o n t r o l  o f  excess ive c r e d i t  and 
consequent  s p e c u l a t i o n  and i n f l a t i o n .  F u r t h e r  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
c a p i t a l  p le n ty  n a tu re  o f  th e  K u w a i t i  economy i s  t h a t  t h e  " f i n a n c i a l  
r e p r e s s i o n "  and " c o n d u i t "  L i t e r a t u r e  d is c u s s e d  e a r l i e r  may n o t  be 
a p p l i c a b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  m o n e ta ry  
s e c to r (7 1 ) .
l l ' i )
As vs saw e a r l i e r ,  the  monetary concept a t  the base o f  these th e o r ie s  i s
t h a t  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  n o t  a c o m p e t i n g  f a c t o r  a g a in s t  c a p i t a l
i n v e s tm e n t  i n  a l l  k i n d s  o f  econom ic  e n v i r o n m e n t ,  bu t  c e r t a i n l y  i n
f r a g m e n t e d  and  u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d  e c o n o m ie s ,  money b s l a n c e s  a r e
complementary t o  c a p i t a l  investment.  The e q u i l i b r i u m  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t
i s  t h e r e f o r e  a c e n t r a l  c once p t  o f  m oneta ry  management in  deve lop ing
economies, o r  shou ld  be, a c c o r d i n g  t o  these  t h e o r i e s .  McKinnon has an
express ion f o r  th e  r e a l  r e tu rn  on ho ld ing  money, d -  P*, where P* i s  the
ex pec ted  f u t u r e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n .  He f u r t h e r  c o n s id e r s  t h a t  t h e
mone ta ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  any deve lop ing economy can c o n t r o l  (d) and the
m 0
ra te  o f  e x p a n s io n  o f  nom ina l  cash b a la n c e s ,  (M ) .  (M) i n  h i s  model
e v e n tu a l l y  determines the a c t u a l  and u l t i m a t e l y  t h e  expe c ted  r a t e  o f  
change i n  the  p r i c e  Level ,  and the  a u t h o r i t i e s  are supposed, t h e r e fo r e ,  
t o  be ab le  t o  se t  d -  P* a t  w h a te v e r  l e v e l  t h e y  choose. We s h a l l  see 
b e lo w ,  a t  s e v e r a l  j u n c t u r e s ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  
K u w a i t ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  on c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n .  There  are ,  however, two 
separate c o n s id e r a t io n s  w i th  respect t o  the e q u i l i b r i u m  ra te  o f  i n t e r e s t  
i n  a coun t ry  Like K u w a i t .  F i r s t l y ,  an economy i s  sub jec t  to  changing 
movements i n  c a p i t a l  f l o w s ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  chang ing  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  (and e x pe c ted  changes i n  r e l a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s ) ,  which aspect o f  t h i n g s  we d i s c u s s  i n  th e  Last sec t ion  o f  t h i s  
chap te r .  But a l s o ,  and desp i te  the f a c t  t h a t  Kuwait i s  not a f ragmented 
and u n s o p h i s t i c a te d  economy, i n  the McKinnon sense, we s h a l l  f i n d  l a t e r  
t h a t  i t  does have  a h i g h  income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  money, j u s t  
l i k e  many deve lop ing  economies. The reason f o r  t h i s ,  we s h a l l  f i n d ,  i s  
c h i e f l y  the " t r a d i n g "  na ture  o f  the Local s tock  market,  which does make 
money balances complementary to  c a p i t a l  investment (o r  investment in  the  
s t o c k  m a rke t  i n  t h i s  c a s e ) .  The McKinnon complementar i ty t h e s is  does 
have an i n d i r e c t  b e a r i n g  h e r e ,  bu t  as we s h a l l  see in  our conc lus ions  
the  a l l o c a t i o n a l  im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  " c o n d u i t "  and " r e p r e s s i o n "  L i t e r a t u r e  
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The fo re ig n  asset  p o s i t i o n  o f  the Kuwait i  commercial banks poses a major 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  p rob lem .  We can see from graph 3.1 t h a t  the commercial 
banking system's  n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  have been a La rge r  belance sheet 
i tem than bank reserves (which f o r  the purposes o f  graph 3;1 a re  c a l l e d  
" u n e d ju s te d  m oneta ry  b a s e " )  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  p e r i o d  under s tudy .  The 
demand f o r  f o re ig n  assets  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  commercial banking system 
1s a n a ly s e d  i n  C h ap te r  4 .  We s h o u ld  no te  h e r e ,  however ,  t h a t  t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  elements 1n the demand f o r  f o re ig n  assets appear to  b e : -
1) The h i s t o r i c a l  l i q u i d i t y  o f  t h e  banks v 1 s - a - v 1 s  Local  c r e d i t
demand.
i1 )  The high le v e l  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange demand by th e  lo c a l  economy
(72) .
i 11) I n t e r e s t  ra te  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and d o m e s t i c  
I n t e r e s t  r a te s .
The g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  1n bank b a la n c e  sheets have been 
l i q u i d  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  The C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kuw a i t  economic r e p o r t  
breakdown o f  f o re ig n  assets  I n d ic a te s  t h i s .
" . . .  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  r e t a i n e d  t h e i r  p r o m i n e n t  
f e a t u r e s  t h r o u g h o u t  1 9 7 2 /3  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  bo th  
l i q u i d i t y  and p o r t f o l i o  ( 7 3 ) .  The h ig h  degree o f  
l i q u i d i t y  was s t I L L  e n s u re d .  Moreover  t h e  main  
components  were b a la n c e s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  banks and 
c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  d e p o s i t "  (74 ) .
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S ince  f o r e i g n  e s s e t s  were m o s t l y  l i q u i d  t h e y  s h o u ld  p resum sb ly  be 
counted ss bank reserves .  In  t h e  a n s l y s l s  o f  t h e  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  by the commercial banks in  Chapter 4 we s h a l l  see t h a t  i t  i s  the 
f i r s t  o f  t h e  t h r e e  e lem en ts  o f  p o s s i b l e  r e le v a n c e  t o  movements 1n 
fo re ig n  asset ho ld ings  o f  the banks which we f i n d  to  be e m p i r i c a l l y  most 
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  namely t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  l i q u i d i t y  o f  t h e  banks v i s - a - v i s  
Loca l  c r e d i t  demand. Hence not on ly  are a Large p a r t  o f  f o re ign  assets 
l i q u i d ,  bu t  by i m p l i c a t i o n  c o u ld  be seen t o  a l s o  be " i n v o l u n t a r y "  
r e s e r v e s  a l t h o u g h  n o t  i n  t h e  l e g a l  o r  s t a t u t o r y  s e n s e .  The h i g h  
l i q u i d i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  h o l d i n g s  i t s e l f  Lends c redence  t o  t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  (7 5 ) .  However, i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  note t h a t  not on ly  do 
f o re ig n  assets q u a l i f y  as reserves from a behav iou ra l  p o in t  o f  v iew  bu t  
a l s o  f rom the le g a l  p o in t  o f  v iew.  In  1974 L e g is la t i o n  f o r  a l i q u i d i t y  
r a t i o  to  be imposed by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  took  s p e c i f i c  account o f  
f o re ig n  asse ts .  The l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  o f  25 p e r  cen t  which was imposed 
inc luded fo re ig n  l i q u i d  assets  such as c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  d e p o s i t ,  banke rs  
ecceptances and s h o r t - te rm  depos i ts  i n  f o re ig n  c u r re nc ie s  in  r e c o g n i t io n  
o f  t h e  r o l e s  t h a t  we have d e s c r i b e d  f o r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  A minimum 
Kuwait i  Dinar  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  o f  7 . 5  p e r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  was 
inc luded in  the l e g i s l a t i o n .
We have s ta ted  t h a t  the methodology o f  c a te g o r i s a t i o n  i n  the IFS i s  no t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  h e l p f u l  i n  t h e  case o f  K u w a i t .  I t  was Newlyn (76) who 
s ta ted  t h a t : -
" . . . c o m p a r a t i v e  a n e l y s i s  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  s y s t e m s  1s c o m p l i c a t e d  b y  t h e  
supe r im pos i t ion  o f  n a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  (77 ) "
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  as we s h a l l  see l e t e r ,  Newlyn d id  not f u l l y  take t h i s
i n t o  ac c o u n t  in  h i s  c e r i v a t i o n  o f  monetary r a t i o s  f o r  Kuwait (78) The 
symbol (H) which we have d e s ig n a te d  t o  r e f l e c t  h igh-powered money, in  
the  con tex t  o f  IMF moretary  s t a t i s t i c s ,  stands f o r  reserve money. Since 
f o re ig n  assets  are l a r g e ly  l i q u i d  and g iven  t h e  reasons  s e t  o u t  above 
f o r  c o n s i d e r i n g  them as r e s e r v e s ,  a r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  reserve money i s  
c a l l e d  f o r .  We c o n t i n u e  t o  use th e  Fr iedman and S chw ar tz  sym bo l i c  
system and we a lso  r e f e r  to  the  rows o f  the IFS a f t e r  each sym bo l .  We 
de f in e  H1 to  mean adj^sfrfLfl reserve money (or monetary base) as f o l l o w s : -
Reserve Money (H) (Row (4) + Net Foreign Assets (NFAg) (Row 21-Row 26c)
G rap h  4 : 4  shows t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  h o l d i n g s  o f  th e  
commercial banks between 1973-80 which inc ludes  s ho r t  term balances w i th  
f o re ig n  banks, in v e s tm e n ts ,  and loans  and d i s c o u n t s  to  non - re s id e n ts .  
Inves tments  abroad have been c h i e f l y  mot iva ted  by th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by 
K u w a i t i  c om m e rc ia l  banks in  the  c a p i t a l  o f  f o re ig n  banking o pe ra t ions ,  
and lo ans  and d i s c o u n t s  t o  n o n - r e s i d e n t s  t e n d  t o  i n v o l v e  m o s t l y  
p o l i t i c a l l y - i n s p i r e d  loans managed by the M in i s t r y  o f  Finance, and i t  i s  
the ca tegory  o f  balances w i th  f o re ig n  banks which q u a l i f i e s  as L i q u i d .  
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  f o r e ig n  asse ts  are c l e a r l y  not dominated by a des i re  to  
b u i l d  up Lend ing  and c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  abroad  b u t  r a t h e r  by the 
des i re  t o  place s h o r t - t e rm  s u rp lu s  f u n d s : -
"Kuwai t i  commercial  banks  adop t  g e n e r a l l y  a ra th e r  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t  p o l i c y ,  whereby  
L i q u i d i t y  and s e c u r i t y  con s id e ra t io n s  rece ive  prime 
a t t e n t i o n "  (79)
Graphs 4:.«j? pnd 4 ; 3  (on pages 223 and 224) show th e  r a t i o  o f  f o re ig n  
assets  o f  the commercial banks t o  t h e i r  t o t a l  a s s e ts ,  and t h e  r a t i o  o f  
net  f o r e ig n  assets  o f  the
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commercial banks to  t h e i r  d ep os i t s .  The t rend  in  both r a t i o s  appears to  
be th e  same. From the second qua r te r  i n  1971 when the r a t i o  o f  f o re ig n  
assets  to  t o t a l  assets  appeared t o  have peaked to  i t s  lowest p o in t  ( the  
la s t  q u a r te r  i n  1977) t h i s  r a t i o  dropped by 55 per c e n t .  The r a t i o  o f  
n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  t o  depos i ts  over the same per iod  dropped 72%, whiLe 
the r a t i o  o f  net  f o re ig n  a s s e t s  t o  t o t a l  a s s e ts  (not seen i n  e i t h e r  o f  
Graphs 4;.2 o r . - 4 ^ ) dropped by 68%. The drop in  net f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  was 
much s t e e p e r  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  th a n  th e  drop i n  f o r e i g n  
asse ts .  Th is  d i f f e r e n c e  in  the b e h a v io u r  o f  the two r a t i o s  was c l e a r l y  
due to  t h e  f a c t  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  f e l l  by much le s s  th a n  f o r e i g n  
asse ts .  The l i q u i d  na ture  o f  f o re ig n  asse ts ,  and in  p a r t i c u l a r  the f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  t h i s  c a p t i o n  i s  balances w i th  f o re ig n  banks 
should mean t h a t  we c o n s i d e r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  as p a r t ,  i n  some way o r  
o th e r ,  o f  bank reserves .  Our d iscuss ions  above regard ing  the b e h a v io u r  
o f  f o r e i g n  asset  r a t i o s ,  however, Lead us to  the conc lus ion  t h a t ,  s ince  
the commercial banks ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  t h e  l a t e r  y e a rs  o f  the pe r io d  
under s tudy)  use f o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  t o  rep len ish  t h e i r  r e s e r v e s  ( i e .  
bor rowings  from fo re ig n  banks take place in  t imes o f  t i g h t  L i q u i d i t y ) ,  a 
ne t  f o re ig n  asset  f i g u r e  may be more a p p ro p r ia te  as an es t im ate  o f  those 
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  wh ich  can be c o n s id e r e d  L i q u i d  a s s e t s  h e ld  a g a i n s t  
r e s i d e n t  d e p o s i t s  under  t h e  c e n t r a l  ban k  Laws ( 8 0 ) .  We s h a l l  be 
d iscuss ing  the na ture  o f  commercial bank p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v io u r  i n  Kuwa i t  
i n  more  d e t a i l  i n  C h ap te r  4 ,  b u t  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  r e p le n i s h m e n t  
argument regard ing  fo re ig n  L i a b i l i t i e s  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  we look a t  
Graph 4 : f i  where peaks i n  t h e  i n d e x  o f  t h e  r a t i o  o f  c l a i m s  o f  t h e  
c om m e rc ia l  banks on the p r i v a t e  sec to r  t o  t o t a l  assets  seem to  c o in c id e  
w i th  peaks in  t h e  i n d e x  o f  t h e  r a t i o  o f  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  t o  t o t a l  
l i a b i l i t i e s .  The t e s t s  c ond uc te d  i n  C h a p te r  4 i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  
demand f u n c t i o n  f o r  banks c l e a r l y  shows f o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  as th e  most 
im por tan t  exp lana to ry  v a r ia b le  i n  the f u n c t i o n .  Moreover f o re ig n
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L i a b i l i t i e s  are discovered to  p lay  an im por tan t  r o le  i n  the  exp lana t ion  
o f  commercial  bank advances o v e r  th e  p e r i o d  1 973 -1981 .  Net fo re ig n  
assets  or the surp lus  o f  f o re ig n  assets  over l i a b i l i t i e s  would ( in  terms 
o f  the banks1 behav ioura l  p a t t e r n )  t h e r e f o r e  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  
p o t e n t i a l  l e v e r a g e  and d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n .  S ince  t o t a l  
L i a b i l i t i e s  = depos i t s  (D) + f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  (L) + o th e r  i tems,  to  
c o n s id e r  r e s e r v e s  (R) + f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  (FA) as l i q u i d  a s s e t s  h e l d  
a g a i n s t  D i s  t o  leave  o u t  an im po r tan t  element (L) on the  l i a b i l i t i e s  
s ide o f  the balance shee t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i f  i t  i s  an a c t i v e  element in  
bank behav iour.  Jus t  as we have rede f ined  the  monetary base above,  we 
s h a l l  r e d e f i n e  t h e  reserve  r a t i o  r  = R/D to  in c lude  net f o re ig n  assets 
such t h a t : -
r '  = R' /D 
and R» = C + NFAQ
Al though i t  may seem th a t  t h e  r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  our  v a r i a b le s  may a f f e c t  
the r e s u l t s  o f  our a n a l y s i s  because o f  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  n e t  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  i n  bo th  ( H 1) and ( r 1) the  Cagan method which we have chosen to  
use f o r  our ana ly s is  o f  the  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  prox imate de te rm inan ts  on the 
money s tock (81) separates the e f f e c t s  o f  changes i n  t h e  r e s e r v e  r a t i o  
and h i g h - p o w e r e d  money w h a te v e r  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e s e r v e s .  Our 
r e d e f i n i t i o n s  s i m p l y  p o r t r a y  a s i t u a t i o n  w h e re  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  
high-powered money i s  no Longer un ique ly  the  c e n t r a l  bank.
The onLy s im i l a r  type o f  a n a l y s i s  ( f o r m a lL y  speaking) t o  t h a t  above can 
be found in  Arno ld  Ha rbe rge r 's  d iscuss ions  on Panama (8 2 ) .  However, h i s  
o b j e c t i v e  i s  d i f f e r e n t  t o  o u r s ,  s i n c e  he i s  t a l k i n g  a b o u t  t h e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  a L o c a l  c u r r e n c y  f o r  t h e  U.S .  d o l l a r .  A l s o  h i s  
conc lus ions are d i f f e r e n t  t o  o u r s : -
"Imagine the  c r e a t io n  o f  a c e n t r a l  bank i n  Panama
which would exchange p r i n t e d  Balboas f o r  the reserve 
ho ld ings  o f  the commercial banks; which would borrow 
f r o m  a b r o a d  an am oun t  e q u a l  t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
"borrowed reserves"  o f  the banking system; and which 
wou ld  Lend t h i s  amount t o  t h e  commercial banks so 
th a t  they c o u ld  pay o f f  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  deb ts .  The 
commercial banks, under t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  would end up 
owing to  the c e n t r a l  bank what they p r e v i o u s l y  owed
a b r o a d ,  and th e  c e n t r a l  bank wou ld  have a s su red
t h e i r  f o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s .  The c e n t r a l  bank 's  f i n a l  
p o s i t i o n  wou ld  e n t a i l  I t s  h o l d i n g  as n e t  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  an amount e qu a l  t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c u r r e n c y  
s u p p l y  p l u s  n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  b a n k in g  
system. But the amount o f  h igh-powered money i n  the 
s y s te m  w o u ld  e q u a l  t h e  c u r r e n c y  s u p p l y  p l u s  
( a p p r o x i m a t e l y )  t h e  g ro s s  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  
banking system p lus  the co ins  in  c i r c u l a t i o n "  (83)
I n  f a c t  i n  H a r b e r g e r ' s  terms he should have concluded t h a t  the  c e n t r a l  
bank 's  net f o re ig n  assets  ( s i n c e  1 t  d i d  n o t  e x i s t  be fo re )  should equal  
e i t h e r  the commercial banks' ne t  f o re ig n  assets o r  t h e  c u r r e n c y  s u p p ly  
p l u 6 th e  amount o f  the  loans made to  the commercial banking system f o r  
the  banks to  pay o f f  t h e i r  f o re ig n  L i a b i l i t i e s .  L ikewise he should have 
sa id  t h a t  h igh-powered money wou ld  equa l  t h e  c u r re n c y  supp ly p lus  the
newly acquired f o r e i g n  L i a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank o r  t h e  new ly
a c q u i r e d  f o re ig n  assets p lus  the loans to  the commercial banks. We can 
Imagine, 1n a more complex system where the c e n t r a l  bank a l ready  e x i s t s ,  
the e f f e c t  o f  t h e i r  t a k i n g  o v e r  t h e  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  
the commercial banks could be seen to  happen i n  the  f o l l o w i n g  s t a g e s : -
i )  The c e n t r a l  bank has on ly  f o re ig n  assets on the asset  s ide o f  i t s  
ba lance  s h e e t ,  b a c k in g  c u r r e n c y  issued and bank ba lances.  The 
commercial banks would  have i n  such a s i t u a t i o n ,  balances w i th  
the c e n t r a l  bank ( p l u s  cash i n  the  t i l l ) ,  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  and 
advances  on th e  a s s e t s  s i d e .  F o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  and l o c a l  
depos i t s  would fo rm th e  l i a b i l i t i e s  s i d e .  H igh-powered money 
equals currency in  c i r c u l a t i o n  pLus bank balances.
i i )  The c e n t r a l  bank wou ld  c r e d i t  t h e  a c c o u n ts  o f  t h e  com m erc ia l  
banks i n  r e t u r n  f o r  a t r a n s f e r  o f  the commercial banks f o re ig n  
asse ts ,  thereby in c rea s ing  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank's balance sheet by a 
s im i l a r  amount on both s i d e s ,  w h i l e  s u b s t i t u t i n g  d o m e s t i c  f o r  
f o r e i g n  asse ts  i n  the banks' balance sheets .  High-powered money 
has grown to  the e x t e n t  t h a t  bank b a la n c e s  a t  the c e n t r a l  bank 
have grown.
1 i i )  The c e n t r a l  bank borrows money from abroad and opens o v e r d r a f t  
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  banks t o  pay o f f  t h e i r  f o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s .  
High-powered money grows a ga in  by an amount e qu a l  t o  t h e  new 
fo re ig n  borrowing o f  the c e n t r a l  bank so t h a t  i t  ends up b e in g  
equa l  t o  cur rency in  c i r c u l a t i o n  p lus  the o r i g i n a l  bank balances 
p lus  the new c r e d i t s  t o  com m erc ia l  bank accounts a t  the c e n t r a l  
bank p lus  the new c e n t r a l  bank f o re ig n  L i a b i l i t i e s .
I n  the  p i c t u r e  we env isage  i n  t h i s  c h a p te r  i n  u s in g  t h e  n e t  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  o f  th e  b an k ing  sys tem as an a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  1n high-powered 
money, the  K u w a i t i  b an k ing  system h a v in g  a la r g e  s u r p l u s  o f  fo re ig n  
a s s e t s  ov e r  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  n o t i o n a l l y  pays o f f  i t s  f o r e i g n  
l i a b i l i t i e s  from itB f o re ig n  balances before  handing over the remaining
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TABLE 3-*&
THE PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS 
TQ ANNUAL MOVEMENTS IN THE MONEY SUPPLY 1963-1981
H' c r ' TOTAL
1963 -520.57 13.71 606.85 100
1964 159.52 0.60 -60 .12 100
1965 162.20 0.00 -62.20 100
1966 98.06 0.02 1 .92 100
1967 82.32 1 .72 15.95 100
1968 85.80 1 .44 12.76 100
1969 -144.54 2.02 42.52 100
1970 191.46 -0.21 -9 1 .2 4 100
1971 96.44 0.17 3.39 100
1972 51.03 -0 .06 49.02 100
1973 -94.15 -0 .8 2 194.97 100
1974 69.49 1 .49 29.01 100
1975 68.82 1 .38 29.68 100
1976 -17.93 1.73 116.11 100
1977 118.76 5 .08 -23 .85 100
1978 . 6.95 4.78 88.26 100
1979 88.38 0.81 10.79 100
1980 90.42 1.71 7.85 100
1981 102.27 5.86 -8 .13 100
H1 = High-powered Money 
c = C/M2 
r '  = R ' /D
Source : Table 3:1
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  t o  th e  c e n t r a l  bank  i n  exchange f o r  c r e d i t s  i n  i t s  
a c c o u n ts  a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank .  The c e n t r a l  bank i 6  t h e r e f o r e  n o t  
r e q u i r e d  to  bo r row  ab ro a d ,  and h ig h -p o w e re d  money expands on ly  by a 
f a c t o r  equal to  the net f o re ig n  assets o f  the commercial banks.
c) The Proximate Determinants o f  the Money SuddLv in  Kuwait 1963-81
I f  we analyse the e f f e c t s  on th e  money supply  o f  our ad jus ted  proximate 
de term inan ts ,  ( H ' ) y (c)  and ( r 1) ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  show t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  
cash pre ference has an i n s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on the ra te  o f  change o f  the 
s t o c k  o f  money. We can see from Tab le 3 :2  t h a t  high-powered money had 
the la rge s t  p o s i t i v e  impact on t h e  g row th  o f  the money s tock except f o r  
the years 1963, 1973, and 1976, and i n  1978 when bank re s e r v e  r a t i o s  
dropped markedly and had by f a r  the la rg e s t  Impact on the ra te  o f  change 
o f  the s tock o f  money. In  1969 the bank reserve r a t i o  a lso  had a h igher  
p o s i t i v e  im pac t  th a n  h ig h -p o w e re d  money b u t  money supply growth was 
negat ive i n  t h a t  ye a r  and h ig h -p o w e re d  money had a g r e a t e r  absoLute 
im p a c t .  I n  1974 and 1975,  b u t  e s p e c i a l l y  1n 1 972 ,  b an k  r e s e r v e  
b e h a v io u r  was s i g n i f i c a n t  b u t  not as im por tan t  as high-powered money. 
Table 3:1 shows the  e s t im a te s  and e q u a t i o n s  which we used to  reach the 
r e s u l t s  1n TabLe 3 : 2 . I n  p a r t i c u l a r  we no te  i n  TabLe 3:1 t h a t ,  as 
indeed we noted e a r l i e r ,  the e r r o r  o f  the es t imates ere smal l  ( the  e r r o r  
1s represented by the  d i f f e r e n c e  between the f i r s t  two columns).
I n  Graph 3 .3  we can see the t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  behav iour  o f  ad jus ted  and 
unadjusted bank re se rve  r a t i o s .  ( r )  behaved t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t l y  f rom 
( r •) dur ing  the pe r iod  under a n a ly s i s  and t h e r e f o r e  as we p o i n t e d  o u t  
a t  t h e  o u t s e t  o f  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  to  have r e l i e d  on t h a t  measure o f  bank 
reserves which we would have done f o l  Lowing th e  c a te g o r i s a t i o n s  o f  the 
IFS wou ld  have Led us t o  m i s u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  t r u e  p i c t u r e .  Our 
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e n t i r e l y  a t  a v o i d i n g  t h i s  p ro b le m .  I n  graph 3.1 we can see t h a t  the 
unadjusted monetary base CH) f a l l s  away 1n th e  p e r i o d  1978-80 whereas 
n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  grow c ons ide rab ly .  I t  would have been d i f f i c u l t  to  
e x p la in  how the monetary  g row th  i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  (which we see in  Graph 
3 . 2 1 would have o c c u r r e d  i f  n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  had n o t  been an 
exp lana to ry  f a c t o r ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  to  the monetary base (which also appears 
1n both i t s  ad jus ted  and unadjusted forms in  Graph 3 . 2 ) .
The im por tance  and ro le  o f  the ad jus ted  bank reserve r a t i o  ( r ' )  w i l l  be 
f u r t h e r  discussed 1n the con te x t  o f  a l a t e r  d iscuss ion  o f  models o f  the 
Kuwait i  economy and e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  o f  money demand f u n c t i o n s .  However, 
we s h a l l  conclude the present  a n a ly s i s  by look ing a l i t t l e  more c l o s e l y  
a t  our proximate determinan ts  and deducing c e r t a in  p r e l im in a r y  a p r i o r i  
c o n c l u s i o n s  from our obse rva t ions .  Graph 3 .4  p l o t s  the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
each o f  (H 'J ,  (c)  and ( r 1) i n  t h e  g row th  o f  the  money s tock  1n each o f  
the years between 1963 and 1980. Some o the r  th in g s  can be seen i n  Graph 
3 . 4  a p a r t  f rom  t h e  o b v io u s  r e l a t i v e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  each p r o x i m a t e  
de terminan t,  and these i n c l u d e : -
( i )  The c y c l i c a l  na ture  o f  the  in f l u e n c e  o f  each de te rm inan t .
(1 i } The i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the in f l u e n c e  o f  the bank reserve
r a t i o  and the  monetary base o r  high-powered money.
The r e l a t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e  p ro x im a te  d e t e r m i n a n t s  and t h e i r  
i n t e r a c t i o n  should be in t e r p r e t e d  i n  o rder  to  g ive  us an a p r i o r i  theo ry  
to  t e s t .  Q u i t e  c l e a r l y  t h e  mone ta ry  base r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  im pac t  o f  
g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  and n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  We can see t h e  
deve lopment  o f  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  (G) i n  Tab le  3 ; 3 . The bank 
reserve r a t i o  on the o the r  hand would seem to  represent  the  in f l u e n c e  o f
loan demand. The l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  K u w a i t  a r e  
c e r t a i n l y  dom ina ted  by government spending throughout  the pe r iod  under 
study (84) b u t  due t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  we have chosen t o  g i v e  to  net 
fo re ig n  assets  we have seen t h a t  government spending i s  on ly  one f a c t o r  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  m oneta ry  base .  Graph 3.1 demonstrates the o v e r r id i n g  
importance o f  the accumulat ion o f  n e t  f o r e ig n  assets  in  the development 
o f  the a d j u s t e d  m oneta ry  base i n  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y .  The bank 
re s e r v e  r a t i o  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  wh ich  i n  our ad jus ted  form dec l ines  
sharp ly  a f t e r  1972, as we can see from Graph 3 . 3 . could be the r e s u l t  o f  
e i t h e r  d e c l i n i n g  r e s e r v e s  o r  ex pa nd ing  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  the commercial 
banking system. Graph 3.1 shows us a s u b s t a n t i a l  r i s e  i n  n e t  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  i n  o u r  a d j u s t e d  m oneta ry  base ,  and so we 
conclude t h a t  given t h i s  o b v io u s  g ro w th  i n  th e  supply o f  reserves,  the 
increase in  commerc ia l  bank l i a b i l i t i e s  and th e  drop 1n t h e  re s e r v e  
r a t i o  was due t o  in c reased  Lending. Increased Lending could have been 
due to  a change i n  management t e c h n i q u e s  1n the commercial banks o r  due 
to  a response to  p re v io u s ly  u n a v a i la b le  lending o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  The f a c t  
t h a t  we choose to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  the banks d id  not s udden ly  change t h e i r  
lending p o l i c i e s  but ra th e r  reacted to  increased Loan demand i s  due both 
t o  common 6ense abou t  bank b e h a v io u r  and t o  the  f a c t  t h a t  the re  1s a 
f a i r l y  good r e la t i o n s h ip  between peaks 1n recorded economic a c t i v i t y  and 
peaks 1n the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  r*  i n  th e  proximate determinan ts  equat ion .  
Th is  can be borne ou t  f o r  the pe r io d  a f t e r  1972 by look ing a t  Graph 4 :7  
which d e s c r ib e s  the Kuwait Stock Exchange a l l - s h a r e  index,  which peaked 
in  1973,  1976 ,  and 1978.  I n  f a c t  1n t h e  f o u r  y e a rs  t h a t  r f peaked 
(1963 ,  1 973, and 1 976 and a l s o  1969)  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  H '  was 
n e g a t i v e ,  i n d i c a t i n g  pe rhaps  a d r a i n i n g  s ta n c e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  the  face  o f  excess ive  c r e d i t  expansion and boom 
c o n d i t io n s .
Periods o f  r i s e s  1n the monetary base wh ich  i n f l u e n c e  an i n c r e a s e  1n 
d o m e s t i c  economy a c t i v i t y ,  seem t o  cause a r i s e  1n loan demand and 
th e r e fo re  i n  l e n d i n g ,  wh ich  i s  f o l l o w e d  by th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  reducing 
expend i tu re  and a t te m p t in g  to  d ra in  reserves  a t  the c e n t r a l  bank and a 
temporary relapse i n  loan demand and t h e r e fo re  Lending. Graph 3 .4  shows 
us th e  f o l l o w i n g  cyc les  1964-68, 1968-69, 1969-72, 1972-74, fo l lowed  by 
almost y e a r ly  cyc les  t o  m id -197 8  when h ig h -p o w e re d  money over took the  
bank reserve r a t i o  and has remained in  t h a t  p o s i t i o n  ever s ince .
Up t o  1974,  t h e  c y c l e s  appear  t o  be long  and c y c l e s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  
government  e x p e n d i t u r e  and monetary base increases (1964-68, 1969-72) 
are fo l low ed  by i n c r e a s e s  1n loan demand. A f t e r  1972 when the  s tock  
m arke t  began i t s  a c t i v i t y  w i t h  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p p o r t ,  t h e  a v e r a g e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  loan demand rose  and t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  t h e  c y c l e s  
s h o r t e n e d  as p r e s u m a b l y  t h e  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  r e a c t e d  more 
consc ious ly  w i th  L e g i s l a t i v e  measures 1n the  face o f  economic boom and 
s i g n i f i c a n t  c r e d i t  expansion. U n t i l  1978 the l i q u i d i t y  o f  the banks and 
the la rge hoLdlngs o f  f o re ig n  assets  by commercial banks al lowed them to  
c o n t i n u e  t h e i r  l e n d in g  a c t i v i t y  and t h e i r  s w i t c h i n g  o f  f o re ig n  i n t o  
domestic a s s e t s  i n  s p i t e  o f  a t t e m p t s  by t h e  e u t h o r l t i e s  t o  re g u la te  
these developments.  A f t e r  mid-1978 when bank L i q u i d i t y  d e c l in e d  so d i d  
t h e  average c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  bank reserve r e t l o  to  the  growth in  the 
money s tock .
Our p r e l i m i n a r y  a p r i o r i  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  w h i c h  w i l l  be s u b j e c t  t o  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and e m p i r i c a l  t e s t  a r e  t h a t  t h e  g row th  1n h ig h  powered 
money i s  due p a r t l y  t o  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  b u t  t h a t  t h e  low 
a b s o r p t i o n  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  economy m ean t  t h a t  o v e r  t h e  y e a rs  t h e  
commercial banking system b u i l t  up la r g e  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  
wh ich  c o n t i n u e d  t o  grow th roughout  the pe r iod  under s tudy  and to  be an
i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  o v e r a l l  growth o f  the ad jus ted  monetary base. 
The independence o f  the banking system in  Kuwait and the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  
f o r e ig n  exchange r e s u l t i n g  from t h i s ,  meant t h a t  p r i v a t e  sec tor  a c t i v i t y  
became an im po r tan t  determinant o f  the development o f  the s tock o f  money 
i n  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m .  Government e x p e n d i t u r e  s h o u ld  be c o n s id e r e d  an 
u l t i m a t e  and h i s t o r i c  sou rce  o f  fu n d s  and o f  an i n d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e .  
Government  s p e n d in g  does crea te  economic a c t i v i t y  and i s  a major cause 
o f  the g row th  o f  loan demand and bank b o r r o w in g  wh ich  i n  t u r n  i s  an 
im p o r ta n t  c o n t r i b u t o r  to  the growth o f  money supp ly .  But h ig h -p o w e re d  
money i t s e l f  i s  l a r g e l y  dependent ( i n  our ad jus ted  form) on the growth 
o f  ne t  f o re ig n  asse ts  and t h i s  i s  o n l y  i n d i r e c t l y  caused by government 
e x p e n d i tu re .  Growth in  net f o re ig n  assets  and L i q u i d i t y  i n  the  b a n k in g  
system gave the banks the a b i L i t y  to  Lend, and growth in  Loan demand the  
o p p o r t u n i t y .  Government expend i tu re  would seem to  have been an i n d i r e c t
cause o f  b o th .  These are im por tan t  and as yet  undiscovered conc lus ions
on the development o f  the  money s tock  in  Kuwait .
v) THE BAHK RESERVE RATIO. AND..THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
a> A.frivrl PKLfisBldJftkW? la
In  our  a n a ly s i s  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  we e s s e n t i a l l y  used an p r i o r i  
model t o  o r g a n i s e  and a n a l y s e  a s a m p le  o f  d a t a  -  t h e  p r o x i m a t e  
d e t e r m i n a n t s  app roach  o f  Friedman and Schwartz.  Our a p r i o r i  approach 
p rov ides  the  f ramework f o r  e x p l a i n i n g  th e  K u w a i t i  monetary sec to r  and 
the way i t  behaves but does not p rov ide  a p rec ise  th e o ry .  Th is  i s  c l e a r  
from the f a c t  t h a t  the  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f  the  a n a l y s i s  i n v o l v e d  a c e r t a i n  
am oun t  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  based on g r a p h i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w h ich  was 
i n t e n d e d  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  b r o a d  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  
prox imate de terminan ts  a n a l y s i s .  A l th o u g h  g raphs  c oun t  as e m p i r i c a l  
ev idence,  more r igo rou s  t e s t s  are requ i red  o f  the temporary conc lus ions
we reached in  the la s t  s e c t i o n : -
(A) H igh -pow ered  money (1n  o u r  a d j u s t e d  f o r m )  wa6 p r i n c i p a l l y  
determined by e x p a n s io n  i n  t h e  ne t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  base o f  t h e  
commercial banks.
(B) The b e h a v io u r  o f  the  bank reserve r a t i o  was main ly  determined by 
loan demand. Foreign a s s e t s  began t o  be switched i n t o  domest ic 
assets  e s p e c ia l l y  a f t e r  1972.
(C) Loan demand emanating from the  t rade  and s tock  market sec to rs  was 
in f luence d  by government expend i tu re  1n prev ious pe r iods .
(D) The net f o re ig n  assets  o f  the banks can be c o n s id e r e d  as l i q u i d  
r e s e r v e s  and a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  by th e  g row th  1n 
depos i ts .
(E) The g r o w t h  i n  d e p o s i t s  was m a i n l y  c a u s e d  by g o v e r n m e n t  
expend i tu re  over the  years.
The p r o x im a te  d e t e r m i n a n t s  approach  had a b e n e f i t  as an a c c e p ta b le  
h e u r i s t i c  framework w i t h i n  which to  develop ideas .  The respec t ive  ro le s  
o f  high powered money and the bank r e s e r v e  r a t i o  have been c a r e f u l l y  
a n a l y s e d .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  a p o i n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  was r a i s e d  e a r l i e r ,  
namely what the im p l i c a t i o n s  were o f  in c lu d in g  net f o re ig n  assets  i n  our 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  h igh-powered money and reserves .  We s ta te d  t h a t  the Cagan 
method we used worked f o r  any d e f i n i t i o n s ,  but n a t u r a l l y  the conc lus ions  
we de r ive  from the c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  each p ro x im a te  determinant  t o  the 
growth in  the  money s tock  must be a l t e r e d .  Almost by d e f i n i t i o n  t h e s e  
c o n c l u s i o n s  cannot be exact as in  the t r a d i t i o n a l  f ramework (se t  ou t  a t
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the beg inn ing o f  s ec t ion  ( i )  and 1n sec t ion  ( i i i )  in  t h i s  chap te r )  where 
the so le  source o f  changes i n  h ig h -p o w e re d  money was from w i t h i n  the  
un iverse  o f  government o p e r a t i o n s .  Here t h e r e  seems t o  be a fo rm  o f  
" s l a c k "  i n  t h e  shape o f  commercial banks f o re ig n  asset  ho ld ings  which, 
through our r e d e f i n i t i o n s ,  t a k e s  us o u t s i d e  the  un iverse  o f  government 
ope ra t ions  1n the exp lana t ion  o f  the growth 1n high-powered money. Th is  
n o t io n  o f  " s l a c k "  must be i n t u i t i v e l y  appea l ing ,  however ,  s i n c e  Kuw a i t  
b e in g  a s u r p l u s  economy w i t h  a low abso rp t i ve  capac i ty  has led to  the 
re -e x p o r t  by the p r i v a t e  sec to r  o f  l i q u i d i t y  i n je c te d  by the government 
over t ime and t h a t  i t  was on ly  a f t e r  1972 t h a t  demand f o r  t h i s  L i q u i d i t y  
1n the domest ic marke t -p lace  a c t u a l l y  s t a r t e d  to  grow. Th is  h i s t o r i c a l  
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  conf i rmed by the a n a ly s i s  i n  Chapter 1 .  The approach 
we have adopted i s  a lso  i n t u i t i v e l y  a p p e a l i n g  because 1t  suggests t h a t  
a t  such t im e  as d o m e s t i c  Loan demand began t o  g ro w ,  t h e  m o n e t a r y  
a u t h o r i t i e s  cou ld  not c o n t r o l  the money supply u n t i l  mid-1978, which i s  
b a s i c a l l y  what  a c t u a l l y  o c c u r r e d .  I n  C h a p t e r  5 we a n a ly s e  th e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  the  c e n t r a l  bank faced 1n c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  money s u p p ly  i n
Kuwait ,  u n t i l  the  banks ran out o f  L i q u i d i t y  i n  m1d-1978.
\
Our approach a l s o  a l l o w s  us to  understand the  d i f f i c u l t y  1n deve lop ing 
any s ta b le  f u n c t io n s  f o r  the K u w a i t i  monetary sec to r  over  a Long pe r iod  
o f  t im e .  For the pe r iod  1963-1971 the s u p p ly  o f  n om in a l  money by t h e  
C e n t r a l  Bank o f  K u w a i t  w o u ld  h a v e  p l a y e d  a m a j o r  r o l e  i n  t h e  
de te rm ina t ion  o f  the  money s tock ,  but the  high "Polak c o e f f i c i e n t "  which 
we c a L l  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange demand m u l t i p l i e r  1n our  a n a ly s i s  a t  the 
end o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  would  have g r e a t l y  reduced t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  the 
r e s u l t i n g  domestic c r e d i t  expansion. For the pe r iod  1972-78 Loan demand 
1n t h e  d o m e s t ic  m a r k e tp l a c e  became o f  m a jo r  im p o r t a n c e ,  wh ich  was 
s a t i s f i e d  almost comple te ly  by the a c t i v i t y  o f  the commercial banks. By 
m i d - 1 9 7 8  t h e  c o m m e rc ia l  banks became r e l a t i v e l y  i l l i q u i d  and t h e
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scenar io  changed d r a s t i c a l l y  once aga in .
Our conc lus ions  developed from the a p r i o r i  approach should now give way 
t o  more e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s .  We adop t  such an approach and beg in  by 
a n a l y s i n g  c e r t a i n  p r e v i o u s  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  o f  da te  i n  t h e  K u w a i t i  
monetary s e c to r .
b ] Money Dqmand F ync^  ons and Tests
R.A. Wi lson makes th ree  d i f f e r e n t  t e s t s  on the  monetary s e r ie s  i n  Kuwait
from J u ly  1976 to  November 1981 (8 5 ) .  He i n v e s t i g a t e s  the r e l a t i o n s h i p
b e tw e e n  b an k  d e p o s i t  and l e n d i n g  d a t a  and m a jo r  macro -econom ic  
v a r i a b le s .  F i r s t  o f  a l l  he t e s t e d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between demand and 
savings depos i t s  and government expend i tu re ,  e u r o - d o l l a r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and p r i c e s  such t h a t : -
D + S = a + gG -  ei  + pP
where 0 = demand depos i t s
S = t ime and savings depos i t s  
G = government expend i tu re  
i  = three-month e u r o - d o l l a r  depos i t  ra tes  
P = wholesale p r i c e  index
The f i n a l  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  t e s t  was:-
D + S = 991.36 + 1.58 G + 28.84i
( 8.46) (2.30)  (4.26)  -  t  s t a t i s t i c s
—p
where R = 0.29 
d = 1.55
p* = 0.81
From h is  t e s t s  o f  t h i s  r e la t i o n s h i p ,  Wi lson concludes t h a t  government
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e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  n o t  e good determinan t o f  bank depos i t  growth.  I t  seems 
strange t h a t  Wi lson should ge t  such a poor  f i t  i f  h i s  v a r ia b le s  show a 
high degree o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Foreign i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  meanwh i le  have a 
p o s i t i v e  s i g n .  Howeve r  each i n i t i a l  t e s t  he c o n c lu d e d  Led t o  a 
Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c  t h a t  r e v e a le d  a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n  and the  Durbin 
procedure had to  be app l ied  to  t rans fo rm  th e  e q u a t i o n .  Most r e s e a rc h  
f i n d s  problems w i t h  a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n  on Kuwait i  monetary and macro da ta .  
The D u r b i n  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  w o u ld  i n v a r i a b l y  h o w e v e r  reduce  th e  
c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  and t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  ( t  -  
s t a t i s t i c ) .  For in s tance  i n  the case o f  t h i s  equat ion the Durbin-Watson 
s t a t i s t i c  was i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  1 . 0 8  t o  1 . 7 5  b u t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t  f e l l  f rom 0.92 t o  0 .29 .  He concludes from these t e s t s  t h a t  
government expend i tu re  i s  not such a good determinant o f  p r i v a t e  sec to r  
a c t i v i t y  as some people assume f o r  the per iod  a f t e r  1975.  However h i s  
s e r i e s  f o r  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  appears to  d i f f e r  a g rea t  dea l  from 
the s e r ie s  used here ( see Jqfrl-6 which i s  ex t ra c ted  from the  Cen tra l
Bank o f  Kuwait Q u a r te r l y  B u l l e t i n  (wh ich  i s  the same source used by the 
IFS s e r i e s ) .  Wi lson c la ims the same sources f o r  h i s  s e r ie s  and the  on ly  
pos s ib le  e x p la n a t io n  f o r  the d i f f e r e n c e  i s  e i t h e r  data ad jus tment  wh ich  
o f te n  takes place i n  so f a r  as Kuwai t i  economic s t a t i s t i c s  are concerned 
o r  an a t t e m p t  t o  d e f l a t e  th e s e  s t a t i s t i c s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  1s no t  c le a r  
whether he does t h i s .  The s i z e  o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  we 
t e n t a t i v e l y  accep t the second r e a s o n .  However,  i f  t h i s  i s  t h e  case ,  
th e n  t h e r e  1s a s u b s t a n t i a l  danger o f  e r r o r  s ince the GDP d e f l a t o r  and 
i n f l a t i o n  s t a t i s t i c s  in  Kuwait a re  h i g h l y  suspect.  Also Wi lson does not 
repo r t  i n  any o f  h i s  t e s t s  on the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m u l t 1 c o l L 1 n e a r 1 t y  i n  
any o f  h i s  r e s u l t s .
W i lson 's  (86) second t e s t  r e la te d  p r i v a t e  sec to r  bank advances t o  demand 
and savings d e p o s i t s ,  f o re ig n  assets  o f  the commercial banks, government 
expend i tu re  and p r i c e s  such t h a t : -
B = G + d (D + S) — fF + gG + pP
where B = bank borrowing (advances)
F = f o re ig n  assets  o f  the banks
The f i n a l  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  t e s t  w as : -
B = -116.29 + 0.85 (D + S) + 0.18 F + 0.48 G
(-1 .27) (9 .62)  (1 .55) (1 .53) -  t  s t a t i s t i c s
where = 0.79
d = 1 .57
p* = 0.85
Bank d e p o s i t s ,  fo re ign  assets and government expend i tu re  a l l  tu rned out 
to  be s i g n i f i c a n t  al though the s ign o f  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  F was no t  what 
Wi lson was expec t ing .  T h is  r e s u l t  o f  W i l s o n ' s  compares s t ra n g e ly  w i th  
h i s  prev ious  r e s u l t .  Whereas government expend i tu re  does not d e te rm in e  
d e p o s i t s  i t  does seem to  determine advances. T h is  seems to  concur w i th  
our prev ious general  obse rva t ion  t h a t  government expend i tu re  i s  more o f  
a background in f lu e n c e  on monetary d eve lop m en ts  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i n  t h e  
p e r i o d  s t u d i e d  by W i l s o n ,  th a n  a d i r e c t  one .  The f a c t  t h a t  f o re ig n  
assets  r i s e  along w i th  b o r ro w in g  app ea rs  t o  puzz le  Wi lson who comments 
t h a t  funds depos i ted  abroad should reduce th e  banks a b i l i t y  t o  expand 
domestic c r e d i t .  I f  we Look a t  our p rev ious  d iscuss io ns  on the ques t ion  
o f  f o re ig n  assets  however, i f  s h o r t - t e rm  t ime depos i ts  are cons idered to  
be l i q u i d  a s s e t s  under  the C en t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait  r e g u la t i o n s  and they 
are more p r o f i t a b l e  assets than  l o c a l  K u w a i t i  D inar  asse ts ,  banks w i l l  
meet t h e i r  l i q u i d i t y  requ irement  by i n v e s t i n g  i n  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  I f  
l i q u i d  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  p a r t i a l l y  c o n t r i b u te  t o  the  monetary base, which 
i s  what we have m a i n t a i n e d ,  t h e n  n a t u r a l l y  t h e y  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  
p o s i t i v e l y  to  the growth 1n commercial bank lend ing .  A l s o  i f  cus tom er  
d e p o s i t s  i n  f o r e i g n  cu r renc ies  r i s e ,  so wiLL fo re ig n  asse ts .  W i l s o n 's  
t h i r d  and Last t e s t  which we rev iew beLow m a in ta ins  t h a t  the c h i e f
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reason f o r  f o re ig n  assets  expanding i s  expansion in  f o re ig n  L i a b i l i t i e s .  
K u w a i t i  commercial banks are seen by Wi lson to  be conse rva t ive  and they
match cu r re nc ie s  on the  a s s e t  and l i a b i l i t i e s  s ide as w e l l  as cover ing
f o r e i g n  L i a b i l i t i e s  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  t r a d e .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  t e s t ,  
c o r r e c t i n g  f o r  au to  c o r r e l a t i o n  using the  Durbin procedure reduced the  
c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  ( b u t  o n l y  t o  a l i m i t e d  e x t e n t )  f rom  0 .99  to  
0 .80 .
W i l s o n  (87)  t e s t s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  
c om m e rc ia l  banks and the supp ly o f  bank dep os i ts ,  the amount o f  f o re ig n  
L i a b i l i t i e s  and the  e u r o - d o l l a r  i n t e r e s t  r a te  such t h a t : -
F = c + d (D + S) + 1 L + c i
where L = fo re ig n  cur rency l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  the banks.
The f i n a l  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  t e s t  was:-
F = 76.52 + 0.36 (D + S) + 0.77 L -0 .7 0  i
(1.78)  (8.80)  (11.33) ( -0 .31 )  -  t  s t a t i s t i c s
where R = 0.92 
d = 1.75 
p* = 0.76
Wilson found f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  banks e x t r e m e l y  im po r tan t  as 
de terminants  o f  f o re ig n  asse ts .  He i n t e r p r e t s  t h i s  as t h e i r  d e s i r e  n o t  
t o  h o l d  open fo re ig n  exchange p o s i t i o n s  but ra th e r  to  match c u r re n c ie s .  
We a l ready  commented above t h a t  he found t h a t  the r i s e  in  f o re ig n  assets  
has been l a r g e l y  due t o  a r i s e  i n  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s .  A l s o  t h e  
i n t e r e s t  r a te  appears to  be on ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  i t s  fo rm  as a r a t e  o f  
change which ex p la ins  our e a r l i e r  comment about banks h o ld in g  l i q u i d
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r e s e r v e s  i n  t h e  most p r o f i t a b l e  a s s e t s  between domest ic  and f o re ig n  
c u r r e n c y .  W i l s o n  d i d  f i n d  some de p e n d e n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  on 
de p o s i t s .  Our own t e s t s  on the de te rm inan ts  o f  he demand f o r  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  by th e  c om m e rc ia l  banks are c a r r i e d  out in  Chapter 4.  We f i n d  
t h a t  o u r  r e s u l t s  a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  W i l s o n  i n  t h a t  f o r e i g n  
l i a b i l i t i e s  and d e p o s i t s  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s  o f  
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i n  bank balance sheets,  w i th  f o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  as the 
v a r i a b l e  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  c o e f f i c i e n t .  We fo u n d ,  how eve r ,  f o r e i g n  
c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  more s i g n i f i c a n t  and more i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  t o t a l  
d e p o s i t s  as an e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  demand 
f u n c t i o n .
The most r e v e a l in g  r e s u l t  o f  W i l s o n ' s  t e s t s  i s  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
loan demand and government expend i tu re  where p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  b o r r o w i n g  
can be s a i d  t o  be i n f l u e n c e d  by government expend i tu re .  The apparent 
dependence o f  bank advances on d e p o s i t s  i s  n o t  so i n t e r e s t i n g .  The 
dependence o f  bank advances on fo re ig n  assets  can be s a i d  t o  be due t o  
t h e i r  r o l e  ( a p a r t  n a t u r a l l y  f rom c o v e r i n g  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s ]  as 
reserves .  T h is  p a r t i c u l a r  r e la t i o n s h ip  we s h a l l  f i n d  to  be im po r tan t  i n  
our  d iscuss ions  o f  f o re ig n  a s s e t s ,  l a t e r ,  but  in  a d i f f e r e n t  form.  The 
most s i g n i f i c a n t  independent v a r ia b le  in  W i ls o n 's  second t e s t ,  how ever ,  
i s  gove rnm en t  e x p e n d i t u r e .  The o t h e r  t e s t s  a re  o f  l e s s  i n t e r e s t ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  d e p e n d e n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  on d e p o s i t s  and Less 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  on f o r e ig n  i n t e r e s t  ra te  changes also p o in t s  t o  t h e i r  r o le  
as r e s e r v e s .  I f  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  appears  t o  i n f l u e n c e  b an k  
b o r r o w i n g ,  but no t  money supp ly then one should t e s t  f o r  a r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between bank b o r r o w in g  (as a p r o x y  f o r  Loan demand) and t h e  money 
supp ly .  Th is  Wi lson does not do. W i lson 's  t e s t s  in  g e n e r a l  leave  much 
to  be des i red .
Some o ther  s tu d ie s  preceded W ilson.  C rocke t t  and Evans in  t h e i r
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e s t i m a t e  o f  a money demand f u n c t i o n  f o r  Kuw a i t  do no t  i n c l u d e  an 
o p p o r tu n i t y  cost  v a r i a b l e  i n  t h e  form o f  f o r e i g n  or domestic i n t e r e s t  
ra tes  a t  a l l  ( 88 ) .  They d id  i n c l u d e  th e  r a t e  o f  change o f  p r i c e s  as 
p o s s i b l y  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  r e t u r n  on r e a l  assets  i n  the economy which 
should by a l l  accounts have a n e g a t i v e  in f l u e n c e  on money demand. They 
found the ra te  o f  change o f  r e a l  M2 to  be c lo s e ly  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  r e a l
p
n o n - o i l  GDP (NOGDPR) such t h a t  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  was R =
0.9841 f o r  a sample pe r iod  f rom 197 2 -78 ,  but t h a t  the ra te  o f  change o f  
p r i c e s  was n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t .  They d i d  n o t  seem to  have p rob lem s  o f  
a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n  as W i l s o n  d i d  because they d e f la te d  aLL v a r ia b le s  by 
th e  GDP d e f l a t o r  p r i o r  t o  t e s t i n g  t o  a v o id  s p u r r i o u s  c o r r e l a t i o n .
W i lson  d i d  f i n d  t h e  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c e  i n d e x  t o  be a s i g n i f i c a n t  
independent v a r ia b le  i n  h i s  f i r s t  two t e s t s  and he consequent ly ad jus ted  
f o r  t h i s  i n  each case by d e f l a t i n g  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  and o m i t t i n g  P.
Perhaps in  both cases the  t e s t s  should have a lso t r i e d  lagged endogenous 
v a r i a b l e s ,  s i n c e  i f  bank advances  seem to  be d e te rm in e d  p a r t l y  by 
government expend i tu re ,  a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n  c o u ld  a l s o  r e s u l t  f rom  t h i s .  
A u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  when the s e r i a l  e r r o r s  are i n t e r - r e l a t e d  and 
t h e  o n l y  way o f  m a k in g  s e n s e  o f  t h e  p i c t u r e  i s  by L o o k in g  a t  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  over t ime and d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  through the use 
o f  lagged f u n c t i o n s .  A l t h o u g h  W i l s o n ' s  f i r s t  t e s t  (89)  shows t h e  
i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  government  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  C rocke t t  and Evans' r e s u l t  
regard ing  the  im po r tan t  r o l e  o f  n o n - o i l  GDP which i s  obv ious ly  c lo s e ly  
l inked  w i th  government e x p e n d i t u r e ,  shows W i l s o n ' s  r e s u l t s  c o u ld  be 
m i s l e a d i n g .  The o n l y  p o s s i b l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  thes e  two a p p a r e n t l y  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  r e s u l t s  i s  t h a t  n o n - o i l  GDP i s  n o t  t a n ta m o u n t  t o  
government expend i tu re  but somehow i s  a Lagged f u n c t i o n  o f  government  
e x p e n d i t u r e .  The re  i s  no d e n y in g  t h a t  government expend i tu re  i s  the 
u l t im a t e  source o f  funds i n  Kuwai t .  However, the accumulat ion o f  assets  
by the p r i v a t e  sec to r  over  t ime has given the p r i v a t e  sec to r  an
independence which i s  pos s ib ly  the o v e r r i d i n g  determinant  o f  sho r t - te rm  
monetary movements as we s h a l l  see b e lo w .  T h i s  r e s u l t  agrees w i th  the 
p i c t u r e  o f  the Kuwait i  f i n a n c i a l  system which has s l o w l y  been b u i l d i n g  
up throughout  t h i s  a n a ly s i s .
The t h i r d  and e a r l i e s t  a v a i l a b le  study o f  Kuwa i t 's  monetary data i s  in  
Khouja and Sadle r  (90 ) .  They i n c l u d e d  t h e  three-month  e u ro d o l la r  ra te  
(a longs ide  government expend i tu re ]  as an e x p l a n a t o r y ,  a l b e i t  n e g a t i v e  
v a r i a b l e .  But o v e r a l l  t h e  t e s t s  o f  the demand f o r  money fu n c t io n  had 
poor r e s u l t s  w i th  a c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  n o t  exceeding R2 = 0 .535 .  
The impact o f  government e x p e n d i t u r e  t h e y  found  to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  and p o s i t i v e  (9 1 ) .  T h e i r  sample o f  data ranged from 1961 to  
1976 as opposed t o  W i l s o n ' s  1976-81 and C r o c k e t t  and Evans 1972-78. 
Th is  probably  exp la ins  why the r e s u l t s  a re  very d i f f e r e n t  from those o f  
Wi lson and C rocke t t  and Evans. They were d i f f e r e n t  f rom both i n  g i v i n g  
th e  t h r e e  month e u r o d o l l a r  d e p o s i t  r a t e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o le ,  and they  
were d i f f e r e n t  from W i lson 's  r e s u l t s  i n  g i v i n g  government expend i tu re  a 
d i r e c t  exp lana to ry  r o le  i n  the demand f o r  money f u n c t i o n .  The r e s u l t s  
were n o t  good,  however .  R e l a t i v e l y  low c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  
0.789 and 0.819 were found w i t h  r e s p e c t i v e  Durbin-W1 Ison s t a t i s t i c s  o f  
2 . 8 2 6  and 2 . 8 2 7  w h ic h  r e v e a l  1n c o n c  l u s 1 v 1 t y  o f  t h e  t e s t  f o r  
a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n .  The pe r iod  1961-1976 i s  p o s s ib l y  aLso the pe r iod  most 
f r a u g h t  w i th  data problems.
c ]  The O ppor tun i ty  Cost V a r ia b le  and F in a n c ia l  Assets 
Competing w i th  Money
As W i l s o n  I n d i c a t e s  (92) the apparent lack  o f  Impact o f  changes i n  the 
e u r o d o l l a r  I n t e r e s t  ra te  on l o c a l  bank depos i ts  i n  Kuwait i s  due to  the 
f a c t  t h a t  banks probably  o f f e r  c l i e n t s  g r e a t e r  inducem en ts  t o  d e p o s i t  
f u n d s  o f  an i n d i r e c t  n a t u r e  i n  response  t o  r i s e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
i n t e r e s t  ra tes  and even p o s s ib l y  even r a i s e  i n t e r e s t  ra tes  u n o f f i c i a l l y  
above the lega l  l i m i t  on loan I n t e r e s t .  They are a b le  t o  pay i m p l i c i t  
I n t e r e s t  r a te s  sometimes above lend ing ra tes  because o f  p r o f i t  f rom the 
h ig h l y  l u c r a t i v e  bu t  u n o f f i c i a l  d i s c o u n te d  cheque market which we s h a l l  
be d iscuss ing  in  d e t a i l  l a t e r .  But i n  theory  there  are o the r  c o m p e t in g  
a s s e t s  t o  money 1n t h e  d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  markets o f  any given c o u n t r y ,  
a p a r t  f rom  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  a s s e t s .  There  a re  do m e s t ic  bonds and 
s tocks .  The high income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  money t h a t  C r o c k e t t  
and Evans found  f o r  Kuw a i t  (1 .411)  i s  a t  the top end o f  the range f o r  
deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s .  Th is  resuLt  might  seem to  r e f l e c t  a lack o f  o th e r  
f i n a n c i a l  assets apa r t  from money i n  the economy and a c e r ta in  degree o f  
backwardness o f  the  f i n a n c i a l  system ( 9 3 ) .  However, i r o n i c a l l y  we f i n d  
the oppos i te  to  h o ld .  Kuwait as we s h a l l  f i n d  o u t  i n  C h a p te r  4 has a 
s t o c k  marke t  which had a market c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  KD.2.5 b i l l i o n  a t  the  
end o f  the second q u a r te r  o f  1978,  i n  excess  o f  the s tock  o f  M2 a t  the 
same t ime (KD.2.1 b i l l i o n ) .  Turnover i n  the s tock  m a rke t  1n t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  o f  1978 reached 20 pe r  c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  the 
L is ted  companies. There i s  a lso  a bond market which by mid-1978 boasted 
a f l o a t  1n excess o f  KD 500 m i l l i o n .  The p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  however has 
almost no share o f  the bond market a t  a l l ,  w h i le  1t  d id  ho ld  77 per cent 
o f  the s tocks i n  the s tock  market a t  the end o f  1978. The bond m a rk e t  
was m a in l y  a government  m arke t  a l though the commercial banks bought a 
share o f  each new I s s u e .  Above a l l ,  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  quas i -money  
be t rays  an advanced f i n a n c i a l  system. These obse rva t ions  t h e r e fo r e  seem 
t o  c o n t r a d i c t  C r o c k e t t  and Evans '  r e s u l t ,  however  we s h a l l  see i n  
C h ap te r  4 t h a t  the appearance o f  an advanced f i n a n c i a l  system in  Kuwait  
goes no f u r t h e r  than t h a t .  We have a l r e a d y  seen t h a t  quasi-money (or  
t im e depos i ts )  are s ho r t - te rm  and are Linked w i th  the t r a d in g  n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t .  Hence C r o c k e t t  and Evans '  r e s u l t s  a re  n o t  so 
incomprehensabLe as they might a t  f i r s t  seem.
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In  t h e  K u w a i t i  economy th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  cheques i n  com m e rc ia l  and 
f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s a c t io n s  i s  paramount. Trade c r e d i t  i s  a lm o s t  e n t i r e l y  
based on p o s t - d a t e d  cheques wh ich  change hands i n  the  se t t lem en t  o f  
payments r a th e r  as endorsed b i l l s  o f  exchange would which save on cash 
balances and increase the  im po r tance  o f  quas i -m oney  v i s - a - v i s  demand 
d e p o s i t s  and currency (94 ) .  Even more s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  the impor tance o f  
p o s t - d a t e d  cheques 1n com m e rc ia l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  made them a n a t u r a l  
c a n d id a t e  f o r  t h e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  f o r w a r d  t r a n s a c t i o n s  on t h e  s t o c k  
m a r k e t .  I n  C h a p te r  4 t h e  d e t a i l e d  w o rk in g s  o f  t h i s  system w i l l  be 
i n v e s t i g a t e d ,  t h e  b road  Impac t  o f  t h i s  system o f  d e a l i n g  on Kuw a i t 's  
monetary s t r u c t u r e  i s  a l l  t h a t  i n t e r e s t s  us a t  t h i s  s t a g e .  The use o f  
cheques was u l t i m a t e l y  connec ted  w i th  the o v e r d r a f t  Lending system o f  
t h e  com m erc ia l  banks ,  and t h e  r e a s o n  why cheques adop ted  f e a t u r e s  
s i m i l a r  to  the general  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  cur rency no tes  as l e g a l  t e n d e r  
(as long  as t h e  s i g n a t u r e  be longed  t o  a repu tab le  name) was so as to  
a v o id  p a y in g  cheques i n t o  ban k  a c c o u n t s  and t h e r e b y  r e d u c in g  th e  
o v e r d r a f t  balance. These o v e r d r a f t s  remained as evergreen Loans.
In  summary, the high  tu rnove r  i n  the s tock  market meant t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  
bank balances were k e p t  f o r  t h i s  pu rpose  and s u b s t a n t i a l  o v e r d r a f t s  
Incu r red  which were r e la te d  to  s tock  market inves tment.  We see as e a r l y  
as i n  1974 a r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  1n the  Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait economic 
re p o r t
" . . . b e s i d e s ,  a p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  couLd presumably 
be t raced  between t h e  movement o f  c u r re n t  accounts 
and the a c t i v i t y  o f  the domestic s tock  market .  Th is  
1s on ly  n a tu r a l  s ince  t h e  s a i d  a c t i v i t y  i s  m a in l y  































































































































d eb i t  s ide  o f  the c u r re n t  account"  (95) .
Wong (96) analyses the tu rn ove r  1n demand and t ime depos i t s  In  Singapore 
to  t r y  and determine the ex ten t  o f  t h e i r  use f o r  f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  
as opposed to  normal t r a n s a c t i o n s .  U n l i k e  Kuwait  these r e s u l t s  showed 
com pet i t ion  ra th e r  than complementar i ty  between t ime depos i ts  and o t h e r  
f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s .  I n  the case o f  Kuwait we can see from Table 3 .4  and 
Graph 3.5  t h a t  f o r  the pe r iod  1973-80, the tu rnove r  in  M2 ( c a l l e d  T1) i s  
c o r re la te d  w i th  the tu rn ove r  i n  t h e  s t o c k  market ( c a l l e d  T2) except f o r  
the pe r iod  1n 1976 when the  peaks i n  T2 appeared s i x  months b e f o r e  t h e  
peak 1n T1 due t o  th e  f a c t  t h a t  many t r a n s a c t i o n s  concluded 1n t h i s  
pe r iod  on t h e  s t o c k  m a rk e t  were f o r w a r d  t r a n s a c t i o n s  s e t t l e d  by s i x  
month pos t -da ted  cheques, I l l u s t r a t i n g  c l e a r l y  t h a t  th e  f o r w a r d  s t o c k  
marke t  1s based on t h e  use o f  p o s t - d a t e d  cheques.  C om p lem en ta r i t y  
between money and s t o c k s  may seem s t r a n g e  t o  a s t u d e n t  o f  economic 
theo ry ,  however we d id  conclude 1n Chapter 1 and we 6 h a l l  a l s o  a n a ly s e  
1n C h ap te r  4 t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  na r row ness  o f  t h e  s t o c k  m a rk e t ,  the 
government supp o r t  and t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p r i c e  r i s e s  o f  s tocks meant 
t h a t  the market was a t r a d in g  ra th e r  than a h o l d i n g  m a r k e t .  The f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  a l s o  shunned t h e  bond market and bond Issues 
were almost always placed w i t h  government  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r  banks, leads 
us to  conclude t h a t  the Kuwait i  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ' s  Investment s t y l e  meant 
t h a t  q u a s i - m o n e y  was a w a i t i n g  room f o r  f u n d s  s e e k i n g  t r a d i n g  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  We analyse t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  1n g rea te r  de ta iL  in  Chapter 
4 and c o n c lu d e  t h a t  t h e  h i g h  L e v e l  o f  q u a s i - m o n e y  we see 1n th e  
s t a t i s t i c s  does not q u a l i f y  the  Kuwait f i n a n c i a l  system to  be c a l l e d  an 
advanced f i n a n c i a l  system.
The use o f  p o s t - d a t e d  cheques i n  commercial and f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s a c t io n s  
Increased th e  r a t i o  o f  quas i -m oney  t o  M2 because t im e  d e p o s i t s  were
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TABLE.3 :3
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY DATA ON KUWAIT 1973-81 
[ M i l l i o n s  o f  Kuwait i  D inars}
M2 G I P A N D S
1 981 IV 
I I I  


































1 980 IV 
I I I  
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10 82 .9  
947.1
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M2 = Money Supply 
6 = Government Expend i tu re
I  = Average D a i l y  Quota t ions  For The 3-Month E u ro d o l la r  Deposi t  Rate
P = Wholesale P r i c e  Index
A = Advances To The P r i v a te  Sec to r
N = Net Foreign Assets  Of The Commercial Banks
D = T o ta l  Depos i ts  Of Residents  With The Banking System
S = Foreign Currency Deposi ts  Of Residents With The Banking System
F = Foreign Assets  Of The Commercial Banks
L = Foreign L i a b i l i t i e s  Of The Commercial Banks
B = Commercial Banks Bank Balances Held With Foreign Banks
W = Government Depos i ts  With The Commercial Banks
TABLE 3 . 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TURNOVER IN THE MONEY STOCK 
AND STOCK MARKET TURNOVER IN SHARES 1973-80
T1 T2
1980 IV 0.1338 0.0220
I I I 0.2028 0.1016
I I 0.2018 0.1249
I 0.1616 0.0521
1979 IV 0.1703 0.0427
I I I 0.2111 0.1661
I I 0.1826 0.0841
I 0.1854 0.1417
1978 IV 0.2121 0.1727
I I I 0.2350 0.2251
I I 0.2362 0.1262
I 0.2521 0.0656
1977 IV 0.1803 0.0372
I I I 0.1669 0.0725
I I 0.2172 0.0782
I 0.1996 0.0207
1976 IV 0.2283 0.0275
I I I 0.2733 0.0967
I I 0.2955 0.1315
I 0.2579 0.1365
1975 IV 0.2180 0.2924
I I I 0.2072 0.1053
I I 0.2735 0.1696
I 0.1690 0.0397
1974 IV 0.1563 0.0173
I I I 0.1516 0.0277
I I 0.1790 0.0737
I 0.1734 0.0314
1973 IV 0.1835 0.0683
I I I 0.1891 0.0385




BC = Average Monthly Bank C le a r in g
TS = VoLume o f  Shares Transacted
NS = Number o f  Shares Outstand ing
f i x e d  and t h e  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  led to  borrowing
aga ins t  t im e  d e p o s i t s  f o r  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  p e r i o d s .  A con s id e ra b le
amount o f  loan demand o r i g i n a t e d  i n  the  s tock  market wh ich  i s  a d i r e c t
and i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i c i a r y  o f  government expend i tu re .  The i n s i g n i f i c a n t
yieLds in  the s t o c k  m arke t  ov e r  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s tu d y  compared w i th
depos i t  y ieLds a lso  i n d ic a te d  t h a t  i t  i s  a t r a d i n g  n o t  an in v e s tm e n t
m a r k e t .  I t  c a n n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  t o  compete as an asset  w i th  money.
Rather,  the demand f o r  money i s  a complementary f a c t o r  to  the demand f o r
s tock ,  in  a manner, as we saw e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  Chapte r ,  rem in iscen t  o f
the " c o n d u i t "  theo ry  o f  the demand f o r  money i n  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s .
Changes i n  the o v e r d r a f t  system are however due and we d iscuss these in
Chapter 4 because aLthough th o s e  r e fo rm s  f a l l  s l i g h t l y  ou ts ide  o f  the
pe r iod  o f  s tudy they w i l l  have im por tan t  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  on t h e  f a c t o r s
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t io n  (9 7 ) .  Th is  i s  a most i n t e r e s t i n g  f i n d i n g  and
t h i s  g e n e r a l  a rea  has been u n d e r - r e s e a r c h e d  i n  t h e  deve lopmen t  o f
monetary systems i n  deve lop ing economies.
d) Spine J e s t s  an<^  ConcLus-jons an the Demand f o r  Mqney 
and t j ie  ^ehayippr. of. the  Money Sfrapk 1973-1981
There i s  wide agreement i n  th e  L i t e r a t u r e  on mone ta ry  m a t t e r s  t h a t  a 
demand f o r  money f u n c t i o n  s h o u ld  con ta in  a scale v a r ia b le  r e l a t i n g  to  
the le v e l  o f  t r a n s a c t i o n s  and a v a r i a b l e  r e p r e s e n t i n g  the o p p o r tu n i t y  
cos t  o f  ho ld ing  money. The t e s t s  o f  K u w a i t 's  monetary sec to r  show t h a t  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  r e a l  a s s e t s  1s n o t  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i th  the money s tock ,  and 
t h a t  developments i n  f o re ig n  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  have l i t t l e  i f  an ambiguous 
impor tance.
The t h re e  month e u r o d o l l a r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  appeared t o  be a n e g a t i v e  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p e r i o d  which was s tud ied  by Khouja and S a d le r .  
But as we saw, Khouja and S a d le r ' 6  r e s u l t s  we considered i n d e c i s i v e  due 
to  poor data and r e s u l t s  which in c luded  p o s s ib le  a u t o - c o r r e l a t i o n  w i th  a 
low regress ion  c o e f f i c i e n t .  By c o n t r a s t ,  the  l a t e r  per iod  which was
154
s t u d i e d  1n W i l s o n ' s  f i r s t  t e s t  showed a c l e a r  p o s i t i v e  in f l u e n c e  o f  
f o re ig n  I n t e r e s t  ra te s  on d e p o s i t  g r o w t h .  R is in g  e u r o - d o l l a r  i n t e r e s t  
ra te s  lead the banks to  Increase y ie ld s  on t h e i r  depos i t s  1n some way or 
ano the r ,  p o s s ib l y  by o f f e r i n g  loans a t  ra tes  which compensate f o r  r i s i n g  
y ie ld s  abroad o r  a l l o w i n g  d e p o s i t o r s  o t h e r  h idden  a d v a n ta g e s .  When 
y i e l d s  i n  Ku w a i t  do la g  f o r e i g n  y i e l d s ,  a r b i t r a g e  by bank customers 
crea tes  a r i s e  i n  loan demand and t h e r e f o r e  a r i s e  in  the money s tock  
f o r  s ho r t  pe r iods  u n t i l  the banks a d ju s t  f o r  decreasing Local l i q u i d i t y .  
Hence th e  p o s i t i v e  s i g n  one c o u ld  e n c o u n te r  i n  t e s t i n g  e u r o d o l l a r  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  as an independent v a r i a b le  i n  the money demand f u n c t i o n .  
We s h a l l  pursue t h i s  i n  more d e t a i l  1n the l a s t  s ec t ion  o f  t h i s  chap te r .
We have seen t h a t  n e i t h e r  the  ra te  o f  change o f  p r i c e s ,  o r  y i e l d s  i n  the  
s tock  and bond markets cou ld  be considered as o p p o r tu n i t y  cost  v a r ia b le s  
1n t h e  demand f o r  money f u n c t i o n .  We found  t h a t  q u i t e  t h e  re v e rs e  
a c t u a l l y  he ld  i n  the  case o f  the s tock  m a r k e t .  Our d i s c u s s i o n s  showed 
t h a t  t h e  s t o c k  m a rk e t  was t h e  o r i g i n  o f  much o f  the  loan demand which 
had a p o s i t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  on the growth o f  the  money supp ly .
C rocke t t  and Evans showed t h a t  the re  ex is ted  a good r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
n o n - o i l  GDP and the demand f o r  money i n  K u w a i t .  AL-Bash1r (98) i n  h i s  
econometr ic study o f  Saud i -A rab ia  also p r e fe rs  to  use an es t im ate  o f  the  
n o n - o i l  GDP to  determine the demand f o r  money. The i r r e l e v a n c e  o f  t h e  
o i l  s ec to r  i n  the a n a ly s i s  o f  money 1s s t ressed by Khouja and S a d le r : -
" . . .  t h e  i m p a c t  m u l t i p l i e r  e s t im a t e  ( o r  e x p o r t  
earn ings minus n e t  f a c t o r  payments )  was r a th e r  Low 
a t  approx im ate ly  1 .15  (when regressed a g a in s t  GDP).
T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  w h i l e  o i l  e x p o r t s  and income on 
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  a re  o f  pa ram oun t  im p o r ta n c e  as a
THE VELOCITY OF MONEY IN KUWAIT 1 963-1 981 
( M i l l i o n s  o f  Kuwait i  Dinars)
Year NOGDP M2 v=N0GDP^
1 963 356.3 177.6 2.0062
1 967 3 80 .3 204.9 1 .8560
1 965 417.1 215.9 1 .931 9
1 966 502.5 305.2 1 .6464
1 967 51 8.3 321 .6 1 .6116
1 968 57 8.3 38B.4 1 .4966
1969 596 .6 378.4 1.5766
1970 543 .2 361.8 1 .5014
1971 732.2 41 8.7 1 .7487
1972 7 87.7 493.6 1 .595 8
1973 691.1 571 .9 1 .20 84
1 974 1147.7 720.6 1 .5927
1975 1336.4 891 .2 1.4996
19/S 1688.3 1220.3 1 .3835
1977 1 96 8.1 1583.3 1 .2430
1978 2109.0 1 950.3 1 .0814
1979 2972.8 22 89.7 1 .2983
198D 3639.5 2 857.6 1 .2736
1981 3864.7 3856.0 0.9996
NOGDP = Non-O i l  Gross Domest ic Product
Sources: NOGDP, I .M .F .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F in a n c ia l  S t a t i s t i c s
M2, C e n t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait Q u a r te r l y  S t a t i s t i c a l  
B u i l e t i n
s o u rc e  o f  f o r e i g n  income . . .  t h e i r  income g e n e r a t i n g  e f f e c t  
measured 1n te rm s  o f  th e  GNP m u l t i p l i e r  i s  minima l . . . .  I t  i s  
im po r tan t  to  note t h a t  government  revenues from o i l  and f o re ig n  
inves tmen ts  a lso have weak m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  on GNP t o g e t h e r  
w i th  i t s  endogenous components" (99)
E s t im a t e s  o f  n o n - o i l  GDP can be o b t a i n e d  d i r e c t l y  f rom M i n i s t r y  o f  
P l a n n in g  da ta  on s e c t o r a l  GDP. GDP d a t a  i s  however  n o t o r i o u s l y  
i n a c c u ra te  and cannot f o r  ins tance p rope r ly  es t im ate  the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
t rad e  o r  r e a l  e s t a t e ,  wh ich  a re  bo th  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s e c t o r s .  A n o th e r  
method wo u ld  be t o  deduct government net saving from es t im ates  o f  GDP, 
b u t  t h i s  a l s o  leads  t o  i n a c c u r a c i e s .  C r o c k e t t  and Evans '  r e s u l t  
concern ing the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between money and n o n - o i l  GDP was s i m i l a r  to  
ou rs .  We used IMF data f o r  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s  t o  
e s t i m a t e  n o n - o i l  GDP. Crude petroleum exports  were deducted from GDP; 
and TahLe By.5 d i s p la y s  the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  years 1963-1981 . Our t e s t  o f  
the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between n o n - o i l  GDP and M2 revea led  no a u t o r e g r e s s i o n
p
( D u r b in  Watson = 1 . 9 7 )  and had a h ig h  R = 0 . 9 8 .  We found an income 
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  money (0.93)  no t  as high as in  the C rocke t t  and 
Evans r e s u l t ,  presumably because o f  the d i f f e r e n t  sample.
Tests  o f  gove rnmen t  e x p e n d i t u r e  as t h e  u l t i m a t e  sou rce  o f  l i q u i d i t y  
should have proved equ a l l y  success fu l  as the  Crocke t t  and Evans' r e s u l t s  
on n o n - o i l  GDP, bu t  they d id  n o t .  Both W i lson 's  and our t e s t s  showed an 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  t - s t a t i s t i c  f o r  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  a t  any l e v e l  o f  
c o n f i d e n c e .  C l e a r l y ,  w h i l e  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
source o f  the  money supp ly ,  the c re a t io n  o f  bank c r e d i t  i s  the  immediate 
cause o f  monetary expa n s io n  i n  Kuwa i t  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a f t e r  1972. The 
b u i l d  up i n  l i q u i d  assets  above the  25 per cent s t a t u t o r y  requ irement
al lowed the banks to  respond to  r i s e s  in  loan demand.
We r e s t r i c t e d  any f u r t h e r  t e s t s  t o  th e  p e r i o d  1973-1981 i n  o r d e r  t o  
^x^N lm i t  t h e  sample and not to  ob ta in  too many c o n f l i c t i n g  r e s u l t s .  Also 
1973 as a s t a r t  d a te  f o r  t h e  s e r i e s  we t e s t  (w h ich  a re  t a b u la te d  in  
TabLe 3 . 3 ) i s  l o g i c a l  both in  terms o f  the watershed created by t h e  oi  L 
p r i c e  e x p l o s i o n  w h ic h  o c c u r r e d  i n  t h a t  yea r  and i n  te rm s  o f  t h e  
r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  government  f i n a n c e s ,  which 
a f fe c te d  the commercial banks : -
" I n  1972, the c e n t r a l  bank was en t rus ted  t o  e x e c u te  
a l l  l o c a l  and f o r e i g n  b u s in e s s  t r a n s a c t i o n s  f o r  
government  m i n i s t r i e s  and a g e n c i e s .  As th o s e  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  were p re v io u s ly  p rocessed  t h ro u g h  th e  
c o m m e rc ia l  banks ,  a l l  government balances i n  l o c a l  
cur rency were t r a n s f e r r e d  f rom thos e  banks to  the 
c e n t r a l  bank" (100) .
Government dep os i ts  a t  the  com m erc ia l  banks d e c l i n e d  s h a r p l y  f o r  t h e
f i r s t  t ime s ince  1968.
"As r e g a r d s  government depos i ts  c u r r e n t l y  kept w i th  
the c om m e rc ia l  banks ,  t h e y  a re  p a r t l y  i n  f o r e i g n  
cu r rency ,  and p a r t l y  i n  t h e  fo rm  o f  cove rage  f o r  
c e r t a i n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  such as guarantees"  (101) .
We t e s t e d  government  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  advances t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  
f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and p r i c e s  a g a i n s t  M2, and found  1n a l l  
v a r i a t i o n s  o f  the equa t ions ,  advances to  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  be th e  
most s i g n i f i c a n t  v a r i a b l e .  We te s te d  the e q u a t io n : -
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MS == e + bG + cA + d l  + eP 
where (3 = government expend i tu re  
A = advances
P = wholesale p r i c e  index
I  = d a i l y  average qu o ta t io n  o f  the 3-month E u rod o l la r  ra te  
and the r e s u l t  was:-
M2 = 412.20600 + 0.21255 G + 0.95617 A -  7.40743 I  -  0.23076 P
(251 .90200) (0.21721) (0.07075) (5.49573) (1 . 8 3 7 4 6 ) -  standard errors
(1 .64) (0 .98)  (13.52) (-1 .35) ( -0 .13 )  -  t statistics
R2 = 0.993 N = 36
d = 0.80
C0ND. = 63
The D u rb in -W a ts o n  s t a t i s t i c  (d )  i n d i c a t e d  au to regress ion  being lower 
than the  lower c r i t i c a l  va lue  f o r  t h e  d s t a t i s t i c  (d^ = 1 .1 5 ) ,  and the  
c o n d i t io n  number (C0ND.) in d ic a te d  no m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y .  The c o n d i t i o n  
number which we use throughout  our es t im a t ion s  i s  an index o f  the degree 
o f  mu L t i  co I l i  nea r i  t y  i n  a r e g r e s s io n ;  the h igher  the  c o n d i t io n  number 
the g rea te r  the degree o f  c o l  l i n e a r i t y  i n  t h e  independent data s e t .  A 
r e s u l t  below C0ND. = 100 i s  good.
The H iLdre th -Lu  procedure (102) t rans fo rm s an e q u a t l o n : -  
y = a + bx + e
to  y -  p y ^  = a (1 -  p) + b (x  -  px_^ ) + e*
♦
i t  then s e le c ts  the  value o f  p which m in im is e s  t h e  sum o f  t h e  squared  
res idu a ls  i n  the t ransformed equa t ion .  Th is  procedure helps to  ob ta in  a 
b e t t e r  r e s u l t  f o r  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  t o  a l l o w  us t o  t e s t  a g a in  f o r  
au to reg ress ion .  The H i Id re th - L u  procedure i s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  but s im iLar
method o f  c o r r e c t i n g  f o r  a u t o - r e g r e s s i o n  i n  r e s id u a ls  to  the Durbin or
the Cochrane-Orcutt  procedures.  I t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  t h e  above e q u a t i o n  
Led to  a b e t t e r  r e s u l t : -
159
M2 = 325.25000 + 0.14431 G + 0.95624 A -  4.35914 I  + 0.30741 P
(269.44900) (0.14172) (0.06760) (5.68670) (2.07707) -  standard errors
(1 .21) (1 .02) (14.15) ( -0 .77 )  (0 .15)  -  t statistics
R2 = 0.996 N = 3 6
d = 1.69 COND. = 31
p = 0.63546
The Durb i  n-Watson s t a t i s t i c  i n d i c a te d  no au to reg ress ion ,  being h ighe r  
than the upper c r i t i c a l  value f o r  t h e  d s t a t i s t i c  ( 1 .5 5 ) .  Advances (A) 
were a h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  M2. None o f  t h e  o t h e r  
v a r ia b le s  in c lu d in g  government expend i tu re  were s i g n i f i c a n t .
We t r i e d  to  determine whether government expend i tu re  in  p rev ious  per iods  
was s i g n i f i c a n t : -
M2 = 311.45000 + 0.01336 G_1 + 0.97943 A -  5.72240 I  + 0.58361 P
(297.95600) (0.14804) (0.06976) (5.85202) (2.25699) “  standard errors
(1.05)  (0 .09)  (14.04) ( -0 .9 8 )  (0 .26)  -  t statistics
R2 = 0.995 N = 3 5
d = 1.67 COND. = 35
p = 0.62321
No a u t o r e g r e s s i o n  was apparent and the  regress ion  c o e f f i c i e n t  was high  
and the re  was no e v id e n c e  o f  m u I t i c o I  L i n e a r i t y . But a g a in  the on ly  
s i g n i f i c a n t  t - s t a t i s t i c  was f o r  A. T h i s  c o n f i r m s  t h e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
dom es t ic  c r e d i t  expansion as a determinan t o f  the  money supply  over  the  
per iod 1973-81.
Government expend i tu re  appeared  neve r  t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  our t e s t s .
However, s ince L o g ic a l l y  government expend i tu re  was the u l t im a te  source
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o f  L i q u i d i t y  i n  K u w a i t  we a p p l i e d  severa l  lagged fu n c t io n s  to  exp la in  
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between M2 and government expend i tu re .  When we a p p l ie d  
a Koyck d i s t r i b u t e d  lag to  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between M2 and government 
e x p e n d i t u r e  t o  t r y  t o  s o l v e  th e  c o n t i n u i n g  m y s te ry  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  
government  e x p e n d i t u r e  we were s u ccess fu l .  The Koyck d i s t r i b u t e d  lag 
a l low s  government expend i tu re  in  prev ious per iods  to  i n f l u e n c e  the  money 
supp ly  i n  l o g a r i t h m ic  decreas ing im po r tance  according  to  age. W i l s o n ’ s 
second t e s t  wh ich  showed t h a t  bank  a d v a n c e s  we re  i n f l u e n c e d  by 
g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  combined w i t h  our  t e s t s  wh ich  showed t h e  
impor tance o f  advances, encouraged us to  f o l l o w  t h i s  l i n e  o f  e n q u i r y .
To avo id  spu r r io u s  c o r r e l a t i o n  f rom th e  s t a r t  we d e f la te d  the  v a r i a b le s
i n  the  equat ion we t e s te d  the f o l l o w in g  e q u a t i o n : -
M2t Gt Gt -  1 Gt -  n
  = a + b —  + b1 ----------  + . . .  + bn -----------
Pt Pt Pt -  1 Pt -  n
was expressed a s : -
M2t M2t -  1 Gt
  = a + ( ) + b —
Pt Pt -  1 Pt
The t e s t  y ie ld e d  the f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t
M2t M2t -  1 Gt
  = -0 .14525 + 1.02347 (-------------) + 0.15237 (— )
Pt (0.18568) (0.04649) Pt -  1 (0.19019) Pt -  standard errors
(-0.78) (22.01) (0.80) - t statistics
R2 = 0.989 N =35
d = 2.14 COND. = 14
h = -0 .4 3 0 7 3
The D u r b i n - W a t s o n  s t a t i s t i c  m i g h t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no 
a u t o r e g r e s s i o n  p ro b le m s .  However,  due t o  t h e  p resence  o f  a lagged 
dependent v a r i a b le  the d s t a t i s t i c  i s  b ia s e d  and u n r e l i a b l e .  D u rb in ' s  K 
s t a t i s t i c  was t h e r e f o r e  c a l c u l a t e d  and i t s  v a l u e  c o n f i r m s  t h a t  
a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  no t  a problem. M u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  a lso  appeared not 
t o  be a problem. I t  i s  c l e a r  n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h a t  government expend i tu re  
i n  the present  pe r iod  ( t )  i s  not s i g n i f i c a n t ,  whereas t h e  t - s t a t i s t i c  
f o r  t h e  second te rm  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  wh ich  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  Koyck 
s t r u c t u r e  c o r r e c t l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  government expend i tu re  on 
the  money supp ly .  The success o f  the Koyck d i s t r i b u t e d  lag form f o r  the 
f u n c t io n  r e l a t i n g  government expend i tu re  to  the money
s u p p l y ,  and o u r  s u g g e s t i o n  t h a t  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  i n d i c a t e s  an i n d i r e c t  
causa t ion  between these two f a c t o r s ,  comes as no s u rp r i s e  i f  we re tu rn  
t o  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p ro x im a te  d e t e r m i n a n t s  and th e  f a c t  t h a t  
a d j u s t e d  h ig h - p o w e re d  money com pr ises  cu r rency  issued, bank reserves  
w i th  the c e n t r a l  bank ,  and , t h e  l a r g e s t  e lem en t  o f  a l l ,  n e t  f o re ig n  
a sse ts .  In  our t e s t s  o f  the f o re ig n  asset demand fu n c t io n  in  Chapter 4,  
d e p o s i t s  a re  shown t o  be im p o r t a n t  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e s .  D e p o s i t  
g ro w th  i s  a lso  an im po r tan t  exp lana to ry  v a r ia b le  o f  net  f o re ig n  asse ts .  
As we saw w i th  W i l s o n ' s  t e s t s ,  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  doesn ' t  seem to  
determine depos i t  growth but does have a s i g n f i c a n t  exp lana to ry  r o l e  i n  
t h e  g row th  o f  bank advances. We quest ioned W i ls o n 's  data on government 
e xpend i tu re ,  and suggest t h a t  government  expend i tu re  was c r u c i a l  in  the 
b u i l d  up o f  L i q u i d i t y  i n  the commercial banking system. Th is  " s l a c k "  o f  
f o r e ig n  bank L i q u i d i t y ,  which was b u i l t  up o v e r  t h e  y e a r s ,  Lead t o  a 
d e la y e d  m u l t i p l e  e x p a n s io n  o f  d e p o s i t s ,  a t  such t ime as inc reases  in  
loan demand a l lowed the  commercial banks to  lend d o m e s t i c a l l y .
Broad ly  speaking, t h e r e f o r e ,  o u r  e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s  are c o n s is te n t  w i t h  
the conc lus ions  (A) -  ( E ) ,  L i s t e d  a t  t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  
which we had deduced from the prev ious a p r i o r i  a n a ly s i s .
v i ) THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEMAND MULTIPLIER AND CURRENCY 
SUBSTITUTABILITY
G iven  th e  impor tance o f  f o re ig n  assets to  commercial banks and the  f a c t  
t h a t  these banks have to  manage t h i s  L i q u i d i t y  in  the l i g h t  o f  the  f a c t  
t h a t  the Kuwai t i  economy has a s izeab le  demand f o r  f o re ig n  exchange,  on 
wh ich  we expand i n  C h ap te r  4 (103) ,  we ought to  look c a r e f u l l y  a t  the 
na tu re  o f  t h i s  demand f o r  f o re ig n  exchange, which was summarized i n  l a te
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1975 as f o l l o w s : -
" . . . t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n a r y  im pac t  o f  t h e  Large balance 
o f  payments d e f i c i t s  in c u r re d  by the p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
wh ich  r e f l e c t s ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  increased im por ts ,  
s u b s t a n t i a l  net  c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s . . .  P r i v a te  c a p i t a l  
movements were m a in l y  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  r i s e  i n
w o r l d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  t h e  im p r o v e m e n t  i n  t h e  
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  d o l l a r ,  . . .  and th e  c o m p a r a t i v e  
s tagna t ion  o f  the domestic s tock  market"  (104) .
We have e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  expa ns io n  Leads to  leaks o f
funds abroad  ( 1 0 5 ) .  I m p o r t s  and c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s  reduce  t h e  money
s u p p l y  w h i l e  government  e x p e n d i t u r e  and l e n d in g  i n c r e a s e  i t .  The 
ques t ions  posed h e re  i n v o l v e  d e t e r m i n i n g  th e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  leak and 
w h e th e r  1 t  1s v a r i a b l e .  The t e s t s  o f  demand f o r  money f u n c t i o n s  
d i s c u s s e d  above seem to  agree in  not g i v i n g  fo re ig n  I n t e r e s t  r a te s  much 
importance in  the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  money s t o c k  except p o s s ib l y  in  
the s h o r t - t e r m .  A l s o  a r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  v e l o c i t y  o f  money i n  th e  
s h o r t - r u n  tends to  lead us to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  Imports  and c a p i t a l  ou t f low s  
are exogenous v a r ie b le s .
To es t im a te  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  Leak l e t  us r e t u r n  t o  t h e  Po lak  model 
(106) and s p e c i f y  i t  more f u l l y .  Th is  model t e l l s  us t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
o n e - t o - o n e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between money s u p p ly  and d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  
expans ion  1n a s m a l l  open economy w i t h  a f i x e d  exchange r a t e .  The 
n a t io n a l  income I d e n t i t y : —
Y = A + X -  IM
where A = domest ic e b s o r p t l o n  w h ich  c o m p r is e s  exogenous co n s u m p t io n  
investment and government spending
X = exogenous expor ts  
IM = Imports
The b a la n c e  t o  payments  i d e n t i t y  shows t h e  change i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
reserves as being the sum o f  the c u r re n t  and c a p i t a l  account b a la n c e s : -
AB = X -  IM + K 
where c a p i t a l  f lows are assumed to  be exogenous.
The d i f f e r e n c e  between domest ic c r e d i t  expansion (ADA) and the change i n  
the money s tock (AM) i s  shown as the  change in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e s e r v e s : -  
AM = ANFA + ADA.
Th is  d i f f e r e n c e ,  i n  the con tex t  o f  monetary management, must n e c e s s a r i l y  
be a fu n c t io n  o f  the on ly  endogenous v a r ia b le  i n  the balance o f  payments 
i d e n t i t y  (1e. Im p o r t s ) .  Imports  are assumed to  be a f u n c t io n  o f  nominal  




M = -  Y 
v
where v 1s the v e l o c i t y  o f  money.
The long term s o l u t i o n  to  the model requ i re s  t h a t : -
1 -  -  
ANFA = —  ( X + K) -  ADA 
zv
1 -  -
AY = -  (X + K)
z
such t h a t  ANFA = 0 and AY = Y_<)
The on ly  a t te n u a t in g  f a c t o r  o f  t h e  m u l t i p l i e r  process o f  t h i s  model i s
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the  p rope ns i t y  to  Import  (z)  which determines the Increase o f  Income 1n 
t h e  no rm a l  m u l t i p l i e r  manner given an Increase In  any o f  the exogenous 
v a r i a b l e s .  V e l o c i t y  ( v )  s i m p l y  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  t i m e - l a g  o f  t h e  
m u l t i p l i e r  process. The c o e f f i c i e n t  e x p r e s s i n g  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange 
demand m u l t i p l i e r  w h i c h  g i v e s  us th e  e x t e r n a l  d r a i n  o f  r e s e r v e s  
assoc ia ted  w i th  one u n i t  o f  domest ic c r e d i t  expansion 1 s : -  
zv ANFA
p = ----------  = -------
1 + zv ADA
Newlyn (107) develops the  Polak model f o r  68 deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s ,  among 
them Kuwait .  He e s t im a t e s  th e  f o r e i g n  exchange demand m u l t i p l i e r  as 
a b o v e  ( p )  and c a l l s  1 t  t h e  P o l a k  c o e f f i c i e n t .  F o r  K u w a i t  he 
c a l c u l a t e s : -  
p = 0.41 
z = 0 . 2 2  
v = 3.20
and he es t imates e ( the  domestic c r e d i t  expans ion  m u l t i p l i e r )  a t  7 .9 0  
g i v e n  t h e  f o rm u la  e = (1 + p)m and t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r  a t  m = 5 . 6 .  
Newlyn e lsew here  (108)  e s t im a t e s  th e s e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  d i f f e r e n t l y  (by 
us ing  Incrementa l  ra th e r  than average values)  which t u r n  ou t  t o  be more 
a c c u r a t e  1n deve lop ing the  e f f e c t s  o f  monetary p o l i c y  1n a Po lak model.  
In  a d d i t i o n  Newlyn (109) uses 6DP/M2 throughout  these s tu d ie s  to  measure 
the  Income v e l o c i t y  o f  money. We have seen t h a t  1n the  case o f  Kuwait 
non-o11 GDP f i g u r e s  need to  be used to  e s t im a t e  th e  v e l o c i t y  o f  money
( 1 1 0 ) .  We have discussed the method o f  es t im a t ion  o f  non-o1I  GDP which 
we show a lo n g  w i t h  ( v )  1n T a b le  3 : 5 . W ith  th e  a d ju s t m e n ts  f o r  the 
c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  v and t h e  use o f  t h e  I n c r e m e n t a l  r a t h e r  th a n  a v e ra g e  
va lues  we have new f l g u r e s : -  
p = 0 . 2 5  
v = 1.08 
z = 0.17
based on a broader  sample than Newlyn's (1962-76).  We ment ioned e a r l i e r
( 1 1 1 )  t h a t  N e w ly n  d i d  n o t  f u l l y  t a k e  I n t o  a c c o u n t  th e  n a t i o n a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  K u w a i t ' s  f i n a n c i a l  system in  p a r t i c u l a r  1n r e l a t i o n  
to  the ro le  o f  l i q u i d  f o re ig n  asse ts .  W ith  our  a d j u s t m e n ts  t h e r e f o r e  
f o r  n e t  f o r e ig n  assets  to  high-powered money and the  bank reserve r a t i o
(112) we reach d i f f e r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s  on t h e  in c re m e n te l  money and DCE 
m u l t i p l i e r s  than does Newlyn.
m = 2 .14
e = (1 + p)m = 2.47 
The I m p l i c i t  cons ten t  v e l o c i t y  o f  money o f  the Polak model d o e s n ' t  seem 
t o  be t o o  u n r e e l 1 s t 1 c  as a s h o r t - t e r m  f a c t o r  f o r  the  con tex t  o f  our 
d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  demand f o r  money f u n c t i o n  g i v e n  t h e  r e l e t i v e  
unimportance o f  most o p p o r tu n i t y  cost  v a r ia b le s  1n the demand f o r  money 
f u n c t i o n  ( 1 1 3 ) .  The t r e n d  f o r  ( v )  can be seen 1n T a b le  3 : 5 . ( v )
appears to  have a downtrend over  t h e p e r l o d  under s tudy ,  a l though ,  i f  we 
omit  the f i r s t  th re e  years and the  Last year o f  the sample in  Tab Le 3 : 5  
the range o f  (v)  drops by almost 60 per cent and s h o r t - te rm  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
o v e r s h a d o w  t h e  s l i g h t  dow nw ard  b i a s  1n t h e  t r e n d  o f  ( v ) .  Our 
o f t - r e p e a t e d  s c e p t i c i s m  o f  GDP s t a t i s t i c s ,  and c o n s e q u e n t l y  o f  our 
r e s u l t s  f o r  NOGDP f i g u r e s  f o r  Kuwai t ,  does not a l low  us to  lay t o o  much 
s to re  by the accuracy o f  the s t a t i s t i c s  on ( v ) .  I t  would appear t h a t  the 
money m u l t i p l i e r  1s no t  much lower  th a n  the DCE m u l t i p l i e r ,  im p ly ing  
t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange Leak 1s n o t  as g r e a t  1n Ku w a i t  as would  
o r d i n a r i l y  be assumed.
The r e s u l t s  o f  e m p i r i c a l  research would tend to  lead us to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
c a p i t a l  f l o w s  are exogenous. Th is  agrees w i th  the r e s u l t s  t h a t  f o re ig n  
assets  o f  the banks are not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f fe c te d  by e x te rn a l  I n t e r e s t  
r a te s .  Also o v e r a l l  y i e l d s  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  d o n ' t  seem to  a f f e c t  the  money 
supply except 1n the  very s h o r t - t e rm ,  and consequent ly  we assume as we
d i d  e a r l i e r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  Inducem en ts  o f fe re d  by banks to  c l i e n t s  
p o s s ib l y  1n the fo rm o f  loan a c c o u n ts  o r  s u b s i d i e s  o f  some k in d .  I f  
y ieLds are r i g i d ,  the sharpness o f  the r i s e  o f  f o re ig n  I n t e r e s t  ra te s  1s 
such t h a t  the banks f i n d  no I n d i r e c t  Inducements to  match th e  r i s e s  i n  
f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  L i q u i d i t y  then  drops r a p id l y  and a v i c i o u s  
c i r c l e  s t a r t s  as cus tom ers  b e g in  t o  bo r row  f o r  I n t e r e s t  a r b i t r a g e  
purposes. Al though i n t e r e s t  a r b i t r a g e  does take p la c e  1n t h i s  manner,  
i t  does no t  seem t h a t  t h e  money s u p p ly  i s  a f f e c t e d  1n the  long- te rm  
because th e  b a n k in g  system e v e n t u a l l y  a d j u s t s  r e l a t i v e l y  q u i c k l y  t o  
compensate f o r  c a p i t a l  f l o w s .  The com m erc ia l  banks 1n Ku w a i t  w ou ld  
s im p ly  r a t i o n  o u t  loans ,  u n t i l  the  L i q u i d i t y  c r i s i s  1s r e l i e v e d  by the 
c e n t r a l  bank and t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  and u n t i l  t h e y  can r e s t r u c t u r e  
themselves t o  o f f e r  enough I n d i r e c t  Inducements  t o  keep t h e i r  main 
c l i e n t  d e p o s i t s .  We shaLL see 1n Chapter 4,  t h a t  to  some ex ten t  Kuwai t i  
depos i to rs  move i n t o  f o re ig n  c u r re nc ie s  w h i le  m a in ta in in g  t h e i r  dep os i ts  
w i t h  t h e  same bank .  The d e p o s i t o r ' s  gain would,  1n the  s h o r t - r u n ,  be 
the bank 's  Loss. I n  t h e  l o n g e r - t e r m ,  e i t h e r  th e  d e p o s i t o r s  cou ld  be 
Induced to  change t h e i r  mind, o r  c e n t r a l  bank and government funds might  
a l low  the commercial banks t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  t h e i r  balance sheets .
The low fo re ig n  exchange demand m u t l i p l i e r  r e s u l t  f o r  Kuwait  agrees w i th  
a high growth ra te  o f  money s u p p ly  t h a t  we see o v e r  t h e  p e r i o d  under  
study and the Importance o f  the lo c a l  s tock  market 1s a t t r a c t i n g  a Large 
share o f  p r i a t e  sec to r  funds a f t e r  1972.
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CHAPTER 4
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE BANKS AND THE STOCK MARKET
i ) INTRODUCTION
The eim o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  i s  to  descr ibe  the na ture  o f  the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  Kuwai t i  f i n a n c i a l  system, and to  ana lyse in  d e t a i l  some 
o f  the behav ioura l  f u n c t io n s  such as the bank reserve r a t i o  f o r  which we 
used t h e  symbol  ( r ) ,  and t h e  p u b l i c  cash p r e f e r e n c e  r a t i o  w i t h  the 
symbol ( j ) ,  which were an i n t e g r a l  pa r t  o f  t h e  p r o x im a t e  d e t e r m in e n t s  
a n a l y s i s  o f  C h a p te r  3 ,  bu t  wh ich  we were unable to  exp lo re  in  enough 
depth to  a l low  us t o  compare t h e o r e t i c a l  a s s u m p t io n s  w i th  respect to  
these r a t i o s ,  and the  r e a l i t y  bshind these assumptions.
In  t h i s  chapter  we s h e l l  see i n  s e c t i o n  ( i i )  how t h e  low p u b l i c  cash 
pre ference r a t i o ,  which i s  an im por tan t  p o s i t i v e  c o n t r i b u t o r  to  the high  
money m u l t i p l i e r  ceme a b o u t .  We s h a l l  c o n t i n u e  o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  i n  
subsequent s e c t io n s ,  by d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  n e t u r e  o f  the  high benk reserve 
r a t i o  o f  the Kuwai t i  banks wh ich , u n t i l  t h e  l a t e r  y e a rs  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  
under s tudy ,  had the  oppos i te  (nega t ive )  e f f e c t  on the  money m u l t i p l i e r .  
The remerkeb le  dec l in e  i n  the  benk reserve r a t i o  ( i n  i t s  ad jus ted  form) 
which we can see in  Graph 3 :3  was an im por tan t  c o n t r i b u t o r  to  the growth 
o f  the s tock  o f  money. The im m ed ia te  reason f o r  t h i s  d ec l in e  i n  the 
ad jus ted  bank re s e r v e  r a t i o ,  was th e  r a p i d  g row th  i n  d o m e s t ic  loan  
demand wh ich  enab led  t h e  c om m e rc ia l  banks t o  r e d e p lo y  t h e i r  f o re ig n  
essets i n t o  domestic lend ing .  Sec t ions  ( i i i )  and ( i v )  look in  d e t a i l  a t  
the commercial banking system i n  K u w a i t .  Whereas s e c t io n  ( i i i )  i s  more 
o f  e d e s c r i p t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n e l  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  t h e  b a n k in g  system and
TAB I E. 4 a
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN KUWAIT 
AS AT DECEMBER 31 ST 1980
TYPES NUMBER
C en t ra l  Bank
Kuwai t i  Commercial Banks
P a r t l y  Foreign Ccmmerciel Banks
I s la m ic  Banks
S p ec ia l i z e d  Banks
Investment Companies










KUWAITI COMMERCIAL BANKS (1) (7)
Na t iona l  Bank o f  Kuwait  (NBK)
Commercial Bank o f  Kuwait  (CBK)
G u l f  Bank o f  Kuwai t  (GULF)
A l - A h l i  Bank o f  Kuwait  (AHLI)
Bank o f  Kuwait And The M idd le-East  (BKME) 
Burgan Bank (BURGAN)
PARTLY FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS (2) (8) 
Bank o f  Bahrain and Kuwait
ISLAMIC BANKS (3) (9) 
Kuwait Finance House (KFH)
SPECIALIZED BANKS (4)  (10)
Kuwait Real Es ta te  Bank (KREB) 
I n d u s t r i a l  Bank o f  Kuwait  (IBK) 
C re d i t  and Savings Bank (CSB)
INVESTMENT COMPANIES (5)
Kuwait Investment Company (KIC)
Kuwait Foreign Trad ing  C o n t ra c t in g  and Inves tment Company (KFTCIC) 
Kuwait I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Investment Company (K I IC )
Kuwait F in a n c ia l  Centre 
F in a n c ia l  Group o f  Kuwait  
Arab T rus t  Company 
Euro-Kuwait i  Inves tment Company 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c ia l  Adv isers  
Arab Investments f o r  Asia 
Arab F in a n c ia l  Consu l tan ts  Company 
Arab Company f o r  T rad ing S e c u r i t i e s
INDEPENDENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEALERS (6)
Muzai ni
Un i ted Trading Group
(1) A l l  Kuwait i  Commercial Banks are l i s t e d  and quoted on the Kuwait  
Stock Exchange.
(2) BBK i s  not l i s t e d  on the Kuweit Stock Exchange and opera tes  one 
Branch in  Kuwait.
(3) KFH is  l i s t e d  but not quoted on the Kuwait Stock Exchange.
(4) Of the s p e c ia l i z e d  banks on ly  KREB i s  l i s t e d  and quoted on the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange.
(5) There are 19 re g is te re d  compenies but on ly  the 11 t h a t  are 
recorded here are o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Also on ly  KIC, KFTCIC and KIIC 
can be sa id  to  be s i g n i f i c a n t  in  terms o f  balance sheet t o t a l s ,  
and fu r thermore  they are the on ly  investment  companies t h a t  are 
l i s t e d  and quoted on the Kuwait  Stock Exchange.
(61 There are 6 recognised independent f o re ig n  exchange dea le rs  but
on ly  the 2 t h a t  are recorded here are o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  terms o f  
business volume.
(7) BKME i s  owned 45% by the government,  and BURGAN 51%. BKME rep laced
the B r i t i s h  Bank o f  the Middle  E a s t 's  branch in  Kuwait in  1971.
(8) BBK i s  owned 50% by Kuwait i  i n t e r e s t s .
(9) KFH i s  owned 49% by the government.
(10) Whi le KREB i s  almost w ho l ly  p r i v a t e ,  IBK and CSB are government 
agencies.
i t s  d eve lop m en t ,  s e c t io n  ( i v )  analyses the reasons the banks held high 
f o r e i g n  exchange r e s e r v e s  and t h e  reasons  why, s u b s e q u e n t l y ,  these 
reserves were dep le ted and domestic loans rose. The s t o c k  m a rk e t ,  i t  
w i l l  be seen , was an i m p o r t a n t  source o f  loan demand and th e r e fo re  o f  
domestic c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n .  We s h a l l  examine be low t h e  na ture  o f  the 
s tock  market boom, and the  a t t i t u d e  o f  the commercial banks towards  i t .  
T h i s  and th e  im pac t  o f  t h e  s to c k  market on the na ture  o f  the monetary 
process in  Kuwait w i l l  be d iscussed  i n  s e c t io n  ( v ) .  F i n a l l y ,  in  sec t ion  
( v i ) ,  bank le n d in g  f o r  s t o c k  pu rchases  i n  t h e  U.S .  b e f o r e  1929 i s  
compared w i th  events i n  the Kuwait s tock  market be fo re  1982.
C l e a r l y ,  t h i s  c h a p te r  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  h e lp  put some f l e s h  on the bare 
bones o f  the t h e o r e t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  we developed in  Chapter 3.
i i ) THE MONEY MULTIPLIER AND THE PUBLIC CASH PREFERENCE RATIO
Observers o f  the Kuwait i  economy o f t e n  c la im  t h a t  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  system 
i s  advanced in  r e l a t i o n  to  o the r  economies i n  the area,  or  indeed in  the 
e n t i r e  d e v e l o p i n g  w o r l d  ( 1 ) .  T h i s  s o r t  o f  s t a t e m e n t  c o u l d  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  in  one o f  two ways. F i r s t l y ,  i f  we look a t  Tab le  4:1 we can 
see a w ide  v a r i e t y  and a l a r g e  number o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  
ex is tence f o r  a country  the  s i z e  o f  K u w a i t .  Such a r e l a t i v e l y  complex 
f i n a n c i a l  marketplace ( r e l a t i v e  to  o the r  economies i n  t h e  M id d le  E a s t )  
c e r t a i n l y  possesses  the broad fe a tu re s  o f  the s o r t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  system 
we f i n d  in  most advanced i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  c o u n t r i e s .  Secondly, however, 
we can re tu rn  to  the d iscuss ion  on the money m u l t i p l i e r  which we had i n  
C h a p te r  3 ( 2 ) .  Tha t  t h i s  second approach should be considered by us 
p o s s ib ly  more meaningful  than  t h e  f i r s t ,  i s  based on the f a c t  t h a t  the 
money m u l t i p l i e r  and i t s  components (and t h e i r  movements ove r  t im e )
d e s c r i b e  i n  an a b s t r a c t  f a s h io n  the nature o f  economic behaviour t h a t  
pervades the economy and u n d e rs c o re s  i t s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework.  The 
developed i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework in  evidence in  Kuwait cou ld  be merely 
a copy o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  advanced i n d u s t r i a l  
e c o n o m ie s ,  and n o t  be o r g a n i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  a c t u a l  economic 
development t h a t  has taken p lace  i n  t h e  c oun t ry .  I t  i s  not  uncommon in  
deve lop ing economies to  f i n d  a p le th o ra  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  a l l  
government  a g e n c ie s ,  which c o n t i n u a l l y  at tempt but f a i l  t o  in v o lv e  the 
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and wh ich  i n  th e m s e lv e s  f a i l  to  
f u l f i l l  a j u s t i f i a b l e  a c t i v i t y .  P . J .  D ra k e  i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  
s e c u r i t i e s  m a rk e ts  i n  d e v e lo p in g  economies no ted  t h i s  ( 3 ) .  Many 
government a g e n c ie s  and compan ies ,  such as in s u ra n c e  and investment 
companies, banks and development funds would p o s s i b l y  no t  have e x i s t e d  
i f  t h e y  had no t  been m o d e l le d  on s i m i l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  advanced 
economi e s .
Let us pursue, t h e r e f o r e ,  o u r  second a p p ro a c h .  Whereas some prev ious 
l i t e r a t u r e  had assessed a f a i r l y  h ig h  money m u l t i p l i e r  f o r  Kuwa i t  i n  
r e l a t i o n  to  t h a t  in  o the r  deve lop ing economies, ( i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  perhaps 
Kuwa i t  had a more advanced f i n a n c i a l  system than those c o u n t r i e s ) ,  our 
es t imate was much lower ( 4 ) .  Two f a c to r s  we i s o la t e d  in  our a n a ly s is  o f  
th e  money m u l t i p l i e r  i n  C h a p te r  3 ,  i n d i c a t e d  t o  us t h a t  t h e  u s u a l  
est imates o f  t h i s  f i g u r e  were no t  based on c o r r e c t  as s u m p t io n s  ( 5 ) .  
F i r s t l y ,  the  money m u l t i p l i e r  tu rned  out to  be lower than assumed i f  we 
took i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n  one o f  t h e  main th e s e s  o f  Chapter 3 -  namely, 
t h a t  the net f o re ig n  assets o f  the commercial banks sh o u ld  be i n c l u d e d  
i n  t h e  m o n e t a r y  b a s e .  The bank  r e s e r v e  r a t i o  was f o u n d ,  q u i t e  
n a t u r a l l y ,  to  be h igher  than assumed, i f  we inc luded net f o re ig n  assets 
in  the monetary base. Th is  meant the rev ised money m u l t i p l i e r  e s t im a t e s  
we e x p e c te d ,w e re  t o  be remarkably lower.  I n f a c t ,  had i t  not  been fo r
184
THE MONEY MULTIPLIER IN KUWAIT 1963-81 
( M i l l i o n s  o f  Kuwait i  Dinars)
M2 H M2/H H' M2/H
1981 IV 3866.0 606.3 6.37 1589.5 2.43
I I I 3525.4 431 .3 8.17 1477.0 2 .38
I I 3 3 85.6 458.2 7.38 1444.5 2.34
I 2974.7 408.0 7.29 1215.8 2 .44
1980 IV 2 857 .5 473.0 6 .04 1218.8 2 .34
I I I 2758.7 357.6 7.71 1114.6 2.47
I I 2632.4 378.2 6.96 1227.4 2 .14
I 24 82.3 315.2 7.87 1073.0 2.31
1979 IV 2289.7 359.2 6.37 962 .8 2 .38
I I I 2247.6 267.1 8.41 802.0 2.80
I I 2038.5 243 .8 8.36 801 .9 2 .54
I 1986.1 242.5 8.19 849.4 2 .34
1978 IV 1950.3 299.7 6.51 912.4 2 .14
I I I 1 845.6 372.4 4.95 941 .9 1 .95
I I 1724.0 414.3 4.16 926.6 1 .86
I 1611.7 442.6 3 .64 900.5 1 .78
1 977 IV 15 83 .3 421 .9 3.75 824.5 1 .92
I I I 1443.0 261.7 5.51 692.6 2 .08
I I 1405.8 258.9 5.43 666.4 2.10
I 1312.4 235.7 5.57 659.8 1 .98
1976 IV 1220.3 221 .5 5.51 572.3 2.13
I I I 1145.1 154.2 7.43 613.8 1.86
I I 1101 .3 187.8 5.86 664 .8 1.65
I 964.2 186.2 5.15 597.4 1 .61
1975 IV 891 .2 168.9 5.27 624.3 1 .42
I I I 823.8 150.9 5.46 612.6 1 .3 4
I I 767.1 197 .8 3 .8 8 602.0 1.27
I 703.5 164.1 4.29 530.5 1 .32
1974 IV 720.6 139.6 5.16 557.6 1.29
I I I 693 .5 133.4 5.19 561.0 1 .24
I I 647.0 108.7 5.95 517.8 1 .24
I 606.6 105.0 5 .78 494.7 1 .22
1973 IV 571.9 98.0 5.83 440.9 1.29
I I I 528.7 109.1 4.85 481 .2 1 .09
I I 513.1 115.1 4.46 471 .7 1 .08
I 510 .4 79.0 6.46 491 .6 1 .03
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M2 = Money Supply
H = High Powered Money
H' = High Powered Money Ad jus ted f o r  Net Foreign
Assets o f  the Commercial Banks (*1)  
m1 = M2/H' = Average Values o f  the Adjusted Money
M u l t i p l i e r  (*2)
Source : Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait ,  Q u a r te r ly  S t a t i s t i c a l
B u l l e t i n ,  Nos. from A p r i l  1968 -  December 1982.
( *1 )  In  Chapter 3 we e s ta b l is h e d  i t  i s  more u s e fu l  to  look at  a f i g u r e  
f o r  Reserve Money wh ich  was a d j u s t e d  to  i n c l u d e  n e t  f o r e i g n  
assets wh ich  was assumed a p p ro x im a te d  a m a jo r  p a r t  o f  banks' 
l i q u i d  r e s e r v e s .  T h i s  d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  t h e  o f f i c i a l  
c a te g o r i s a t i o n s  o f  the monetary s t a t i s t i c s  was adop ted  i n  o r d e r  
t o  e x p l a i n  bank  b e h a v i o u r  and t h e  m o n e t a r y  s e c t o r  more 
e f f e c t i v e l y  s ince th e  C e n t r a l  Bank s t a t u t o r y  c o n t r o l  r a t i o  has 
been a l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  w h ich  i n c l u d e s  a m a jo r  p a r t  o f  banks '  
f o re ig n  assets .
( *2 )  I n  t h e  " p r o x im a t e  d e t e r m i n a n t s "  approach  in  Chapter 3,  we saw 
t h a t  the equat ion f o r  the money m u l t i p l i e r  was :-
m = j  1
j  + r
where r = R/D or  the bank reserve r a t i o  (bank reserves  d iv id e d  by 
t o t a l  d e p o s i t s ) ,  and j  = Cp/D or  the p u b l i c  cash to  t o t a l  depos i t  
r a t i o .
D e f i n i t i o n s
M2 = cur rency i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  ( C p ) ,  demand d e p o s i t s  (Dd) and t ime and 
savings depos i ts  (D t ) .
H = currency in  c i r c u l a t i o n  (Cp) and bank reserves (R) .
NB R in  commercial banks' balance sheets i s  always sm a l le r  than t h a t  in  
the Cen t ra l  Bank's balance shee t .  C e n t ra l  Bank s o u rc e s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  
where t h i s  i s  the case, the discrepancy i s  due to the f a c t  t h a t  balances 
h e ld  on b e h a l f  o f  the  s p e c ia l i s e d  banks was sometimes wrongly added to 
the f i g u r e .  The c o r r e c t  s t a t i s t i c s  a re  thos e  i n  c om m e rc ia l  banks '  
balance shee ts .
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TABLE 4 ;3
THE MONEY MULTIPLIER (m) f»1) FOR SIXTY-EIGHT 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (19761
A lg e r ia 2.18 Li bya 2.02
Argen t i  na 2.33 Ma Lagasy 2.43
B o l i  v ia 1 .48 Malawi 1 .89
B r a z i I 2.63 Ma la y s ia 2.93
Burma 1 .28 Mauri t i  us 3.41
Cameroons 2.48 Mexi co 1 .53
Chi le 1 .66 Morocco 2.41
Columbi a 2.05 Ni caragua 2.84
Costa Rica 3.27 Ni ge r i  a 2.70
Cyprus 2.70 Paki stan 2.28
Oominican Republ ic 1 .96 Paraguay 1 .62
Ecuador 1 .76 Peru 1 .48
Egypt 1 .63 Phi l i p p i n e s 3.34
El Salvador 2.07 Saudi Arab ia 1 .57
Eth i  opi a 2.00 Senegal 2 .44
Gabon 2.59 S ie r ra  Leone 2.01
Ghana 1.30 Somali a 1 .81
Gambi a 1 .21 Sri  Lanka 1 .90
Greece 3.31 Sudan 1.75
Guatemala 2.32 Sy r i  a 1 .25
Guyana 3.76 Taiwan 3.48
Hai t i 1 .58 Tanzani a 2.83
Honduras 2.93 Thai land 3.11
In d i  a 2.39 Togo 2.46
Indonesi  a 2.02 Tr i  ni dad + Tobago 5.35
I ra n 2.22 Tuni si  a 3 .04
I ra q 1 .29 Turkey 2.09
I re la n d 3.26 Uganda 2.88
Jamai ca 4.07 Upper V o l ta 1 .92
Jordan 1 .52 Uraguay 1 .63
Kenya 3.84 Venezuela 2.88
South Korea 3.00 Vi etnam 1 .90
Kuwait 5,60 Zaine 1.99
Lebanon 4.12 Zambi a 3.35
Source : W.T. Newlyn, " I n te rm e d ia t i o n  and C re d i t  C r e a t io n " ,  
in  The F inanc ing  o f  Economic Development.
W.T. Newlyn (ed . )  (Oxford : Clarendon Press 1977)
( *1 )  m = M2/C in  Newlyn's model where:
M2 = money p lus  quasi-money, and,
C = currency he ld  o u ts id e  the banking system 
and c la im s  o f  commercial  banks in  the 
monetary a u t h o r i t y .
the low leve l  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  cash p r e f e r e n c e  r a t i o  i t s e l f ,  they would 
have been. Th is  p u b l i c  cash pre ference r a t i o ,  which we discussed in  our 
a n a ly s is  o f  the proximate determinants  ( 6 ) ,  and which we considered both 
in  r e l a t i o n  to  the money supply (c = C/M2) and in  r e l a t i o n  t o  d e p o s i t s  
( j  = C /D ) ,  has t y p i c a l l y  been extremely  low in  Kuwait over the pe r iod  
under  s t u d y ,  even by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s .  A low p u b l i c  cash 
p r e f e r e n c e  means a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  h i g h e r  money m u l t i p l i e r  s i m p l y  
because th e  cash le ak  f rom th e  ba n k in g  system, i n t o  the hands o f  the 
p u b l i c  i s  t h a t  much lower.  D e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  our es t imates  o f  the 
money m u l t i p l i e r  are d i f f e r e n t  to  those o f  o t h e r s  ( 7 ) ,  any c la im  t h a t  
t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s y s te m  i n  K u w a i t  has reached an advanced s ta g e  o f  
development, can o n l y  be based on e s t im a t e s  o f  b e h a v io u r a l  f u n c t io n s  
such as the  p u b l i c ' s  p re fe rence  f o r  h o l d i n g  cash and n o t ,  as we have 
seen, on s u p e r f i c i a l  evidence such as the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s u p e r - s t r u c tu r e  
o f  the f i n a n c i a l  system. I f ,  t o  cont inue w i th  our example, the p u b l i c ' s  
p reference f o r  ho ld ing  cash i s  low,  t h e r e  a re  s p e c i f i c  behav iou ra l  and 
s o c ia l  reasons why t h i s  i s  the case. And these reasons ,  we s h a l l  show 
i n  s u b - s e c t i o n  (a) below, have no th ing  to  do w i th  an advanced economy's 
tendency to  save on the  use o f  cash as t ime progresses (8 ) .
Before we go on to  exp lo re  th e s e  re a s o n s ,  we show why our es t im a tes  o f  
the money m u l t i p l i e r  in  Kuwait are d i f f e r e n t  to  those o f  o t h e r s .  As we 
n o ted  i n  t h e  l a s t  c h a p t e r ,  Newlyn worked out the average value o f  the 
money m u l t i p l i e r  f o r  68 LDC' s and t h e  U .S .A .  The r e s u l t s  o f  these  
c a l c u la t i o n s  are L is ted  i n  TabLe 4 : 3 . The lowest value recorded f o r  the 
money m u l t i p l i e r  was t h a t  f o r  Gambia ( 1 . 2 1 )  and t h e  h i g h e s t  r e c o rd e d  
v a lu e  was t h a t  f o r  Kuwa i t  ( 5 . 6 0 ) ,  wh i le  the median value was 2.30 and 
the value f o r  t h e  U . S . A . ,  w h ich  was i n c l u d e d  as a y a r d s t i c k  f o r  the 
value o f  money m u l t i p l i e r s  i n  advanced economies, was 6 .38 .  I f  we Look 
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4 : 2 . w h i c h  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r  as i t  would  have been
c a lc u la te d  by Newlyn ,  we can see t h a t  i t  reaches  a h ig h  in  the t h i r d
q u a r te r  o f  1979 o f  8 .41 ,  and a low o f  3 .64  in  the f i r s t  qua r te r  o f  1978,
w h i le  the median value f o r  th e  s e r i e s  i s  6 . 0 7 .  These f i g u r e s ,  wh ich
have been abs t rac ted  from Table 4 : 2 . are those f o r  the money m u l t i p l i e r
based on the unadjusted monetary base. Newlyn's f i g u r e s  f o r  Kuwait are
average re p re s e n ta t i v e  va lues ,  however ,  and h i s  money m u l t i p l i e r  (5 .60)
i s  f a i r l y  c lose  to  the median f o r  the h i s t o r i c a l  s e r i e s ,  based on th e
u n a d ju s te d  mone ta ry  base, spanning the per iod  1963-80. As we saw w i th
the p r o x im a te  d e t e r m i n a n t s  approach  ( 9 ) ,  t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r  i s  a
fu n c t io n  o f  the p u b l i c ' s  cash p r e f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  form o f  t h e  cash to
d e p o s i t  r a t i o  ( j )  and t h e  b a n k s '  r e s e r v e  r a t i o  ( r ) .  Newlyn's model,




where c = Cp/D
and r  = R/D (11)
In  Table 4 :3  we compare K u w a i t ' s  money m u l t i p l i e r  w i th  those o f  o the r  
deve lop ing economies, based on Newlyn's sample f o r  1976. Kuwa i t 's  money 
m u l t i p l i e r  i s  much h igher  than t h a t  o f  most o the r  d e v e lo p in g  economies 
and r e l a t i v e l y  c l o s e  to  t h a t  o f  the  U.S.A. Th is  r e s u l t  should imply a 
developed banking system in  Kuwai t .  I f  we re tu rn  aga in ,  however, to  our 
arguments in  Chapter 3,  which led  t o  a s i g n i f i c a n t  downward r e v i s i o n  o f  
the es t im ate  o f  the money m u l t i p l i e r ,  we reach  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s .  
I n  T a b le  4 : 2  we see how ou r  ad jus tments  f o r  net fo re ig n  assets i n  the  
c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  h ig h  powered money a f f e c t s  ou r  e s t im a t e s  o f  the money 
m u l t i p l i e r  (M 2 /H ' ) .  The s e r ie s  f o r  the ad jus ted  money m u l t i p l i e r  wh ich  
spans t h e  p e r i o d  1 s t  q u a r t e r  1963 -  4 th  q u a r t e r  1980, has a high o f  
2 .80 ,  a low o f  0 .9 2  and a median o f  1 . 0 8 .  However,  e s t i m a t i n g  the  
f u n c t io n  M2 = mH' gives us the  inc remen ta l  value o f  m = 2 . 1 4 ,  wh ich  we
used e a r l i e r  to  r e v i s e  N e w ly n 's  i n i t i a l  es t imate o f  (m) es an average 
value (12 ) .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r  changed con s id e ra b ly .  
The in f l u e n c e  o f  a low p u b l i c  pre ference f o r  ho ld ing  cash on t h e  money 
m u l t i p l i e r  was o f f s e t  i n  t h e  e a r l y  yea rs  o f  t h e  p e r i o d  under  study 
(1962-72) by an i n v o l u n t a r y  h igh  bank re s e rv e  r a t i o ,  but  subsequent ly 
the bank reserve r a t i o  f e l l  and the money m u l t i p l i e r  rose. We can see 
from Graph 3 :4  t h a t  the currency to  depos i t  r a t i o  made a sm a l l ,  a l though 
s ta b le ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  changes in  the money s tock throughout  the  pe r iod  
u n d e r  s t u d y ,  and t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  movements i n  t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r  
( e s p e c ia l l y  a f t e r  1972) a re  a lm o s t  e n t i r e l y  due to  changes i n  the bank 
reserve r a t i o .  But the  low p u b l i c  cash pre ference r a t i o  was im po r tan t  in  
t h a t  the money m u l t i p l i e r  o v e r a l l  cou ld  have been lower, and we add ress  
ourse lves  to  t h i s  ques t ion  immediate ly beLow.
a ) The Low P u b l i c  Cash Preference Rat io and I t s  S o c ia l  O r ig in s  
In  Chapter 1, we discussed the  importance o f  the merchant c lasses in  the  
K u w a i t i  economy ( 1 3 ) .  One o f  the more obvious economic enclaves which 
has been dominated by the la rge merchant f a m i l i e s  i s  the banking s e c to r .  
In Tab le 4:1 we note t h a t  i n  t h e  n i n e t e e n  yea rs  between 1952 and 1971 
banking was who l ly  pr iva te-owned in  Kuwait .  The n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  
b ranch  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Bank o f  the Middle East (BBME) in  1971, a l lowed 
th e  government  a 49 pe r  c e n t  s h a r e h o l d i n g  i n  t h a t  bank ,  w h ich  was 
renamed the  Bank o f  Kuwait and the Middle East (BKME). Rather than t h i s  
p o i n t i n g  t o  a g ro w in g  i n f l u e n c e  o f  c e n t r a l  gove rn m en t  i n  b a n k i n g  
m a t t e r s ,  the  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  fo re ig n  banking i n  Kuwait which accompanied 
the n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  the  BBME i n  1971 was much more an i n d i c a t i o n  o f  
the in f l u e n c e  o f  the merchant f a m i l i e s  on p o l i c y - m a k i n g  i n  t h i s  a r e a .  
The f i r s t  b a n k in g  p r o j e c t  wh ich  can be d i r e c t l y  assoc ia ted  w i th  the 
c e n t r a l  government i s  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  Burgan Bank in  1976, in  
which the c e n t r a l  government had a stake o f  51 per cen t .  We s h a l l  show
l a t e r ,  t h a t  d e s p i t e  t h e  s a l e  o f  49 per  cent  o f  the shares to  a broad 
number o f  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n v e s t o r s ,  and d e s p i t e  o v e r t  government  
suppor t ,  t h i s  bank f a i l e d  to  grow a t  the same ra te  as t h e  o t h e r  banks ,  
and f a i l e d  to  develop a sound customer depos i t  base (14) .
The merchant community in  Kuwait i s  e t h n i c a l l y  conscious.  I f  Kuwait ,  as 
a w h o le ,  had n o t  such a smal l  p o p u la t io n ,  and were i t  not  f o r  the  f a c t  
t h a t  t h a t  sub-set  o f  the p o p u l a t i o n  wh ich  c o n t r o l l e d  i t s  economic l i f e  
was even t h i s  would not be a remarkable f a c t  a t  a l l .  The 1976 census 
est imated the p o p u la t ion  o f  Kuwait a t  j u s t  over one m i l l i o n ,  whereas the 
f o u r t e e n  f a m i l i e s  wh ich  we rev ie w e d  i n  Chapter 1 ,  who c o n t r o l l e d  the 
c o u n t r y ' s  economic l i f e , c o u l d  n o t  have exceeded 10 ,000  people .  The 
f a c t  remains, however, t h a t ,  even in  such a smal l  community, d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  e t h n i c  o r i g i n s  o f  v a r i o u s  g roups  have  had a s t r o n g  i m p a c t  on 
c om m e rc ia l  l i f e .  The Large t r a d in g  f a m i l i e s  can be d iv ide d  i n t o  th ree  
d i f f e r e n t  e th n ic  g roup ings ,  namely t h o s e  o f  Saudi ,  those o f  I r a n ia n  and 
those o f  T u rk ish  ( I r a q i )  o r i g i n .  More s p e c i f i c  to  our purpose here,  the 
es tab l ishment  o f  the  va r iou s  commercial banks i n  Kuwai t  was I n f l u e n c e d  
by these e th n ic  d i v i s i o n s .  The most power fu l  f a m i l i e s  1n the e a r l y  days 
i n  Kuwa i t  were a l l  from the Onaiza t r i b e  which we saw in  Chapter 1 had 
m ig ra te d  f rom th e  Ne jd  i n  Saudi  A r a b ia  and th e s e  f a m i l i e s  were a l l  
d i s t a n t l y  r e la te d  to  the  r u l i n g  f a m i l y ,  the  Al-Sabahs (1 5 ) .  T h i s  group 
i s  the  c lo s e s t  one can get t o  an "es tab l ishm en t "  i n  Kuwait i  s o c i e t y .  So 
i t  was t h a t  t h e  A l -Hamad,  A l -S a g a r ,  A l -Bahar ,  A l -Sayer  and A l -K h o r a f i  
f a m i l i e s  were a l l  founders o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Bank o f  Kuwait i n  1952 ( the 
Al -Ghanim, a p r o m in e n t  t r a d i n g  f a m i l y ,  was a l s o  a s i g n a t o r y  on t h e  
f o u n d a t i o n  document al though they d o n ' t  appear i n  the bank 's  board room 
to d a y ) .  The Commercial Bank o f  Kuwait was formed e ig h t  years l a t e r  by a 
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  group i n c l u d i n g  names such as AL-Marzook, A l -S h a y e ' ,  
Al -Homaizi  and A L -N a f is i  but  who were also Onaiza. Some o f  the f a m i l i e s
in v o lv e d  in  the  founda t ion  o f  the Commercial Bank had been p r e v i o u s l y  
i n v o l v e d  w i t h  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Bank b u t  t h e  names 
in v o lv e d  i n  t h i s  case were on average  d i f f e r e n t .  The same goes to  a 
c e r t a i n  ex ten t  f o r  the G u l f  Bank, a lso formed in  1960, but t h i s  bank had 
an im por tan t  nucleus o f  founders who were K u w a i t i  f a m i l i e s  o f  T u r k i s h  
o r i g i n  known as t h e  J i n i a t i  ( w i t h  names such as A l -Mutawa ' ,  A l -S a le h ,  
AL-Su l tan  and A l - I s s a ) .  The l a s t  f u L l y  p r i v a t e  sec to r  commercial bank 
to  be formed was the  A l - A h l i  Bank o f  Kuwait es tab l ishe d  in  1967 where we 
see the f o u n d in g  c o re  o f  f a m i l i e s  were K u w a i t i  f a m i l i e s  o f  I r a n i a n  
o r i g i n  known as t h e  A jem i  ( w i t h  names such as A l -R o u m i ,  Behbehani , 
Makki-Juma, M a ' r e f i ) .
D e s p i t e  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  t h e  c h a r t e r  o f  each o f  t hes e  banks t h a t  
d i r e c t o r s  o f  the bank should not b e n e f i t  from c r e d i t  f a c i l i t i e s  from the 
bank in  q u e s t i o n ,  wh ich  p r o v i s i o n  i s  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  K u w a i t i  
c om m e rc ia l  code,  these  d i f f e r e n t  groups w i th  t h e i r  i n t e r t w i n i n g  f a m i l y  
connect ions put most o f  t h e i r  b u s in e s s  t h ro u g h  the bank which they had 
founded. We s h a l l  see l a t e r  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  
a t t e m p t s  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  lending by the commercial banks, 
t h a t  the i n f o r m a l  b u s in e s s  d e a l i n g s  between th e  members o f  a s i n g le  
f a m i l y ,  and the  apparent needlessness o f  lega l  documentat ion t o  back  up 
such dea l ings  in  Kuwai t i  s o c ie t y ,  meant t h a t  p ro v is io n s  which were aimed 
a t  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  b o r r o w in g s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i n d i v i d u a l s  were n o t  
en fo rceab le .  So i t  was t h a t  the management and c r e d i t  o f f i c e r s  o f  these 
banks had L i t t l e  o r  no i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  m a jo r  loans  d isbu rsed  by the 
banks, al though t h i s  began t o  change g r a d u a l l y  as t h e  banks grew i n  
c o m p l e x i t y ,  and t h e  boa rd  o f  d i r e c t o r s  had t o  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e l y  on 
p ro fe s s io n a l  management teams f o r  t h e  r u n n in g  o f  t h e i r  banks. But no 
management team ever  was a b l e  to  change t h e  o v e r a l l  tone  o f  t h e  way 
commercial banks conducted t h e i r  business in  Kuwait .
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Each bank  a t  i t s  f o u n d a t i o n  had a c e r t a i n  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  
subscr ibed by the founders .  However, in  each case a p a r t  o f  the c a p i t a l  
was opened to  p u b l i c  s u b s c r i p t i o n  th ro u g h  b ro k e r s .  Despi te  the c o n t r o l  
exer ted by the merchant f a m i l i e s  i n  t h e  banks ,  t h e r e  was w ide s p re a d  
o w ne rs h ip  o f  bank shares among the p u b l i c  which has to  some ex ten t  been 
th e  b a s i s  f o r  p u b l i c  t r u s t  i n  t h e  b a n k s .  The e x c e p t i o n a l  p r i c e  
performance o f  bank s h a r e s ,  wh ich we can see i n  T a b le  4 : 1 4  f o r  th e  
p e r i o d  1973-78, made them a f requen t  Leader i n  major s tock  market p r i c e  
movements. The s o c i a l  im p o r ta n c e  o f  s t o c k  m arke t  specu la t io n  and the 
ou ts tand ing  performance o f  bank s tocks helped to  t u rn  the names o f  banks 
in t o  household names. In  general  the le v e l  o f  p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s  exposure 
o f  the banks in  Kuwait has been h igher  than t h a t  o f  any sec to r  i n c lu d in g  
the c e n t r a l  gov e rnm en t .  I n c r e a s i n g l y  f rom 1975 each bank employed 
a d v e r t i s i n g  agents who developed the image o f  the bank and marketed i t s  
se rv ices  ch ie fLy  th rough  t e l e v i s i o n .  The m arke t  which the banks were 
compet ing f o r  and which was s t i l l  uncommitted by group o r  f a m i l y  t i e s ,  
were the e x p a t r i a te s  and the  bedouin f r i n g e ,  as w e l l  as o c c a s io n a l l y  the 
f i n a n c i n g  o f  m a jo r  government c o n t r a c t s .  A l l  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  have 
cond i t ioned  a p u b l i c  -  whether  o r i g i n a l l y  Loyal  to  the founders o f  the 
banks, o r  whether eve n tu a l l y  coaxed i n t o  d e p o s i t i n g  o r  d o in g  b u s in e s s  
w i th  them -  which has cons ide rab ly  more t r u s t  i n  the  banking system than 
the p u b l i c  i n  most deve lop ing economies.
D e s p i t e  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  high le v e l  o f  t r a d in g  a c t i v i t y  in  bank s tocks ,  
i t  has been on ly  those sha res  i s s u e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  which have had any 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t u r n o v e r .  Those sha res  s t i l l  owned by t h e  f o u n d i n g  
f a m i l i e s  a re  j e a l o u s l y  guarded as ,  n a t u r a l l y ,  have been the  a t tached 
v o t in g  r i g h t s .  The r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  has been a Lower average tu rn o v e r  in  
bank s ha res  th a n  i n  any o t h e r  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t ,  d e a r l y
r e s u l t i n g  from the r e l a t i v e l y  low " f l o a t "  i n  these shares, by comparison 
w i th  the Large number o f  shares o r i g i n a l l y  issued (see Table 4 :13 ) .  For 
example ,  i n  1977 t h e  t u r n o v e r  i n  bank s h a re s  on t h e  K u w a i t  S t o c k  
Exchange was 2 pe r  cen t  whereas the o v e r a l l  market average was 14 per 
cen t .  Th is  was one o f  the main reasons  f o r  the excep t iona l  performance 
o f  th e  p r i c e  o f  bank s h a re s  b e tw e e n  1 9 7 3 - 8 0 .  T h i s  e x c e p t i o n a l  
p e r f o r m a n c e  i n  t u r n  has been an added i n c e n t i v e  f o r  t h e  merchan t  
f a m i l i e s  to  cont inue c o n s o l i d a t i n g  t h e i r  ho ld  on the banks, in  a d d i t i o n  
to  the g e n e r a l  com m erc ia l  im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  banks t o  t h e i r  o v e r a l l  
busi ness.
b ) The Use o f  Cheques i n  the Commercial L i f e  o f  Kuwait
The w ide  use o f  c hequ ing  a c c o u n ts  by th e  p u b l i c  f o r  most o f  t h e i r
t r a n s a c t i o n a l  needs, however ,  i s  n o t  s impLy due t o  th e  t r u s t  o f  the
p u b l i c  i n  t h e  banks o r  t h e  s t r o n g  c o n n e c t i o n s  be tween  c o m m e r c i a l
a c t i v i t y  and th e  b a n k in g  system through the shareho ld ing  s t r u c t u r e  o f
the banks, which we have d iscussed above.  A much more impor tan t  reason
o f  t h i s  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  b a n k in g  sys tem ,  was t h e  o v e r d r a f t  system o f
l e n d i n g ,  a Legacy o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  management o f  banks in  Kuwait,  which
Led to  the  c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n fo r m a L  t r a d e  c r e d i t  system based on the
t
d iscoun t in g  o f  personal  cheques (16) .  Some e x t r a c t s  we can quo te  f rom 
t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kuwa i t  economic re p o r ts  descr ibe  the Link between 
the p u b l i c ' s  Low p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  h o l d i n g  cash and th e  in fo rm aL  t rade  
c r e d i t  system based on d iscoun t in g  cheques:-
"The r a t i o  o f  c u r r e n c y  i n  c i r c u l a t i o n  ( c u r r e n c y  
issued means cash in  the v a u l t s  o f  banks) t o  the GDP
c o n t i n u e s  t o  be Low p a r t i c u l a r l y  when compared to
s im i l a r  r a t i o s  i n  the deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s .  Even i f
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the o1L sec to r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  GDP i s  excluded,  t h i s  
r a t i o  rem a ins  w i t h i n  12-13%, w h ich  i s  a lm o s t  the 
same as t h a t  o f  c o u n t r ie s  having advanced m oneta ry  
s y s te m s .  T h i s  i s  p r o b a b l y  due t o  t h e  sp read  o f  
ba n k in g  p r a c t i c e s  and t h e  w ide usage o f  cheques 
in s tead  o f  cash ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  among bus inessm en"
(17 ) .
We see, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  cheques a re  used i n  an in fo rm a l  t rade  c r e d i t  
system, where such cheques,  i f  w r i t t e n  by a c c e p t a b le  and we l l -known 
merchant names, are endorsable w i th ou t  recourse f o r  payment o f  goods and 
se rv ic e s .  As we s h a l l  see l a t e r  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t hes e  cheques a l s o  
came to  be used to  s e t t l e  forward t r a n s a c t i o n s  on the s tock  market by a 
s imple p o s t - d a t i n g  method ( 1 8 ) .  We have a l r e a d y  seen i n  Chapter 3,  
however, t h a t  the tu rnove r  in  cheques i s  r e la te d  to  the a c t i v i t y  on t h e  
s t o c k  m a r k e t  ( 1 9 ) .  The se  w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d  p r a c t i c e s  i n  K u w a i t i  
commercial l i f e  led to  a n a tu r a l  pre ference f o r  us ing the banking system 
and w r i t i n g  c h e q u e s  f o r  a l l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  m os t  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  A low p u b l i c  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  h o ld in g  cash was a n a tu r a l  
r e s u l t .  We have seen t h a t  the reason f o r  such a g row th  i n  t h e  use o f  
c h e q u e s  was l i n k e d  t o  t h e  o v e r d r a f t  system o f  l e n d i n g ,  wh ich  i s  
descr ibed by the c e n t r a l  bank i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x t r a c t  from one o f  i t s  
economic r e p o r t s : -
"According to  the c r e d i t  system, banks were bound to  
g i v e  t h e i r  c u s t o m e r s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  w i t h d r a w  
o v e r d r a f t s  w i t h i n  a l i m i t e d  s c a l e  o f  t h e  c r e d i t  
f a c i l i t i e s  each y e a r .  Most o f t e n  t h i s  arrangement 
had t o  be m a in t a i n e d  f o r  an i n d e f i n i t e  p e r i o d  
b e c a u s e  t h e  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t i e s  were c u s t o m a r i l y
197
renewed yeer a f t e r  year .  Though t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  in  
th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  c u s t o m e r s  i t  i n v o l v e s  a m a jo r  
shor tcoming,  namely, i t  weakens th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  bank c r e d i t  and a l l o w s  f o r  a 
major p o r t i o n  o f  the c r e d i t  f a c i l i t i e s  to  be d iv ided  
towards unproduc t ive  a c t i v i t i e s ,  such as specu la t ion  
on land, o the r  r e a l t i e s  and shares" (20) .
Chapter 5 w i l l  d iscuss i n  d e t a i l  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank 's  at tempts  to  c o n t r o l  
i n f l a t i o n  and specu la t io n  and the assoc ia ted c r e d i t  pyramid based on the 
d iscoun t ing  o f  cheques which grew bo th  w i t h i n  t h e  b a n k in g  system and 
o u t s i d e  i t ,  i n  in fo rm a l  c r e d i t  markets.  Reforming the o v e r d r a f t  system 
was a p i v o t a l  p o i n t  f o r  t h o s e  re fo rm  a t t e m p t s ,  s i n c e  i t  had been the 
main f a c t o r  which had Led to  t h e  use o f  cheques f o r  t h e  e x t e n s io n  o f  
t rade  c r e d i t  o r  indeed o the r  forms o f  c r e d i t ,  as w e l l  as to  the p ra c t i c e  
o f  e n d o r s in g  and d i s c o u n t i n g  cheques ( 2 1 ) .  Merchants  w i th  o v e r d r a f t  
f a c i l i t i e s  a t  a bank wou ld  draw-down th e  maximum poss ib le  cash amount 
from t h e i r  bank accounts and would subsequent ly evo id  p a y in g  any funds  
i n t o  t hes e  accounts,  to  ensure permanence o f  the loan, and to  avoid the 
r i s k  o f  a f o r c e d  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e i r  o v e r d r a f t  L i m i t .  The la c k  o f  
Lending o u t l e t s  d om es t ica l ly  meant t h a t  banks had L i t t l e  c h o ic e  bu t  t o  
renew such f a c i l i t i e s ,  and t h e y  r a r e l y  t r i e d  t o  seek repayment ,  in  
p a r t i c u l a r  f rom members o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  m erchan t  f a m i l i e s .  On the 
c o n t ra ry ,  merchants a lways  s o ug h t  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  L i m i t s  w i t h  th e  
banks .  Cheques rece ived i n  payment f o r  goods and s e rv ices  by merchants 
would  r a r e l y  be p a i d  i n t o  a b an k  a c c o u n t  and c e r t a i n l y  n o t  i n t o  
overdrawn accounts.  Ins tead  the  cheques would be endorsed and passed on 
in  payment f o r  o the r  goods and se rv ices  p u rc h a s e d .  The smaLL s i z e  o f  
the business community in  Kuwait gave t h i s  system a c r e d i b i l i t y  based on 
c o n f i d e n c e  and p e r s o n a l  c o n t a c t .  Cupboards f u l l  o f  cheques in  the
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o f f i c e s  o f  the Kuwei t i  merchents represented the growing in fo rm s l  c r e d i t  
sys tem,  wh ich  th e  c e n t r s L  benk  s u b s e q u e n t l y  t r i e d  t o  d e fu s e ,  by 
l e g i s l a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  b a n k in g  system phase-down o v e r d r a f t  l e n d in g  i n  
f a v o u r  o f  term loans w i th  f i x e d  repayment schedules,  as we s h a l l  see in  
Chapter 5.
One o f  the most wo r ry ing  a s p e c ts  o f  o v e r d r a f t  lend ing which gave cause 
f o r  grave concern a t  the c e n t r a l  bank from 1978 onwards ,  was t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  no t  o n l y  were o v e r d r a f t s  p e rm a n e n t l y  renewed so as to  remain as 
eve rg re e n  loans  on th e  books o f  t h e  banks ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  
rece ivab le  on these o v e r d r a f t s  was o f te n  never pa id  i n  cash, but deb i ted  
to  the customer 's  account .  C o n t i n u a t i o n  by th e  banks o f  a p o l i c y  o f  
c a p i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  due on o v e r d r a f t  accounts,  might have led to  
t e c h n i c a l  i l l i q u i d i t y  i n  t h e  b a n k in g  system and p o s s i b l e  consequent 
in so lvency ,  e s p e c ia l l y  in  t imes o f  t i g h t  L i q u i d i t y ,  as f o r  i n s t a n c e  in  
th e  p e r i o d  1 9 7 8 -8 0 .  C l e a r l y  t h e  h ig h  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  o f  the bonks, 
which gave t h e i r  boards and management teams the excuse, es i t  were, to  
ca r ry  on such p o l i c i e s ,  was s t i l l  not  s u f f i c i e n t  p r o t e c t i o n  to  deal w i th  
t h i s  problem. The nature o f  lend ing i t s e l f  in  Kuwait ,  the c e n t r a l  bank 
was convinced, had to  be reformed.
From 1979 onwards, as the s tock  market su rged  f o r w a r d  y e a r  a f t e r  y e a r  
base d  on a g r o w i n g  am oun t  o f  f o r w a r d  d e a ls  s e t t l e d  by means o f  
pos t -da ted  cheques ( 2 2 ) ,  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  bank l e n d in g  became even more 
dange rous .  Banks became i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  y i e l d s  
a v a i l a b le  in  the  d iscoun t in g  o f  personal  pos t -da ted  cheques which y i e l d s  
were p o s s i b l e  because o f  t h e  premium forward deaLs commanded over  the 
spot p r i c e s  in  the  s tock  m a r k e t .  I n  1982 th e  c e n t r a l  bank forbade the 
banks o u t r i g h t  to  cont inue t h i s  p r a c t i c e .  As we s h a l l  see in  Chapter 5, 
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com m erc ia l  banks c o u ld  d i s c o u n t ,  bu t  no t  s u f f i c i e n t l y .  I t  must have 
been one o f  t h e  few o c c a s io n s  i n  economic h i s t o r y  t h a t  banks would 
a c t i v e l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  an i n s t r u m e n t  c r e a t e d  by an i n f o r m a l  c r e d i t  
m a rk e t ,  which ins trument  in  t u rn  was p a r t l y  born from the p e c u l i a r i t i e s  
o f  the banking system.
C l e a r l y  f rom th e  above a rguments  we can c o nc lude  t h a t  t h e  Low cash 
preference o f  the p u b l i c  was due to  p e c u l i a r  f a c t o r s ,  p o s s i b l y  s p e c i a l  
t o  K u w a i t ,  w h i c h  do no t  encourage us t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c a s h - s a v i n g  
charac te r  o f  the Kuwait i  f i n a n c i a l  system as being t h a t  o f  an advanced 
economy.
i i  i ) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM IN KUWAIT
In the per iod  1962-72, the low p u b l i c  pre ference f o r  ho ld ing  cash was in  
g e n e r a l  o f f - s e t  by e l i g h t  i n v o L u n t a r y  bank re s e r v e  r a t i o ,  i n  t h e  
de te rm i  n e t io n  o f  the money m u l t i p l i e r .  By 1972 the bank reserve r a t i o ,  
i n  te rm s  o f  ou r  d e f i n i t i o n s  i n  C h e p t e r  3 ,  began t o  d e c l i n e  due t o  
increased domest ic lending and t h i s  became the mein d e t e r m in a n t  o f  t h e  
s teady  in c r e a s e  o f  t h e  money m u l t i p l i e r  i n  Kuwai t .  Th is  s ec t ion  w i l l  
analyze the general  p r o g r e s s  o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  banks i n  the per iod  under 
study and the change in  emphasis o f  b u s in e s s  between t h e  f o r e i g n  and 
d o m e s t i c  sec to rs  over t im e .  Sec t ion  ( i v )  w i l l  look more s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t  
the manegement o f  l i q u i d i t y  and o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  by the management 
teams o f  the banks.
a) A D e s c r ip t io n  o f  the F in a n c ia l  I n s t i t u t i o n s  in  Kuwait
We can see from Table 4:1 t h a t  the f i n a n c i a l  sec to r  i n  Kuwait comprises,  
in  a d d i t i o n  to  the Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait ,  s i x  commerc ia l  banks -  f o u r
TABLE 4 : 5
ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN ASSETS. FOREIGN LIABILITIES 
AND DEPOSITS OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS 1963-80 
( M i l l i o n s  o f  Kuwait i  Dinars)
YEAR /  QUARTER FA FL N FA/TA* FL/TA* D N/D
1 980 IV 1 880.1 1134.3 745.8 0.39 0.24 2606.3 0.29
I I I 1713.3 956.3 757.0 0.39 0.22 2521 .7 0.30
I I 16 93 .4 844.2 849.2 0.41 0.20 2408.8 0.35
I 1558.5 800.6 757.9 0.40 0.21 2259.5 0 .34
1979 IV 1407.7 803 .9 603.6 0.38 0.22 2073.8 0.29
I I I 1260.2 725.3 534.9 0.37 0.21 2035.2 0.26
I I 1291 .7 733.6 558.1 0.41 0.23 1848.8 0.30
I 1270.3 663.4 606.9 0.42 0.22 1798.4 0.34
1978 IV 1214.4 601 .5 612.9 0.42 0.21 1773.3 0.35
I I I 939.9 370.4 569.5 0 .38 0.15 1667.4 0.34
I I 899.4 3 87.1 512.3 0.37 0.16 1556.9 0.33
I 86 8.6 410.7 457.9 0.37 0.18 1451.4 0.32
1977 IV 822.4 419.8 402.6 0.35 0.18 1432 .4 0 .28
I I I 791 .0 360.1 430 .9 0 .38 0.17 1299.6 0.33
I I 719.9 312.4 407.5 0.37 0.16 1266.0 0.32
I 690.5 266.4 424.1 0.40 0.15 1175.5 0.36
1976 IV 674.9 324.1 350 .8 0.40 0.19 1091.2 0.32
I I I 689.0 229.4 459.6 0.45 0.15 1028.7 0.45
I I 621.3 144.3 477.0 0 .44 0.10 987.1 0 .48
I 567.4 156.2 411.2 0.46 0.13 85 8.0 0 .48
1975 IV 614.4 169.0 445.4 0.52 0.14 789.5 0.56
I I I 591 .6 129.9 461.7 0.55 0.12 729.5 0.63
I I 527.7 123.5 404.2 0.52 0.12 673.2 0.60
I 501.8 135.4 366 .4 0.53 0.14 617.4 0.59
1974 IV 561.4 143.4 418.0 0.58 0.15 638.9 0.65
I I I 546.6 118.0 42 8.6 0 .58 0.13 614.2 0.70
I I 510.4 101.3 409.1 0.59 0.12 571.2 0.72
I 481 .6 91 .9 389.7 0.61 0.12 532.5 0.73
1973 IV 479.0 136.1 342.9 0.63 0.18 500.8 0 .68
I I I 487.1 115.0 372.1 0.65 0.15 462.4 0.80
I I 481 .6 125.0 356.6 0.67 0.17 442.7 0.81
I 487.0 74 .4 412.6 0.72 0.11 449.7 0.92
1972 IV 513.4 103.6 409.8 0.73 0.15 466.6 0 .88
I I I 504.1 90.1 414.0 0.75 0.13 423.7 0.98
I I 526.2 105.0 421.2 0.76 0.15 424.9 0.99
I 452.6 63 .8 388.8 0.74 0.10 378.0 1 .03
1971 IV 477.9 83.1 394 .8 0.74 0.13 405.4 0.97
I I I 438.2 82.4 355 .8 0.75 0.14 340.7 1.04
I I 507.6 160.2 347.4 0.78 0.25 344.0 1 .01
I 406.6 70 .9 335.7 0.74 0.13 326.9 1 .03
YEAR /  QUARTER FA FL N FA/TA* FL/TA* 0 N/D
1970 IV 439.5 115.6 323.9 0.75 0.20 317.3 1 .02
I I I 379 .8 64.2 315.6 0.73 0.12 312.0 1 .01
I I 362 .4 44.6 317.8 0.72 0.09 316.5 1 .00
I 350.7 59.6 291 .1 0.72 0.12 299.3 0.97
1969 IV 369.2 78 .4 290.8 0.73 0.15 334.9 0.87
I I I 326 .8 38.6 288.2 0.69 0 .08 332.0 0.87
I I 323 .4 20.3 303.1 0.70 0.04 336.1 0.90
I 323 .8 19.6 304.2 0.70 0.04 344.9 0.88
1968 IV 315.1 17.3 297.8 0.69 0 .04 339.4 0.88
I I I 318.7 9.1 309.6 0.72 0.02 317.4 0.98
I I 321 .8 9.5 312.3 0.73 0.02 308.5 1.01
I 258.3 8.1 250.2 0.71 0.02 276.6 0.90
1967 IV 260.1 8.7 251 .4 0.72 0.02 269.1 0.93
I I I 2 80.1 8.7 271 .4 0 .74 0.02 277.2 0.98
I I 266.1 11 .5 254.6 0 .68 0.03 284.0 0.90
I 260 .4 11 .8 248.6 0.72 0.03 263.3 0.94
1966 IV 263.6 9.7 253.9 0 .74 0.03 261.0 0.97
I I I 263 .8 14.1 249.7 0.76 0 .04 242.8 1.03
I I 238.0 7.7 230.3 0 .74 0.02 234.4 0 .98
I 193.1 6 .5 186.6 0.70 0.02 189.8 0 .98
1965 IV 191 .3 8.7 182.6 0.71 0.03 1 83.8 0.99
I I I 197.3 8.1 189.2 0.72 0.03 173.5 1.09
I I 169 .4 7.7 161 .7 0.70 0.03 166.5 0.97
I 173.3 6.0 167.3 0.72 0.02 173.9 0.96
1964 IV 1 80.8 5.1 175.7 0 .74 0.02 175.1 1 .00
I I I 165.7 3 .8 161 .9 0.72 0.02 166.1 0.97
I I 146 .8 4 .4 142.4 0 .68 0.02 152.1 0.94
I 137.7 4.2 133.5 0 .68 0.02 147.8 0.90
1963 IV 137.7 3 .2 134.5 0.69 0.02 147.6 0.91
I I I 140 .4 3 .0 137 .4 0.71 0.02 148.1 0.93
I I 136.3 3 .2 133.1 0.71 0.02 145.6 0.91
I 138.7 2 .2 136.5 0.73 0.01 144.8 0 .94
FA = Fore ign Assets o f  the Commerciel Banks
FL = Fore ign L i a b i l i t i e s  o f  the Commercial Banks
N = FA-FL = Net Fore ign Asse ts  o f  the Commercial Banks
TA* = T o ta l  Assets  o f  the Commercial Banks (*does not in c lude
o th e r  asse ts )
0 = T o ta l  Resident  Depos i ts  o f  the Commercial Banks
( i n c l u d i n g  demand, t ime and savings d e p o s i t s ,  f o re ig n  
cur rency  depos i ts  and C e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  Depos i t )
Source : C en t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwai t ,  Q u a r te r l y  S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l t e t i n ,  
Nos. from A p r i l  1968 -  December 1982.
TABLE 4 ; 6
THE COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN ASSETS OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS 1973-80
( M i l l i o n s  o f  Kuwait i  D inars )
Year /Quar ter Balances w i th  
Fore ign Banks
Advances o f  




T o ta l  
Forei  gn 
Assets
1980 IV 1436.7 252.7 190.7 1880.1
I I I 1234.8 223.8 254.7 1713.3
I I 1254.4 213.1 225.9 1693.4
I 1206.2 193.3 159.0 1558.5
1979 IV 1028.9 203.3 175.3 1407.5
I I I 928.9 153.8 177.5 1260.2
I I 991 .8 121 .5 178.4 1291 .2
I 974.7 114.8 180.8 1270.3
1978 IV 926.4 101 .9 186.1 1214.4
I I I 683.7 86.9 169.4 940.0
I I 671 .4 81.0 147.0 899.4
I 640.8 86.6 141.2 868.6
1977 IV 626.1 80.6 115.7 822.4
I I I 577.8 88.7 124.5 791 .1
I I 500.6 88.8 130.5 719.9
I 477.2 90.3 123.0 690.5
1976 IV 459.1 89.2 126.6 674.9
I I I 462.0 109.6 117.5 689.1
I I 390.6 115.6 115.1 621 .3
I 346.5 113.5 107.4 567.4
1975 IV 402.3 116.3 95.8 614.4
I I I 375.2 114.8 101 .6 591.6
I I 339.8 101.2 86.7 527.7
I 334.7 89.6 77.5 501.8
1974 IV 384.1 98.5 78.8 561 .4
I I I 355.5 97.0 94.1 546.6
I I 316.7 94 .4 99.3 510.4
I 293.1 84.8 103.7 481.6
1973 IV 293.9 86.7 98.5 479.1
I I I 292.1 84.0 111 .0 487.1
I I 302.8 72.6 106.2 481.6
I 325.4 65.3 96.2 486.9
Source : Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait  Q u a r te r l y  S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l e t i n ,  
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TABLE 4 : 8
THE DEPOSIT STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM 
BY TYPE OF DEPOSIT AND SECTOR OF ORIGIN 
(1971-801 
( M i l l i o n s  o f  Kuwait i  D inars)
PRIVATE RESIDENT DEPOSITS
YEAR DEMANO SAVINGS TIME CDs FOREIGN CURRENCY TOTAL
1971 60.9 101 .6 145.2 98.1 405.8
1972 88.6 117.8 182.8 - 77.4 466.6
1973 103.6 140.1 163.7 - 93.4 500.8
1974 117.9 145.8 202.1 - 173.1 638.9
1975 188.6 175.8 303.5 - 121.6 789.5
1976 264.7 204.6 456.2 - 165.7 1091 .2
1977 339.7 253.6 737.0 15.0 87.5 1432.4
1978 422.0 313.4 824.0 32.6 181.3 1773.3
1979 410.6 302.1 985.2 20.3 355.6 2073.8
1980 418.4 272.5 1311 .2 16.2 587.9 2606.2
GOVERNMENT DEPOSITS
YEAR DEMAND TIME





















Source : Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait Q u a r te r ly  S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l e t i n ,  
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p r i v a t e l y  owned and two w i th  a government stake (BMKE and BURGAN have a 
government sharehold ing o f  49 per  c e n t  and 51 per cent r e s p e c t i v e l y )  -  
an I s la m ic  Bank, the Kuwait Finance House i s  49 per  cen t  owned by th e  
government b u t  i s  n o t  regu la ted  by the c e n t r a l  bank, th ree  s p e c ie l i s e d  
banks, 19 investment compan ies ,  a number o f  in su rance  companies, both 
lo c a l  and f o re ig n ,  and exchange dea le rs  and s tockb roke rs .  By 1980 ,  t h e  
s i x  com merc ia l  banks had a network o f  approx imate ly  115 branches, each 
serv ing  an average o f  11,000 i n h a b i t a n t s .  Un l ike  the o the r  G u l f  S ta tes ,  
where fo re ig n  banks are al lowed to  opera te ,  the expansion o f  the banking 
system in  Kuwait ,  as we have a l r e a d y  seen, has come about through lo c a l  
i n i t i a t i v e ,  and p ro tec ted  by the laws p r o h i b i t i n g  fo re ig n  bank ing. More 
r e c e n t l y ,  however, c e r t a in  f o re ig n  banks which are a t  leas t  50 pe r  cen t  
owned by K u w a i t i  i n t e r e s t s  were p e r m i t t e d  by a s p e c i a l  law t o  open 
branches i n  Kuwa i t  ( 2 3 ) .  The Bank o f  B a h ra in  and Kuwai t  i s  now the 
f i r s t  to  operate such a branch. Foreign banks have, n e v e r th e le s s ,  been 
a l lo w e d  t o  h o ld  m i n o r i t y  e q u i t y  stekes in  Kuwei t i  investment companies 
and o the r  non-bank f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  wh ich  e x p l a i n s  the  rap id  
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  o f  the number o f  these investment companies from th re e  to  
nineteen between 1974 and 1980. These i n v e s tm e n t  compan ies ,  however ,  
canno t  ta k e  d e p o s i t s  f rom  th e  p u b l i c ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  a re  a l lo w e d  to  
borrow from the banks to  f inance  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .
b) The Foreion Business o f  the Commercial Banks
We can see from Tables 4 :4  and 4 :5  the r e l a t i v e  h i s t o r i c a l  importance o f  
the f o r e ig n  p a r t  o f  th e  c om m e rc ia l  ba n k s '  a c t i v i t i e s .  We s h a l l  be 
look ing  a t  quest ions re la te d  to  f o re ig n  assets and t h e i r  dep loym en t  i n  
sec t ion  ( i v )  o f  t h i s  chap te r ,  when we ana lyse the p o r t f o l i o  behaviour  o f  
t h e  com m erc ia l  banks .  As we s h e l l  see t h e r e  i s  c lo s e  i n t e r a c t i o n  
between f o re ig n  assets and bank l i q u i d i t y .  In  Chapter 3 we inc luded  net
f o re ig n  assets  as p a r t  o f  t h e  ba n k s '  l i q u i d i t y  on t h e  bas is  t h a t  the 
major p a r t  o f  f o re ig n  assets  were i n  t h e  fo rm  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  d e p o s i t s  
abroad wh ich  a c te d  as l i q u i d  r e s e r v e s  h e ld  a g a in s t  t h e  commercial  
ban ks '  l i a b i l i t i e s  and w e re  r e c o g n i s e d  as such  by c e n t r a l  bank 
l e g i s l a t i o n .  Also t h a t  pa r t  o f  fo re ig n  assets corresponding t o  f o r e i g n  
l i a b i l i t i e s  c o u ld  n o t  be c o n s id e r e d  as l i q u i d  rese rves  he ld  aga ins t
lo c a l  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  hence th e  use o f  ne t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  r a t h e r  than
balances w i th  fo re ig n  banks, as the proxy f o r  bank l i q u i d i t y  (24) .
Broadly speaking though, the c o u n t r y ' s  o i l - r e l a t e d  f i n a n c i a l  s u r p l u s  i n  
g e n e r a l  f o r c e d  th e  banks to  de p lo y  a Large p a r t  o f  t h e i r  resources 
abroad. Up u n t i l  1972 around 70 p e r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  assets were fo re ig n  
assets .  T h i s  p r o p o r t i o n ,  however ,  kep t  d ro p p in g  as l o c a l  economic 
a c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e d .  F i r s t  t h e  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  f o r e i g n  essets f e l l  to  
around 50 per  cen t  between 1 9 7 3 -75 ,  and then  t o  a round 35 per  cent
t h e r e a f t e r .  Between 65 per c e n t  and 82 p e r  cen t  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,
depending on the year i n  ques t ion ,  cons is ted  o f  s ho r t - te rm  depos i t s  w i th  
f o r e i g n  banks which wouLd in d i c a te  t h a t  the fo re ig n  business o f  Kuwait i  
banks d i d  no t  c o n c e n t r a t e  on l e n d i n g  b u t  i n v o l v e d  p r i n c i p e l l y  t h e  
placement o f  funds  f o r  s h o r t  m a t u r i t i e s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  money 
m a rk e ts .  The assumption o f  a c lose  r e la t i o n s h ip  between f o re ig n  assets 
and bank l i q u i d i t y  was j u s t i f i e d  p r e c i s e l y  by thes e  f a c t s .  We s h a l l  
a l s o  see t h a t  t h e r e  were no l i q u i d  a s s e t s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  l o c a l  
f i n a n c i a l  system i n  Kuwait such th a t  la rge amounts o f  s ho r t - te rm  money 
could be absorbed and managed d o m e s t ic a l ly .
c) The Bahra in i  O ffshore Banking Un i ts  and the Compet i t ion  
o f  Domestic Lending i n  Kuwait
As fo re ig n  assets  d e c l in e d ,  d o m e s t ic  a s s e t s  rose r e f l e c t i n g  the growth
o f  domest ic economic a c t i v i t y  a f t e r  th e  o i l  p r i c e  r i s e  o f  1973.  But 
K u w a i t i  com m erc ia l  banks were a c t u a l l y  not the on ly  banks to  reac t  to  
t h e  expa ns io n  o f  loan demand i n  K u w a i t  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  197 3 -7 8 .  In  
October,  1975, the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA), th e  c e n t r a l  bank o f  
t h e  S t a t e  o f  B a h r a in ,  announced a new form o f  l im i t e d  banking l i cence 
which would permit  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  banks to  e s t a b l i s h  o f fs h o re  branches in  
Bahra in .  These s o - c a l l e d  O f f s h o r e  Bank ing  U n i t s  (OBU's) were designed 
to  a t t r a c t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  banks who wanted t o  do b u s in e s s  i n  th e  GuLf 
r e g io n  bu t  were u n a b le  t o  e s t a b l i s h  b ranch es  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  in  Saudi 
A r a b ia  and Kuwa i t  where f o r e i g n  b a n k in g  was e i t h e r  r e s t r i c t e d ,  o r  
t o t a l l y  p r o h i b i t e d .  Bahrain was a t  a c o n v e n ie n t  enough d i s t a n c e  from 
Kuwa i t  f o r  ins tance  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  banks t o  jump a t  t h i s  o p p o r tu n i t y  
to  set  up a business base i n  t h e  G u l f .  OBU's were not a l lowed,  unless 
another c h a r te r  was g ranted,  to  opera te a l o c a l  b ranch  t o  do b u s in e s s  
w i t h i n  th e  l o c a l  B a h r a i n i  com mun i ty .  The pu rpose  o f  OBU's was t h a t  
ba n k in g  o p e r a t i o n s  s h o u l d  be c a r r i e d  o u t  f r o m  B a h r a i n  w i t h o u t  
r e s t r i c t i o n ,  e i t h e r  w i th  non - res iden ts  o r  w i th  the B a h r a in i  government 
and i t s  agencies.
A t  a BMA board meet ing on ly  a few weeks a f t e r  t h i s  announcement, a l i s t  
o f  f i f t e e n  a p p l i c a t i o n s  was app roved ,  and then another  twe lve  were also 
approved i n  January,  1976. By June, 1976, s ix te e n  OBU's were o p e r a t i n g  
and r e p o r t i n g  a s s e t s  o f  $3 .5  b i l l i o n ,  and by December 1976 tw e n ty - s ix  
banks repor ted a s s e t s  o f  $2 .6  b i l l i o n  a t  t h e i r  end o f  year accounts.  
The OBU's c h i e f  areas o f  bus iness  were c o n c e n t r a t e d ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  th e  
p re -1 9 7 9  p e r i o d ,  i n  G u l f  cur rency business and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  Kuwait i  
Dinars (KDs). They found  t h a t  s h o r t - t e r m  fu n d s  i n  KDs were p l e n t i f u l  
and a v a i l a b le  cheaply compared w i th  i n t e r e s t  ra te s  pa id  on t ime depos i ts  
a t  banks o r  on commercial loans to  Kuwai t i  customers and t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  
t hey  c o u ld  make a s i z e a b le  spread by o n - le n d in g  these funds in  Kuwai t .
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The reason t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  p r e v a i l e d ,  as we sh a L l  see i n  t h e  n e x t  
s e c t io n ,  was the  f a c t  t h a t  up u n t i l  1978 in te rbank  placements i n  KDs by 
com m erc ia l  banks in  Kuwait were considered l i q u i d  assets  i n  the con tex t  
o f  r e p o r t i n g  c r i t e r i a  to  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank and t h a t  most Bahra in i  OBU's 
were branches o f  acceptab le  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  banks. The com m e rc ia l  banks 
i n  Kuwa i t  i n i t i a l l y  welcomed t h i s  demand f o r  funds on the p a r t  o f  the 
OBU's due to  the Lim i ted p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  placement o f  s h o r t - te rm  
money in  Kuwait (which p o s s i b i l i t i e s  were r e s t r i c t e d  to  the c e n t r a l  bank 
and the in te r - b a n k  market) u n t i l  i t  was re a l i s e d  they  were u s i n g  th o s e  
funds  t o  f inance  com pe t i t i ve  loan o f f e r s  to  Kuwait i  r e s id e n ts .  Between 
1975 and 1978 B a h r a i n i  OBU's f i n a n c e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
increased lend ing i n  Kuwai t .  Es t imates,  however, on t h i s  are sparse but 
can be assumed by us to  be a f u n c t i o n  o f  s h o r t - t e r m  l e n d in g  t o  th e s e  
OBUs by K u w a i t i  banks o f  l o c a l  c u r r e n c y .  Neverthe less,  some fo re ig n  
c u r r e n c y  loans  were made w h ic h  w o u ld  o b v i o u s l y  n o t  depend on KD 
borrowing.  Table 4:11 shows t h a t  Loans and s h o r t - t e r m  p la c e m e n ts  t o  
Arab co u n t r ie s  rose from $2.48 b i l l i o n  i n  1976 to  $19.77 b i l l i o n  i n  1980 
and t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  a s s e t s  p la c e d  in  Arab c o u n t r ie s  by OBU's 
rose from 40 pe r  c e n t  t o  52 pe r  c e n t .  M eanw h i le ,  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
t o t a l  assets which were s imply  sho r t - te rm  in te rbank  placements ave rag ed  
75 per  cen t  f o r  the pe r iod  1976-80. The p ro p o r t io n  o f  business done i n  
lo c a l  currency v a r i e d : -
"The reg io na l  cur rency p ro p o r t io n  o f  lo c a l  bus iness, 
i n i t i a l l y  m a in l y  K u w a i t i  D in a r s  bu t  L a t t e r l y  more 
Saudi R ia l s ,  rose from around 20per cant i n  1 976/77 
t o  a round  29per  cen t  i n  t h e  l a t e r  years .  Most o f  
the remaining business was d o l l a r  denominated."  (25)
But the re g io n a l  c u r r e n c y  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  Loca l  b u s i n e s s  v a r ied  mainLy
because a f t e r  1978 the accent o f  growth f o r  OBU's was i n  Saudi  R i a l s ,  
r a t h e r  than  Kuwait i  Dinars  i n  the pe r iod  1976-78, s ince a f t e r  t h a t  t ime 
the l e g i s l a t i o n  came o u t ,  wh ich  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  e g a i n s t  OBU's i n  the 
placement o f  Kuwai t i  Dinars  (26 ) .  The balances i n  K u w e i t i  D in a r s  h e ld  
by K u w a i t i  com m e rc ia l  banks w i t h  OBU's were KD 49m in  1977, rose to  a 
high  o f  KD 106m i n  1 978 and f e l l  t o  KD 65m by 1 980 . Al though these 
balances were smal l  by comparison w i th  t o t a l  balances he ld  w i t h  f o r e i g n  
benks by K u w a i t i  com m erc ia l  banks (n e v e r  r i s i n g  above 11 .5  per cen t ,  
w h i le  a c t u a l l y  f a l l i n g  t o  4 .5  pe r  cen t  by e n d -1 9 8 0 ) ,  a t  one p o in t  in  
t ime they d id  have ser ious  im p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  the com pet i t ion  f o r  domest ic 
lend ing in  Kuwai t .  Only approximate es t imates o f  OBU lend ing  i n  Kuwa i t  
a re  p o s s i b l e .  In  1978 t o t a l  p r i v a t e  sec to r  Lending by commercial banks 
was KD 1214.2m, w h i le  t o t a l  cus tomer  Lending by OBU's to  the Arab world  
can be assumed to  be $3 b i l l i o n  on the  bas is  o f  Tab le  4:11 . and we can 
a lso assume t h a t  75 per cent o f  assets  he ld  i n  the Arab wor ld  would have 
been i n t e r - b a n k  d e p o s i t s .  I f  we aLso assume th a t  OBU's i n  1978 would 
have len t  Kuwait b o r ro w e rs  a t o t a l  o f  t h r e e  t im e s  t h e i r  Kuweit i  Dinar  
balances, s ince as we saw many Loans were i n  U.S d o l l a r s ,  t h e  t o t a l  
amount o f  Lending by OBUs wou ld  have reached around $1 b i l l i o n  (o r  a 
t h i r d  o f  the $3 b i l l i o n  o f  OBU loans  t o  t h e  Arab w o r l d ) .  Th is  would 
have represented in  t o t a l  25 per cent  o f  a l l  advances and d i s c o u n t s  by 
K u w a i t i  com m erc ia l  banks t o  r e s id e n t s  i n  1978. Th is  l e v e l  o f  Lending 
was q u i t e  la rge a l th o u g h  i n  o t h e r  y e a rs  i t  wou ld  have been much Less, 
because 1978 represented the  peak o f  OBU a c t i v i t y  in  Kuwait .
d) The Development o f  Domestic Lending bv the Kuwai t i  Commercial 
Banks
The share o f  domestic bank c r e d i t  i n  th e  t o t a l  a s s e t s  o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  
com merc ia l  banks inc reased  c o n t in u o u s ly ,  beg inn ing  i n  1973 (see Table
4 ; 4 ) . P r i o r  to  t h a t  da te ,  the share o f  domestic bank c r e d i t  amounted to  
a p p r o x im a t e l y  25 pe r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  a s s e t s ;  subsequent ly,  t h i s  f i g u r e  
jumped t o  c l o s e  t o  50 p e r  c e n t ,  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  pace o f  
domestic economic a c t i v i t y .  For a w h i l e ,  however ,  th e  K u w a i t i  banks ,  
l a c k i n g  modern management e x p e r t i s e ,  and accustomed to  the p r o v is i o n  o f  
s imple sho r t - te rm  o v e r d r a f t  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  t h e i r  customers,  were unable 
t o  meet t h e  I n c r e a s i n g  need o f  c o m p a n ie s  f o r  medium t e r m  f u n d s  
( o v e r d r a f t s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  accounted f o r  as much as 80 per cent o f  the 
banks'  loan p o r t f o l i o ) .  In  1974 th e  c e n t r a l  bank requested the Kuwait i  
banks t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  t h e i r  l e n d in g  p r a c t i c e s  f o r  t h e  r e a s o n s  we 
d is c u s s e d  i n  t h e  Last  s e c t i o n ,  and conse quen t l y ,  by the end o f  1980, 
f i x e d  t e r m  Loans a c c o u n t e d  f o r  45 p e r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  ba n k  loan 
p o r t f o l i o s ,  w h i le  o v e r d r a f t s  dec l ined  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y .  The sou rce  o f  
commercial banks' funds i n  the pe r iod  1974-78 were main ly  i n  the form o f  
s h o r t - t e r m  d e p o s i t s  f rom th e  p u b l i c  w i th  an average m a tu r i t y  o f  below 
two months. Th is  f a c t  obv ious ly  had not encouraged the manegement teams 
o f  th e  l o c a l  banks t o  expand t h e i r  m e d iu m - te rm  l e n d in g  b u s in e s s .  
Consequent ly,  Kuwait i  companies and bo r row e rs  welcomed t h e  approaches  
made by fo re ig n  banks (main ly  the OBU's i n  Bahra in)  which had management 
w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Lending exper ience t h a t  cou ld  answer 
many o f  these borrowers requ i rements ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  f o r  p r o je c t  Lending. 
Kuwait i  banks were ab le  n e v e r t h e l e s s  as we saw above to  recap tu re  much 
o f  t h e i r  Lost  b u s in e s s  due t o  f a v o u r a b l e  s t a t u t o r y  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  
f o l l o w i n g  the c e n t r a l  bank 's  re g u la t io n s  in  1977 exc lud ing  a l l  depos i t s  
placed w i th  f o re ig n  banks from Kuwait i  banks' L iqu id  assets  (27 ) .
During most o f  th e  p e r i o d  197 0 -8 0 ,  c r e d i t  t o  th e  t r a d e  s e c to r  was on 
ave rage  s l i g h t l y  o v e r  30 p e r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  bank c r e d i t ,  w i t h  t h e  
c o n s t ru c t i o n ,  personaL loans and f i n a n c i a l  se rv ices  sec to rs  each shar ing 
about 20 per cent o f  the  t o t a l ,  and the a g r i c u l t u r a l  and f i s h e r i e s
s e c t o r  and t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  sec to r  each account ing f o r  around 5 per cent 
[see Tab le  4 : 9 1. Over t h e  same p e r i o d ,  however ,  bo th  th e  f i n a n c i a l  
se rv ic es  s e c t o r  and p e r s o n a l  loans  s e c t o r  s t e a d i l y  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  sha re s  o f  t o t a l  bank c r e d i t  t o  a p p ro x im a te ly  25 per cent 
each, most ly  a t  the expense o f  t h e  t r a d e  s e c t o r ' s  share.  Th is  occurred 
as a r e s u l t  o f  the mushrooming o f  lo ca l  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t h e  
coun t ry ,  and the  increased o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  s p e c u la t i v e  r e a l  e s ta te  and 
share market a c t i v i t i e s  (28 ) .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t ,  u n l i k e  o the r  G u l f  
c o u n t r i e s ,  c r e d i t  t o  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  s e c t o r  has been c o n t a i n e d  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y  t o  20 pe r  c e n t  o r  Less o f  t o t a l  
d o m e s t ic  c r e d i t .  T a b le  4 :1 0  shows t h a t  d u r i n g  1978 and 1979 ,  t h e  
p e r s o n a l  Loans and f i n a n c i a l  se rv ices  sec to rs  enjoyed the f a s t e s t  ra te s  
o f  growth o f  bank c r e d i t .  D u r in g  1980,  however ,  t h e  g row th  ra te  o f  
c r e d i t  has been more evenly d iv ide d  among the  var ious  s e c to r s ,  w i t h  t h e  
t r a d e  s e c t o r  t a k i n g  t h e  h i g h e s t  sha re  a t  28 p e r  c e n t .  I n c r e a s e d  
caut iousness among th e  banks i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  involvement  w i th  the 
s tock  market c r e d i t  system caused t h i s  reduced growth in  personal  loans, 
as w e l l  as loans  t o  f i n a n c i a l  and o t h e r  s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r s .  T h i s  
c a u t i o u s n e s s  was p r o b a b l y  due t o  c e n t r a l  bank warn ings , but the  f a c t  
t h a t  t h i s  k i n d  o f  l e n d in g  c o n t i n u e d  anyway,  led  t o  t h e  need f o r  the 
c e n t r a l  bank t o  impose a t o t a l  ban on t h e  d i s c o u n t i n g  o f  p e r s o n a L  
cheques i n  1982.
e) Developments i n  the Sources o f  Funds and the L i a b i l i t y  Management 
o f  the Kuwait i  Commercial Banks
A f t e r  1 979 K u w a i t i  b a n k s  became c o n s i d e r a b l y  more a c t i v e  i n  t h e  
p ro v is io n  o f  med ium-te rm Loans t o  t h e i r  cus tom ers  denominated i n  the 
Kuwait i  D ina r .  Banks cou ld  not  hope to  cont inue Lengthening m a t u r i t i e s  
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t h e i r  d e p o s i t s .  The banks' depos i t  base remained s ho r t - te rm  as we can 
see from TabLe 4 : 6 . I n  1 980 , h a l f  o f  t h e  d e p o s i t  base was made up o f  
t ime d e p o s i t s ,  p r i n c i p a l l y  w i th  a one-year m a tu r i t y  o r  Less, 16 per cent 
w e re  s i g h t  d e p o s i t s ,  and 11 p e r  c e n t  s a v i n g s  d e p o s i t s .  T h e  
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  b a n k s '  sources o f  funds and the leng then ing o f  
the m a t u r i t i e s  on depos i ts  has been a s u b je c t  o f  concern a t  the c e n t r a l  
bank f o r  some t im e .  The main purpose o f  the new l i q u i d i t y  re g u la t io n  o f  
March 1978 was to  t r y  t o  encourage such a le n g t h e n in g  o f  m a t u r i t i e s  
(29 ) .
M e anw h i le ,  t h e  g ro w in g  need f o r  t h e  bank ing  system to s t rengthen the 
s ize  o f  i t s  d e p o s i t  base i n  g e n e r a l  i s  c l e a r  f rom th e  s t a t i s t i c s  i n  
Table 4 ; 7 . which shows t h a t  the bank's loan to  depos i t  r a t i o  ( c a lc u la te d  
as c l a im s  on th e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  d i v i d e d  by p r i v a t e  n o n -g o v e rn m e n t  
d e p o s i t s )  rose  t o  app rox im a te ly  100 per cent by 1979. We s h a l l  see in  
sec t ion  ( v ] t h a t  t hes e  deve lopm en ts  were due t o  t h e  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  o f  
r i s i n g  f o r e ig n  i n t e r e s t  ra tes  a g a i n s t  r i g i d  d o m e s t ic  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  
wh ich  d i d  n o t  a l l o w  l o c a l  d e p o s i t s  t o  grow as f a s t  as advances and 
d i s c o u n t s .  Advances and d i s c o u n t s  were encouraged t o  grow by t h e  
a t t r a c t i v e  lend ing  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  r e la te d  to  fo rward t r a n s a c t i o n s  on t h e  
s t o c k  m a rk e t  and t h e  d i s c o u n t i n g  o f  p o s t - d a t e d  cheques,  as w e l l  as 
a r b i t r a g e  borrowing induced by w id e n in g  y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between the 
Kuwai t i  D i n a r  and t h e  U .S .  D o l l a r .  S e t t i n g  a s id e  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  
source-staf  funds from our c a l c u la t i o n s  o f  the depos i t  base, the loans to  
depos i t  r a t i o  rose to  an e x c e p t i o n a l  132 p e r  cent in  1980. We can see 
from TabLe 4 :7  t h a t  the p r o p o r t i o n  o f  f o re ig n  currency depos i t s  w i th  the 
commercial banks rose from a low o f  6 per cent i n  1977,  t o  22 pe r  c e n t  
o f  t o t a l  d e p o s i t s  i n  1980 as a r e s u l t  o f  y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  We see 
Later t h a t  c a p i t a l  o u t f lo w s  were compensated f o r  by the banks from t h e i r  
borrowing a c t i v i t i e s  abroad (30 ) .  S imu ltaneous ly ,  the banks exper ienced
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a s u b s ta n t ia l  na r row ing  i n  t h e i r  sp reads  as a r e s u l t  o f  the  increased 
cos t o f  depos i t s  r e s u l t i n g  from the need to  a t t r a c t  funds,  coup led  w i t h  
an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c e i l i n g  o f  10 per  c e n t .  The L u c r a t i v e  y i e l d s  
a v a i l a b le  from the d i s c o u n t in g  o f  f o rw a r d  cheques were almost the  on ly  
way th e  banks c o u l d  r e d r e s s  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  and o n c e  t h e y  had 
p a r t i c i p a t e d ,  a l l o w e d  them, as we s h a l l  see l a t e r ,  to  inc rease re tu rn s  
on depos i t s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  ( a l t h o u g h  n o t  o f f i c i a l l y )  t o  stem both the 
s w i t c h  t o  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s ,  and t h e  f l i g h t  o f  c a p i t a l  t o  
f o re ig n  banks.
Except  f o r  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Bank o f  Kuwait (which made an issue as e a r l y  
as in  1975) and th e  Kuwa i t  Real  E s t a t e  Bank, d e b e n tu re s  have not  yet  
f i g u re d  as sources o f  medium-term funds f o r  the commercial banks. As we 
can see from Table 4:12 most issues o f  debentures i n  t h e  Loca l  c a p i t a l  
market have been made on b e h a l f  o f  f o re ig n  e n t i t i e s ,  s ince  the in c e p t io n  
o f  th e  KD bond m arke t  i n  1968 when the World Bank ra ised  KD 15 m i l l i o n  
in  the form o f  6 1 /2  per c e n t ,  20 year  n o te s  through Kuwait Investment 
Company (K IC) .  C e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  depos i t  (CDs) on th e  o t h e r  hand,  have 
been more popuLar  and s e v e r a l  o f  the commercial and s p e c ia l i s e d  banks 
have made issues ,  on a f i x e d  and a f l o a t i n g  ra te  bas is  s ince 1977 but CD 
issues both i n  the form o f  t r a n c h e  p lacem en ts  and tap issues have not 
exceeded a t o t a l  s ize  o f  KD 100 m iL l io n ,  which i s  an i n s i g n i f i c a n t  sum 
compared w i t h  t h e  t o t a l  d e p o s i t  base o f  t h e  banks i n  1980 o f  KD 2.6  
b i l l i o n .  The inves tmen t  compan ies who f l o a t e d  th e  t ranche issues f o r  
the banks found t h a t  the p u b l i c  had l i t t l e  or no demand f o r  these issues 
which were bought c h i e f l y  by banks o r  o the r  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The 
use o f  these medium-term f u n d in g  i n s t r u m e n t s  s h o u ld  have become more 
p o p u l a r  w i t h  t h e  com m erc ia l  banks f o r  them to  e x p l o i t  m ed ium- te rm  
Lending p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and t o  s u p p o r t  t h e s e  r e v is e d  Lending s t r a t e g i e s .  
CDs were f i r s t  issued in  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  the c e n t r a l  bank a l t e r i n g  t h e
l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  t o  a graded one, as i t  d id  in  March 1978. Under t h i s  
system as we s h a l l  see i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  t im e  d e p o s i t s  w i t h  a 
m a t u r i t y  i n  e x c e s s  o f  one y e a r  w o u ld  n o t  be r e q u i r e d  t o  have  
compensating l i q u i d  asse ts .  To t h i s  end, the G u l f  Bank made a t r a n c h e  
i s s u e  t h r o u g h  K u w a i t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n v e s tm e n t  Company ( K I I C )  and 
I n d u s t r i a l  Bank o f  Kuwait (IBK) made a tap issue o f  CDs w i th  m a t u r i t i e s  
o f  two and th ree  years.  However, as these i s s u e s  were p la c e d  l a r g e l y  
w i t h  o t h e r  banks and were ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  absorbed w i t h i n  the  in te r - b a n k  
market,  t h e i r  bas ic  r a t i o n a l e  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  d e p o s i t o r s  to  depos i ts  o f  
Longer m a tu r i t y  f a i l e d ,  and issues subsequent ly became i n f r e q u e n t .  The 
f a i l u r e  o f  CDs t o  a t t r a c t  i n v e s t o r s  i s  c l e a r l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  our 
f i n d in g s  in  Chapter 3 t h a t  t im e  d e p o s i t s  s h o u ld  be cons idered,  not as 
being he ld  f o r  in v e s tm e n t  p u rp o s e s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  f o r  s t o c k  m a rk e t  and 
o th e r  f i n a n c i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n a l  needs.
The l i m i t e d  success  o f  the CD market and the i n a b i l i t y  o f  banks to  tap 
the bond market as a source o f  funds was due, among o the r  t h i n g s ,  t o  the 
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  and i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  money and c a p i t a l  m a rk e ts  i n  
Kuwait .  S ta tu te  requ i red  t h a t  loans w i th  m a t u r i t i e s  i n  excess  o f  one 
yea r  bea r  an a l l - i n  annual cost  ( i n c lu d in g  commissions and fees ]  o f  10 
per cen t  o r  under  w h i l e  s h o r t e r  m a t u r i t i e s  had lower  i n t e r e s t  r a te  
c e i l i n g s .  Th is  meant, q u i t e  n a t u r a l l y ,  t h a t  p u b l i c  i s s u e s  o f  bonds o r  
CDs a l s o  had t o  a b id e  by t h i s  s t a t u t e .  At  the same t ime s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
more i n t e r e s t  than t h i s  was b e in g  p a id  i n f o r m a l l y  i n  per iods  o f  t i g h t  
l i q u i d i t y  on sho r t - te rm  t ime depos i ts ,  w h i l e  s h o r t - t e r m  t im e  d e p o s i t s  
were by t h e i r  very nature ins t ruments  whose rea l  r e tu rn  does not a t t r a c t  
as much p u b l i c i t y  as,  f o r  in s tance ,  bonds and CDs, which are  neg o t iab le  
ins t ruments  which, in  c o n t r a s t  t o  d e p o s i t s ,  have a t tached and p u b l i c l y  
c i r c u l a t e d  documentat ion.  A t  the end o f  1 979, when th e  U.S.  e n t e r e d  a 
per iod  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  monetary p o l i c y ,  and U.S. s h o r t - te rm  ra tes  reached
22
p e a k s  1n e x c e s s  o f  22 p e r  cen t  per  annum, th e  KD bond m a rke t  was 
o f f i c i a l l y  c l o s e d ,  and when i t  r e -o p e n e d  i n  1981 th e  c e n t r a l  bank 
a c t u a l l y  al lowed p u b l i c  i s s u e s  t o  come t o  t h e  m arke t  w i t h  y i e l d s  i n  
excess  o f  10 pe r  c e n t  ( i n  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e  i s s u e s  came i n  f a c t  w i th  
y i e l d s  r a n g in g  between 1 2 .5  pe r  c e n t  and 14 .5  p e r  c e n t ] .  T h i s  was 
j u s t i f i e d  by the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  because th e  b o r r o w e rs  conce rned  
were f o re ig n  e n t i t i e s .
N e v e r t h e le s s ,  t h e r e  begen to  grow in  1980 the excep t iona l  fe a tu re  o f  a 
h i g h l y  l i q u i d  do m e s t ic  money m a r k e t ,  d e s p i t e  h ig h  e x t e r n a l  d o l l a r  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  The re a s o n  f o r  t h i s ,  as we saw a b o v e ,  was t h e  
e xcep t iona l  y i e l d s  o f fe re d  by the s tock market c r e d i t  system. The s tock  
m a rke t  g e n e ra te d  c r e d i t  t h r o u g h  the d iscoun t in g  o f  pos t -da ted  cheques 
which y i e l d e d  a t  f i r s t  a p p r o x im a t e l y  25-40 pe r  c e n t  p e r  annum, but 
which,  a f t e r  1979, yieLded premia in  excess o f  100 p e r  c e n t  pe r  annum 
( 3 1 ) .  U s u a l l y ,  o n l y  t h e  cheques o f  weL l-known m erch an ts  wou ld  be 
d iscounted.  The a v e l l a b i L i t y  o f  such y i e l d s  w i t h in  the In fo rm e l  c r e d i t  
s t r u c t u r e  in  Kuwait had the  e f f e c t ,  f i r s t  o f  a l l  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  funds  
i n t o  t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  fa c e  o f  h ig h  e x t e r n a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  and 
secondly o f  r a i s i n g  y ie ld s  in  a l l  o t h e r  investments in  Kuwait i n c lu d in g  
d e p o s i t s ,  f a r  beyond t h e  l e g a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  l e v e l s .  As W i l s o n  
i n d i c a t e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  and as we have p re v io u s ly  discussed,  banks would 
to  some ex ten t  in c rea se  r e t u r n s  p a id  on d e p o s i t s  to  keep funds i n  the 
face o f  h igh e x te rn a l  y i e l d s ,  which they were able to  do Largely because 
o f  the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  d is c o u n t in g  cheques i n  the s t o c k  m a rke t  c r e d i t  
sys tem ( 3 2 ) .  Banks a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  depos i ts  by 
mak ing them as s h o r t  as p o s s i b l e  and a l l o w i n g  cus tom ers  t o  b o r ro w  
aga ins t  them, g i v in g  them fea tu re s  almost i d e n t i c a l  to  i n t e r e s t  b e a r i n g  
c u r re n t  accounts (33 ) .
The need f o r  t h e  bank ing  system to  pay g rea te r  a t t e n t i o n  i n  the f u tu r e  
to  L i a b i l i t y  management 1s c le a r  from the prolonged per iods  o f  l i q u i d i t y  
shortage i n  t h e  K u w a i t i  D i n a r  m arke t  between 1978 and 1980 which we 
discuss in  more d e t a i l  i n  the n e x t  s e c t i o n .  S u b s t a n t i a l  o u t f l o w s  o f  
p r i v a t e  s e c to r  funds from the KD market,  and the  sw i tch ing  from Kuwait i  
D in a r  t o  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  w i t h  t h e  l o c a l  banks ,  induced  
p r i m a r i l y  by the la rge  i n t e r e s t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between KD end E u r o d o l l a r  
i n t e r e s t  ra tes  recu r red  du r ing  t h i s  pe r iod .  The banks reacted to  t h i s ,  
bu t  o n l y  b e l a t e d l y .  We on ly  r e a l l y  began to  see la rge  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s  
s t a r t i n g  i n  1980 when s t o c k  m arke t  p r i c e s  s t a r t e d  t o  r i s e  a f t e r  the 
1978-79 l u l l .  Th is  boom al lowed the  banks to  ra is e  domest ic y i e l d s  and 
t h e r e - b y  a t t r a c t  funds  back i n t o  t h e  c o u n t r y .  The Large share o f  
domest ic c r e d i t  t h a t  went to  the  p e r s o n a l  Loans and f i n a n c i a l  and o the r  
se rv ice  sec to rs  between 1978-80 r e f l e c t e d  n o t  o n l y  a Large amount o f  
b o r r o w in g  by i n v e s t o r s  f o r  i n v e s tm e n t  i n  t h e  s t o c k  market ,  but  a lso  
borrowing to  some ex ten t  f o r  i n t e r e s t  a r b i t r a g e .  We can see from Table 
4 :8  th a t  KD depos i ts  d id  not grow as f a s t  as Lend ing  and t h a t  f o r e i g n  
c u r r e n c y  depos i ts  grew from a Low o f  6 per cent i n  1977 to  a high o f  22 
pe r  cen t  i n  1980 .  The h i g h  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  personaL loans  and t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  and o t h e r  s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r s  1s e v id e n c e  o f  c o n t i n u i n g  and 
inc reas ing  bank involvement  w i th  the s tock market c r e d i t  system.
f ) The Return to  the Expansion o f  Foreign Business bv the Banks
The re c e n t  expa ns io n  s i n c e  1980 o f  the  K u w a i t i  banks ou ts id e  Kuwait 
seems to  be a r e s u l t  o f  the l im i t e d  scope f o r  growth l o c a l l y  f o l l o w in g  a 
s lowing down o f  a c t i v i t y  i n  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and t rade  sec to rs  caused 
c h i e f l y  by a reduc t ion  i n  p o r t  c o n g e s t i o n  i n  n e i g h b o u r i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  
Th is  beceme more obvious once they adopted the view t h a t  lend ing r e la te d  
to  stock market a c t i v i t y  was not se r ious  lend ing and could be dangerous.
Such a m a jo r  r e o r i e n ta t i o n  w i l l  have a number o f  impor tan t  im p l i c a t i o n s  
f o r  the Kuwait i  banks. Perhaps the most impor tan t  i s  the need f o r  bas ic  
s t r u c t u r a l  changes i n  m a n a g e r ia l  s t y l &  and s t a f f i n g ,  to  cope w i th  the 
demands o f  a com pe t i t ive  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  env ironment.  We have a l s o  seen 
t h a t  most f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  a re  i n  t h e  fo rm o f  l i q u i d  balances and t h a t  
a c t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  customer l e n d in g  and inves tment  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
A major change in  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  b u s in e s s  t o  f o r e i g n  m a rk e ts  wou ld  
r e q u i r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i c y  changes and changes i n  a t t i t u d e  among the 
banks.
The new i n t e r e s t  the commerc ia l  banks a re  showing i n  expanding abroad, 
whatever the problems they may face in  doing so, seems to  b r i n g  us f u l l  
c i r c l e  back t o  the  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  p r e v a i le d  p r i o r  to  1973 when f o re ig n  
assets were the l a rg e s t  p a r t  o f  bank b a la n c e  shee ts  and leads us to  a 
complete ly  d i f f e r e n t  o b j e c t i v e  to  those p r e v a i l i n g  i n  the pe r iod  1973-79 
when expans ion  o f  d o m e s t i c  l e n d i n g  a t  any c o s t  was t h e  p r i m a r y  
obj a c t i v e .
i v )  PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOUR OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
a) I n t r o d u c t i o n
The c e n t r a l  p ro b le m  d i s c u s s e d  i n  C h ap te r  3 i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  
an a ly s i s  o f  the d e te rm in a n ts  o f  t h e  money s t o c k  was the  t rea tm en t  and 
proper d e f i n i t i o n  o f  bank reserves  (34 ) .  A L e g is la te d  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  
wou ld  have been a n a tu ra l  base around which to  b u i l d  t h e o r ie s  about the 
p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v io u r  o f  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s ,  bu t  no f i g u r e s  were 
produced or  al lowed to  be produced on L iqu id  assets  h e ld  by banks ,  and 
no cash r a t i o  became th e  s u b j e c t  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  u n t i l  the end o f  the 



































































































































































































1 a ) (X1 r - 1
cn 2 :
^  i o
r cn :z:
a
i—CD CDf cnc n \—
u *^ri CD cn
K 1 i d cn h -
f — 11 I o t— LU
fC CJ CD
r - cn LU cn
r . l u i—t 27 <cr cn a 1—
't . .C cn
h  • r j UJ r ID
f f CJ > h* *
L3S -T 21 lu
♦ - CD r xCO CD o
CJ* IU 11) 21 ! i_
4 — ** 1 CJ r j CD i
- r ] < r UJ -tc
.. ..i > • cn 1—
*■ '■C a a oI I )r ■c l l . K -
* — icn t
I I
onr -cn













































































































LU cn\\ U .  cn LU r j L—I \ a t - f
K
\ >- CD
i i CD cn Li_ CJ O
1 \ \ I ■ h - t— a Q-
\ t h-1 i—t cn LU LU\ 1 l _  CD CD cn h - cn rr Q
\ \ i i fx CD o t—i LU re1 \ n_ c l cn L— ID 1—
\
[ 1 1 | IU LU o <C CJ Z
.1
Ii \
1 CD a n_ CJ LU
\
i*-' x
LU ►—1 DC ZL
\ CD CD a !J_ CD *L.'/ i ix iz : -z. t— f f rr\ i i— i LU 1— IU LU, t li > ze: rr rr >
\ / LU f-H LU C J o
/  \ 


































>  cDT 
co irj
. . m  CJ 
'4 - _  CD O  I“C 1—* i-ir r - J r -  












\1 } ' /









\  / /  N ' /
* /  \ /  y
\  <)















— r  t  i  r  t i  r  i  r  j  t i  l  i  i  i i  
LO O
LD ID





CD 3 : L—
cn i—i













H* _i cn cn
CJ LU x
LU 1— ! i—i rr
CD CJ »— <
rr i—i CD
IU LU _i
H- 31 i— i
"-C J” CD <c
O <C 1—1




I u I’­ z:
rr o
f— Ll 1— CD
a o
ZI h - LU





-r rr 1 Li
Ti LU i—i >-
a \  - CJ_] »— i z
' i ; iu LU
i-1 K - t— i rr
CJ rn rr'•r~ >■ < r
i i j i—1 t— 1 CJj' rr rr _ j
ZJ rr o _ j
cj L - 2 _ j*
CJ cn r j CD o
1—  LU i—i c ) ;r
iu >c cn Ll ) ! C »
rr IU rr i •
!— m  i u CD
i—11— Ll 1-1 LU
lu cn -r r>
CJ LU J- Ll CD
r r  t - i a I—  LU
cn rr i—I f -
ZL _j rr o CD -X
h  i ■c 1—1 C D >•'C 1—  iu I— rr »-i
_j cj rr <x lu rr





which i t  was necessary to  es t im ate  the t r u e  L i q u i d i t y  o f  the  banks by 
adding net f o re ig n  assets  to  reserves in  Chapter 3 .  In  TabLe 4:7 we can 
see t h a t  the cash r a t i o  (row 8) i s  changeable and q u i te  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t o t a l  r e s i d e n t  p r i v a t e  d ep os i t s .  Cash means in  t h i s  case 
Kuwai t i  Dinar notes and c o ins .  I f  we add balances w i th  the C e n t ra l  Bank 
in  Kuwait i  Dinars which gives us the r a t i o  o f  reserves to  t o t a l  r e s id e n t  
p r i v a t e  depos i ts  (row 9 in  T a b le  4 : 7 1 t h e  v o l a t i l i t y  from year to  year 
becomes s p e c t a c u l a r .  C l e a r l y  we canno t  base o u r  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v io u r  o f  t h e  com m erc ia l  banks on t h e i r  K u w a i t i  D inar  
l i q u i d  asse ts .  Since we have no f i g u r e s  f o r  the L i q u i d i t y  o f  the banks 
we had to  look c l o s e r  a t  what m ig h t  be ou r  e s t im a t e s  o f  n o n - K u w a i t i  
D in a r  l i q u i d i t y  1n C h ap te r  3 f t h a t  we m igh t  reach a g loba l  L i q u i d i t y  
f i g u r e .  In  Graph 4 :4  we can see t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  fo re ig n  assets  and 
c l e a r l y  balances w i th  f o re ig n  banks i s  t h e  m a jo r  p a r t .  However,  t h e  
a r g u m e n t  we used  a g a in s t  u s i n g  b a la n c e s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  banks as an 
es t imate o f  non-Kuwait i  D in a r  l i q u i d i t y  p o i n t e d  to  the r o le  o f  f o r e ig n  
l i a b i l i t i e s  which became an in c re a s in g ly  im por tan t  source o f  s h o r t - t e r m  
f i n a n c e  ( Graph 4 : 6 ) .  Net f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  were t h e r e f o r e  used as an 
a p p ro x im a t i o n  o f  t h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  w h ich  q u a l i f i e d  as 
l i q u i d  reserves  f o r  the f o l l o w in g  major reasons : -
i )  The la rge s ize  o f  commercial bank ho ld ings  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  b a la n c e  s h e e ts .  In  Table 4 :5  (Graph 4 ; 2 ] we 
see t h a t  i n  the second p a r t  o f  1971 f o r e i g n  asse ts  were 78 per 
c e n t  o f  t o t a l  a s s e t s ,  th e  h i g h e s t  l e v e l  1n t h e  p e r i o d  und e r  
6 t u d y ,  w h i l e  t h e  lowest  l e v e l  was reached i n  the  f o u r t h  q u a r te r  
o f  1972 and was 35 per cen t .
i i )  Most f o re ig n  asse ts ,  we can see f rom Table 4 :6  ( Graph 4 ; 4 l . were 
s h o r t - te rm  balances w i th  f o re ig n  banks ( r a n g in g  between 61 p e r
c e n t  and 82 pe r  c e n t  o f  t o t a l  f o r e i g n  asse ts  between 1965 and 
1980] and would q u a l i f y  under the le g a l  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o .
i i i )  On o c c a s io n  a s m a l l  p a r t  o f  t h e s e  b a la n c e s  wou ld  be h e ld  i n  
s h o r t - te rm  d ep os i t s  denom ina ted  i n  K u w a i t i  D ina rs  w i th  OBUs in  
Bahrain ( p r i m a r i l y  i n  the pe r iod  between 1976 and 1978] and would 
t h e r e fo re  a d d i t i o n a l l y  q u a l i f y  under the Kuwait i  D inar  L i q u i d i t y  
r a t i o .
i v )  I n  T a b le s  4 : 5  and 4 :7  ( Graph 4 : 6 ) . we can see an i n c re a s in g ly  
im por tan t  r o le  being played by fo re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  as a source o f  
funds in  the s ho r t - te rm  f o r  the commercial banks.
In  a d d i t i o n  to  the reasons above, a f u r t h e r  reason was c i t e d  f o r  the use 
o f  net  f o re ig n  assets  in  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  prox imate de terminants  and 
t h a t  was the judgement t h a t  the la rge L iqu id  f o r e ig n  a s s e t  h o l d i n g s  o f  
th e  com m e rc ia l  banks were i n  some sense " i n v o lu n t a r y "  and t h a t  a f t e r  
1972, when domest ic  loan  demand began t o  g row,  t h e s e  h o ld ings  were a 
c r u c i a l  b u i l d i n g  b l o c k  on wh ich  bank management t o o k  t h e i r  Lending 
d e c i s i o n s .  T h i s  s u p p o s i t i o n  c o n t r a s t s  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  W i lson 's  
t h i r d  t e s t : -
"The  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t  f o r  f o r e i g n  
l i a b i l i t i e s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a m a jo r  m o t i v e  f o r  the  
a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  f o re ig n  assets  by banks in  Kuwait i s  
p r e c a u t i o n ,  as t h e r e  i s  a d e s i r e  to  a v o id  open 
p o s i t i o n s  i n  f o re ig n  c u r re nc ie s  which b r in g  exchange 
r i s k "  (35)
The purpose o f  t h i s  s e c t io n  o f  Chapter 4 i s  to  t r y  end d i s c o v e r  w h e th e r
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any s y s t e m a t i c  p i c t u r e  o f  bank p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v io u r  in  Kuwait can be 
reached and i f  so, whether i t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the conc lus ions  o f  our 
a n a ly s is  so f a r .  A c e r t a i n  amount o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  work  done on bank 
p o r t f o l i o  behaviour i s  o f  d i r e c t  re levance here.  We noted in  Chapter 3,  
i n  the course o f  our  d iscuss ion  o f  the Friedman and Schwartz models,  the 
p o s s i b l e  d e f i c i e n c i e s  o f  t h e i r  k i n d  o f  mechan is t ic  approach from the 
behav ioura l  p o in t  o f  v iew.
b) Im p l i c a t io n s  and D e f i c ie n c ie s  o f  Bank P o r t f o l i o  Behaviour Thoerv
Edgeworth i n  1888 (36) f i r s t  sugges ted  the  importance o f  random depos i t  
v a r i a t i o n s  f o r  the de te rm ina t ion  o f  a bank 's  optimum p o r t f o l i o ,  and i t  
was P o r t e r  (37 )  who f i r s t  a p p l i e d  an in ven to ry  model to  descr ibe  bank 
p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v i o u r  u n d e r  u n c e r t a i n t y .  B e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
i n v e n t o r y - t h e o r e t i c  r o o ts ,  t h i s  approach has been p a r t i c u l a r l y  u s e fu l  in  
desc r ib ing  bank demand f o r  excess  r e s e r v e s  and o t h e r  l i q u i d  a s s e t s .  
L a t e r  work  by O r r  and M e l l o n  ( 3 8 ) ,  M o r r i s o n  ( 3 9 ) ,  Charnes and Thore 
(40) ,  and P oo le  (41)  c l e a r l y  s u g g e s ts  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  impor tance o f  
u n c e r t a in t y ,  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c os ts ,  lega l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
a l t e r n a t i v e  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n ,  and a t t i t u d e s  to w a rd  b o r r o w in g  i n  
ex p la in in g  bank demand f o r  s econ da ry  r e s e r v e s .  The i n s ig h t s  i n t o  bank 
b e h a v io u r  p r o v i d e d  by t h i s  g roup  o f  a u t h o r s  se rve  t o  p i n p o i n t  t h e  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  the e a r l i e r  money supp ly th e o ry .  That theory  i n d ic a te d  
t h a t  w i th  f r a c t i o n a l  reserve r e q u i r e m e n ts  the commercial banking system 
would expand i t s  d e p o s i t  l i a b i l i t i e s  by some m u l t i p l e  o f  an i n i t i a l  
i n c re a s e  i n  t h e  l e v e l  o f  r e s e r v e s .  The s i z e  o f  t h e  m u l t i p l i e r  was 
determ ined by d r a i n s  i n t o  t h e  F e d e ra l  Reserve banks ,  as w e l l  as by 
losses i n t o  the p u b l i c ' s  hoard o f  c u r r e n c y .  D r a in s  o f  r e s e r v e s  i n t o  
d e s i r e d  excess  r e s e rv e  h o ld ings  and a d d i t i o n s  to  reserves through bank 
b o r ro w in g  f rom  th e  c e n t r a l  b a n k  r e c e i v e d  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e
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d i s c u s s i o n  o f  c r e d i t  m u l t i p l i e r s .  I n  C h s p t e r  3 we a n s l y s e d  t h e  
" p r o x im a t e  d e t e r m i n a n t s "  approach  o f  Fr iedman and Schwartz where the 
money m u l t i p l i e r  depended on t h e  p u b l i c :  cash pre ference r a t i o  and the 
bank reserve ratio^. But i n  t h a t  model the bank res e rv e  r a t i o  subsumed 
bo th  v o l u n t a r y  excess r e s e r v e s  (o r  secondary reserves in  the Robinson 
te rm ino logy )  and in v o lu n ta r y  reserves  (o r  Legal ly  requ i red  re s e rv e s ) ,  as 
w e l l  as a d d i t i o n s  to  reserves t h ro u g h  bank bor row ing.  The d e f i c i e n c i e s  
o f  the genera l ised  approach, whether i n  f r a c t i o n a l  reserve modeLs o r  i n  
th e  " p r o x im a t e  d e te rm in a n ts "  model, are c l e a r .  The bank reserve r a t i o  
i s  an e x -p o s t  e q u i l i b r i u m  r e l a t i o n ,  n o t  a b e h a v i o u r a l  r e l a t i o n .  An 
e x p l a n a t o r y  m ode l  o f  b an k  b e h a v i o u r  can o n l y  be f o u n d  i n  t h e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  as bank demand f o r  excess  r e s e r v e s ,  o r  
demand f o r  d iscoun ts  from the c e n t r a l  bank change. Brunner (42) i n f a c t ,  
deve loped  a d e t a i l e d  a n a ly s i s  o f  the supply theory  o f  money based upon 
an aggregat ion o f  such s t r u c t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  banks.
We can see one o f  t h e  fu n d a m e n ta l  p rob lem s  w i t h  m o d e l - b u i l d i n g  and 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  i n  the area o f  bank p o r t f o l i o  b e h a v io u r  by l o o k i n g  a t  
M a r k o w i t z ' s  p i o n e e r i n g  study o f  e f f i c i e n t  p o r t f o l i o  s e le c t i o n  (43) and 
a t  T o b in 's  paper on l i q u i d i t y  p re ference (44 ) .  T h e i r  p o r t f o l i o  approach 
assumes t h a t  an i n v e s t o r ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  q u a d ra t i c  i n  the r a te  o f  
r e tu rn .  A p o r t f o l i o  i s  e f f i c i e n t  i f  i t  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  
expected ra te  o f  re tu rn  w i th o u t  r a i s i n g  i t s  r i s k  (o r  v a r ia n c e ) .  Bankers 
do o p e r a te  in  a wor ld  i n  which asset  ra te s  o f  r e tu rn  are  not  known w i th  
c e r t a i n t y  and i n  w h ic h  r 1 s k - r e t u r n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  d i f f e r  among 
d i f f e r e n t  asse ts .  F u r th e r ,  bankers are l i k e l y  to  be r i s k - a v e r s e ,  e i t h e r  
because t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e  fu n c t io n s  are convex i n  d i s c o u n t i n g  f u t u r e  n e t  
income,  o r  because i n f l u e n c i a l  d e p o s i t o r s  o r  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  
induce them to  a c t  i n  a r i s k - a v e r s e  f a s h i o n .  The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the 
theory  o f  p o r t f o l i o  s e le c t i o n  to  banking cannot y i e l d  p rec ise  sta tements
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about asset  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  banks w i l l  make in  respon.se to  changes i n  
exptec ted ra tes  o f  r e tu rn  and /o r  r i s k .  But the approach has i m p o r t a n t  
d e f i c i e n c i e s  as w e l l .  The r e s u l t s  are s e n s i t i v e  to  the s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ,  and s to c h a s t i c  depos i t  f lows  cannot be handled as 
e a s i l y  as w i th  the in v en to ry  app roach .  Perhaps i t s  g rea tes t  d e f i c i e n c y  
i s  t h a t  i n v e s t o r s  o f t e n  do n o t  have t h e  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  ab o u t  
i n d i v i d u a l  a s s e t s  t h a t  t h e  t h e o r y  r e q u i r e s .  F u r th e r ,  a bank chooses 
from a la rge set  o f  assets  w i th  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  cannot be un ique ly  
mapped i n t o  the mean-var iance ra te  o f  r e t u r n  space .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  
such a s s e t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as loan m a t u r i t y  and borrower  guarantees 
suggests t h a t  banks a re  conce rned  w i t h  many more dimensions o f  assets  
than simply the  f i r s t  two moments o f  the s in g le  p e r i o d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
ra tes  o f  r e t u r n .
b) The Management o f  the Foreign Balances and L io u id  Assets 
o f  the Commercial Banks
We b e g i n  h e r e  by o u t l i n i n g  c e r t a i n  p r o p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  we i n t e n d ,  
subsequent ly ,  to  t e s t .  These p r o p o s i t i o n s  are reached by in s p e c t io n  o f  
g raphs  w h i l e  th e  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t s  w i l l  t a k e  t h e  f o r m  o f  m u l t i p l e  
regress ion  a n a ly s i s .
I n  TabLe 4 : 5  we can see t h a t  w h i l e  bo th  net f o re ig n  assets and t o t a l  
f o re ig n  assets d e c l in e d  i n  a s i m i l a r  f a s h i o n  as a p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  
assets ,  net  f o re ig n  assets dec l ined  sL igh tLy  f a s t e r  due to  an in c re a s in g  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  f o re ig n  L i a b i l i t i e s  i n  banks '  b a la n c e  s h e e ts  o v e r  t i m e .  
M e a n w h i l e ,  b a l a n c e s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  banks rema ined a f a i r l y  s t a b l e  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o ta L  f o re ig n  a s s e ts  ( 4 5 ) .  Foreign  l i a b i l i t i e s  inc reased 
i n  r e l a t i o n  to  t o t a l  fo o t in g s  i n  banks'  balance sheets from 10 p e r  c e n t  
t o  20 pe r  c e n t  by 1980,  bu t  grew c o n s id e r a b l y  in  r e l a t i o n  to  f o re ig n
assets  which s tood  a t  a m u l t i p l e  o f  4 .6  t im e s  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  i n  
1969, but on ly  around 1 .6  t imes by 1980, w i t h  t h e  l a r g e s t  d rop  t a k i n g  
p la c e  i n  1976 f rom 3 .6  t im e s  down t o  t w i c e  the amount o f  ou ts tand ing  
fo re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  by the  end o f  t h e  y e a r .  In  1976, we can see from 
Table 4:10 the l a r g e s t  jump i n  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  t o o k  p l a c e ,  
w h i l e  o u r  a n a l y s i s  o f  the de te rm ina t ion  o f  the money supp ly shows t h a t  
in  1976 the drop i n  the bank re s e rv e  r a t i o  i n c lu d in g  net  f o re ig n  assets  
was the la rg e s t  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  t h e  g row th  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y  ( 4 6 ) .  
B o th  t h i s  and t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  b a la n c e s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  banks as a 
p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  th roughout  the pe r io d  
movements i n  f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  r e f l e c t  b o r r o w in g  a c t i v i t y  by t h e  
c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  t o  r e p l e n i s h  t h e i r  l i q u i d  r e s e r v e s .  A c l e a r  
i l l u s t r a t i o n  on t h i s  p o in t  can be seen i n  Graph 4 : 6 . where c la im s o f  the 
commercial banks on the p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  as a p ro p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  assets  
grew, whereas the r a t i o s  o f  t o t a l  depos i ts  and o f  Kuwait i  D inar  dep os i ts  
to  c la ims o f  the commercial banks on th e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  f e l l  between 
1971 and 1980 .  The r e s u l t i n g  f u n d i n g  gap i n  bank balance sheets was 
made up by f o re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s ,  and th e s e  can be seen to  be r i s i n g  over 
the per iod  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  as a p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  L i a b i l i t i e s ,  w i t h ,  
i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  peaks t h a t  are c o i n c id e n t a l  w i th  peaks i n  the t ren d  o f  the 
r a t i o  o f  p r i v a t e  sec to r  to  t o t a l  asse ts .
W h i le  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  dec l ined  as a p ro p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  assets (47) due 
to  r i s i n g  domestic demand f o r  f u n d s ,  f o r e i g n  s ho r t - te rm  placements were 
g radu a l l y  t r a n s fe r r e d  i n t o  Local cur rency l i q u i d  a s s e t s  m a in l y  because  
o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .  The a v o i d a n c e  o f  exchange r i s k  may have been a 
m o t i v a t in g  f a c t o r  i n  b u i l d i n g  up an in v e n to ry  o f  lo c a l  l i q u i d  as s e ts ,  in  
the sense t h a t  the banks wou ld  be s e e k in g  t o  reduce t h e i r  net  f o r e ig n  
asset p o s i t i o n ,  but o u t l e t s  f o r  s h o r t - t e r m  i n v e s tm e n ts  i n  K u w a i t  were 
l i m i t e d  and t h i s  f r u s t r a t e d  any a t t e m p t s  to  p la c e  a large amount o f
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funds  L o c a l l y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  as we s h a l l  see b e lo w ,  t h e  money and 
c a p i t a l  markets i n  Kuwait  exper ienced depressed y i e l d s  r e l a t i v e  to  th e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a rke ts  dur ing  most o f  the pe r io d  under study 
due to the i n t e r e s t  r a te  r e g u le t i o n s ,  and t h i s  discouraged investment o f  
l i q u i d  funds d o m e s t i c a l l y  ( 4 8 ) .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f o re ig n  exchange 
cover a t  the c e n t r a l  bank in  the form o f  an a l b e i t  l i m i t e d  b u t  u s e f u l  
f o r w a r d  exchange merket,  a l lowed a c e r t a in  amount o f  hedging o f  f o re ign  
currency assets to  go on from Late 1977 onwards. As we saw e a r l i e r ,  the 
w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  OBU's to  borrow KDs in  the sho r t - te rm  money market,  p r i o r  
to  the L e g is l a t i o n  o f  1979, a lso  he lped, but on ly  t e m p o r a r i l y .
But,  1n any e v e n t ,  t h e r e  a lways  remained s i z e a b l e  n e t  f o r e i g n  asset 
ho ld ings  in  the commercial  banking system, mo6t o f  wh ich  wou ld  n o t  be 
hedged i n  the fo rward  market.  There e x is ted  a h i s t o r i c a l  pre ference  by 
the commercial banks f o r  keep ing  f o r e i g n  L i q u i d  esse ts ,  because o f  the 
dangers assoc ia ted  w i th  p os s ib le  sudden c a p i t e l  o u t f lo w s  assoc ia ted  w i th  
r i s e s  in  f o re ig n  i n t e r e s t  r a te s .  Th is  p o in t  was d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  Lest 
s e c t i o n  o f  C h a p te r  3 .  However, we discovered th e re ,  t h a t  the c o u n t r y ' s  
f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  demand m u l t i p l i e r ,  o r  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  " P o l a k  
c o e f f i c i e n t " ,  w h ich  g i v e s  us t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  e g i v e n  i n c r e e s e  i n  
d om es t ic  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n  wh ich  we expect to  Leak out  abroad, has not 
been unusua l ly  high  by compar ison w i t h  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  We see, i f  we 
compere f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i n  Graph 4 : 4 . f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  o f  
r e s i d e n t s  w i t h  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  ba n k s  i n  Graph 4 : 5 . and f o r e i g n  
l i a b i l i t i e s  as a p ro p o r t i o n  o f  balance sheet in  Graph 4 ; 6 . t h a t  they a l l  
r i s e  over the same p e r io d s .  I t  would seem th e t  the behev iour  o f  f o re ig n  
assets i s  determined by a c o n s e r v a t i v e  p o l i c y  o f  cove r ing  bank f o re ig n  
exchange exposu re  by m a tc h in g  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  a s s e t s  w i t h  f o r e i g n  
currency l i a b i l i t i e s ,  which i s  W i l s o n 's  argument in  h i s  t h i r d  t e s t  (49 ) .  
However, i f  we Look a t  Tables 4 :5  and 4 :8  we see t h a t  net f o re ig n  assets
a re  much h i g h e r  than  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  dep os i ts  (except  f o r  1980) and 
t h a t  the re  1s no e x p l i c a b le  p a t te rn  to  the r a t i o  between the su rp lus  o f  
f o re ig n  assets over  l i a b i l i t i e s  and the f o re ig n  cur rency depos i t s  o f  the 
commerc ia l  banks .  I f  we I n c l u d e  government  d e p o s i t s  (wh ich  a re  in  
f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y )  w i t h  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  o f  r e s i d e n t s  and 
s u b t ra c t  from net f o re ig n  assets ,  we have a surp lus  o f  between a high  o f  
1 9 2 .9  per  c e n t  (1972)  and a low o f  - 0 . 9  per cent (1980) w i th  a mean o f  
93.29 per cent and a median o f  98.91 p e r  c e n t .  The importance o f  t h i s  
p o in t  becomes c le a r  i f  we say t h a t ,  i f  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  th e  c o m m e rc ia l  
banks i n  Kuwait were t r y i n g  to  avo id  f o re ig n  exchange exposure,  and they 
hed a n e t  f o re ig n  asset p o s i t i o n  o f  cons iderab le  p ro p o r t io n s  th roughout  
the pe r iod  under study (and the re  i s  no c le a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between these 
net f o re ig n  assets  end fo re ig n  cur rency depos i ts  a t  the banks),  then,  as 
we po in ted  out ebove, the n e t u r a l  t h i n g  f o r  the  benks to  do would have 
been to  t r y  and in v e s t  these excess f o re ig n  balances in  Kuwait i  D i n a r s .  
As a c o r o H o r a r y  o f  t h i s ,  we can see the e t t r a c t i o n ,  i n  such a case, o f  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  d e p o s i t i n g  s h o r t - t e r m  L i q u i d  f u n d s  denominated in  
K u w a i t i  D in a r s  w i t h  t h e  B a h r e in i  OBUs t h e t  wou ld  be p a y in g  h i g h e r  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  than those a v a i l a b le  i n  the Kuwait marke tp lace f o r  these 
funds.  Th is  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  a c o m p le t e l y  d i f f e r e n t  answer to  t h a t  o f  
Wi lson, who saw banks as seeking to  place funds sbroad to  avo id  f o r e i g n  
exchange r i s k ,  i s  necessary to  exp la in  the fo re ig n  cur rency balences o f  
the commercial banks.
The swap f a c i l i t i e s  i n s t i t u t e d  by the c e n t r e l  bank i n  1979 were a b e t t e r  
and more c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  a t t e m p t  t o  c r e a t e  f o r w a r d  c o v e r  f o r  th e  
commercial banks than p rev ious  in fo rm a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  p romote  a f o r w a r d  
f o r e i g n  exchange market  from 1977 onwards, which we ment ioned e a r l i e r .  
Th is  seemed, a t  t h e  t i m e ,  t o  answer t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  concern o f  the 
banks .  As we s h a l l  see be lo w ,  however ,  t h e  swap f a c i l i t i e s  we re
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i n f l e x i b l e  end to o  sm e l l  to  make any d i f f e re n c e  to  the problem o f  lack 
o f  forward fo re ig n  exchange c o v e r  ( 5 0 ) .  We s h a l l  see in  Chapter 6 the 
fundamental  na ture  o f  the problem o f  the net f o re ig n  a s s e t  p o s i t i o n  o f  
th e  com m e rc ia l  banks ,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  c e n t r a l  bank cur rency management 
p o l i c y .  An i m p o r t a n t  reason f o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  th e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
Kuwait i  D ina r ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  U.S.  D o l l a r ,  would  seem to  
l i e  i n  th e  c e n t r a l  b a n k s '  i n a b i l i t y  t o  develop a la rge  and e f f i c i e n t  
fo rward market i n  the  K u w a i t i  D i n a r  wh ich wou ld  enable the commercial 
banks to  hedge t h e i r  f o re ig n  cur rency exposure.
The t r a n s f e r  o f  l i q u i d  assets  to  the l o c a l  marke t  wh ich  we can see i n  
T a b le  4 :17  was mainly  the r e s u l t  o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  and developments w i t h i n  
the  c e n t r a l  bank .  The i n t e r e s t  r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  r e s u l t i n g  f rom th e  
p o l i c i e s  o f  the c e n t r a l  bank d id  not represent a s t r u c t u r e  r e n u m e ra t i v e  
enough i n  the con tex t  o f  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  marketplace to  encourage the 
banks to  sw i tch  t h e i r  s h o r t - t e r m  b a la n c e s  t o  the domest ic market.  The 
l i q u i d i t y  r e g u la t io n s  o f  23rd A p r i l ,  1974, demanded t h a t  7.5% o f  L i q u i d  
assets be in  KDs whereas the  law in  March 1978 increased t h a t  p ro p o r t io n  
to  33 1/3% a c le a r  at tempt  to  fo rc e  banks to  swi tch s ho r t - te rm  funds to  
the domestic merket (51 ) .  Between March 1978 and February 1979 much o f  
these KD l i q u i d  assets were he ld  w i th  OBU's i n  B a h r a in ,  bu t  as we saw 
t h i s  L o o p h o le  was d i s c o n t i n u e d  i n  e a r l y  1979.  The na t  f i n a n c i a l  
p o s i t i o n  o f  the commercial banks w i t h  th e  c e n t r a l  bank should have been 
in  su rp lus  by mid-1979, given these l e g i s l a t i v e  developments.  However,  
h ig h  f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s  a t  t h i s  t ime which 
cons iderab ly  reduced t h e  f o r e i g n  and d o m e s t i c  l i q u i d i t y  o f  the banks 
kept them in  o v e r a l l  d e f i c i t  a t  the c e n t r a l  bank (see T a b le  4 : 1 7 ) . We 
saw o v e r  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  n o t  o n l y  a drop in  the bank reserve  
r a t i o  but a lso  a r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  a s s e t s  w i t h in  t h i s  reserve r a t i o  
due to  L e g i s l a t i o n .  As we s h a l l  see i n  t h e  nex t  c h a p te r  t h e  r e s e r v e
r a t i o  always took the  form o f  a l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  and the r8  was no at tempt 
by th e  c e n t r a l  bank t o  e s t a b l i s h  a cash r a t i o  u n t i l  June 1980, s ince 
f a i r l y  adequate cash balances seemed always to  be he ld  by the commercial 
banks. An im po r tan t  aspect o f  t h e  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  these l i q u i d  assets 
and the l e g i s l a t i o n  connected th e re w i th  (we s h a l l  analyse t h i s  in  d e t a i l  
i n  Chapter 5) was the  increased deployment o f  s ho r t - te rm  l i q u i d  funds in  
Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Ku w a i t  b i l l s  ( o r  CBK b i L l s )  -  t h e  f i r s t  a t t e m p t  t o  
c rea te  a neg o t iab le  sho r t - te rm  Kuwait i  D inar  l i q u i d  asse t .
d) Em p i r i ca l  Tests  o f  the R e la t io nsh ip s  between the Foreign Balances 
and Deposi ts  o f  the Commercial Banks and I n t e r e s t  Rates
We pursued  a c e r t a i n  number o f  t e s t s  r e la te d  to  the obse rva t ions  made 
abo ve  b u t  p r i n c i p a l l y  t o  l o o k  a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  
determinan ts  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  a s s e t  h o l d i n g s  o f  th e  commercial  banking 
system. W i lson 's  t h i r d  t e s t  showed f o re ig n  assets n o t  t o  be dependent  
on i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  b u t  on th e  o t h e r  hand to  be h i g h l y  dependent on 
f o r e i g n  l i a b i l i t i e s  and d e p o s i t s  i n  t h a t  o r d e r .  To b e g in  w i t h ,  we 
te s te d  the same express ion t h a t  Wi lson used : -
F = a + bD + cL + d l  
where F = f o re ig n  assets  o f  the banks
D = depos i ts  o f  p r i v a t e  res iden ts  
L = fo re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  the benks 
I  = average o f  dai ly  quo ta t io ns  o f
the three-month London E u ro d o l la r  
i n t e r e s t  r a te .
The r e s u l t  o f  the t e s t  was as f o l l o w s : -
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F = 107.35300 + 0.30062 D + 0.63933 L + 15.77120 I
(31.46730) (0.04170) (0.10990) (3.36877) -  standard errors
( 3.41) (7.21)  (5.82)  (4.68) -  t statistics
R2 = 0 .9 9 1  
N = 3 6  
COND. = 20
whereas  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  was i n d i c a t i v e  o f  high c o r r e l a t i o n
—p
(R = 0 .9 9 1 ) ,  the Durb i  n-Watson s t a t i s t i c  i n d i c a t e d  au to reg ress ion  in  
the  r e s id u a ls  (d = 0 . 9 8 )  s i n c e  i t  was Lower than  th e  Lower c r i t i c a l  
v a l u e  ( d l  = 1.15)  f o r  an equat ion w i th  36 obse rva t ions  and 4 v a r ia b le s .  
The c o n d i t i o n  number (COND.) i n d ic a te d  no m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y .
To repeat  our d e s c r ip t i o n  in  Chap te r  3 o f  the H i Id re th -L u  procedure,  i t  
can be b r i e f l y  descr ibed as t ran s fo rm ing  an equat ion 8S f o l l o w s : -
y = a + bx + a 
to
y ~ p y ^  = a (1 -  p) + b (x  -  p x ^ )  + e* f
i t  t h e n  s e l e c t s  th e  v a lu e  o f  p wh ich  m in im i s e s  th e  sum o f  s q u a re d  
re s id u a ls  in  the t ransformed equa t ion .  Th is  procedure helps to  ob ta in  a 
b e t t e r  f i t  f o r  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n  t o  a l l o w  us t o  t e s t  a g a i n  f o r  
au to re g re s s io n .  The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  Hi I d r e t h - L u  procedure  in  the 
above equat ion led to  a b e t t e r  r e s u l t : -
F = 145.80900 + 0.32752 D + 0.61532 L + 9.49562 I
(41.86260) (0.04336) (0.10327) (3.77484) -  standard e r ro r s
(3.48) (7.55)  (5 .96)  (2.52)  -  t  s t a t i s t i c s
R2 = 0 . 9 9 3
p = 0 .6 0 2 2 9
N = 3 6
COND. = 9.29533
and the  Durbi n-Watson s t a t i s t i c  i n d ic a te d  no a u t o r e g r e s s i o n  (d = 1 . 8 1 )  
being above the upper c r i t i c a l  value (du = 1 .6 3 ) .  Both (D) and (L) were 
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  a l though as we can see (L) had a h igher  c o e f f i c i e n t  va lue .
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But t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  was also s i g n i f i c a n t  (al though on ly  a t  the 99.99 
per cent Level o f  con f idence)  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  resuLt  o f  W i lson 's  t h i r d  
t e s t .  M u L t i c o I l i n e a r i t y  was s t i l l  absent .
No conc lus ions  cou ld  p os s ib ly  be reached w i t h o u t  b r e a k i n g  down thes e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n t o  t h e i r  components .  We can see from Table 4:8  and 
Graph 4 : 5  t h a t  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  o f  r e s i d e n t s  became 
in c r e a s in g ly  im po r tan t ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  a f t e r  1977. In  a d d i t i o n ,  e a r l i e r  
on in  t h i s  chap te r ,  i t  was in d ic a te d  t h a t  t h e  government d i s c o n t i n u e d  
t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  p l a c i n g  K u w a i t i  D in a r  d e p o s i t s  w i t h  th e  commercial  
banks, and t h a t  a f t e r  1972 a L l  government  d e p o s i t s  were i n  f o r e i g n  
cu r rency .  Presumably, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  s h o u ld  be some r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
between f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  d e p o s i t s  as a whole and f o re ig n  asse ts .  We 
te s te d  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i g n o r i n g  c o m p le t e l y  the  K u w a i t i -D ina r  depos i t s  
o f  r e s id e n ts .  We te s te d  the f o l l o w in g  e q u a t i o n : -
F = a + bS + cW + dL + e l  
where F = f o re ig n  assets  o f  the banks
S = f o re ig n  currency depos i ts  o f  res iden ts  
L = fo re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  the banks 
W = government depos i t s  
I  = average o f  dai Ly q u o ta t io ns  o f  the 
three-month London E u rod o l la r  
i n t e r e s t  r a te .
E a r l i e r ,  we s ta ted  t h a t  R.A. Wilson viewed the  Kuwai t i  commercial  banks 
a re  c o n s e r v e t i v e  because h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  apparen t ly  c lose 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between fo re ig n  l i a b i l i t i e s  and fo re ig n  assets  was t h a t  the 
banks wished to  avoid open p o s i t i o n s  ( 5 2 ) .  The large net f o re ig n  asset 
p o s i t i o n s  o f  the banks, however, made t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n t u i t i v e l y
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unappealing to us at first, although it is important to remember t!,e 
fact that a good part of commercial bank deposits are in foreign 
currency. Wilson's remark that the close relationship between (L) and 
(F) is due to the fact that the banks wish not to hold open foreign 
exchange positions, should presumably hold for the portion of (D) which 
is held in foreign currency at the banks and also for government 
deposits which are uniquely in foreign currency, when placed with the 
commercial banks as opposed to the central bank. So this test was 
structured to find out the relationship between foreign currency 
liabilities [not merely foreign liabilities) and foreign assets. It is 
to be noted that both foreign assets and Liabilities of the banks (F and 
L) occasionally do contain Local currency as we have mentioned earlier 
but not amounts that could be considered to be significant. Interest 
rates were also added to the test to see whether their importance would 
vary with the reformulation of the expression. The results of the test 
were:-
F = 279.67000 + 0.65883 S + 0.53598 W + 1.14645 L - 0.66087 I
(55.79020) (0.26148) (0.76431) (0.08167) (5.87978)" standard errors
(5 .0 1 ) (2.52) (0.70) (14.04) (-0 .1 1 ) " t statistics
R2  = 0.985 
N = 36 
COND. = 19
— P
although the correlation coefficient was high (R = 0.983), the 
Durbin-Watson statistic revealed autoregression (d = 1.04] where the 
Durbi n-Watson statistic was lower than its lower critical vaLue (dL =
1.09) for an equation with 36 observations and 5 variables.
The Hi Idreth-Lu procedure was applied, and although the correlation 
coefficient was high and (S) and (L) were significant, the t-statistic 
for the interest rate variable was not significant, while that for (W) 
was marginally significant. Unfortunately, the d-statistic was 
inconclusive (d = 1.46), lying between the Lower and upper critical 
values (dl = 1.09, du = 1.70).
F = 545.27400 + 1 .08582 S + 0.62854 W + 0.59792 L - 5.19941 I
(210.91300) (0.31 971) (0.54905) (0.11849) (5.580 89)- standard errors
(2.59) (3.40) (1.14) (5.05) (-0.93) - t statistics
R2 =0.990
p = 0 . 973 32
N =36
COND. = 2.623
Despite the inconclusive result, the insignificance indicated by the 
t-statistic of (I), induced by the introduction of (S) and (W) into the 
equation prompted us to test further the relationship between interest 
rates and the various components of foreign assets to try and assess 
what possible impact interest rates could have on foreign asset 
holdings. In our tests, it has been made clear that the interest rate 
being included as the explanatory variable in these functions, is the 
eurodollar interest rate and not a differential between foreign and 
domestic interest rates. We shall see below that the reason for this is 
that the true remuneration to depositors 1 n the domestic market has not 
been officially disclosed in any statistics and that even if it were 
tried, certain of the side benefits being offered to depositors are 
unquantifiable. We tested for:- 
B = a + bl 
and X = a + bl 
where B + X = F
and B = balances with foreign banks
X = Investments abroad and advances 
and discounts to non-residents
The correlation coefficient in both cases was poor, which is not 
surprising, given the simplistic nature of the equation, but the
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t-statistic for the variable (I) was significant. We therefore expanded 
the equation as follows:-
B = a + bD + cl 
where B = balances with foreign banks
D = deposits of private residents 
I = average of daily quotations of 
the three-month London 
Eurodollar interest rate 
which led to the following result:-
B = -84.80320 + 0.42884 D +
(27.46120) (0.01571)
(-3.09) (27.30)
R2  =0.982 
d = 1.29 
N =36 
COND. = 7.53
The Durbin-Watson statistic was inconclusive Lying between the lower and 
upper critical values for the d-statistic (dl = 1.20, du = 1.56). The 
HiIdreth-Lu procedure was consequently applied leading to the following 
result:-
B = -69.59570 + 0.43510 D + 15.29490 I
(35.95420) (0.01970) (4.23796) -  standard errors
(-1.94) (22.09) (3.61) -  t statistics
R2  =0.984 
p = 0.34625 




(3.56214) -  standard errors 
(4.92) -  t statistics
2 4 3
The Durbin-Watson statistic (d = 1.67] revealed no autoregression Lying 
between the upper critical value and 4 - du (du = 1 .56 and 4 -  du =
2.44]. There was no evidence of multicollinearity. Interest rates were 
shown to be significant at a high level confidence (99.995 per cent].
But they lost their significance once again, when we introduced (S), (W) 
and (L) into the above expression such that:- 
B = a + bS + cW + dL + el 
where B = balance with foreign banks
S = foreign currency deposits of 
residents with the banks 
W = government deposits 
L = foreign liabilities 
After applying the HiIdreth-Lu procedure to the initial result, the test 
yielded the new result:-
B = 195.23700 + 0.68282 S + 0.60911 W + 0.60524 L + 1.69791 I
(72.83780) (0.27508) (0.50126) (0.13100) (5.43244)- standard errors






The Durbin-Watson statistic revealed no autocorrelation and lay between 
the upper critical value and 4 -  du (du = 1.71 and 4 -  du = 2.29).
There was no evidence of mu Iti co I Linearity. The t-statistics were as 




L = 4.62 
I =0.31
The only variable therefore which had a t-statistic which turned out not 
significant, was the interest rate (I).
Interest rate differentials and interest rate policy seem, from the 
econometric tests carried out here, to influence residents' foreign 
currency deposits with the banking system directly and as we shall see 
below, this is the conclusion reached by the central bank (53). The 
influence of interest rates on government deposits is negligle as these 
deposits depend more on current government project and expenditure 
programmes than anything else. Meanwhile the influence of foreign 
interest rates on foreign Liabilities is indirect. It  takes hold 
through the impact of rises in foreign interest rates on capital 
outflows and the consequent drops in the local currency resources of the 
banks and private sector borrowings which are made for arbitrage reasons 
and used to invest abroad. These influences strain the Liquidity of the 
banks and they are forced to borrow abroad, thereby increasing foreign 
liabilities (54). The significant results in the tests for foreign 
interest rates as a determinant of the level of foreign assets when 
foreign currency deposits were ignored, indicate that they had an
i
indirect influence through the liability structure of the banks, in the 
manner we have indicated above. The fact that interest rates do not 
seem to have a direct impact implies that our earlier view that foreign 
assets cannot be considered as investments that are managed according to 
international rates of return is correct and rather that they simply 
should be regarded as short-term surplus funds held abroad without an 
outlet in the domestic market. We pointed out in Chapter 3 that the 
foreign business of the commercial banks are not dominated by a desire
to build up lending and client relationships abroad but rather by the 
desire to place short-term funds in the international mney markets (55). 
This characteristic of the commercial banks1 foreign assets allowed them 
to be readily run down in the face of rising domestic Loan demand and 
consequent domestic credit expansion.
It  would appear that balances held et foreign banks were held as 
reserves against foreign currency exposure, including that portion of 
resident deposits in foreign currency (S), government deposits (W) and 
foreign liabilities (L). As we sew ebove the results were better for 
(S) (foreign currency deposits] than for (D) (total deposits) when 
tested in the foreign asset demand function because the coefficient for 
(S) was much higher, and substantially higher again than the coefficient 
for (L). This conclusion, however, is erroneous and in general the 
results of the econometric tests on the behaviour of foreign assets need 
to be interpreted in the context of actual experience.
"During 1972 and 1973 the Local banks experienced a 
process of rapid accumulation of surplus funds for 
which adequate local investment outlets were at 
certain stages limited" (56).
I f  we look at Graph 4:2. compared with the situation in 1976, the 
proportion of foreign assets to total assets was very high in 1972. For 
a decade the ratio had been moving between 67 per cent and 78 per cent 
of total assets until 1972 when i t  started to drop sharply. This 
downward trend of the ratio of foreign assets to total assets continued 
until 1 976/7. The only year when a clear rise took place in the period 
1970-80 was in 1978 and this was due to a Large amount of placement of 
short-term Kuwaiti Dinars with OBU's in Bahrain (57).
"One of the major factors encouraging Kuwaiti 
commercial banks to expand these transactions is 
that most of them are expressed in KDs, a fact 
providing these banks with a foreign investment 
field free from exchange risks" (58).
Up unti I early 1979 KD balances with OBU's were calculated among the 
components of liquid assets. As we showed, this was stopped (59). By 
1979 Kuwaiti Dinar balances with foreign banks fell again reducing the 
importance of foreign assets to the same level as in 1977 (see Graph 
4:4).
If  we look at Table 4:6 and in particular Graoh 4:4. we can see that 
although foreign assets declined throughout the period, balances with 
banks remained fairly stable as a percentage of foreign assets although 
in the period of initial local lending growth between 1973-1976 this 
proportion dropped from the mid-70% range to the mid-60% range. Foreign 
liabilities meanwhile, remained comparatively constant (as we can see 
from Graph 4:6) as a proportion of total Liabilities except in the years
of liquidity shortages after 1978 when it rose above its previous peaks.
The central bank appears to show surprise at the fact that the 
commercial banks borrow funds from abroad to replenish their reserves 
when Liquidity is strained, although our econometric tests of this 
relationship below shall show this plainly.
"The rate of growth in foreign liabilities as one of
the commercial banks' resources slowed to 34% in
1980 compared to 41% in the previous year, and was 
pronounced in the liabilities in foreign currencies,
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a fact reflecting to a large extent th(3 banks' 
expanded operations with foreign banks, particularly 
OBU's in Bahrain. Apparently, Kuwaiti banks resort 
to borrowing from foreign markets whenever their 
liquidity is strained" (60).
We tested for the relationship between advances to the private sector 
and foreign borrowing by setting up a funding equation for the banks as 
follows:-
A = a + b(D — S) + cL 
where A = advances by the banks to the private sector 
D = total deposits by residents 
S = foreign currency deposits of residents 
L = foreign liabilities 
The results of the test were as follows:-
A = -185.34200 + 0.74595 (D -  S) + 1.23333 L
(32.68050) (0.06626) (0.13519) - standard errors





The Durbin-Watson statistic  demonstrated the existence of 
autocorrelabion in the residuals and we consequently employed the 
HiIdreth-Lu procedure to reach the following conclusion:-
A = 106.68100 + 0.78573 (D - S) + 0.55385 L
(256.26200) (0.09444) (0.13178) -  standard errors
(0.42) (8.32) (4.20) -  t statistics
R2  = 0.998 N =36
d = 1.84 COND. = 2.0247
p = 0.97049
The Durbin-Watson test showed d Lay between du = 1.56 and 4 - du = 2.44 
and that no autoregression therefore is in evidence. There was no 
evidence of multicollinearity. The t-statistic for both Local currency 
deposits and foreign Liabilities were significant at the 99.995 per cent 
Level of confidence. Clearly foreign liabilities played an important 
role in the funding needs of the banks.
Further tests included all resident depositors as an explanatory 
variable of bank advances to the private sector yielded similar results. 
Clearly if  CD) and (L) were found to be significant explanatory 
variables in both the foreign asset and domestic asset functions, while 
there was a considerable change over time in the relative importance of 
these latter two variables in proportion to total assets, imp Lies that 
the extremely rapid growth of the commercial banks' balance sheet were 
an overriding factor and more important in influencing these results, 
than the changing structure of the balance sheets. We can only appeal 
to close inspection of the graphs and tables to show the nature of the 
relationships, where time series summary results neturally hide the 
short-term changes in the structural relationships. It  is clear that 
whereas foreign assets as a proportion of total assets fell, foreign 
liabilities as a proportion of total liabilities rose slightly on the 
average. This in itself is sufficient for us to doubt the thesis that 
foreign assets were held by the commercial banks as reserves against 
foreign liabilities. Graph 4:6 corresponds to the funding equation 
above, and whereas (L) is no more important an explanatory variable than 
in the foreign asset demand function, we see peaks in foreign
Liabilities as a proportion of total liabilities during periods of high 
domestic credit expansion.
Our thesis therefore stands that foreign assets were "waiting room 
funds" and not protective cover against foreign exchange exposure. 
Before the legislation of the period 1978/9 there was a clear Lack of 
availability of instruments at the short-end of the maturity scale in 
the Kuwaiti financial markets for the development of domestic Liquid 
reserves. The central bank comments on:-
".... the absence of a developed domestic financial 
market with the consequent placement abroad of a 
substantial portion of commercial banks' resources"
(61).
In Chapter 5 we shall discuss the development of interest bearing 
deposits at the central bank and swap arrangements. CBK bills were 
created to replace interest-bearing deposits and to form the basis of a 
future tool of monetary policy but what is clear is that i f  it  was not 
for legislation, commercial banks would not have been attracted to those 
instruments due to the rigid interest rate policy of the central bank.
e) The Impact of Interest Rates on the Banking System
and Developments in the Kuwaiti Interest Rate Regime
Although interest rates can be said not to have been an important factor 
in the movement in foreign assets over time, interest rates and interest 
rate differentials continued to have a sizeable impact on the commercial 
banks' sources of funds as our econometric tests above showed:-
"If it  is to be noted thet deposits of the privste 
sector ere highly vulnerable to developments in 
world money markets. This was clearly shown through 
the currency redistribution (of deposits] following 
the monetary crisis during the fiscal year 1971/2.
There was a continuous shift from deposits in 
foreign currencies to deposits in local currencies"
(62]
Table 4:8 shows the various movements in local and foreign currency 
deposits for the period under study. Also Table 4:16 shows official 
published borrowing and lending rates of the banks. However, as we 
indicated earlier, banks would often remunerate depositors with benefits 
other than the interest rate and wouLd also pay interest above the 
official published rates. For legal reasons, and faced with the legal 
lending rate ceiling, they were unable to disclose such arrangements. 
As a result of this, domestic interest rate data is highly dubious and 
cannot be used in statistical tests. It  is impossible, therefore, to 
include the implicit interest rate in any econometric tests.
Before 1976 interest rates were determined by an interbank agreement and 
both lending and deposit rates were changed according to foreign 
interest rates. In 1 969 savings deposits earned 5% and time deposits 
between 5.5% and 6.5% depending on the maturity of the deposit which 
ranged between 3-12 months (where the minimum size for a time deposit 
was KD 20,000). On 1st January, 1971, the time deposit rate was 
decreased to a range between 5.25% and 6 % and on 1st January, 1972, it 
was decreased again to between 4.25% and 5%. On 1st JuLy, 1972, the 
time deposit minimum amount was reduced to KD 1 ,500 from KD 20,000 and
the Length of maturities extended out to 5 years. The new interest 
rates applicable at this time ranged between 3 5/8% for 3 months and 5 
1/2% for 5 years. On 1st December, 1974, two categories of time 
deposits were created, one between KD 1,500 and KD 100,000 and the other 
over KD 100,000. The new range of interest rates was fixed between 4.5% 
and 6.25% depending both on the maturity and the type of the deposit.
Meanwhile interest rates on savings deposits remained at 5% up until 1st 
February, 1972, and then fell to 4%. On 1st August, 1972, the interest 
rate on savings deposits was reduced to 3.5% then increased again to 4% 
on 1st December, 1974. Interest rates, although agreed upon entirely by 
the commerciel benks without interference, were managed by the 
commercial banks strictly within the context of the 7% legal maximum on 
loan interest. By 1976, the central bank was in control of interest 
rates, however. Under article 166 of the Kuwaiti Commercial Code -  Law 
No.2 of the year 1961 - the maximum contractual interest rate for loans 
was set at 7%. In November 1976 this article was amended by decree No. 
102 of the year such that the 7% ceiling was aboLished and the central 
bank given discretion to set the rate suitable for its monetary policy 
with the approvel of the ministry of finance required in the case of 
each alteration.
As we shall see in Chapter 5 this was part of the central bank's plan to 
reform the money and capital markets together with the reserve and 
liquidity management of banks (63]. The central bank had previously 
seen Local interest rates as too rigid and was dissatisfied because they 
remained within the province of the commercial banks and were not under 
its control. However, despite rises in foreign interest rates in the 
period 1978-80 the central bank did not raise local interest rates. The 
central bank decided on:-
" . . .  maintenance of the local interest rate 
structure, especially as regards the KD Lending 
rates governed by the LegaL ceiling, despite strains 
resulting from the sharp upward trend in 
international interest rates (64).
The strain on liquidity as we can see from Table 4:17. was taken up 
partially by central bank injection of cash. Table 4:16 shows us that 
officially the spreads between borrowing and Lending rates did not 
change for the banks in the period of tight Liquidity although the 
official picture is far from the true picture. What helped the system 
to survive this period in addition to the central bank cash injections 
wss the ability of the commerciel banks to increase the return paid on 
time deposits and perhaps even, as we have seen, to be flexible about 
the nature of deposit thereby meking it even more attractive. Our 
thesis has been that time deposits in Kuwait have been more similar to 
interest bearing current accounts than time deposits in advanced 
financiel systems. Meanwhile, the banks were able to do this because of 
their increesed lending within the context of the stock market credit 
system which efforded extremely high yields as we have seen in the 
section on the stock market.
During the period 1976-80 when foreign essets declined as a proportion 
of total assets, we also saw a rise of a local inter-bank market which 
included the Bahraini OBUs until the Legislation of 1979 came out which 
effectively excluded them from it .  The inter-bank market began after 
the law of 23rd April, 1974, which instituted the first Liquidity 
ratios, and outstanding balances in this market rose from almost nothing 
to KD 748m by the end of 1980 (13.2% of total assets and up from KD 500m
in 1 979 and KD 305m in 1978). Much of the activity of this market was 
with the specialised banks which had borrowing and lending requirements 
with the commercial banks. Investment companies and other financial 
institutions not considered part of the inter-bank market and were 
treated as customers by the banking system. However, some commercial 
banks did meet a proportion of their KD requirements from the inter-bank 
market. The largest amount of funds being supplied in the inter-bank 
market came from the older established banks that had a solid deposit 
base, in particular the National Bank, whereas the newer banks and in 
particular Burgan Bank were usually net borrowers. The newer and 
smaller banks, and this was not Limited to Burgan Bank, but included 
also Al-Ahli and Gulf Bank which had a deposit base, were the most 
hard-hit in periods of strained liquidity due to the necessity of 
tapping the inter-bank market for relatively costly funds. As a result, 
these banks were more prone to entering the stock market credit system 
in order to boost their incomes.
f ) Overview of Commercial Bank Behaviour
It may seem that due to the lack of data the implied rate of interest in 
Kuwait, despite the official data presented in Table 4:16. it would be 
well-nigh impossible to quantify in the context of clealy-defined models 
bank portfolio behaviour 1n Kuwait. This has not been the only 
obstacle. As we saw earlier, the lack of data on the banks' Liquidity 
ratio is another major obstacle which we confronted in chepter 3 and the 
solution to which allowed us to draw more useful conclusions.
We have already seen the Importance of stochastic models in pinpointing 
deficiencies in the type of money supply theory thet indicated that with 
fractional reserve requirements, the commercial banking system would
expand its deposit liabilities by some multiple of an initial increase 
in the level of reserves. However, this assumes that the bank reserve 
ratio remains stable. We can see from Graph 3:3 that the bank reserve 
ratio, in our adjusted form, is far from stable. In fact in the period 
before 1972 it was sometimes over 1.0, which would imply e fractional 
contraction rather than multiplication of deposits in those few ceses. 
After 1972 the bank reserve ratio fell drastically. The stochastic 
models we discussed in the introduction of this chapter allowed for 
drains of reserves into desired excess reserves and additions to 
reserves through bank borrowing from the central bank. After 1978, this 
would be applicable in the case of Kuwait, however, prior to 1978 our 
analysis has indicated that the bank reserve ratio was determined by 
domestic credit expansion and not central bank legislation or desired 
excess reserves.
A related point to this discussion of the bank reserve ratio is the 
question of the commercial banks' foreign liabilities. At first sight 
it would seem strange that a banking system with a high level of foreign 
assets should borrow abroad rather than convert foreign into domestic 
assets when necessary. There are three separate reasons for this 
behavioural pattern observed in the period under study:-
1] Foreign assets as we have indicated in chapter 3 act as Liquid 
reserves to the banking system. We can see from Graph 4:3 that 
they have declined considerably since 1972. In Graph 4:6 we can 
see that foreign liabilities as a proportion of total Liabilities 
have risen. In this sense foreign LiebiLities are used, and 
having increasingly been used since 1 978, as a method of 
replacing reserves. In the U.S. the federal funds acts as a
Lender and borrower of excess reserves between the banks, and
using this as an analogy of the behaviour banks in the market for 
foreign bank borrowing would not be out of place.
2) In chapter 5 the short-term nature of deposits with the Local 
commercial banks in Kuwait is discussed. The average of the 
Kuwaiti banks' liabilities is extremely short despite the rather 
high apparent Level of time and savings deposits. Most 
"quasi-money" is made up of time deposits with extremely short 
maturities. It  could be that in certain instances, even if  
Kuwaiti commercial banks were not in need of replenishing Liquid 
reserves, they would borrow funds from the Bahrain or London 
inter-bank markets for maturities up to one year, to improve the 
average life of their liabilities. To liquidate short-term 
foreign assets to make medium-term domestic loans would worsen an 
already precarious transformation ratio in the Kuwaiti banking 
system.
3) To some extent aLso, foreign liabilities would be incurred as 
opposed to foreign assets being liquidated, if the loan envisaged 
by a particular bank at a particular juncture were to be 
disbursed in a currency which that bank was short of to the 
extent that a certain amount of foreign exchange expense 
minimization might have taken place, it  would also affect the 
need for the banking system to incur foreign liabilities.
In discussing the Friedman and Schwartz models 1n chapter 3 we saw that 
even in developed economies there are expectational factors at work in 
certain periods which make the predictive ability of well-defined models 
of bank behaviour unsatisfactory. In section (vi] we shall discuss the 
role of the commercial banks in the U.S. in the stock market crash of
1982 and the ensuing depression. It 1s clear from that section that the 
bank reserve ratio 1n the U.S. depends on the public preference for 
holding cash and that when a crisis of confidence occurs these two 
behavioural functions feed on each other to create massive contractions 
in money supply, without the interference of the monetary authorities. 
The central role of the stock market in domestic credit expansion in 
Kuwait will require that we look closely at a comparison with a, prima 
facie, similar experience in the monetary history of the U.S.
v) THE STOCK MARKET
Some introductory points on the stock market have already been discussed 
in Chapter 1. We pointed out in that chapter, that the stock market had 
been actively encouraged by the government since the early days of its 
history (during the period 1961-1979), and that it  had been used as a 
mechanism for the transfer of wealth to the private sector to promote 
local industry and to help to reduce or perhaps even reverse the outflow 
of private wealth which was, as the World Bank commented, the inevitable 
result of the land acquisition programme (65). We also quoted studies 
describing the nature of market imperfection. The average investor 
could "consistently beat the market" on the stock exchange in Kuwait. 
This so-called inefficiency was clear at the expense of the government 
which intervened to support the market on occasions while pursuing a 
policy of investment in certain sectors of the market 1n any case. The 
result was an effective method of redistributing wealth to the private 
sector which either sold on shares to the government fairLy expensively 
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CAPITALIZATION OF THE KUWAITI COMMERCIAL BANKS
ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE 1973-B 
(KD millions as of 31st December)
Bank 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978*
N8KmOKfl1 .
1 0 1  . 0 93.5 105.0 429.9 179.68 280.9
34.2 33.6 53.7 156.8 155.9 237.8
GULF 1 29.3 26.6 47.0 101 .4 89.7 154.3
AHU 17.8 15.6 22.5 66.5 71.4 151 .2
BKME ] 11 . 8 1 0 . 6 28.4 6 8 . 0 78.4 1 1 2 . 8
KREB
BURGAN* 1 H2)
19.5 15.7 23.0 57.5 51 .3 81 .9
97.3
(A)TOTAL MARKET






91 .0 63.8 89.2 197.4 218.4
RATIO OF A TO B 4.69 3.83 2.81 7.62 3.17 5.10
Source : Ministry of Commerce, Kuwait, and Table 4:13
(1) For definitions of these abreviations see Table 4:1 under
caption "Kuwait Commercial Banks".
(2) Burgan Bank although founded in 1976 was not listed, as
required by law, until 1978.
(3) These figures are for end-August 1978.



























































































































































































































































































































TABLE 4 : 1 6
WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF PUBLISHED INTEREST RATES PAID 
ON DEPOSITS* AND CHARGED ON DISCOUNTS AND ADVANCES 
TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1971-79
(Percentages)
YEAR TIME AND SAVINGS DEPOSITS ADVANCES AND DISCOUNTS
1971 5.5 7.5
1972 3.9 6 . 6
1973 3.8 6 . 6
1974 4.9 6 . 8
1975 5.2 7.0
1976 5.6 7.2
1977 6.4 8 . 0
1978 6 . 0 8 . 0
1979 7.9 9.5
Source : Central Bank of Kuwait
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a) The H isto ry  o f  Government In te r v e n t io n  in the Stock Market
Public flotations of new issues for companies began with the National 
Bank of Kuwait In 1 952 (see Table 4:131 and was followed by the 
flotation much Later of new issues for the Commercial Bank and the Gulf 
Bank in 1960, and the Al-Ahli Bank in 1961. But, trading in the 
outstanding shares in the market was Limited until the 1970's, while, as 
we indicated in Chapter 1, no official records of trading exist before 
1973.
The all-share Index can be traced from 1973 onwards as we can see in 
Table 4:15 and in Graph 4:7. Thera follows a brief history of 
development in the Kuwait stock market which will enable us to 
substantiate the broad statements we made so far about this market, in 
particular, relating to the phenomenon of government support. The first 
bull market occurred in 1973, but the market at the time was still in 
its infancy and the first major bull market developed in 1 976. The 
market leaders during this period of rising stock prices were the three 
main Local property companies, followed by the Insurance and investment 
companies, all of whom owned substantial real estate developments in 
which they made most of their profits. Banks and Industrial companies 
Lagged the rest of the market in the 1976 bull market. Much of the 
liquidity available for investment by the private sector in stocks 
during this period originated from the cash compensations paid to 
investors after the nationalisation of the Kuwait National Petroleum 
Company (KNPC) which was acquired by the government in Late 1975 at the 
going market price. This was a clear case of government stock purchases 
in the open market. An important feature of the latter part of the 
stock market during 1976 was the growing number of forward transactions
which we discussed in Chapter 3 and which we had noted then had had an 
impact on the number of cheques cleared in the banking system. Forward 
transactions tended to be effected for settlement within 6 - 1 2  months 
from the transaction date at a 25 per cent per annum premium over the 
spot price per share. The all-share index rose by 133 per cent between 
January and November 1976 on a turnover volume of around KD 950 million.
Company results announced early in 1977, however, generally fell short 
of market expectations. One of the property companies in particular, 
United Real Estate, ran into trouble. At the same time all the major 
banks proposed to do rights issues totalling KD 84 million to increase 
their capital base. The result of all these and other developments was 
a marked weakness 1n the market throughout 1977. In September 1977 
there was a brief rally in the prices of shares, at the time when the 
government allotted shares 1n the newly formed United Arab Shipping 
Company (UASC) to the former shareholders of Kuwait Shipping Company 
which had been taken over by UASC. The take-over had initially 
increased liquidity in the hands of the investing community. By this 
time, however, the full effect of the forward deals entered into during 
1976 began to be felt. Most forward stock purchases had been transacted 
at premia of around 25 per cent over the prices ruling in the period 
October/November 1976. A year Later the all-share index had fallen by 
20 per cent. There ensued a number of bankruptcies among investors 
which followed quickly after the presentation for payment of the 
post-dated cheques used to effect those forward transactions.
The clearest case of government support occurred during the stock market 
slump of 1977-78. Although the government affected the market 
previously, as we saw in the case of the KNPC take-over for instance, no 
previous overt and general price support scheme had been set up in the
stock market after a period of declining prices. By late 1977 pressure 
on the government from the merchant families grew, and strong 
representations for official support in the stock market were made. 
Both the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank at the 
time held that 1 t was not their business to rescue speculators from the 
consequences of their own folly. Nevertheless, it was decided by the 
cabinet of ministers that some action must be taken to help the stock 
market, and accordingly a price support scheme was established which set 
a floor price for each share at which the government brokers, Kuwait 
Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company (KFTCIC) would be 
prepared to buy those shares. The immediate result of these measures 
was an upturn 1n the Last week of 1977. In all, the government 
disbursed KD 150 million during the four months the fund was operating, 
two-thirds of which went on the purchase of shares in just four 
companies - United Real Estate, Gulf Insurance, NationaL Automotive and 
Livestock Trading.
Further measures were taken by the market-place to promote a recovery in 
stock prices. Several of the major Listed companies, and primarily the 
banks (whose shares stood at very high unit prices) voted to split their 
shares to a nominal value of KD 1 in March 1978, so multiplying the 
number of outstanding shares in the case of each company by a factor of 
seven and a half to ten times, depending on the company in question. 
The government's vacillation in giving its approval for tha stock splits 
took some of the potential speculative steam out of the market in the 
period March-Apri I 1978. By summer, however, after the government had 
finally conceded, a bull market was under way again, Lead this time by 
the bank shares. Marketability had improved markedLy after the stock 
splits. In Graph 4:7. we can see the turnaround in the stock market 

































































government support and the stock s p l i t s  to  br ing I t  about.
By mid-1979, with the passing of the Bahrain offshore ordinance for 
investment companies, a rash of new investment companies were formed in 
Bahrain by Kuwaiti entrepreneurs frustrated with the ministry of 
commerce restriction on the flotation of new companies. Although 
initially, these new flotations temporarily drained liquidity from the 
local market, the eventual effect was the reverse, as most of these new 
companies were re-investing on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. However the 
stock market all-share index dropped between the third quarter of 1979 
and the second quarter of 1980, clearly 1n reaction to international 
Interest rates. In May 1980 the government announced that it proposed 
to buy out the private shareholders in Kuwait Transport Company [the 
municipal bus company) and UASC, adding approximately KD 50 million of 
liquidity into the market. Although the market rose slightly after 
this, it continued to be under pressure throughout 1980 due to the 
growing political problems 1n the Gulf area. Additional negative 
factors at this time include U.S. interest rates turning up again, and 
the government announcing the flotation of the PetroLeum Investment 
Company, which flotation withdrew KD 30 million of liquidity from the 
market.
b) The Nature of Dealing on the Stock Market and its imoact on the 
Monetary Process
It is important to note when following this brief history of the stock 
market on Graph 4:7. that because the system of deaLIng only records a 
price change when a deal actually takes place, there being no continuous 
quotation systems as, for instance, in the New York and London Stock 
Exchanges, the movement of the all-share index probably understated the
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true extent of every downturn over the period under study. The 
performance of prices in the stock market is highly volatiLe in periods 
of rising prices, whereas during a slump in the market very little 
activity takes place, which means that, since only prices actually 
transacted are recorded, the market seems to reach a "plateau" in bad 
times rather than fall drastically. Actual declines in the market are 
short-lived except for the decline in 1982/3 which occurs after the 
period under study.
In the Kuwait stock market no one usually buys shares for their dividend 
yield. Share prices are extremely high whether measured in terms of 
yield percentages, price-earnings ratios or net asset values. In 1980, 
for example, the major bank shares stood at price levels with dividend 
yields generally less than 1% and in some particular cases less than 0.5 
per cent. Price/earnings ratios in the bank sector in 1980 ranged from 
50 to over 100 and almost all the sheres had prices standing at five and 
a half to six times net book value per share (based on 1980 results). 
Some of the newer industrial companies who had as yet made no profits 
and had no assets, other than shareholders' equity in the form of cash, 
could have stock prices standing at over twice the net asset velue. 
Profits in such a market environment clearly came chiefly from capital 
gains and not dividend income. The trading nature of the Kuwaiti stock 
market had important repercussions on the nature of the monetary 
process. In Tab le 4:4 we can see a high Level of quasi-money, 
proportionately to M2. This feature could have been used in section 
(ii) of this Chapter as an argument in defence of the argument favouring 
the advanced nature of the Kuwaiti banking system. But our findings in 
Chapter 3 regarding the correlation between the turnover in cheuqes 
cleared and the turnover in volume of shares traded in the stock market, 
Led us to a different interpretation (6 6 ). It  would seem that time
deposits were not funds invested with banks for long periods, but what 
we called "waiting-room" funds, awaiting use in the stock market, and 
against which the customer could borrow, should funds ever be needed at 
short notice. The very short maturities on time deposits which have 
worried the central bank throughout the period under study, are further 
confirmation of this point of view. A different approach supporting the 
argument that the Kuwaiti financial system as a whole is advanced, 
because perhaps of the bias in the money stock away from cash,because 
also of the high level of quasi-money, and not Least because of 
obviously important securities markets, would not agree with the results 
of Crockett and Evans in their study of demand for money in the 
Middle-East (67). Their findings show such a high elasticity of demand 
for money that the existence of fully-fledged securities markets as an 
alternative financial asset to money, would seem to be impossible. The 
only satisfactory conclusion to the diLemmas facing us here, therefore, 
is precisely that which comes out of our analysis in Chapter 3, namely 
that the growth in the stock of money must be complementary to the 
growth of the domestic stock market.
We have seen before, for instance in the use of post-dated cheques, that 
the small size of the investing community Lent certain characterisitcs 
to commercial dealings. The system of dealing itself in the stock 
market is one of direct client-to-client dealing which is possible 
because of the small number of people involved. There is no obligation 
on a trader to employ a broker when dealing. It is relatively easy for 
a trader to find a buyer or a seller of a particular stock from among 
his own acquaintances, but even in the many cases where the client does 
employ a broker to find a counterparty, the final contract is still 
regarded as being a direct contract between the two clients of the 
broker. Either party has the right to refuse to consummate the deal
when he eventually learns of his counterparty's identity. As a result 
of this custom, the broker usually accepts no responsibility for the 
settlement of the transaction, unlike practice in all other stock 
exchanges in the world. Once the deal is agreed, the seller takes his 
share certificate and the broker's contract note to the company 
registrar from whom he obtains a receipt. He then presents this to the 
buyer against payment by cheque. The buyer then takes his copy of the 
contract with the receipt, to the company and receives a temporary note 
of t it le , pending issue of the formal share certificate. In active 
markets, many deals are completed on the basis of these temporary 
documents, as the buyer wishes to re-sell before registration is 
complete. In fact, we pointed out in Chapter 1 that since a great deal 
of trading did take place on the basis of temporary notes of title, 
accurate data on daily stock market transactions was almost impossible 
for the Ministry of Commerce to achieve.
In addition to these normal deals done for cash settlement, as we have 
seen earlier forward transactions became increasingly popular with time. 
Forward transactions have had a considerable impact on the performance 
of the stock market, on loan demand, and on the banking system in 
general as we have seen throughout Chapters 3 and 4. This form of 
dealing started during the 1976 boom in the stock market, in spite of 
the fact that, at that time, such deals were officially illegal and the 
resulting contrects therefore unenforceable in Law. The basic procedure 
foLLowed in this form of dealing was that two dealers agreed a price 
(normally a premium over the current market price) and a delivery date. 
The usual premium was about 25 per cent per annum, until 1979 when such 
premia rose to over 100 per cent. A premium of this nature is an 
implicit interest rate and as we saw earlier in this chapter the 
commercial banking system did participate in the stock market credit
s y s t e m ,  w h ic h  was based on p o s t - d a t e d  cheques,  as w e l l  as mak ing 
persona l  loans t o  members o f  t h e  la r g e  merchan t  f a m i l i e s  a l l  o f  whom
were i n v o l v e d  as t r a d e r s  i n  t h e  s t o c k  m a rk e t .  In  TabLe 4 : 1 0 . f o r
in s ta n c e ,  we saw t h a t  the f a s t e r  growing areas o f  lend ing were f i n a n c i a l  
and o t h e r  se rv ic e s  and personal  loans e s p e c ia l l y  between 1974-1976. I t  
1s d i f f i c u l t  to  es t im ate  what p r o p o r t i o n  o f  those loans were discounted 
pos t -da ted  cheques, but whatever the p r o p o r t i o n ,  1t  i s  obv ious t h a t  t h e  
y i e l d s  a f fo rd e d  by t h i s  a c t i v i t y  f a r  o u t s t r i p p e d  the pub l ished  i n t e r e s t  
ra te s  f o r  advances and d i s c o u n t s  l i s t e d  i n  T a b le  4 : 1 6 . The procedure 
f o r  se t t lem en t  o f  such a forward deal  was t h a t  the s e l l e r  should d e l i v e r  
the shares a t  once and r e c e i v e  i n  r e t u r n  a p o s t - d a t e d  cheque.  T h i s  
p r o c e d u r e  was c us tom ary  because a v a l i d  a c t i o n  c o u ld  a c t u a l l y  be 
brought  a g a in s t  t h e  p u r c h a s e r  i f  h i s  cheque was n o t  honoured by h i s  
bank, whereas the und e r ly in g  forward c o n t ra c t  was unenfo rceab le  i n  law .  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t h e r e  was t h e  p rob lem  t h a t  K u w a i t i  b a n k in g  law d i d  not 
recogn ize the p o s t - d a t i n g  o f  cheques,  and th e  s e l l e r  cou ld  t h e r e fo re
e f f e c t i v e l y  request payment a t  any t ime dur ing  the  l i f e  o f  t h e  f o r w a r d
c o n t r a c t .  T h i s  b a s i c  a s y m m e t r y  b e tw e e n  t h e  l e g a l  b a s i s  o f  t h e  
components o f  these t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  led  t o  t h e  ra th e r  c u r iou s  se t t lem en t  
procedure o f  d e l i v e r i n g  shares immedia te ly  on a f o r w a r d  c o n t r a c t .  I n  
t u r n  t h i s  s e t t l e m e n t  procedure was a t  the bottom o f  the i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  s t o c k  m arke t  end l e d  t o  s p e c u l a t i v e  e x c e s s e s  and u n p le a s a n t  
consequences. E a r l y  i n  1977 ,  a f t e r  t h e  p rob lem s  o f  f o r w a r d  d e a l i n g  
became a p p a r e n t ,  an a t t e m p t  was made by th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce t o  
impose a r e g u l a t e d  system o f  f o r w a r d  d e a l i n g  where t h e  buye r  was 
requ i re d  to  pay over  the premium element a t  once but the balance o n ly  on 
m a t u r i t y .  In  a d d i t i o n  i t  was thought  t h a t  he cou ld  not expect d e l i v e r y  
o f  sha res  u n t i l  payment was c o m p le te .  T h i s  sys tem was c lose to  the 
system o f  op t io n  d e a l i n g  used on t h e  London S to c k  Exchange but lacked 
the e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e ,  t o  make such a pu rchase  a t t r a c t i v e ,  t h a t  t h e
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buy e r  can w i t h d r a w  a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  Losing h is  premium. I t  was he ld  by 
the Lawyers o f  the M in i s t r y  o f  Commerce t h a t  such a fe a tu re  wouLd be in  
v io L a t io n  o f  the p r o h i b i t i o n  to  engage i n  t r a n s a c t i o n s  o f  pu re  chance 
under  I s L e m ic  Law. The Longest  term t h a t  wouLd be pe rm i t te d  f o r  such 
c o n t ra c ts  was f o r  tweLve months ,  and deaLs done under  t h i s  o f f i c i a L  
procedure were to  be recorded and enforced a t  Law. The procedure worked 
f o r  a s h o r t  p e r i o d ,  b u t  by 1979 t h e  m a rke t  found  t h e  oLd s t y L e  o f  
fo rward deaLing more a t t r a c t i v e .
c ]  The Offshore  Companies
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  s tock  market ,  a paraLLeL or  u n o f f l c l a L  s tock  market 
was s ta r t e d  f o r  overseas companies d o m ic iL e d  in  GuLf s t a te s  o th e r  than 
Kuwait ,  tweLve o f  which were formed between 1977 and 1980 and many more 
a f t e r  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y .  The c a p i t a L  o f  t h e s e  companies was 
actuaLLy owned LargeLy i f  n o t  whoLLy by K u w a i t i s ;  and t h e  growth o f  
these overseas (or  o f f s h o re ]  companies became an ex t remeLy  im p o r t a n t  
f e a t u r e  o f  the s tock  market i n  i t s  L a t te r  stages.  The e a rL le r  overseas 
companies were e s tabL is hed  i n  t h e  smaLLer member s ta te s  o f  the Un i ted 
Arab Emira tes.  More recentLy however, s ince  the passing o f  th e  B a h ra in  
O f f s h o r e  O r d i n a n c e  f o r  i n v e s tm e n t  compan ies ,  t h e y  were fo rmed i n  
Bahra in .  The f i r s t  ov e rs e a s  company was th e  Sha r jah  Group and a good 
deal o f  con t roversy  surrounded t h i s  share is sue .  When t h e  L icence  was 
g r a n te d  f o r  t h e  f L o t a t i o n  o f  the  Shar jah Group, i t  was assumed by the 
a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  t h i s  wouLd be on t h e  normaL b a s i s  t h a t  a p p l i e d  to  
Kuwait i  p u b l i c  companies. Th is  meant t h a t  no t r a d i n g  c o u ld  t a k e  p l a c e  
i n  t h e  sha res  o f  t h e  company u n t i l  the f i r s t  annual accounts had been 
pub l i shed and, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  f o u n d e rs  shou ld  make no a t tempt  t o  
s e l l  t h e i r  own shares u n t i l  t h r e e  y e a rs  had e lapsed  f rom  th e  i n i t i a l  
i s s u e  da te  ( t h i s  be ing a p r o v is i o n  o f  Kuwait i  Law s p e c i f i c a l l y  designed
t*
t o  preven t the Launching o f  'bubbLe '  o p e r a t i o n s ] .  As soon as i t  became 
ev iden t  t h a t  the Shar jah issue  had been a suc c es s ,  t h e  f o u n d e rs  soLd 
t h e i r  sha res  a t  once ,  c L a im in g  t h a t  K u w a i t i  Law d id  not appLy in  the 
case o f  a f o r e i g n - r e g i s t e r e d  o p e ra t io n .  The Kuwait i  a u t h o r i t i e s  reacted 
immediateLy by th e  o u t r i g h t  ban n in g  secondary  m arke t  t r a d i n g  i n  the 
shares,  and t h i s  ban was automat icaLLy ex tended  t o  aLL o t h e r  o f f s h i  re 
companies t h a t  foLLowed.  L i k e  t h e  ban on f o r w a r d  deaLings, i t  was 
aLmost universaLLy i g n o r e d ,  how ever .  I n  1 979, an a t tempt  was mada by 
the a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  make t h e i r  ban more e f f e c t i v e  by o rd e r in g  the  cLosure 
o f  the r e g i s t r a r ' s  o f f i c e s  in  Kuwait so t h a t  no t r a n s f e r s  o f  t i t L e  could 
take p lace .  W i th in  a week r e g i s t r a t i o n  was being a r ra n g e d  by t e l e x  a t  
t h e  v a r i o u s  com pan ies '  head o f f i c e s  and th e  u n o f f i c i a l  m a rke t  was 
f l o u r i s h i n g  aga in .
The i n i t i a l  im p e tu s  f o r  t h e  r a p i d  g r o w t h  i n  t h e  numbers o f  th e s e  
o f f s h o re  companies was the 1977 embargo on t h e  f l o t a t i o n  o f  any more 
K u w a i t i  companies and t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  s t r i c t u r e s  o f  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  
Commerce i n  r e g a r d  t o  p u b l i c  f l o t a t i o n s .  W h i le  t h i s  embargo Lasted 
Kuwai t i  en t repreneurs  w ish ing  t o  e s ta b l i s h  new companies had p e f o r c e  t o  
lo ok  o f f s h o r e .  The a t t r a c t i o n  o f  the o f fs h o re  companies to  Kuwait  was 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  avo id ing  b u re a u c ra t i c  c o n t r o l s  imposed by the Kuwai t i  
a u t h o r i t i e s  on l o c a l  c o m p a n i e s .  U n de r  t h e  Law, any change t o  a 
company's a r t i c l e s ,  i n c lu d in g  an inc rease o f  c a p i t a l ,  must be sanct ioned 
by the a u t h o r i t i e s  be fore  becoming e f f e c t i v e .  In  1978,  t h i s  power was 
used t o  f o r c e  amendments t o  t h e  te rm s  o f  proposed r i g h t s  issues even 
a f t e r  they have been passed a t  s h a r e h o I d e r s ' s m ee t ings .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  
under Kuwait i  company law the o b je c t i v e s  o f  a company must be n a r r o w l y  
drawn-up i n  i t s  c h a r t e r ,  and a r e ,  i n  case o f  a r b i t r a t i o n s ,  nar row ly  
i n te r p r e t e d  by the c o u r t s .  An o f f s h o re  company i s  f r e e  by d e f i n i t i o n  to  
d is regard  these r e s t r i c t i o n s .
In  1980, the government acted t o  t r y  t o  reso lve  the anomalous s i t u a t i o n  
c reated the ex is tence  o f  unrecognised companies by I s s u i n g  g u i d e l i n e s  
f o r  o v e r s e a s  c o m p a n ie s  w h ic h  d e s i r e d  o f f i c i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n .  The 
g u id e l in e s  set by the M in i s t r y  o f  Commerce were, b road ly  speaking,  t h a t  
the company must be e x i s t e n c e  f o r  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  t h a t  i t  must have a 
c a p i t a l  o f  n o t  le s s  than KD 5 m i l l i o n ,  and t h a t  a l l  the shares must be 
owned by c i t i z e n s  o f  G u l f  s ta te s  (and a h a l f  o f  the shares by K u w a i t i s ) .  
In a d d i t i o n ,  the o b je c t i v e s  o f  th e  company must have been c l e a r l y  drawn 
up in  the company's c h a r t e r  w h i le  management must be a b le  t o  show t h a t  
t h e  company had c o n s i s t e n t l y  made a p r o f i t  equal to  not less  than ten 
per cent o f  i t s  c a p i t a l ,  on a c t i v i t i e s  wh ich  f e l l  s t r i c t l y  w i t h in  the 
a c t i v i t i e s  so de f ined .  The th re e -y e a r  r u le  alone im m e d ia te l y  e x c lu d e d  
a l l  b u t  h a l f - a - d o z e n  o f  t h e  o v e r s e a s  c o m p a n ie s  f ro m  im m ed ia te  
c ons ide ra t ion  and the re q u i re m e n t  o f  a p r o f i t  h i s t o r y  excluded most o f  
them. The f i r s t  two overseas companies, one based i n  Ajman and one i n  
S h a r j a h ,  were a d m i t t e d  t o  o f f i c i a l  t r a d in g  in  March, 1981. Meanwhile 
u n o f f i c i a l  t r a d in g  i n  what became known as th e  "Manakh" market ,  a f t e r  
th e  s i t e  where o f f s h o r e  companies s h a r e s  we re  t r a d e d ,  c o n t i n u e d  
u n a ba ted .  A l t h o u g h  some banks t r i e d  to  d i s c r im in a te  in  t h e i r  lend ing  
dec is ions  between loans o r  d i s c o u n t e d  cheques r e l a t e d  to  the o f f i c i a l  
s tock  exchange, and those r e la te d  to  the "Manakh" o r  u n o f f i c i a l  s t o c k  
m a rk e t ,  on the bas is  t h a t  the l a t t e r  was more s p e c u la t i v e ,  o v e r a l l  bank 
loans and d iscounts  r e la t e d  t o  a l l  s t o c k  marke t  t r a n s a c t i o n s  cont inued 
to  grow throughout  the pe r iod  under s tudy .
v i )  BANK LENDING FOR STOCK PURCHASES -  COMPARISONS WITH THE U.S.
EXPERIENCE IN 1929
The most w ide ly  researched h i s t o r y  o f  commercial banks invo lved  w i th  the 
s tock market must be th e  p e r i o d  1920 -1934  i n  t h e  U.S .  T h i s  s e c t i o n
a t t e m p t s  t o  a n a ly z e  i n  what way the s i t u a t i o n  in  Kuwait resembled t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  p a i n f u l  e x p e r i e n c e  i n  t h e  economic h i s t o r y  o f  the U.S. 
Subsequent to  the end o f  the p e r i o d  under  s t u d y ,  t h e  s t o c k  m arke t  i n  
K u w a i t  s u f f e r e d  a c o l la p s e  almost as p a i n f u l  as t h a t  exper ienced in  the 
U .S . ,  a l t h o u g h  what  r e a l l y  i n t e r e s t s  us a re  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t h e  e n v i ro n m e n t  i n  b o t h  c o u n t r i e s  i n  t h e s e  two  
d i f f e r e n t  per iods  and the consequent d i f f e re n c e s  in  the reasons f o r  the 
occurence o f  s p e c u la t i v e  exceses in  the f i r s t  p lace .
F r iedman and S c h w a r tz  comment on t h e  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d  l e v e l  o f  
investments  o f  the commercial banks i n  the U.S. between 1922 and 1929,  
w h ich  r e p r e s e n t e d ,  on a v e ra g e ,  40 pe r  c e n t  o f  t h e i r  Loans over t h i s  
pe r iod  as opposed t o  on ly  29 per cent i n  1920.
'The h ighe r  l e v e l  o f  i n v e s tm e n ts  may have r e f l e c t e d  
p a r t l y  the ope ra t ions  o f  s e c u r i t y  u n d e r w r i t i n g  and 
d i s t r i b u t i n g  companies t h a t  were then  a f f i l i a t e d  
w i t h  c o m m e r c i a l  b a n k s  . . . . .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  
combining the f u n c t i o n  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
w i t h  t h a t  o f  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n ,  com m erc ia l  banks 
i n t e n s i f i e d  t h e i r  e x e r c i s e  o f  f i d u c i a r y  f u n c t io n s  
a f t e r  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  A c t  and a w a r t i m e  
amendment recogn ised the r i g h t  o f  n a t io n a l  banks to  
engage in  any k ind  o f  t r u s t  f u n c t i o n . "  (68)
The main fea tu res  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t y  in  t h i s  p e r io d ,  which cu lm inated 
i n  a m a jo r  s t o c k  m a rke t  boom i n  1 9 2 8 / 9 ,  a c c o r d i n g  to  Fr iedman and 
Schwartz,  were the p u b l i c  f l o t a t i o n  o f  f o re ig n  s e c u r i t i e s  and a s h i f t  by 
domest ic e n t e r p r i s e s  f rom  b o r r o w in g  by means o f  bank lo a n s ,  t o  t h e  
p u b l i c  i s s u e  o f  bonds and s tocks as a means o f  r a i s i n g  funds.  Th is  was
p a r t i a l l y  due t o  th e  r e l u c t a n c e  o f  b u s in e s s e s  to  become indeb ted  to 
banks, a f t e r  t h e i r  exper ience o f  loan l i q u i d a t i o n  in  1920-21.
Given the d i s a s t ro u s  co l lapse  o f  the s tock  market from 1929 to  1933, the 
investment  e v a lua t io ns  o f  banks must be considered t o  have been u n d u ly  
o p t i m i s t i c .  However,  Fr iedman and Schwar tz  t a k e  t h e  v iew  t h a t  the 
c o l la p s e  cou ld  have been g r e a t l y  moderated i f  t h e  Federal  Reserve had 
pursued d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c i e s  and, i f  such p o l i c i e s  had been f o l l o w e d ,  
i n v e s t i n g  banks m ig h t  w e l l  have been j u s t i f i e d  i n  t h e i r  assessment o f  
the  market p r i o r  to  1929. Friedman and Schwartz s t re s s  two major p o in t s  
i n  t h i s  respec t .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  s t o c k  m arke t  c rash  i t s e l f  deepened the  
u n d e r l y i n g  enconomic c o n t r a c t i o n  t h a t  was t a k i n g  p l a c e .  S e c o n d l y ,  
how eve r ,  t h e  c ra s h  i t s e l f  was more d i r e c t l y  a cause o f  the banking and 
l i q u i d i t y  c r i s i s  ra th e r  than  a cause o f  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n .  The l i q u i d i t y  
c r i s i s  i t s e l f ,  t h e y  m a i n t a i n ,  was u l t i m a t e l y  due t o  i n e p t  mone ta ry  
p o l i c y .
"W ha teve r  i t s  m a g n i tu d e ,  th e  downward pressure on 
income produced by th e  e f f e c t s  o f  the  s tock  market 
crash on e x p e c t a t i o n s  and w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  spend -  
e f f e c t s  t h a t  can a l l  be summarized in  an independent 
de c l in e  i n  v e l o c i t y  -  was s t ro n g ly  re in fo rc e d  by the 
behav iour  o f  the s tock  o f  money." (69)
The s i t u a t i o n  im m ed ia te ly  a f t e r  the crash in  October 1929 was eased by 
the New York banks'  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  t a k e  ov e r  loans from o the r  n a t i o n a l  
banks. The r e s u l t a n t  inc rease in  depos i t s  i n  New York (due to  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  New Yo rk  banks t o o k  o v e r  c l a im s  on b o r ro w e rs  in  re tu rn  f o r  the 
o r i g i n a l  lender accep t ing  a d e p o s i t  i n  the  New York banks as repayment) 
meant t h a t  the  New York banks had to  acqu ire  a d d i t i o n a l  re s e rv e s .  They
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d i d  so 1n t h e  week o f  t h e  c resh  p a r t l y  by bor rowing from the Federal
Reserve. The Federal  Reserve Bank o f  New York also make an unprecedent
o u t r i g h t  purchase o f  government  s e c u r i t i e s  o f  $160m. f o r  t h e  system 
a c c o u n t  and the re  were no pan ic Increases In  money market ra tes  such as 
those In  past market c r i s e s .  S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  however, a la rge number o f  
bank f a i l u r e s  occurred which p r e c i p i t a t e d  a l l  economic c o n t r a c t i o n .  The 
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  F e d e ra l  Reserve system to  ta k e  th e  cue from p r i v a t e  
banking I n i t i a t i v e s ,  led to  the co l lapse  o f  banks, which 1n t u r n ,  led to  
a d e c l i n e  In  the demand f o r  dep os i t s ,  and t h e re fo re  a sharp drop In  the 
s tock  o f  money (but not as much as wou ld  have been the case, had p r ic es  
o f  re a l  assets not been d e c l i n in g  so r a p i d l y . )
"The great  surge in  bank f a i l u r e s  t h a t  cha rac te r ized  
t h e  f i r s t  b a n k in g  c r i s i s  a f t e r  O c tobe r  1 930 may 
p o s s i b l y  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  f r o m  p o o r  Loans and 
Investment made 1n th e  T w e n t i e s . . . .  However, the 
subsequent pay-out  record dur ing  the L i q u i d a t i o n  o f
t h e  Bank o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  s u g g e s ts  t h a t ,  i f
t he re  was any permanent im pa i rmen t  o f  assets a t  the 
t im e  the  bank  f a i l e d ,  1 t  c o u l d  n o t  have  been 
g r e a t . . . .  W h a t e v e r  may have been t r u e  o f  t h e  
i n i t i a l  bank f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  banking c r i s i s ,  
any e x c e p t i o n a l  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  1n th e  q u a l i t y  o f  
l o a n s  and i n v e s t m e n t s  1n t h e  l a t e r  t w e n t i e s  o r  
s im p l y  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  L o w - q u a l i t y  loans  and 
Investments 1n t h a t  p e r i o d ,  was a m ino r  f a c t o r  i n  
the subsequent bank f a i l u r e s "  (70)
An i n i t i a t i v e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  F e d e ra l  Reserve such as im p o s in g  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  o f  d e p o s i t s  I n t o  cash, cou ld  have
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stemmed the t i d e  o f  bank f a i l u r e s .  But no such i n i t i a t i v e  was taken  
d e s p i t e  th e  proven success o f  r e s t r i c t i n g  c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  o f  depos i ts  in  
prev ious cases.
"Banks had to  dump t h e i r  assets  on the market,  which 
i n e v i t a b l y  fo rced  a d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  market value o f  
those assets and hence o f  the remaining a s s e ts  t h e y  
h e l d .  The impairment i n  the market value o f  assets 
h e l d  by b a n k s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e i r  bond 
p o r t f o l i o s ,  was t h e  m os t  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  
im p a i rm e n t  o f  c a p i t a L  lead ing to  bank suspensions, 
r a t h e r  than  th e  d e f a u l t  o f  s p e c i f i c  loans  o r  o f  
s p e c i f i c  bond issues"  (71)
There fore  i t  was not the q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  i n v e s tm e n ts  t h a t  le d  t o  bank
co l lapses  but the t r a i n  o f  events i n  the wake o f  s t r a i n s  on l i q u i d i t y .
" I f  d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  c r e d i t  q u a l i t y  or  bad banking 
was the t r i g g e r ,  wh ich  i t  may t o  some e x te n t  have 
been, the  damaging b u l l e t  i t  d i s c h a r g e d  was t h e  
i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  b a n k i n g  s y s te m  t o  a c q u i r e  
a d d i t i o n a l  h igh-powered money to  meet the r e s u l t i n g  
demands o f  d e p o s i t o r s  f o r  c u r r e n c y ,  w i t h o u t  a 
m u l t i p l e  c o n t r a c t i o n  o f  d e p o s i t s . . . . .  The
composi t ion o f  assets  he ld  by the banks would ha rd ly
have mattered i f  a d d i t i o n a l  h igh-powered  money had 
been made a v a i la b le  from whatever source to  meet the 
demands o f  depos i to rs  f o r  cur rency w i thou t  r e q u i r i n g  
a m u l t i p l e  c o n t r a c t i o n  o f  depos i ts  and a s s e t s .  The 
t r i g g e r  w o u l d  h e v e  d i s c h a r g e d  o n l y  a b l a n k
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c a r t r i d g e .  The b a n k s  w o u ld  have been under  no 
nece ss i ty  to  dump t h e i r  asse ts "  (72)
The s to r y  t h a t  Friedman and Schwartz t e l l ,  shows both the im po r tance  o f  
the banking system in  the investment boom o f  the la te  1920 's in  the U.S. 
and in  the ensuing c o l la p s e .  The s tock  market crash which began due to  
an u n d e r l y i n g  c o n t r a c t i o n  and wh ich  companies on th e  s t o c k  market,  
show ing  d l s s p p o l n t  r e s u l t s ,  c l e a r l y  he lped  t o  deepen th e  economic 
recess ion ,  but was worsened due to  the bank f a i l u r e s .  The blame f o r  the 
th re e  waves o f  bank f a i l u r e s  (October 1930, Merch 1931 and January 1933) 
then l i e s  squareLy on th e  d o o rs te p  o f  th e  F e d e ra l  R eserve .  Why was 
m one ta ry  p o l i c y  so i n e p t? ,  i s  asked In  the t i t l e  o f  Sect ion 7,  Chapter 
7,  o f  "A Honetery H i s to r y  o f  the  U n i t e d  S te tes ,  1867-1960."  Since 1919 
the ques t ion  o f  s e c u r i t y  specu le t io n  had been a cause f o r  concern w i t h i n  
the Federa l  Reserve s ys tem .  The d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  a rose  between the  
Federa l  Reserve Board and the Federal  Reserve Bank o f  New York about the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  " q u a l i t a t i v e "  techn iques o f  c o n t r o l  designed to  induce 
banks to  d i s c r i m i n a t e  e g a i n s t  loans  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  purposes, became 
w e l l  known. The view a t t r i b u t e d  to  the Board in  the  p e r i o d  192 8 -9  was 
t h a t  d i r e c t  p r e s s u r e  wes a f e a s i b l e  means o f  r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  
e v e 1 l a b 1 l i t y  o f  c r e d i t  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  pu rposes  w i t h o u t  u n d u ly  
r e s t r i c t i n g  i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  f o r  p r o d u c t i v e  purposes, whereas a r i s e  in  
d i s c o u n t  r a t e s  o r  open m arke t  s a l e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s e v e r e  t o  c u r b  
s p e c u l e t i o n  wou ld  be to o  s e v e re  f o r  business in  genera l .  The Board 's 
p o in t  o f  view t h e t  d i r e c t  p r e s s u r e  was a f e a s i b l e  means o f  r e s t r i c t i n g  
c r e d i t  f o r  s p e c u la t i v e  purposes wes exp ressed  i n  a l e t t e r  w r i t t e n  by 
G o v e r n o r  Roy A .  Young t o  t h e  Reserve Benks on F e b ru a ry  2 ,  1929,  
as s e r t in g  t h a t  "a member bank i s  n o t  w i t h i n  i t s  reasonable c la im s f o r  
red iscoun t  f a c i l i t i e s  a t  i t s  Federa l  Reserve bank when i t  borrows e i t h e r  
f o r  t h e  pu rpose  o f  making s p e c u l a t i v e  loens  o r  f o r  t h e  p u rpo s e  o f
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m a i n t a i n i n g  s p e c u l a t i v e  l o a n s " .  George L. H a r r ison ,  Governor o f  the 
Federa l  Reserve Bank o f  New Yo rk ,  a rgued  on the c o n t ra ry  t h a t  g e n e ra l l y  
c r e d i t  was o v e r - e x te n d e d  and t h a t  t h e  d i s c o u n t  r a t e  must r i s e  and 
" q u a l i t a t i v e "  c o n t r o l s  c o u ld  have no e f f e c t .  R e g r e t f u l l y ,  the c r e d i t  
squeeze came to o  l a t e ,  and when th e  c rash  came th e  F e d e ra l  Reserve 
System d id  no th ing  to  preven t bank f a i l u r e s ,  a l though a l l  members o f  the 
Board c l e a r l y  u n d e rs to o d  th e  p rob lem  r a i s e d  by a p a n i c  a t t e m p t  t o  
c o n v e r t  d e p o s i t s  i n t o  c u r r e n c y .  I n  t h e  a f t e r m a t h  o f  t h e  c rash  the 
G la s s -S te a g L e  A c t  o f  1 932 /3  p r o v i d e d  f o r  a c om p le te  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
commercial and i n v e s tm e n t  b a n k in g  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  U . S . ,  so as t o  
p r e v e n t  a recurrence o f  the s p e c u la t i v e  f l u r r y  t h a t  preceeded the s tock  
market c rash.
The dilemmas t h a t  faced the  F e d e ra l  Reserve system in  these years were 
faced the Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait in  the years under s tudy ,  and we s h a l l  
d i s c u s s  t h e  changing a t t i t u d e s  o f  the c e n t r a l  bank to  these dilemmas i n  
d e t a i l  in  Chapter 5.  I f  we compare th e  s tock  market boom in  Kuwait  and 
t h a t  o f  th e  U.S. i n  1928 -29  th e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  K u w a i t  has shown 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  awareness by comparison w i th  the Federa l  Reserve i n  1929. 
The Federal Reserve had c e r t a i n l y  seen a problem but cou ld  not agree how 
to  so lve  i t ,  w h i le  a c t io n  was ta k e n  much t o o  la te  wh ich, we have seen, 
e x a c e rb a te d  t h e  p rob lem when i t  came. The C e n t r a l  Bank o f  K u w a i t  
reorganised and t r i e d  to  deal  w i th  the problem o f  s p e c u la t io n .  However, 
somewhat  i n  t h e  same p o s i t i o n  as t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce i n  i t s  
l e g i s l a t i v e  a t t e m p t s  t o  c u rb  s t o c k  m arke t  s p e c u l a t i o n ,  t h e  C e n t r a l  
Bank's a t tempts a t  re form, the avoidance o f  a c r i s i s  (w h ich  e v e n t u a l l y  
came a f t e r  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s tu d y  i n  March 1982),  were f o i l e d  by the 
na ture  o f  soc ie ty  in  Kuwait and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c i rcum ven t ion  o f  the  Laws 
-  and in  p a r t i u l a r  o f  the new l e g i s l a t i o n  -  was ignored by the r u l e r  and 
the cab ine t  o f  M in i s t e r s .  I f  c e r t a i n  problems have emerged, t h e r e f o r e ,
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1 t  has  been due t o  a c i r c u m v e n t i o n  o f  Law and an i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  e n fo r c e  r e g u l a t i o n .  I t  would seem t h a t  modern 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  such as t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kuwa i t  and th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  
Commerce sat  une as i l y  on top o f  a complex t r i b a l  s o c ie t y .
As we have seen in  Sec t ion  3 above but as we s h a l l  see in  more d e t a i l  i n  
C h ap te r  5 ,  th e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  Kuwait ,  Like Governor Harr ison b e fc re ,  
has, s ince 1978, become s c e p t i c a l  o f  " q u a l i t a t i v e "  c o n t r o l s  a p p l ie d  to  
com m erc ia l  banks t o  reduce lo ans  made f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  p u r p o s e s .  
Investments by the banks themselves have been p r o h ib i t e d  o u t r i g h t ,  w h i le  
a s e c t o r a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  c r e d i t  was begun to  c o n t r o l  the d i r e c t i o n  
o f  loans  w i t h  t h e  id e a  o f  u s i n g  m o r a l  s u a s io n  t o  reduce s e c u r i t y  
lend ing .  Th is  system not having worked as w a l l  as i t  was hoped, s t i f f e r  
l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s  were a p p l i e d  and " a g g r e g a t i v e "  c r e d i t  c o n t r o l  was 
th o u g h t  t o  be more e f f e c t i v e  i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  s tock  market specu la t io n  
ra th e r  " q u a l i t a t i v e "  measures. However, the  l i q u i d i t y  c r i s e s  crea ted  by 
ex te rn a l  developments i n  t h e  U.S .  between 1978-80 meant t h a t  i n  t h i s  
pe r iod ,  the C en t ra l  Bank had to  i n j e c t  funds i n t o  the commercial banking 
system. C le a r l y ,  the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s 1 r e s t r i c t i v e  s tance,  and i t s  
concern  o v e r  s t o c k  m a rke t  s p e c u l a t i o n  d i d  not prec lude the adding o f  
h ig h  powered money t o  p r e v e n t  ban k  f a i l u r e s  when t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
warranted. Th is  was c l e a r l y  an exemplary stance,  i f  compared w i t h  t h a t  
o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e s e r v e  Sys tem  between 1 9 2 8 -3 2 .  We can see t h i s  
f l e x i b i l i t y  and pragmatism in  c e n t r a l  p o l i c y  in  Chapter 5 which c lea rLy  
shows us the i r o n y  o f  r e d i s c o u n t  and swap f a c i l i t i e s  ar ranged a t  one 
t ime to  d ra in  l i q u i d i t y  f rom the f i n a n c i a l  system, but subsequent ly used 
to  add l i q u i d i t y  to  i t ,  as c i rcumstances changed.
The more u n c o n t r o l l a b le  aspects o f  s tock  m a rke t  s p e c u l a t i o n  i n  Kuw a i t  
r e l a t e  t o  t h e  " G u l f "  o r  " o f f s h o r e "  s tocks  which were descr ibed i n  the
l a s t  s ec t ion  o f  t h i s  chap te r .  We have a l ready  seen t h a t  the M in i s t r y  o f  
Commerce t r i e d  to  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the  p u b l i c  to  be abLe to  t rad e  
i n  shares which d id  not have a t r a c k - r e c o r d ,  but in  v a in .  The o f f i c i a l  
s t o c k s  ( t h e  42 L i s t e d  s t o c k s  on th e  K u w a i t i  S to c k  Exchange)  were 
a f f e c t e d  a f t e r  1979 i n  p a r a l l e l  f a s h i o n  w i t h  t h e  "Manakh" m a r k e t ,  
because they were the  t a r g e t  o f  s p e c u la t i o n  by th e  o f f s h o r e  compan ies  
themselves. O f fshore  companies had been se t -up  in  the Emirates and then 
i n  B a h r a in  p r e c i s e l y  because t h e y  c o u ld  i g n o r e  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  
Kuwait i  Law on company r e g i s t r a t i o n .  The M i n i s t r y  o f  Commerce i n  1977 
t r i e d  an embargo on the f l o t a t i o n  o f  such compan ies ,  then  i n  1979 i t  
i s s u e d  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  o f f s h o r e  c o m p a n ie s  t h a t  s o u g h t  o f f i c i a l  
r e c o g n i t i o n .  Trad ing  in  the o f f s h o re  company shares were u n c o n t r o l l a b le  
c h i e f l y  because o f  the lack  o f  p o l i t i c a l  w i l l  a t  the Level o f  the  r u l e r  
and the cab ine t  o f  m in i s te r s  in  respect o f  the e n f o r c e a b i l i t y  o f  th e s e  
Laws and r e g u la t i o n s .
Bank c r e d i t  was not the main cause o f  s pec u la t iv e  feve r  i n  Kuwait i n  the 
p e r i o d  under study as i t  had been in  the U.S. i n  the Late 1920 's .  But 
al though the ban k ing  system d id  seek t o  j o i n  t h e  s t o c k  market c r e d i t  
system, con t ra ry  to  the wishes o f  the C e n t r a l  Bank and s p u r r e d  on ( i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n  1980/1) by the e x t ra o rd in a ry  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  such loans,  
much o f  the c r e d i t  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  pushed the market to  i t s  e x t r a o r d in a r y  
h ig h s  was g e n e ra te d  i n t e r n a l l y  by th e  system o f  d e a l i n g  w h i c h  we 
d e s c r i b e d  i n  the la s t  s e c t io n .  The present d e l i v e r y  o f  a share aga ins t  
a p o s t - d a t e d  cheque gave t h e  s t o c k  m arke t  c r e d i t  sys tem an unusua l  
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  l e v e r a g e .  A f o r w a r d  pu rchase  by an i n v e s t o r ,  w o u ld  
I m m e d ia te ly  c r e a t e  enough c o l l a t e r a l  f o r  a f u r t h e r  purchase, whether 
spot or fo rward ,  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  d e l i v e r y  o f  the s tock .  I t  i s  
no t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  t h e  sys tem  was u n u s u a L L y  a d e p t  a t  
g e n e r a t i n g  b u l l  m a r k e t s .  The most i n t e r e s t i n g  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  these
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p oss l  b i  L111 es was seen  i n  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  La rge  b r o k e r a g e  
o p e r a t i o n s .  A b r o k e r ,  i n  one o f  t h e  s i m p l e r  examples o f  b ro k e ra g e  
d e a l i n g s ,  would  s e l l  a s t o c k  and buy i t  back on t h e  fo rward market,  
thereby genera t ing  cash (between t h e  r e c e i p t  o f  monies on the spot sa le  
and the payment o f  the pos t -da ted  cheque f o r  the fo rward purchase) which 
could be le n t  out a t  usur ious  ra tes  to  i n v e s t o r s  i n  t h e  s t o c k  m a r k e t .  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  th e  p re s e n t  d e l i v e r y  r u le  (which we have shown e a r l i e r  i s  
the basis o f  the Leverage sys tem)  c o u ld  a l l o w  th e  broker  to  do such a 
t ra n s a c t io n  a number o f  t imes in  sequence, thereby genera t ing  even more 
cash wh ich he c o u ld  o n - l e n d  t o  i n v e s to r s  i n  the s tock  market.  Broker 
c r e d i t ,  t h e r e fo re ,  as w e l l  as c r e d i t  t e n d e r e d  between mejor t r a d e rs  i n  
the market,  i n  the form o f  pos t -da ted  cheques,  c o n s t i t u t e d  th e  c r e d i t  
i n t e r n a l l y  g e n e ra te d  by th e  s t o c k  m a r k e t ,  or  what we have c a l l e d  the 
s tock market c r e d i t  system.
The quest ion o f  c r e d i t  ex tended  d i r e c t l y  between the major t r a d e rs  in  
the market i s  an extremely im por tan t  f a c t o r  wh ich  has b e a r i n g  on bo th  
th e  n a t u r e  o f  the s tock  market boom and the  im p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a p o t e n t i a l  
c o l la p s e .  As we saw i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  th e  number o f  p la y e rs  i n  
the Kuwait  S to c k  m arke t  i s  s m a l l ,  w h i l e  t h e  d e a l i n g  sys tem i m p l i e s  
c l e a r l y  t h a t  these  p la y e rs  are p e rs o n a l l y  known to  each o th e r  and t h a t  
i t  i s  extremely d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a new e n t r a n t  to  make a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact 
on share dea l ings .  The s m a l l  g roup o f  p l a y e r s  i n  the  marketp lace who 
themselves have generated a s u b s t a n t i a l  amount o f  c r e d i t ,  who o r g a n i s e  
s h a r e  swaps, and who a re  s u p p o r te d  by c r e d i t  f rom  th e  b r o k e r s  and 
u l t i m a t e l y  from the banks, can, as we have seen, cont inue to  push s tock  
p r ices  up f o r  long pe r iods  o f  t im e .  I t  has o f t e n  been s a i d  i n  Ku w a i t  
t h a t  government  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  m a rk e t  i s  th e  main cause beh ind  the 
b u l l i s h  psychology.  T h i s ,  however ,  has t o  be q u a l i f i e d .  F i r s t l y ,  in  
the case o f  the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  and t h e  s t o c k  m a rke t  r e g u l a t i v e
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body t h e r e  i s  on ly  evidence o f  cau t io n  and o f  s ens ib le  at tempts  by both 
to  preven t s tock  market " b u b b le s "  f rom b e in g  c rea ted ,  desp i te  the f a c t  
t h a t  the government machine as a whole d id  not a c t i v e l y  t r y  t o  p romote  
t h e  e n f o r c e a b i  L i t y  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  i s s u e d  by th e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  
agenc ies.  Secondly, w h i le  the m e rch an ts  cou ld  in  some ins tances  ga ther  
the support  o f  the r u l e r  a t  t imes when the s tock  market would go through 
a depressed phase, and w h i le  i t  has been government p o l i c y  as we saw i n  
t h e  Last s e c t i o n  o f  C h a p te r  1 to  promote the development o f  the s tock  
market,  the e f f e c t s  o f  these f a c t o r s  must be cons idered as secondary to  
the r i g g i n g  o f  the market by the  market p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  
la rg e  ones .  W i th  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h i n d s i g h t ,  the crash o f  March 1982 d id  
not p a r t i c u l a r l y  a f f e c t  t h e  b a n k in g  system i n  any s e r i o u s  f a s h i o n ,  
whereas ,  q u i t e  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  U.S.  e x p e r i e n c e ,  th e  p rob lem  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l  bankrup tc ies  posed i t s e l f  as the c e n t r a l  problem.
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CHAPTER 5
THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANK POLICY IN  THE CREDIT MARKETS
1) THE OBJECTIVES OF CENTRAL BANK POLICY
The im p o r ta n c e  o f  money i n  the  growth process based on the no t io n  t h a t  
re a l  money balances ac t  as a " c o n d u i t "  f o r  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  investment  
and are t h e r e fo re  complementary t o  i t ,  which we discussed in  C h a p te r  3 ,  
i s  a p o i n t  which may be o f  some relevance to  the con tex t  o f  the Kuwait i  
economy ( 1 ) .  However, a n a ly s ts  o f  the Kuwait economy have always been : -
" . . .  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  a d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  problems 
from those encountered in  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a l i m i t e d  
f i n a n c i a l  b u t  more d i v e r s i f i e d  p hy s ic a l  and human 
resources"  (2)
Pu t  s im p l y ,  Ku w a i t  i s  a c a p i t a l - p l e n t y  economy q u i t e  u n t y p i c a l  o f  
deve lop ing  econom ies .  However,  and more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  we have seen 
e v idenc e  o f  Low loan demand and l im i t e d  investment o p p o r tu n i t i e s  o f  the 
su rp lus  o f  t h e  b a n k in g  sys tem f o r  t h e  p e r i o d  1960-76  wh ich  has been 
fundamental to  our arguments so f a r .  I n  sharp  c o n t r a s t ,  u n s a t i s f i e d  
loan demand i s  an i m p l i c i t  a ss u m p t io n  o f  McKinnon and Shaw models o f  
" f i n a n c i a l  rep ress io n "  wh ich d e s c r i b e  t h e  p o l i c y  dilemmas o f  g e n e ra l l y  
over -popu la ted  and c a p i t a l - s c a r c e  economies wh ich a re  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  
g row.  We have shown t h a t  i n  Kuwait growth in  loan demand has been one 
o f  the main causes o f  g ro w th  i n  t h e  money s u p p ly  i n  t h e  pe r iod  under 
s t u d y ,  d u r i n g  wh ich  p e r i o d  bank l e n d i n g  i n c r e a s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l y .  
C onsequen t ly  i t  would appear t h a t  problems o f  " f i n a n c i a l  r ep ress io n "  as
def ined  in  Chapter 3 and the  r e l a t e d  p o l i c y  cons ide ra t ion s  do not app ly  
i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  p o l i c y  i n  Kuwai t  ( 3 ) .  But t h e  
e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s  t e n d in g  to  show the  high income e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand 
f o r  money, and show in g  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  d e s p i t e  a l l  t h e  a t t e n d a n t  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  a constant  to  d e c l i n i n g  v e l o c i t y  o f  money, lead us t o  
t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  not much fundamenta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  
between t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  Kuwa i t  and t h a t  i n  many o t h e r  d e v e lo p in g  
c o u n t r ie s .  But the reasons f o r  t h i s  s u p e r f i c i a l  s i m i l a r i t y ,  wh ich  make 
the  " f i n a n c i a l  rep ress ion"  and " c o n d u i t "  approaches apparen t ly  u s e fu l  i s  
based,  as we saw in  C h a p te r  3 ,  on t h e  " t r a d i n g "  n a tu re  o f  the s tock  
market and the  t r a n s a c t i o n a l  n a t u r e  o f  quasi-money in  Kuwait .  Whereas 
the McKinnon e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  may seem t o  be 
a p p ro p r ia te  here,  f i r s t  o f  a l l  the  low i n t e r e s t  ra te s  i n  Kuwait have led 
t o  f a s t  c r e d i t  expansion and secondly ,  as we saw in  the la s t  s e c t io n  o f  
Chapter 3,  the  r e la t i o n s h ip  between domest ic  and f o re ig n  i n t e r e s t  ra te s  
are very im por tan t  i n  the case o f  a c a p i t a l - p l e n t y  economy.
Kuwa i t  i e  a s m a l l  open economy wh ich  i s  c l e a r l y  a c a n d id a te  f o r  a 
P o l a k - t y p e  model, and where the bas ic  l o g ic  o f  Polak models t h a t  we set  
out i n  Chapter 3 a p p l i e s .  Consequent ly,  we s h a l l  t r y  to  assess what the  
im p l i c a t io n s  o f  t h i s  are f o r  t h e  d e f i n i n g  o f  Kuwa i t 's  p o l i c y  o b je c t i v e s  
i n  the  con tex t  o f  our d iscuss ions  re g a rd in g  c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  econom ies ,  
which were considered in  Chapter 3 as p r a c t i c a l  examples where the Polak 
f ramework  wou ld  a p p l y ,  b u t  where the  degree o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  would vary 
depending on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  c u r re n c y -b o a r d  in  
ques t ion  ( 4 ) .  We found t h a t  both the  model and d iscuss ions  by Wong ( 5 ) ,  
Betz (6) and Drake (7) o f  cu r rency-board  economies, a l l  agreed t h a t  t h e  
money s t o c k  tended  t o  be an endogenous va r iabLe ,  in  t h a t  i t  depended 
par tLy  o f  the balance o f  t r a d e  o r  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  payments. There was, 
never the less ,  enough o f  a lag  between t h e  t im e  when d o m e s t ic  c r e d i t
e x p a n s io n  wou ld  lead t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  domestic incomes and the t ime 
when i t  would be washed ou t  i n  d e c l i n i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange reserves f o r  
c o n t r a - c y c l i c a I  monetary  p o l i c y  t o  be used t o  p u r s u e  a p o l i c y  o f  
o f f s e t t i n g  s h o r t - t e r m  i n f l u e n c e s  f rom th e  fo re ig n  t rade  and payments 
s e c t o r  on t h e  L e v e l  o f  d o m e s t i c  i n c o m e s .  The o b j e c t i v e  o f  
c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l  monetary p o l i c y  i s  c l e a r l y  in d ic a te d  by the lo g ic  o f  the 
Polak model as the prime f u n c t io n  o f  domest ic monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  s ince 
as we have seen i n  the p o l i c y  a l l o c a t i o n  o r  ass ignm ent  models  a f i x e d  
exchange r a t e  (wh ich  i s  a b a s i c  assum pt ion  o f  the Polak model) would 
imp ly  ass ign ing  monetary p o l i c y  to  managing the  ex te rn a l  balance ( 8 ) .
As we s h a l l  see below, however ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  the c e n t r a l  bank has not 
been f u l l y  i n  c o n t r o l  o f  the monetary base o r  " h ig h -p o w e re d  money" o f  
t h e  system has been a m a jo r  drawback i n  i t s  a b i l i t y  to  ca r ry  out any 
k i n d  o f  c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  However,  p r i o r  even t o  
a n a l y s i n g  t h i s  as pe c t  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  a s s e t  and l i a b i l i t y  
s t r u c t u r e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a s s e t  and L i a b i l i t y  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
commercial  banks ,  t h e r e  a re  more fu n d a m e n ta l  p o i n t s  t o  t a c k l e  which 
in v o lv e s  the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework which s u r ro u n d s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between t h e  money s tock and the balance o f  payments i n  Kuwait which may 
have fundamental  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  p o l i c y .  In  b r i e f  
c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l  p o l i c y  in  respect o f  the t rade  or payments ba lance s  may 
not be s t r i c t l y  necessary.  The sa le  o f  petroleum which i s  Kuw a i t 's  main 
f o r e i g n  exchange ea rne r  has no d i r e c t  impact on money supply s ince the 
M in i s t r y  o f  Finance h o ld s  t h e  la r g e  m a j o r i t y  o f  the  c o u n t r y ' s  f o re ig n  
exchange reserves and the s o -c a l l e d  "ba lance  o f  payments e f f e c t "  when 
f o r e i g n  exchange e a r n in g s  i n c r e a s e  ( o r  i n  a cur rency-board con tex t  -  
decrease) the money s u p p l y ,  t a k e s  p l a c e  no t  d i r e c t l y  but u s u a l l y  when 
the  M in i s t r y  o f  Finance undertakes lo c a l  e x p e n d i tu r e : -
" I t  i s  to  be noted t h e t  the M i n i s t r y  o f  F in s n c e  i s  
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  wh ich  edm in is te rs  the Is rge r  p o r t i o n  
o f  s t s t e  reserves o r i g i n s t i n g  f rom  revenues, w h i le  
t h e  c e n t r a l  bank e x e c u te s  a l l  l o c a l  and f o r e i g n  
b a n k in g  t r a n s a c t i o n s  f o r  government m i n i s t r i e s  and 
agenc ies" (9)
Since the M in i s t r y  o f  Finance c o n t r o l s  a l l  government expend i tu re  in  the  
economy and i n s u la te s  i t  from developments in  the c o u n t r y ' s  c h i e f  expo r t  
s e c to r ,  i t  t h e r e f o r e  d e te r m in e s  what we have c a l l e d  t h e  "ba lance o f  
payments" e f f e c t  by v i r t u e  o f  p u b l i c  expend i tu re  p o l i c i e s .  The c e n t r a l  
bank seems t o  have no r o l e  i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t y p i c a l  c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l  
monetary p o l i c y  requ i red  in  a smal l  open economy to  o f f s e t  the e f f e c t  o f  
e x te rn a l  in f l u e n c e s  on the money supp ly and incomes.
The r o le  t h a t  the  c e n t r a l  bank has seen f o r  i t s e l f  s ince i t s  in c e p t io n  
in  1969 which has been repeated in  i t s  annual  r e p o r t s  e v e ry  year  s i n c e  
then,  i s  to  temper the  i n f l a t i o n a r y  impact o f  a high le v e l  o f  government 
e x p e n d i t u r e  and t h e  spe c u la t iv e  consequence o f  such expend i tu re  i n  the  
con tex t  o f  the p r i v a t e  s e c to r .
" . . .  m oneta ry  p o l i c y  adop ted  by t h e  Bank th rough
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r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  1977,  has t o  some 
e x t e n t  a l l e v i a t e d  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s  on th e  
lo c a l  economy and has c o n t r i b u t e d  towards L im i t i n g  
s p e c u l a t i o n  by o r g a n i z i n g  and r a t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  
c r e d i t  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  commercial banks, and curb ing  
the sharp expans ionary  t r e n d  o f  domest ic  l i q u i d i t y  
. . .  However i t  i s  L ik e ly  t h a t  t h e  la r g e  amounts o f  
l i q u i d  cash i n j e c t e d  i n t o  the domest ic economy as o f
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December 1977 -  t h ro u g h  Government p u rche ses  o f  
shores o f  n o t i o n a l  companies -  would  make domestic 
l i q u i d i t y  grow a t  ra tes  surpass ing by f a r  t h e  r a t e s  
o f  r e a l  e c o n o m ic  g row th  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .  Hence 
em phas is  s h o u l d  a g a i n  be made as r e g a r d s  th e  
necess i ty  f o r  c o - o r d in a t i o n  o f  e f f o r t s  between th e  
m o n e ta r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  [ t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank) and th e  
f i s c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  ( t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  F in a n c e )  t o  
r egu la te  the f low  o f  domestic l i q u i d i t y  from i t s  two 
major sou rces  (Government e x p e n d i t u r e  and c r e d i t  
expansion) accord ing to  such economic p r i o r i t i e s  and 
c r i t e r i a  as w o u ld  n o t  r e s u L t  i n  d e t r i m e n t a l  
r e p e r c u s s io n s  on t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy as a whole 
whether i n  the shor t  o r  Long- term." (10)
T h is  i s  t h e  f u l l e s t  s t a te m e n t  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  o b j e c t i v e s  and 
a t t i t u d e s  yet  made which recogn ises the  L im i ta t i o n s  imposed on i t  by the 
dom inan t  n a t u r e  o f  pubLic  expend i tu re  o f  the  government in  r e l a t i o n  to  
i t s  own a b i l i t y  t o  d r a i n  l i q u i d i t y  f r o m  t h e  s y s t e m  and w h ic h  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  recognises  the  L im ited abso rp t i ve  capac i ty  o f  the domest ic 
economy where both p u b l i c  e x p e n d i tu r e  and c r e d i t  c re a t io n  seem to  be in  
t h e i r  view ove r -expans iona ry : -
"One o f  the  major conce rns  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank a t  
present  i s  the sharp expansion in  domest ic l i q u i d i t y  
a t  r a t e s  o u t p a c i n g  t h e  e x pa ns io n  o f  p r o d u c t i v e  
economic a c t i v i t i e s "  (11)
The appeal by the  c e n t r a l  bank above f o r  increased c o o rd in a t io n  between 
monetary and f i s c a l  p o l i c y  would seem to  be on ly  h a l f  the problem s in c e
t h e  com m erc ia l  b a n k in g  system I t s e l f ,  b e in g  h i g h l y  l i q u i d ,  has been 
capable o f  cons iderab le  dom es t ic  c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  (12 ) .  To some ex ten t  
the  e f f e c t s  o f  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  a re  washed o u t  t h ro u g h  t h e  
f o r e i g n  exchange demand m u l t i p l i e r  (1 e .  th e  demand f o r  im p o r t s  and 
c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s ) ,  bu t  as we have seen t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange demand 
m u l t i p l i e r  1n Kuwait i s  not as h ig h  as i s  u s u a l l y  assumed due t o  t h e  
h ig h  r e t u r n s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  made a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  p r i v a t e  sec to r  
dom es t ica l ly  as a r e s u l t  o f  c o n t in u e d  h igh  p u b l i c  expend i tu re  (13 ) .  As 
we s h a l l  see below the main problem in  c o n t r o l l i n g  p o t e n t i a l l y  exp los ive  
domest ic c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  1s i n  t h e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a s s e t  and 
l i a b i l i t i e s  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  the c e n t r a l  bank and the  commercial banks. We 
saw i n  Chapter  3 t h a t  to  a la rge e x te n t ,  the expansions o f  bank lend ing  
i n  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y  was ba s e d  n o t  on d o m e s t i c  bu t  f o r e i g n  
reserves .  In  summary:-
" . . .  l e v e l s  o f  l i q u i d i t y  a r e ,  t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  
r e la te d  t o  o u ts id e  f a c t o r s  beyond the c o n t r o l  o f  the 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s "  (14)
w h e th e r  we a re  t a l k i n g  abou t  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i tu re  or  bank lend ing .  We 
have seen in  the la s t  sec t ion  o f  Chapter 4 t h e t  much o f  the expansion o f  
the s tock market was due to  an i n f o r m a l  c r e d i t  system, and al though the  
commercial banks d i d  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  what we c a l l e d  t h e  s t o c k  m a rke t  
c r e d i t  system, they  were not d i r e c t l y  the  cause o f  the  c r e d i t  exp los ion  
and the r e la te d  s t o c k  m arke t  boom. The c e n t r a l  bank as we shalL see 
beLow has been s p e c i f i c a l l y  concerned about the  s p e c u l a t i v e  a s p e c ts  o f  
the  K u w a i t i  s t o c k  market and the p o s s ib le  involvement o f  the banks and 
began to  take a s e r i e s  o f  s t e p s  t o  p r e c lu d e  dangerous developments as 
f a r  back as 1973 when i t s  o f f i c i a l s  made the f o l l o w in g  remark:-*
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"The c e n t r a l  bank has . . .  been l a t e l y  i n  c l o s e  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  a v ie w  t o  a l l e v i a t i n g  t h e  r a p i d l y  
growing s p e c u la t io n "  (15)
The c e n t r a l  bank re c o g n iz e d  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  much o f  the  c r e d i t  pyramid 
t h a t  grew s ince then has been based on the r a p id l y  growing s to c k  m a rke t  
and sees  i t s e l f  1n a " s u p p o r t i v e  r o l e "  i n  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  p r e v e n t  
conf idence-shak ing  d e f a u l t s  r e s u l t i n g  from a s tock  market debacle.  A.B. 
Cramp in  h i s  book on monetary management s ta ted  t h a t : -
"The c e n t r a l  bank has t w i n  d u t i e s  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  markets and o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  th e s e  m a rke ts  
i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  macro -economic  p o l i c y .  These 
du t ie s  can in  c e r t a in  c i rcumstances c o n f l i c t ,  and in  
t h e  absence o f  some r e c o n c i l i n g  e x p e d i e n t  t h e  
c e n t r a l  bank must g i v e  p r i o r i t y  t o  i t s  s u p p o r t i n g  
r o l e "  (16)
Cramp d is c u s s e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  what m ig h t  i n h i b i t  a c e n t r a l  bank from 
severe ly  squeezing a cash-base 1s g e n e r a l l y  poss ib le  adverse e f f e c t s  o f  
a s t rong and f a s t  upward i n t e r e s t  r a te  s p i r a l  on i n s t i t u t i o n s  where ra te  
s t r u c t u r e  i s  " s t i c k y " .  The on ly  p o s s ib le  r e c o n c i l i n g  expedient  would be 
i n  the form o f  d i r e c t  c o n t r o l s  i n  such a c a s e .  The s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  we 
have d e s c r ib e d  wh ich  e x i s t s  i n  Kuwa i t  leads the c e n t r a l  bank t o  put  
emphasis on i t s  s u p p o r t i v e  r o l e ,  d u e ,  r a t h e r  by d e f a u l t ,  t o  i t s  
i n a b i l i t y  t o  p ro p e r l y  implement a squeeze on the  monetary base, and n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  due t o  an o b j e c t i v e  a p p r a i s a l  o f  p o l i c y  consequences. 
S ince  t h e  e a r l y  days th e  c e n t r a l  b an k  has  t r i e d  t o  impose d i r e c t  
c o n t r o l s ,  as we have seen, i n  the  form o f  a s e c to ra l  lend ing m o n i t o r i n g  
f u n c t i o n ,  c e n t r a l i z e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  on bor rowers  and lend ing l i m i t s  on
i n d i v i d u a l s .  These d i r e c t  c o n t r o l s  have been,  a lo n g  w i th  o ther  more 
s p e c i f i c  d i r e c t i v e s ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  f r e q u e n t  m e e t in g s  between t h e  
c e n t r a l  bank and t h e  management o f  t h e  com m erc ia l  banks. But i t  i s  
c le a r  from our a n a l y s i s  t h a t  t h i s  has n o t  p r e v e n te d  th e  c e n t r a l  bank 
from pursuing  a p o l i c y  o f  deve lop ing t o o l s  t h a t  would h e lp  t o  i n c r e a s e  
i t s  a b i L i t y ,  i n  the long- te rm,  o f  implement ing a c o n t r o l l i n g  fu n c t io n .
In  summary, t h e  c e n t r a l  bank has pursued a pragmat ic path in  d e f in in g  
i t s  o b j e c t i v e s .  I t  has determined such o b je c t i v e s  la rg e ly  accord ing to  
the l i m i t a t i o n s  i t  faces but a lso  accord ing  to  what 1 t  c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  
i t  s h o u ld  be r i g h t  t o  do i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  what i t  has f r e q u s n t l y  
r e f e r r e d  t o  as "dan ge rous  d e v e lo p m e n ts "  i n  t h e  s t o c k  marke t  c r e d i t  
system and the re a l  es ta te  s e c to r .  Such "dangerous developments" was a 
c l e a r  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  dangers  t h e  com m erc ia l  banks faced  i n  th e  
a f te rmath o f  the c o l l a p s e  o f  a s p e c u l a t i v e  b u b b le .  The impact o f  i t s  
p o l i c i e s  have n a t u r a l l y  been weak over  the years taken as a whole due to  
the need to  develop ins t rum en ts  o f  c o n t r o l  t o  im p lem en t  i t s  p o l i c i e s ,  
and as we have seen 1n both Chapters 3 and 4,  by the t ime l e g i s l a t i o n  in  
r e s p e c t  o f  bank c r e d i t  c o n t r o l  hod been passed and p e r fec te d  in  1978/9, 
the banking sys tem was no l o n g e r  l i q u i d  and a c t u a l l y  t h e  commercial 
banks began to  seek to  borrow funds from th e  c e n t r a l  bank (as w e l l  as 
from o the r  sou rces ) .  1978 represented the  beg inn ing o f  a per iod  o f  high 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  which put a s t r a i n  on the domest ic banking 
system in  Kuwai t ,  due t o  t h e  r i g i d  d o m e s t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a te  s t r u c t u r e .  
The ex ten t  to  which the t a r d i n e s s  o f  r e fo rm  o f  t h e  d o m e s t ic  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  was an i n t e n t i o n a l  p loy  on b e h a l f  o f  the  c e n t r a l  bank to  
increase t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e  c om m e rc ia l  banks ,  w i l l  be discussed 
below.
The t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e o r e t i c a l  p a ra m e te rs  f o r  s m a l l  open economies and 
c u r r e n c y - b o a r d  economies do n o t  t h e r e f o r e  app ly in  Kuwait due t o  the 
c a p i t a l - p l e n t y  na tu re  o f  t h e  economy. In  p a r t i c u l a r  the in f l u e n c e  o f  
t h e  b a la n c e  o f  payments on t h e  money s u p p ly  i s  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  F i n a n c e .  The problem has been t h a t  the s ize  o f  government 
expend i tu re  (as w e l l  as the  lack o f  ins t ruments  to  c o n t r o l  money supp ly )  
has meant t h a t  i t  has been very d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the c e n t r a l  bank to  pursue 
any k in d  o f  c o n t r a - c y c l i c a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  Meanwhi le  t h e  h ig h  
l i q u i d i t y  g e n e ra te d  by government  e x p e n d i t u r e  i n  a low a b s o r p t i o n  
economy has meant t h a t  the c e n t r a l  bank has had to  d i v e r t  i t s  a t t e n t i o n  
main ly  t o  l im i t e d  domestic c r e d i t  expansion.
i i )  INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL
In  the  f i r s t  pe r iod  o f  the c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  ex is tence  (1969-78) we see an 
emphasis on meet ings w i th  the  commercial banks and m ora l  s u a s io n  as a 
t o o l  o f  p o l i c y .  The mandatory l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  o f  23 A p r i l  1974 was much 
Lower than e x i s t i n g  r a t i o s  and had l i t t l e  impact,  w h i le  i n t e r e s t  bea r ing  
d e p o s i t s  a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  b an k  a t t r a c t e d  L i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  and t h e  
red iscoun t  window was l i t t l e  used u n t i l  1978. S e le c t i v e  c o n t r o l s  are  an 
app ro p r ia te  s t r a t e g y  i f  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  Loans i s  a problem which we 
seem t o  have shown i n  ou r  a n a l y s i s  i n  C h a p t e r  4 on t h e  s e c t o r a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c r e d i t .  In  the con tex t  o f  the c e n t r a l  bank 's  s t r u g g le  
f o r  independent  m oneta ry  management,  s e l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l s  which im p ly  
moral suasion and tended to  be implemented through d i r e c t  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  
i n  f a c t  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  o n l y  in s t ru m e n t  t h a t  in  p r i n c i p l e  they may have 
had to  m i t i g a t e  the s p e c u la t i v e  excesses  o f  the s tock  market.  However, 
the success o f  s e l e c t i v e  c r e d i t  c o n t r o l s  can o n l y  be p a r t i a l  i n  an 
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TABLE 5 .2
LIST OF MAJOR POLICY CHANGES BY THE CENTRAL BANK OF KUWAIT 1972-80
1973 Estab l ishm ent  o f  i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  deposi ts  at  the centrel
bank.
1974 F i r s t  mandatory L iquidity  r a t io .
1975 Discount window f o r  commercial  b i l l s  up to th re e  months
opened.
1976 F i r s t  reform of  in te re s t  rates and r a i s in g  o f  the i n t e r e s t
cei l ing .
1978 a) Discount window f a c i l i t i e s  extended to tweLve months.
b) Grsded mandatory l i q u i d i t y  ra t io  introduced and average 
l iq u id i ty  re t io  raised.
c) F i r s t  proposal o f  currency swaps.
1979 a) Currency swep arrangements introduced fo r  the commercial
• bonks.
b) Introduct ion o f  Centrel  Bank B i l l s
1980 a) F i r s t  mandatory reserve ra t io
b) F i r s t  mandatory Central  Bank B i l l  ra t io
or as 'genera l  trading companies'. Monitoring the use of funds 1n th is  
context 1s very d i f f i c u l t  and some would argue im p o ss ib le .  In  the 
second period of  the centra l  bank's existence through to the end o f  the  
p er iod  under study (1978 -80 )  some o f  the Long-term p o l i c i e s  of the 
central  bank began to  bear f r u i t  w h i le  a t  the  same time circumstances 
conspired to reduce bank l i q u i d i t y  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  reduce  t h e i r  
independence. During t h i s  per iod  as we sha l l  see below, the central  
bank t ightened control over bank L i q u i d i t y ,  increased the proportion of  
l iq u id i ty  that need be kept domestically,  and t ightened control  a lso on 
o v e r d r a f t s  w h i l e  t r y i n g  to lengthen the average m a t u r i t y  o f  bank 
d e p o s i ts .  The c e n t r a l  bank d e v e lo p e d  o t h e r  independent and more 
sophisticated methods of  contro l .  I t  makes clear  i t s : -
" . . .  desire to d ive rs i fy  and develop the local money 
markets to enable i t  to r e g u la t e  the L i q u i d i t y  in  
the domestic economy" (17)
In  A p r i l  1979 in  i t s  f i n a l  attempt to impose a non-voluntary method of  
in jec t ing  and d r a in in g  bank rese rves  the c e n t r a l  bank began issuing 
Central  Bank of  Kuwait b i l l s  (CBK b i l l s )  to replace the in terest-bear ing  
deposit  system which had been used by the c e n t r a l  bank to a t t r a c t  
surplus funds away from the commercial banks but which c lea r ly  were not 
as f le x ib le  as the proposed system o f  CBK b i l l s .  These b i l l s  began to 
be issued in 91-day and 28-day m a t u r i t ie s : -
" . . .such b i l l s  would provide the c e n t r a l  bank with  
one of  the s ig n i f ic a n t  monetary policy tools  whereby 
i t  could both r e g u la t e  Local banks' l iq u i d i t y  and 
also contribute to  the development of the monetary 
and f in a n c ia l  market and expand and d i v e r s i f y  i t s
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b a s e .  At p r e s e n t  t h i s  t o o l  i s  the nucleus o f  
operations adm in is te re d  w ide ly  in  h ig h ly  advanced 
monetary and f in a n c ia l  markets, namely 'open-market  
operations'"  (18)
The development of  money and cap i ta l  markets that  would al low the growth 
of domestic reserve assets and the i n s t i t u t io n  of  open market operations  
would seem to depend however on the reform of  the in te re s t  rate system. 
Deena Khakhate has reviewed the development of  open market operations in 
the context of Taiwan (1 9 ) .  She remarks t h a t  many LDC's in the 1970's  
have promoted the concept o f  government bonds, both as a means o f  
promoting savings and o f  developing an asset base on which to perform 
open market operations. While frequent use of  rediscount f a c i l i t i e s  has 
been made in these c o u n t r i e s ,  thereby e l lo w in g  the  d iscount  rate  to 
become an e f fe c t iv e  policy t o o l ,  the resor t  to  open market o p e ra t io n s  
has been conspicuous by i t s  elmost t o t s l  absence. Taiwan's experience 
c r y s t a l l i z e s  the genere l  problem t h a t  the p o l i c i e s  pursued by LDC 
governments 1n t h e i r  c r e a t i o n  o f  a government  bond m a rk e t  have  
eliminated the conditions tha t  would have been necessary for  open market 
o pe ra t io n s  to  succeed. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w ith  the pr ice  
mechanism in the bond markets has made open market policy in e f fe c t i v e .  
The au thor i t ies  in Taiwan assumed that  a non-variable but high i n t e r e s t  
r a t e  was n e c e s s a ry  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c ' s  a c c e p ta n c e  o f  governm ent  
o b l i g a t i o n s .  Through the Bank o f  Taiwan's in tervent ion ,  the L iquid i ty  
of government bonds wes assured, so t h a t  in e f fe c t  what the public held 
was "money" with a lucra t ive  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  The a u t h o r i t i e s  thereby  
denied themselves the chance to vary the in te res t  rate  structure ,  while  
the gimmick of  maintaining unchanged government bond prices also proved 
unrewarding. F lex ib le  and f ree  play of  in te res t  ra tes  and bond y i e l d s  
are essent ial  for these operations and also for  the development of these
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m arkets .  Khakhate a lso p o in ts  out t h a t  the banks did not buy these 
bonds o f  t h e i r  own f r e e  w i l l  and t h a t  the i n a b i l i t y  o f  the bond to 
r e f le c t  market demand and supply l im ited the banks' p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  We 
see l ike w ise  in Kuwait that  the issue by the central  bank of  CBK b i l l s  
(which were issued in  p l a c e  o f  t r e a s u r y  b i L l s  s ince  the c e n t r a l  
government is  not a net borrower) had to be managed within the o f f i c i a l  
in te res t  rate structure which unfortunately did not g ive  a high enough 
y i e l d  to induce banks and o th e r  in s t i tu t io n s  to buy them v o lu n ta r i ly .  
This problem has e x is te d  s ince the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t  bearing  
deposits in 1973 which CBK b i l l s  were supposed to r e p la c e .  The amount 
o f  CBK b i L18 h e l d  by banks d id  i n c r e a s e  from the date o f  t h e i r  
incept ion,  but they only increased substant ia l ly  a f t e r  the establishment 
of a mandatory reserve  r a t i o  ( i n  a d d i t io n  to the e x i s t i n g  l iq u id i ty  
ra t io )  in June 1980 which included as reserve  assets  CBK b i l l s  along  
w i t h  cash and ba lances  a t  the c e n t r a l  bank. A s p e c ia l  p ro v is io n  
required that  10 per cent o f  l i q u i d  assets  be he ld  in CBK b i l l s .  The 
fact  that  the increase in KD l iqu id  assets held by the commercial banks 
over  the years was Largely due to l e g i s l a t i o n  was commented on in  
Chapter 4 ( 2 0 ) ,  and in  the  case o f  CBK b i l l s  the s i t u a t i o n  i s  no 
d i f f e r e n t : -
"CBK b i l l s  were introduced in A p r i l  1979, and t h e i r  
issue remained l im i t e d  u n t i l  the amended l iq u id i ty  
system was put in to  force in mid-June 19BO" (21)
Usury Laws remained unchanged u n t i l  A r t i c l e  166 o f  Kuwaiti Commercial 
Law was amended under the Amiri Decree No. 102 in November 1976 when the 
7 per cent per annum I n t e r e s t  c e l l i n g  was abandoned f o r  a graded  
s t r u c t u r e  where the l im i t  on secured loans o f  one year maturi ty  or Less 
was kept a t  7 per  cent per annum but unsecured loans w ith  a s im i la r
maturi ty  structure had a Limit of  8.5  per cent per annum and unsecured 
l oans over one year  Long had a Limit of 10 per cent per annum. Unti L 
that  t ime we showed in Chapter 4 t h a t  the commerciaL banks managed 
in te res t  rates through an inter-bank agreement and reguLar meetings but  
aLways w i th in  the context of  the in te res t  rate ce i l in g  set by Law (22 ) .  
The amendment in  1 976 f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  the responsi bi Li ty  fo r  
managing in te res t  rates within  the gu ide l ines  set  by the Law Lay w i th  
the c e n t r a l  bank, which began e f fe c t iv e ly  to act in th is  d i rect ion  on 6 
February, 1977: -
" . . .  the resolut ion set the minimum rate of in terest
on Local savings in KD at  4 1 /2  per cent" (23)
But the o vera l l  r i g i d i t y  in  Local i n t e r e s t  ra tes  coupled with a stable  
exchange rate  against the US do l la r  often lead to arbi tage f lows. These 
flows as we have seen tended to increase the demand f o r  Loans (24)  and 
also led to an increase in the foreign exchange demand m u l t ip l i e r  in the 
per iod  1978-80 ( 2 5 ) .  Since the merchant community borrows Kuwaiti 
Dinars to re-Lend at  higher in te re s t  rates abroad, as we saw in the last  
section of  Chapter 3 ,  runs down KD depos i ts  and switches to foreign  
currency deposits (26) ,  the banking system is  forced to run down foreign  
assets and t h e i r  reserve  r a t i o s  a t  unacceptable  r a te s  which led to  
increases  in borrowing from abroad and from the central  bank. I f  the 
c e n t r a l  bank stopped s u p p ly in g  L i q u i d i t y  to rep le n is h  the banks1 
reserves, a l iq u id i ty  c r i s i s '  would occur. Reform of  the i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
s t r u c t u r e  would provide a regulatory mechanism that  would prevent these 
shocks from a f fe c t in g  the system. We have seen in Chapter 4 tha t  i t  
was the i n t e n t i o n  o f  the centraL bank consciously  to keep domestic  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  Low and supply the l i q u i d i t y  needed by the banks to 
replenish t h e i r  reserves through the d iscount  window and swaps (2 7 ) .
However a change o f  d i rec t ion  was evident at the c e n t r a l  bank over the  
years in i t s  approach towards in te res t  rates and th e i r  reform:-
"The recent  amendment abrogating the former ce i l ing  
on the lo c a l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  and empowering the 
central  bank to control in te re s t  rates is  in  i t s e l f  
a s i g n f ic a n t  step on the path of  the development of  
the domestic money and cap t ia l  market" (28)
How d i f f e r e n t  t h i s  o p t i m i s t i c  statement was to a statement made four 
years la te r  in 1981: -
" . . .  m a in te n a n c e  o f  th e  l o c a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
structure especia l ly  as regards the KD lending rates  
governed  by t h e  Legal c e i l i n g ,  d es p i te  s t r a i n s  
r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  s h a r p  u p w a rd  t r e n d  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  I t  was n e i t h e r  
possible nor advisable for  the local i n t e r e s t  r a te s  
t o  c o m p e t e  w i t h  t h i s  t r e n d ,  b e c a u s e  t h e  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  r a i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  in  the
U.S.A. or elsewhere do not necessarily apply to the
Local In te re s t  rates in Kuwait" (29)
I t  could have been t h a t  the  c e n t r a l  bank was Limited by the in te res t
rate law in I t s  a b i l i t y  to ra ise  i n t e r e s t  rates 1n response to r ises in
in te rnat iona l  in te res t  ra tes .  However, what is  p a r t ic u la r ly  in te res t ing  
is  that  whereas the Introduction of  swaps agreements as an instrument of  
p o l ic y  to d ra in  L i q u i d i t y  d id  not have the occasion t o  f u n c t i o n ,  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  had as we have seen a considerably 
draining impact on the benks. Despite what the above quotation implied,
: o 6
p r e v io u s ly  the c e n t r a l  bank had o f te n  s ta ted  t h a t  a c r e d i t  c o r t ro l  
pol icy  had been imposed in  order  to  h a l t  runaway specula t ion ,  and to 
increase in te re s t  rates in Kuwait would have done L i t t l e  but to  p r o j e c t  
the  l i q u i d i t y  o f  the banking system and encourage depositors to keep 
t h e i r  funds in Kuwait and in Kuwaiti Dinars. The increased borrowing of  
the commercial banks from the c e n t r a l  bank in th is  period reduced t h e i r  
t r a d i t i o n a l  independence from the monetary au thor i t ies  considerably.  In 
p a r t ic u la r  th is  became e s p e c ia l ly  t r u e  a f t e r  the l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  June 
1980 which required the commercial banks to hold a cer tain proportion of  
t h e i r  l i q u i d  ass e ts  in  the form of  CBK b i l l s .  The period of  stra ined  
l i q u i d i t y  in  the  banking system between 1978 and 1980,  provided an 
excel lent  opportuni ty  for  the central  bank to introduce CBK b i l l s  as a 
compulsory L iqu id  asset  in  compensation for  the large borrowings that  
the commercial banks had been b u i ld in g  up from the centra l  bank. Even 
i f  t h is  had not been necessari ly a premeditated plan on the p a r t  o f  the  
c e n t r a l  b a n k ,  i t  showed Laudable pragmatism in  e x p l o i t i n g  such a 
s i tu a t io n .  This is  an important and as yet unnoticed observation in the 
Central  Bank's c re d i t  pol icy development.
In the 1981 Economic Report the  c e n t r a l  bank was q u i t e  wrong when i t  
stated tha t  i t  had two possible policy a l te rn a t ives  before i t  in periods 
o f  s t r a in e d  L i q u i d i t y  due to externa l  factors .  I t  had stated tha t  i t  
could e i t h e r  respond by r a i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  thereby a l l e v i a t i n g  
pressure from c a p i ta l  outf lows, or by keeping i n t e r e s t  ra te s  Low w h i le  
supp ly ing  l i q u i d i t y  to  the banks through discount f a c i l i t i e s  and the 
swap window. I t  did choose to f o l l o w  the second policy a l te rn a t iv e  but 
in view o f  the o v e ra l l  circumstances that  the central  bank was operating  
in i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to view i t  as a c l e a r  a l t e r n a t i v e  r a t h e r  than the  
only p o s s ib le  one ( 3 0 ) .  The second best environment that  the centra l  
bank operated in and the need f o r  continuous attempts a t  reform of  the 
f in a n c ia l  system has meant that  there is  a need for unusual policy
d ec is io n s  to be ta k e n .  I f  our t h e o r ie s  t h a t  the major drawback in 
centra l  bank ef fectiveness and i t s  a b i l i t y  to control bank reserves has 
been due to the p e r e n n ia l  l i q u i d i t y  o f  the banking system, then the  
above p o l i c i e s  which were f o l l o w e d  in  th e  p e r i o d  1978-81 were 
appropriate in that  they f i n a l l y  reduced the Liquidity  o f  the commercial 
banks and thereby t h e i r  independence.
The determination o f  the c e n t r a l  bank to c rea te  complementarity in the  
asset structures o f  i t s  own balance sheet and those o f  the commercial  
banks i s  c l e a r .  Such assets  would have to have the q ua l i ty  that  they 
could be eas i ly  t ransferable  from one to the other .  Such an asset need 
not have been in the form of  CBK b i l l s : -
'The central  bank is  considering the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  th e  sec ondary  m arke t  o f  KD 
denominated bonds, since such bonds are considered a 
basic too l  in the Local cap i ta l  market" (31)
We have seen however t h a t  the  ban k in g  system I t s e l f  both b ids  f o r  
foreign currency deposits and also increases the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  KD 
d epos i ts  a t  such t imes as f o r e ig n  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  r i s e ,  not j u s t  by 
increasing returns paid to d e p o s i to rs ,  but also by giving non-monetary 
or side benefi ts  to customers fo r  instance by g r a n t in g  compensatory 
loans to customers or al lowing them to break the deposit in the middle 
of  a f ixed period without penalty ,  or simply by paying commissions which 
would be v is ib ly  unrelated. The central  bank, however, has been working 
in the opposite d i rec t ion  to the tendency for the banks to give c l ie n ts  
maximum Liquidity  and the a b i l i t y  to break t h e i r  depos i t  per iods  in  
order  to r e s t r u c t u r e  t h e i r  L i a b i l i t y  structure which is  on average too 
short in m a tu r i ty .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  the l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o  of  25 per cent
imposed from August 1974 a f te r  the new law announced on 23 A p r i l  1974,  
was changed to a graded system where the l iq u id i ty  ra t io  depended on the 
term o f  the l i a b i l i t y .  Time depos i ts  w ith  m a t u r i t i e s  over one year 
would not be subject to the r a t i o ,  w h i le  35 per pent l iq u id i ty  had, at  
the other end o f  the spectrum, to be kept against current accounts. The 
overa l l  minimum ra t io  was 33 1 /3  per cent w h i le  the KD p o r t i o n ,  as we 
have seen, was increased  from 7 .5  per cent to 33 1/3 per cent.  I t  is  
clear  that  the imbalance created by the domestic in te res t  rate structure  
led to the banks giving both u n o f f i c i a l  payments to depositors as well  
as f l e x i b i l i t y  on the nature  o f  the d e p o s i t ,  and i n c r e a s i n g l y  so as 
l i q u i d i t y  became s t r a in e d  in  the period 1978-60. We saw in Chapter 3 
that  time deposits could h a rd ly  be considered quasi-money due to t h e i r  
short matur i t ies  and the f a c t  t h a t  they were dependent on o v e r d r a f t  
f a c i l i t i e s  being granted to the customer (32 ) .  I f  the central  bank was 
not successful 1n changing i n t e r e s t  r a t e  p o l ic ie s  i t  did attempt,  with 
vary ing  degrees o f  success, to  Impose a b e t t e r  s t r u c t u r e  on th e  
l i a b i l i t i e s  o f  the banks, such t h a t  the average deposit had a longer 
matur ity .
Reform over the years has been aimed a lso  a t  improving the c e n t r a l  
bank's c o n t r o l  over the reserve  assets  o f  the banking system. The 
discount  window f o r  commercial b i l l s  of  matur it ies  not exceeding three  
months, opened in 1975, f a i l e d  as we have seen due to the fact  that not 
many 3-month b i l l s  were ava i lab le  in the system and that  the banks were 
l iqu id  for  most o f  the period under study. By 1978 though the l iq u id i ty  
c r i s i s  increased  the number of  discounts and the increase of the l im i t  
to 12-month paper improved the f a c i l i t y ' s  usefulness. The central  bank 
could not i n t e r e s t  the commercial  banks e i t h e r  in  t h i s  nor 1n th e  
i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g  deposits (established in 1973] which bore an in te res t  
rate of 1/2% above the  savings depos i t  r a t e  but which as we have seen
were eventually replaced by CBK b i l l s .  We can see th is  from Tab le  4:17  
which shows the i n s i g n i f i c a n t  balances held at the central  bank even 
a f t e r  1979 .  The c o n v e r t i b i l i t y  o f  the Kuwaiti  Dinar  in to  the U.S. 
D o l l a r  a t  a r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b le  exchange meant t h a t  h igher  y i e l d i n g  
f o r e ig n  l i q u i d  assets  would be more l i k e l y  to a t t r a c t  the commercial 
banks' a t t e n t i o n .  The same y i e l d  problems have dogged the various  
attempts by the centra l  bank to issue CBK b i l l s .  Low discount rates has 
seen the commercial banks on the average as borrowers from r a t h e r  than  
l e n d e r s  to  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank, to the ex ten t  t h a t  borrowing l i m i t s  
applicable to each bank would p e r m i t .  Th is  as we have seen might have 
exacerbated the centra l  bank's i n a b i l i t y  to control c r e d i t  c r e a t io n  in  
the p a s t ,  but in the longer term th is  factor  contributed importantly to 
the loss of  independence in the commercial  banking system. The centra l  
bank however has not s t i l l  been able to develop a s u b s t a n t i a l  stock o f  
domestic assets i t  can use to manage the money supply and in pa r t ic u la r  
to o f fs e t  the impact o f  government expend i tu re  on the "high-powered" 
money base of  the banking system. In the period 1960-78 a large part of  
the monetary base has been in the hands o f  the commerciel banks. Most 
of  the commercial banks' foreign assets have been Liquid:
" . . .  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  r e t a i n e d  t h e i r  prominent  
f e a t u r e s  throughout 1 9 7 2 /3  w i th  respect  to  both 
L i q u i d i t y  and p o r t f o l i o .  The h igh  deg re e  o f  
l i q u i d i t y  was s t i l l  ensured. Moreover the main 
components were balances w i th  fo re ig n  banks and 
c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  deposit" (33)
Since much of  the commercial  banks' independence was based on t h e i r  
f o r e ig n  exchange re s e rv e s ,  the c e n t r a l  bank in  May 1978 decided to 
i n s t i t u t e  currency swap arrangements to enable i t  to drain l iq u id i ty  by
e f fec t ing  3-month purchase and resale f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  fo r e ig n  currency .  
T h is  in  a way was to be the equivalent of repurchase agreements in the 
foreign exchange market. However, l i k e  i n t e r e s t  bearing deposits,  the 
swap system suffered certa in  shortcomings, in p a r t i c u l a r  the Lack o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  the system which was based on r ig id  swap cei l ings  allowed 
f o r  each i n d i v i d u a l  bank and the i n a b i l i t y  o f  the  c e n t r a l  bank to  
exercise f u l l  control over t ra n s a c t io n s  as they depended largely on the 
i n i t i a t i v e  and the motives o f  the commercial  banks.  None o f  th e  
ins t rum ents  crea ted  in  the past by the c e n t r a l  bank allowed them to 
improve a d ra in in g  programme in the commercial  banks, and the only 
p o t e n t i a l l y  u s e fu l  in s t ru m e n t  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i s  th e  CBK b 1 L L. 
L i q u i d i t y  and the e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  large proportion of  excess reserves 
over and above statutory  l im i ts  during the period 1960-78 has Led us to 
re in te rp re t  the notion of  "high-powered" money 1n the Kuwait system and 
to  c lass  the net f o r e ig n  assets  o f  the banks as l iqu id  assets.  This 
does remind us of  B e tz 's  view o f  the currency-board  economy of MaLaya 
and Singapore, and the operations of  the foreign banks in  t h a t  kind o f  
economy ( 3 4 ) .  However 1n the per iod  1978-80 the p ic ture  as we have 
shown is  gradually changing away from these previous pat terns.
1i i ) THE STOCK MARKET CREDIT SYSTEM AND CENTRAL BANK REGULATIONS
We saw in Chapter 4 that the stock market boom in the U.S. in the period 
1920-29 produced severe disagreement w i t h in  the Federal Reserve system 
on pol icy ,  overs impl if ied as a d i f ference between the Federa l  Reserve  
Board and the  Federa l  Reserve Bank o f  New York. Both, in te res t ing ly  
enough agreed that  secur ity  s p e c u la t io n  was cause for concern, but the 
d i f f e r e n c e  in op in ion  was about the d e s i r a b i L l t y  o f  " q u a l i t a t i v e "  
techniques o f  c o n t r o l  designed to induce banks to discriminate against
loans for  speculative purposes. The view a t t r i b u t e d  to the Board was 
t h a t  d i r e c t  p r e s s u r e  was a t e r r i b l e  means o f  r e s t r i c t i n g  the  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  c r e d i t  f o r  s p e c u l a t i v e  purposes  w i t h o u t  undu ly  
r e s t r i c t i n g  i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  for productive purposes, whereas a r ise in 
discount  r a te s  on open m a rk e t  s a l e s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  severe to curb 
speculation would be too severe for  business in gen era l .  The c o n f l i c t  
continued u n t i l  the  eve o f  the stock market crash and the outcome was 
predictably a compromise: -
"not r e s t r i c t i v e  enough to h a l t  the b u l l  market yet
too  r e s t r i c t i v e  to  f o s t e r  v i g o r o u s  b u s i n e s s
expansion" (351
Although the central  bank in the case of Kuwait has in s t i tu te d  select ive  
c o n t r o ls  and s t a t i s t i c s  on the d is t r ib u t io n  of  bank Loans, as we have 
seen since e a r l y  days almost in  the manner proposed by the Federal  
Reserve Board in 1928, i t  is  nevertheless d i f f i c u l t  to c o n t r o l  the use 
o f  funds in  the p r o p r i e t o r s h i p  trading -  companies or partnerships of  
indiv iduals  both o f  which represent the mejor part o f  the banks' c l ie n t  
base. We saw 1n Chapter 4 that  a large proportion o f  c r e d i t  expansion  
in  Kuwait  i s  L i m i t e d  to  i n v e s t m e n t  in  shares,  which we saw are  
low-y ie ld ing investments  and t h e r e f o r e  only  s e I f - 11q u id a t in g  to the 
extent that  other market p a r t i c ip a n t s  and the government support the  
market enough to c rea te  a cap i ta l  gain (36 ) .  We saw also in Chapter 3 
that  the demand f o r  money and i t s  s t r u c t u r e  is  c l e a r l y  influenced by 
dealing in the stock market. Time deposits for  instance can be seen to
be c o l l a t e r a l  a g a in s t  o v e r d r a f t s  fo r  the most p a r t ,  which are  used
act ive ly  for  w r i t i n g  cheques f o r  the t r a d in g  o f  stocks (37 ) .  To the 
extent that stock market prices r ise  and encourage new investment credi t  
expansion associated with stock market booms need not Lead to fo re ig n
exchange Leaks ( c a p i t a l  o u t f lo w s ) ,  but when the stock market declines 
there is  no p a r a l l e l  c r e d i t  c o n t r a c t io n  s ince stocks are not usuelly 
Liquidated, or i f  they are overdrafts  tend not to be repa id  and funds 
are transferred abroad (38 ) .
The dangers o f  such a system of  borrowing fo r  stock market speculation 
were clear  to the c e n t r a l  bank s ince the very beg inning of  the stock 
market. The s i tua t ion  combined not only the normal dangers o f  stock  
market  sp e c u la t io n  but also the dangers o f  the terms on which bank 
customers rece ived  o v e r d r a f t s ,  which we descr ibed in  Chapter 4 as a 
system t h a t  could lead to i l l i q u i d i t y  1n the banking system i f  not  
control led (38 ) .  I t  i s  c lear  from the discussion in Chapter 4, however, 
t h a t  much o f  the c r e d i t  created for  shares speculation was forthcoming 
from an informal c r e d i t  system which we have c a l l e d  the "stock market 
cred i t  system", which took the form of discounted personal  cheques o f  
s p e c u la to rs .  The banks par t ic ipa ted  1n th is  system to benefi t  from the 
yields but were not the o r i g i n a t o r s  o f  t h i s  system ( 4 0 ) .  Post-dated 
cheques we saw made t h e i r  debut in the 1976 stock market boom but then  
largely disappeared again u n t i l  1978 when the size o f  the t o t a l  f lo a t  of  
such cheques increased exponential ly and continued beyond the end of  the 
p e r i o d  under  s t u d y .  The c e n t r a l  bank imposed a t o t a l  ban on the  
discounting of  cheques in  June 1982 ,  but b e l a t e d l y .  Like the Federal 
Reserve System in  the U.S. in  1928,  the c e n t r a l  bank perce ived  the  
dangers o f  the stock market boom, but unlike the Federal Reserve System 
i t  moved from ear ly  days to at tempt to control  the s i tu a t io n .  However, 
the fact  that  the basic c red i t  system that  Lay behind the stock market  
boom was u n c o n t r o l l a b le  by the c e n t r a l  bank, meant that  i t s  po l ic ies  
have L i t t l e  influence on the outcome o f  events except perhaps to Limit 
the banks' exposure to the stock market, which as we have explained, due 
to the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  m on i to r ing  the  use o f  loan funds in  Kuwait was
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sizeable in any case.
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CHAPTER 6
TH E EVO LU TIO N OF CENTRAL BANK P O L IC Y  IN  THE CURRENCY MARKETS
i ) INTRODUCTION
We have seen t h a t  there  are no important benefi ts  in Kuwait having i t s  
own independent currency and t h a t  some arguments could be advanced for  
the u n i f ica t ion  of  the Kuwait i  D inar  w ith  o th e r  Arab c o u n t r i e s .  In  
Chapter  2 we reached the  conclus ion t h a t  the monetary au thor i t ies  in 
Kuwait inher i ted  the Kuwaiti Dinar  by h i s t o r ic a l  accident while they do 
not appear to have la id  great store by t h e i r  independent currency ,  and 
have made certa in proposals through the Gulf  Corporation Council towards 
t h e  p o s s ib le  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  the G u l f  c u r r e n c ie s .  As we s h a l l  see 
towards the end of  th is  chapter,  they fol lowed a pol icy of  s t a b i l i t y  in 
the management of th e i r  currency.
i 1} OIL PRICING POLICY
A rough sketch of petroleum pr ic ing policy 1s necessary because o f  the  
importance of  petroleum in  the  c o u n t r y 's  balance of payments and the 
consequent importance for  the  c o u n t r y 's  t ra d e  of  the decision to price  
petroleum in U.S. do l la rs .  No attempts were ever made to have any p a r t  
o f  the c o u n t r y 's  petroleum exports priced in domestic currency. While 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  such a programme would be enormous because of the 
size of  the petroleum sector in re la t ion  to the rest o f  the economy, the 
lack of in te res t  on the part of the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  in  a t te m p t in g  
or even studying such a programme in d e t a i l ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  the fac t  that
the government never had anything except a Limited role in view for the 
Kuwaiti Dinar.  We s h a l l  see l a t e r  t h a t  one o f  the approaches to an 
opt im a l  basket fo r  a country such as Kuwait, with a homogenous export 
commodity of considerable importance in  the country's overa l l  trade,  is  
that  the weights used in that  country's basket peg should r e f l e c t  t o t a l  
world t ra d e  in  t h a t  commodity, r a t h e r  than the d i re c t io n  of  Kuwaiti 
t r a d e .  Whatever th e  c o n c l u s i o n  on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  op t im a l  peg 
c r i t e r io n ,  o i l  pr ic ing pol icy is  o f  fundamental importance because a t  
some point in the monetary decision-making process (whether at the level  
o f  the M in is t ry  of  Finance which is  responsible for domestic government 
ex p e n d i tu re ,  or a t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  bank) the monetary 
au thor i t ies  w i l l  take into  account that  the m a j o r i t y  o f  the c o u n t r y 's  
earnings are denominated in the currency of  invoice for petroleum.
Payments fo r  petroleum expor ts  used to be made 1n S te r l in g ,  and even 
a f te r  independence in 1961 payments could not p r a c t i c a l l y  be made in 
Kuwaiti Dinars due to the thinness of  the Kuwaiti D inar  money-markets.  
From 1946 onwards, G u l f  O i l  and BP, the two fo r e ig n  partners in the 
Kuwait 011 Company (KOC), each pa id t h e i r  contr ibut ions from petroleum 
revenues to the government of  Kuwait through an account in London. BP 
paid in  s t e r l i n g ,  and GuLf O i l  in  d o l l a r s  which were converted into  
s te r l in g ,  a l l  transactions being c a r r i e d  out at  the B r i t ish  Bank of  the 
Middle East in London. The r o y a l t i e s  on petroleum in  the e a r l y  days 
were f i x e d  in  Rupees (w h ic h  was as we have seen a surroga te  fo r  
s t e r l i n g ) .  Before 1951,  the  agreement o f  the Kuwaiti government with 
KOC provided for  a f ixed money payment of three Rupees per long ton o f  
crude,  in  a d d i t io n  to  a few e x t r a s .  The equivalent of $36.5 m i l l io n  
were paid  as r o y a l t i e s  to  Kuwait between 1946-50 fo r  284 .2  m i l l i o n  
barre ls .  A tax law was passed in Kuwait subjecting o i l  companies to 50% 
corporate p r o f i t s  tax in 1951, fol lowing V enezue la 's  p recedent .  Th is
inc reased  government revenue considerably (Kuwait received $60 m i l l ion  
in 1953 aLone). I t  was the  concept o f  posted pr ices  introduced in an 
agreement of  11 October,  1955 ,  which in t roduced U.S.  d o l l a r s  as the  
reference pr ice for  petroleum.
According to the agreement of the 11th October, 1955, imputed tax values 
o f  petroleum exports  in  1956 -8  were to be assessed on the basis of a 
"posted p r i c e "  per b a r r e l l  r a t h e r  than on a c tu a l  p r ic e s  re c e iv e d .  
Companies would post a pr ice  in  the neighbourhood o f  what they might  
r e a l i s e  from the sa le  o f  petro leum ,  but these p r ic e s  were employed 
merely as tax reference p r i c e s .  Consequent ly ,  should petroleum prices  
f lu c tu a te ,  the Level of tax would not.  Royalty payments were changed to 
12.5% of  the "posted pr ice" ,  from th r e e  Rupees per Long t o n .  At the  
same t im e ,  t h i s  agreement provided f o r  voLume discounts of  8.3% of  
"posted p r ic e s "  on petro leum sa les  in  excess o f  20 m i l l i o n  tons per 
annum, va l id  u n t i l  the end o f  1958. Marketing expenses were set  a t  2% 
o f  "posted p r ic e s "  but were reduced to 1% following the 18th December, 
1958, agreement between the government of Kuwait and KOC. These changes 
in terms appl ied ,  and in  p a r t i c u l a r  the concept o f  the posted pr ice ,  
were due to the power o f  the Large o i l  market ing c o rp o ra t io n s  ( the  
bigges t  seven were known as ths "Seven S i s t e r s " )  and t h e i r  tendency 
during t h i s  per iod  to reduce t h e  m a rk e t  p r i c e  o f  petro leum .  The 
a c t i v i t i e s  of  the Seven S is ters  (Standard Oi l  New Jersey ,  Texaco, G u l f  
O i l  C o rp o ra t io n ,  Standard O i l  C a l i fo rn ia ,  Mobil O i l  Corporation, Royal 
Dutch S h e l l ,  and B r i t i s h  P e t r o l e u m )  Led to  th e  format ion  o f  the  
Organisation of  Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1959 the f i r s t  
Arab petroleum congress was he ld  in C a i r o ,  and I r a n  and Venezuela  
attended as observers but,  a f t e r  fur ther  o i l  pr ice reductions by the o i l  
companies, a meeting o f  o i l  ex p o r te rs  ( in c lu d i n g  I r a n ,  I r a q ,  Saudi 
Arabia,  Kuwait and Venezuala) formed OPEC. The use of the U.S. d o l la r
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in p r ic in g  o i l  began because to e s t a b l i s h  the concept o f  e "posted  
p r i c e "  which in e f fec t  was an expected merket p r ice ,  one had to use the 
currency most used in  the o i l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  market i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  
Subsequent to 1959f the m u l t i l a te r a l  cooperat ion  needed in OPEC meent 
t h a t  th e r e  was no quest ion  o f  "posted p r ic e s "  being in the nat ional  
currency of  o i l  expor ters ,  and the quest ion  o f  the declin ing velue of  
the U.S. do l la r  between 1970-79 was dealt  with by simply increasing the  
"posted pr ice" .
i i i )  A REVIEW OF THEORETICAL CURRENCY QUESTIONS
At th e  b e g in n i n g  o f  C h e p t e r  2 i t  was e x p la in e d  t h a t  the issues  
concerning the creation of  an independent currency and those of  monetery 
i n t e g r a t i o n  were q u i te  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s id e r a t io n s .  Consequent ly ,  we 
should not forget  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  throughout d iscuss ions  on currency  
issues ,  the edoption of  f ixed exchenge rates by a country and jo in ing  a 
common currency area, are d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s  [ 1 ) .  We cannot expect, 
for  instance, currencies in a f ixed exchange regime to  remain a l ig ned  
over  long periods of  t ime, and we should e n t ic ip e te  a cer ta in  degree of 
destab i l is ing  specula t ive  c e p i t e l  f lows ( 2 ) .  A f ix e d  exchange regime 
between a group o f  c o u n t r i e s  i s  not  a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  m onetary  
u n i f ica t io n  and is  prone to frequent and sharp exchange rate  adjustment.
We e s te b l is h e d  in  Chapter  2 t h a t  two c r i t e r i a  appear in the relevent  
l i t e r a t u r e  to determine whether en area should have a separate currency 
or not -  1 .  s i z e  and 2 .  s o c ia l  u n i t y  with co n t iguous  a r e a s .  The 
quest ion  o f  s i z e  Leading to certa in indeterminacies, we concluded that  
social  u n i ty  is  a s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more im por tan t  c r i t e r i o n  than size ,  
although we s t i l l  have to look a t  the e f fec t  of a country 's  s ize  on i t s
a b i l i t y  to a d ju s t  to  payments imbalances without a separate currency.  
Quite c lear ly  the marginal propensity  to  import (or openness] c r i te r io n  
along with the p r i c e - e l a s t i c i t y  o f  exports c r i te r io n  (both s u b - c r i t e r i a  
o f  the s iz e  c r i t e r io n ]  would make i t  more e f f i c i e n t  i f  Kuwait were part  
of a common currency area.
Although we analyse the d i f f e r e n t  arguments for  f loa t ing  and adjustable  
par ( f ixed ]  exchange r a te s  in  our d iscussion o f  currency management 
below, we sha l l  rapidly  come to the conclusion that  a f lo a t in g  exchange 
rate is  not relevant to the Kuwaiti  s i t u a t i o n .  Certain arguments, such 
as the  lack o f  proper  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and market s t r u c t u r e s  f o r  th e  
o p e ra t io n  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e s ,  w i l l  lead us to consider that  
perhaps for  Kuwait as in many developing economies, adjustable p a r i t i e s  
are more des irable .  The decision not to f l o a t ,  however, is  a d i f f e r e n t  
one to the choice of  c r i t e r i o n  for  exchange rate adjustment.
A glance a t  the sources and uses o f  funds in the Kuwaiti Dinar money 
market immediately makes us aware o f  an unusual p ic ture  that  requires 
unusual answers. The u l t imate  "source" of  Kuwaiti Dinars on the foreign  
exchange market is  e n t i re ly  government expenditure. In  1969 ,  when the  
Central  Bank was formed i t  was o f f i c i a l l y  separated from the Ministry of  
F in a n c e  and P e t r o l e u m ,  which held  and cont inues to hold a l l  the  
country's in te rn a t iona l  r e s e rv e s .  The Kuwait Investment Board in that  
year became the Kuwait Investment O f f i c e  and more or Less the London 
branch o f  the M i n i s t r y  o f  Finance and Petroleum. The separation made 
sure t h a t  th e re  could be no d i r e c t  l i n k  between the note issue and 
petroleum revenues which began to o u t s t r i p  the c o u n t r y 's  a b s o rp t ive  
c a p a c i ty  even in the ear ly  days of  petroleum production. The petroleum 
section of the Min istry  received the revenues while the f inance section 
made in te rnat iona l  investments and developed a plan f o r  exp end i tu re  in
Kuwait with the aim of  d iv e r s i f i c a t io n  of  the country's productive base. 
The Kuwait i  D inar  economy can in t h i s  sense be viewed as one of the 
investments of the M i n i s t r y  o f  F inance.  The note issue, as we saw in 
Chapter 5,  a r i s e s  when the  M in i s t r y  buys i t s  requirements from the  
C e n t r a l  Bank w i th  fo r e ig n  cur renc y .  The major "uses" of  the Kuwaiti 
Dinar on the foreign exchange markets are  for public and pr ivate  sector 
imports and cap i ta l  exports of  the pr ivate  sector.
I t  would seem clear  that being the unique source of Kuwaiti D inars ,  the  
Kuwait i  government need not f l o a t  the currency to a f fe c t  sources and 
uses (exports,  imports and c a p i t a l  f low s)  while i t  can use the currency 
to t ry  and keep wealth accrued to the pr ivate  f irm being exported, which 
we mentioned in Chapter 2 as a r e la t i v e ly  important goal of the Kuwaiti  
a u t h o r i t i e s  in  the h i s t o r ic a l  context.  We also mentioned in Chapter 2 
that  i t  was not c lear  whether t h i s  was a j u s t i f i e d  policy or not but we 
shaLL look more c lo s e ly  a t  t h i s  a t  the  end o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r .  The 
r e p a t r i a t i o n  o f  Kuwait i  d o l l a r s  is  not, however, as we sha l l  see, the 
only reason for  keeping a s t a b le  exchange r a t e .  Among other reasons, 
there is  the factor  of  the large net fo re ig n  assets  o f  the commercial  
banks.
iv )  THE FIXED VERSUS FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE DEBATE
We shall  review the c lass ica l  f ixed versus f lo a t in g  exchange rate  debate 
to assess i t s  re levance to developing economies, and then we sh a l l ,  
pr ior  to assessing K u w a i t 's  currency management performance, analyse 
some of  the reasons why the c lass ica l  debate is  not a ltogether  r e le v a n t  
to developing economies and in p a r t ic u la r  to Kuwait.
We have mentioned that  f ixed exchange rates can lead to speculative and 
des tab i l iz ing  c a p i ta l  f lows ( 3 ) .  Even when confidence in a permanent 
f ixed exchange rate system al lows imbalances to be f inanced with  the  
minimum o f  fuss and d i f f i c u l t y ,  i n a b i l i t y  to induce an equ i l ib ra t ing  
move in r e l a t i v e  costs  and p r i c e s  can a l lo w  marked d i s p a r i t i e s  in  
incomes and wealth to a r i s e ,  and lead to s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  
re g io n a l  unemployment rates and/or large-scale forced migration. Rare 
a r e  th e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  where l o c a l  wage r a t e s  and p r i c e s  v a ry  
s u f f ic ie n t l y  f l e x i b l y ,  r e l a t i v e l y  to each o t h e r ,  to maintain a c t i v i t y  
and employment in each region. Ingram (4) proposed a f ixed ra te  system 
based on the P u e r to -R ic a n  e xp er ien ce ,  but Fleming (5) shows th is  is  
u n r e a l is t ic  in the case of  a chronic d e f i c i t  and implies a complete Loss 
to  the region o f  monetary p o l i c y  as a t o o l  to in f lu e n c e  domestic 
economic a c t i v i t y .
The adjustment problems can be overcome with in the conf ines  o f  a f ix e d  
exchange r a te  system, even under condit ions where r e la t iv e  reaL wages 
are  slow to a d j u s t .  To do so ,  how ever ,  re q u i re s  the adoption o f  
appropriate f is c a l  po l icy ,  which would probabLy invo lve  a La rg e -s c a le ,  
and o f te n  lo n g -co n t in u ed ,  t r a n s f e r  o f  r e a l  resources from the more 
prosperous region to the disadvantaged regions (6 ) .  P o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  
give few grounds for beL iev ing  t h a t  th e r e  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  harmony among 
d i f fe r e n t  areas to establ ish a permanently f ixed exchange r a te  system,  
and t h i s  problem has a l re a d y  been mentioned in  the context  o f  our 
discussion of optimum currency a re a s .  Given, therefore ,  that  exchange 
rate  adjustments are made necessary by such imbalances,  the quest ion  
a r is e s  whether the exchange ra te  between d i f fe re n t  areas should f loa t  
(and therefore be determined by market f o r c e s ) ,  or be managed by the 
monetary au th o r i t ie s .  Management o f  a currency can be e i t h e r  in  the  
form o f  "ad hoc" i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  the s e t t i n g  o f  "c raw l ing  p a r i t i e s "
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(allowing the currency to vary w i t h in  l i m i t s ,  and vary ing the l im i ts  
over t im e) ,  or by way of an adjustable peg which would in v o lv e  sudden 
r e v a l u a t i o n s  and d e v a lu a t io n s .  F e l l n e r  (7)  makes a case fo r  the  
"crawling peg" in an attempt to combine the best features of f l e x i b i l i t y  
with some res t ra in ing  and s t a b i l i s i n g  f e a tu r e s  o f  f ixed p a r i t i e s .  I t  
was widely  b e l ie v e d  when he wrote ( i n  1966)  t h a t  the then e x i s t in g  
system o f  f i x e d  p a r i t i e s  w ith  narrow margins f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  and 
in f req u en t  changes in  p a r i t y ,  represented a bad compromise among a 
number of  a l te rn a t iv e  systems. We shall  see below that where the f i x e d  
versus f l o a t i n g  debate runs along l in e s  t h a t  a re  i r r e l e v a n t  to the 
p r a c t i c a l  problems o f  developing economies, the  a d ju s t a b le  par and 
crawling peg theories are proposed without any d e f i n i t e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  
adjustment.
The same basic  reason t h a t  a l lowed the Gold Standard to work in the 
nineteenth  century  a l lowed f i x e d  p a r i t i e s  to work in  the immediate 
post-war period.  T r i f f i n  (8) shows that  there was a certa in  para l le l ism  
in the movement of  the nat ional  pr ice levels of  industra l ized  co u n tr ie s  
in the nineteenth century, and that  th is  was p a r t i a l l y  due to r e la t iv e ly  
s i m i l a r  monetary p o l i c i e s  but also because the p r i n c i p a l  burden of  
adjustment f e l l  on c o u n t r ie s  o f  th e  " p e r ip h e r y " ,  producers o f  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  f o r  the growing i n d u s t r i e s  o f  E u ro p e ,  c o u n t r i e s  which  
exper ienced adverse movements in  the terms of trade whenever B r i ta in  
t ightened money and which o f te n  r e l i e d  on changes in exchange rates to 
restore balance. Harmony between monetary p o l ic ies  to a c e r ta in  e x ten t  
al lowed f i x e d  p a r i t i e s  in  the immediate post-war period a f t e r  Bretton 
Woods. However, from 1968 onwards when the Federal Reserve started to 
slow down gold sales to foreign central  banks, the success of the f i x e d  
exchange r a t e  system depended actualLy on the macro-economic s t a b i l i t y  
of the U.S economy. The U.S.  did not in te rv e n e  much in  the foreign
exchange market and allowed large do l la r  holdings to build up abroad as 
a r e s u l t  o f  balance o f  payments d e f i c i t s .  Under t h i s  system, fo r  
countries other than the U . S . ,  i n c i p i e n t  or actual balance of payments 
surpluses ( d e f i c i t s )  had the immediate impact of inc reas ing  ( reduc ing)  
money s u p p l y .  On the o th e r  hand, the asymmetr ical  exchange r a t e  
p o s i t io n  o f  the U.S.  v i s - a - v i s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  where the Federa l  
Reserve did not intervene and the U.S. d o l la r  was an acceptab le  I . O . U .  
throughout the w o r ld ,  in  f a c t  acted to prevent  the U.S.  balance of  
payments d e f i c i t s  from a u t o m a t ic a l l y  c o n t r a c t in g  the monetary base of  
the U.S. While European and Japanese balance o f  payments surpluses  
induced substant ia l  monetary expansion, the monetary impact in the U.S. 
of the corresponding U.S. payments d e f i c i t s  was f u l l y  s t e r i l i z e d .  This 
state  of a f f a i r s  lasted u n t i l  confidence was lost and the run out of the 
U.S. do l la r  began. This was due, according to Ronald McKinnon, to  the  
Vietnam War, and i r r e s p o n s i b l e  monetary policy during the Johnson and 
Nixon administrations in the U.S.  ( 9 ) .  Automatic s t e r i l i z a t i o n  of  what 
McKinnon c a l l e d  the  " c e n t re "  c o u n t r y 's  payments d e f i c i t s  becomes a 
d e fec t  in  the w o r ld 's  monetary system only  when th a t  country i t s e l f  
becomes unstable.  The d o l l a r  debacle  o f  1971-3  led to the system of  
f lo a t in g  exchanges we have had since 1973. Strenuous e f fo r ts  to enforce 
a new legal basis f o r  f i x e d  exchange r a t e s ,  which was agreed a t  the  
Smithsonian I n s t i t u t i o n  in  December 1971,  had collapsed by February 
1973.  The present  regime o f  f r e e  f L o a t in g  i s  sub jec t  to  only the  
loosest kind o f  supervision by the In te rn a t iona l  Monetary Fund (10) .
So we see that the continued success of f ixed exchange r a t e s ,  re q u i re s  
e i ther  harmony o f  monetary po l ic ies  between d i f f e r e n t  areas, or one or a 
number o f  areas to  take  the brunt  o f  adjustment fo r  the rest of  the 
w or ld .  In  the  n in e te e n th  ce n tu ry  to  the ex te n t  t h a t  th e re  was no 
monetary harmony, the so-cal led 'Third  World" or the "periphery" in  the
t e rm in o lo g y  o f  T r i f f i n  paid by way o f  d e t e r i o r a t i n g  barter  turms of  
trade and ensuing impoverishment.  In  the t w e n t ie th  century the U.S. 
took over th is  role  but only to the extent t h a t  the U.S. d o l l a r  was a 
g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t a b l e  I . O . U .  , and i t s  d e f i c i t  could t h e r e f o r e  be 
i n d e f in i t e ly  f inanced. Th is  only  changed when the Vietnam War led to 
fast  monetary growth in the U.S.  and the value o f  the U.S.  d o l l a r  to  
f o r e ig n  h o ld e rs  was a t  r i s k .  This experience teaches us c lea r ly  that  
q ue st ions  o f  currency  management can not  b a s i c a l l y  be u n i l a t e r a l  
dec is ions.  The "snake" p r o j e c t  in  Europe and the ensuing European 
Monetary System ( E .M .S . )  both had to be based on the harmonisation of  
monetary p o l i c y  between European c o u n t r ie s  i f  they were to succeed 
comp lete  l y .
The basic reason why countries and more s p e c i f i c a l l y  governments f e e l  
the  need to r e t a i n  the a b i l i t y  to vary t h e i r  exchange rate  is because 
e x t e r n a l  developments and shocks t h r e a t e n  the maintenance o f  the  
in te rn a l  balance. We sha l l  see t h a t  the bas ic  c r i t e r i o n  o f  exchange 
r a t e  ad justment  should be the continuance o f  i n t e r n a l  balance while 
being con ten t  to  ensure t h a t  th e  e x t e r n a l  balance i s  s a t i s f i e d  on 
average over the medium term. We sha l l  see th is  po in t  very c l e a r l y  in  
our d iscuss ion  concerning the use of  baskets to which to peg exchange 
ra tes .  Where f i s c a l  po l icy  is  i n f l e x i b l e  and at the same time a f ixed  
exchange rate  does not al low monetary pol icy to have i t s  f u l l  impact on 
the i n t e r n a l  ba lance ,  we would have severe problems. T h is  sort  of  
s i tua t ion  is  envisaged in the "po l i  cy -a  I location" models, in p a r t ic u la r  
F le m in g  ( 1 1 ) .  We a n a ly s e d  ( i n  C h a p t e r  3 )  th e  p rob lem  o f  th e  
"endogeneity" o f  the money supply and the in f lu e n c e  o f  the balance o f  
payments through the " P o L a k - e f f a c t " ( 1 2 ) ,  which show us the possibLe 
impotence o f  domestic c red i t  expansion v i s - a - v is  managing the country's 
in te rn a L  ba lan c e ,  in economies w i th  f i x e d  exchange r a t e s .  Us ing
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d e f l a t i o n a r y  measures f o r  ins tance  in an attempt to prevent imported 
i n f l a t i o n ,  may backfire by drawing more money in from abroad on the back 
of r is ing  in te re s t  r a t e s ,  thereby n e u t r a l i z i n g  the improvement in the 
externa l balance brought about by the i n i t i a l  d e c l in e  in  incomes. In  
any event,  a country l ike Kuwait with a very high percentage of tradable  
to  n o n - t ra d e d  goods, would face  less unemployment from pursu ing a 
d e f l a t i o n a r y  p o l i c y  than  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  a h i g h e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  
non-traded goods. However, we must not f o r g e t  t h a t  in  the smal l  open 
economy the price level is bas ica l ly  determined by world pr ices.
In  t h i s  re s p e c t ,  the adopt ion of a regime of  f re eLy - f loa t ing  exchange 
rates has a number of apparent advantages.  I f  the au thor i t ies  maintain 
some p a r t ic u la r  level of domestic demand, then usuaLly th e re  should be 
one and only one exchange r a t e  t h a t  w iL l  al low the maintenance of an 
external  balance consistent with the chosen in te rn a l  balance. However, 
i t  may not be v i a b l e  to r e l y  on movements in  the exchange r a t e  to  
maintain externa l balance.
The currency v o l a t i l i t y  o f  the  period 1973 onwerds has been blamed on 
d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n .  To t h e  p o p u l a r  f i n a n c i a l  press ,  the  
unexpectedly wide var ia t ions ,  as much as ten to t h i r t y  percent per year,  
in f lo a t in g  exchange rates since 1973 appear to be per se evidence o f  
d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u la t io n .  In  f a c t ,  t h i s  v o l a t i l i t y  i s  due to the 
absence o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u la t io n  (13 )  and the f a c t  t h a t  a market 
consisting of  only legit imate traders and covered in te res t  a r b i t r a g e u r s  
(who determine the forward currency r a te s  on the bas is  o f  in te re s t  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  m a t u r i t i e s  -  the  I n t e r e s t  Rate P a r i t y  
Theorem ( 1 4 ) )  i s  i n h e r e n t l y  u n s ta b le .  Where, in  a regime o f  f i x e d  
exchange r a t e s ,  currency speculation thr ives  because centra l  banks are 
known to be market-makers and support the market for a currency
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w i t h in  p r e - s e t  p r i c e s ,  by contrast  i t  disappears when such support is  
taken away (15 ) .  The reason t h a t  a market for  foreign exchange without 
speculation is  unstable  is  because o f  what is  commonly known as the  
J -curve  ( 1 6 ) .  I f  the long-term price e l a s t i c i t y  of demand far  any one 
c o u n t r y 's  exports  should be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  g r e a t e r  than u n i t y ,  the  
long-run change in the exchange rate  required to a d ju s t  to  an e x t e r n a l  
shock, given the  le v e l  of domestic demand, should be small.  But i f  we 
assume lags and r i g i d i t i e s  in  the  response o f  suppl iers ,  the short-run  
price e l a s t i c i t y  of  demand for a country's exports may be much lower, to 
the e x te n t  t h a t  the d e v a lu a t io n  may lower the t ra d e  ba lance .  The 
J -cu rve  was so cal led because i t s  shape indicates an immoderate decline  
in the trade balance of a certa in  country followed by a longer recovery. 
This is  a var ia t ion  on what we have ca l led the MarshalL-Lerner condit ion 
for  s t a b i l i t y  in  the e f f e c t s  o f  a de v a lu a t io n  or  r e v a lu a t io n  in the 
trade balance of a p a r t ic u la r  country.  Th is  c o n d i t io n  m a in ta ins  t h a t  
fo r  an exchange r a t e  movement not to  have a p e rve rse  impact on the 
balance of  t ra d e  the sum o f  the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  f o r e ig n  demand o f  a 
country's expor t  and lo c a l  demand f o r  imports must be g r e a t e r  than  
uni t y .
Why was the s t a b i l i z i n g  speculation expected by th e o re t ic a l  economists 
of f r e e ly - f lo a t i n g  exchanges not forthcoming?
"Under a system of  g r e a t e r  f l e x i b i l i t y  such serious 
d isa l ignm ents  o f  exchange r a te s  would nev er ,  or  
hardly ever, a r is e ,  and expectations of  change would 
be conf ined  to miniscule adjustments. P r o f i t s  from 
small  changes can o n l y  be s m a l l ,  i n v i t i n g  only  
m o d era te  s p e c u l a t i o n ,  w h ic h  can be e a s i l y  
discouraged, i f  t h is  is  wanted, by r e l a t i v e l y  minor
d i f f e r e n t i a ls  in in te re s t  ra tes" .  (17)
Machlup was not alone is  these views. Other notable economists such as 
Friedman, Johnson, and Sohmen (18) have maintained s im i lar  views on the 
gradualness of  adjustment under f l o a t i n g  r a t e s ,  which they contrasted 
favourably with the sharp and discrete changes and one-way s p e c u la t io n  
f renzies of  the old pegged-rate system. McKinnon (19) assesses that  the 
problem was that  in the furor  of  deciding whether speculation was going 
to be s t a b i l i z in g  or d e s t a b i l i z i n g ,  economists fo r g o t  to address the 
problem o f  who was going to supply the cap i ta l  for such speculation.
"Exchange r a te s  can move sharp ly  in response to  
random v a r i a t i o n s  in the d ay - to -d ay  demands by 
merchants or  from monetary d is tu rb a n c e s .  Once a 
r a t e  s t a r t s  to move because o f  some te m p o r a r y  
p e r t u r b a t io n ,  no prospective speculation is  w i l l i n g  
to hold an open p o s i t i o n  f o r  a s i g n i f i c a n t  t ime
I n t e r v a l  1n order  to  b e t  on a r e v e r s a l  ..............
Bandwagon p s y c h o lo g ie s  r e s u l t  from the genera l  
unwil lingness of  p a r t i c i p a n t s  to take net posit ions  
a g a i n s t  n e a r - t e r m  m a rk e t  movements t h a t  a r e  
n e c e s s a r i l y  a c c e n t u a t e d  by th e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  
non-speculative merchants". (20)
Both commercial banks and m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  l i m i t  t h e i r  foreign exchange 
exposure and the more v o l a t i l e  the markets, the more they r e s t r i c t  and 
c o n t r o l  these a c t i v i t i e s .  P r iv a t e  indiv iduals  as a group do not have 
the c a p i t a l  or the knowledge to  rep lace  them, and hot money flows -  
whether by m u l t i n a t i o n a l s  or p r i v a t e s  -  a re  de fens ive  r a t h e r  than  
speculative and may widen rather  than dampen f luc tua t ions .
The burden o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  in th is  sort of  environment lays therefore  
with  the c e n t r a l  banks. The a u t h o r i t i e s  charged w ith  running the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monetary system, as set  up a t  B r e t t o n  Woods, have  
t h e r e f o r e  kept t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  f ixed on the wrong measure. They have 
usually been concerned w i th  p a r i t y  l e v e ls  and c o n t r o l l in g ,  pegging or 
adjusting these leve ls .  But they do not, and cannot, know what le v e ls  
a r e  c o r r e c t ;  t h e i r  a t t e m p t s  to m ain ta in  such le v e ls  Lead to the  
im p o s i t io n  o f  d i s t o r t i o n s  on th e  w o r ld  economy ( e g .  v ia  d i r e c t  
contro ls ) ;  and the occasional l a r g e - s c a l e  jumps in  exchange ra te s  to  
r e c t i f y  an impossible s i tua t ion  are d isrupt ive .  Instead, t h e i r  concern 
ought to be with the r a t e  o f  change o f  p a r i t i e s ,  and con tro l l ing  and 
managing th is  rate o f  change to see t h a t  i t  i s  never too la rge  (eg .  
under  the in f lu e n c e  o f  low s h o r t - ru n  e l a s t i c i t i e s )  to represent  a 
disrupt ive force.
Clear ly  a f te r  what we have said some form of  intervent ion is  necessary.  
"Crawling p a r i t i e s " ,  unLess they are so w i d e l y  d e f i n e d  as to  be 
meaningless,  smel l  too much o f  the o ld  centra l  bank support of  f ixed  
exchanges, to be r e a l i s t i c .  Market -making by a centra l  bank allows i t  
to be exploited, and therefore intervent ion to Limit the rate o f  change 
of  p a r i t i e s  is  best done on a discret ionary than any automatic basis.  
Central  banks have Lost so much o f  t h e i r  power to control rates, given 
the development of  the in te rn a t iona l  money markets, t h a t  they could be 
prevented from ach ieving the most modest tergets for  Limiting the rate  
of change o f  r a t e s ,  j u s t  as they were prevented from keeping t h e i r  
support levels for  f ixed p a r i t i e s  in the 1960's .  Discretionary c e n t r a l  
bank i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  however,  does have a ro le ,  since centrel  banks are 
b e t te r  informed o f  economic prospects  and more capable  o f  ta k in g  a 
Long-term economic view than pr ivate  speculators. Central  banks should
have the o p p o r tu n i ty  to s t a b i l i z e  exchange rates (and make a p r o f i t  in 
so do1ng).
v) THE OPTIMAL PEG DEBATE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
As we 6a1d e a r l i e r  conclusions such as that  above that  ne i ther  f lo a t in g  
nor f i x e d  exchange r a t e s  a r e  s e n s i b l e  or  even p o s s i b l e  p o l i c y  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  eco nom ies ,  and t h a t  some form o f  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  are r a t h e r  empty w ithout  the s o r t  o f  
adjustment c r i t e r i a  that  can be deduced from the optimal peg l i t e r a t u r e  
and the discussion on baskets. Crockett and Nsouli correctly  p o in t  out  
th a t  the d iscussion on f ixed and f loa t ing  rates have been made without  
reference to developing economies.
Crockett and Nsouli (21) show t h a t  developing economies have preferred  
adjustable par va lues ,  al though a s i g n i f i c a n t  m in o r i t y  have e i t h e r  
f l o a t e d  t h e i r  exchange rates or pegged them to a basket of currencies.  
Although f loa t ing  exchanges, w i th  the important  provision that central  
bank i n t e r v e n t i o n  1s c r u c i a l ,  are  p o s s ib ly  not o n ly  w o r k a b le  but  
necessary f o r  in d u s t r ia l i z e d  countries (meaning broadly speaking, OECD 
members) given the o v e r a l l  monetary c o n d i t io n s  o f  the 1 9 8 0 's ;  the  
d i f f e r e n t  economic c h e r a c t e r i s t i c s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e a l i t i e s  in  
d e v e lo p in g  economies lead us to d i f f e r e n t  conclusions on currency  
management in non-indust re l i  sed c o u n t r i e s .  Crocket t  and Nsouli point  
out that  the balance of  trade may be less responsive ,  a t  Least in  the  
s h o r t - r u n ,  to a change in the exchange ra te ,  given the in e la s t ic  demand 
fo r  imports  and the i n e l a s t i c  s u p p ly  o f  exports  ( 2 2 ) .  S i m i l a r l y  
contrationary monetary pol icy Leading to an Increase in  i n t e r e s t  r e te s  
may have very L i t t l e  e f fec t  on cap ita l  flows into the country.  Exchange 
ra te  adjustment in developing economies may suf fer  from more than ju s t
temporary i n s t a b i l i t y .  C e n t r a l  bank i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  the case o f  
developing economies, given the low in te rna t iona l  reserves of  developing 
economies and t h e i r  p r im i t ive  c a p i t a l  markets would be f u t i l e  in the  
face  o f  long-term i n s t a b i l i t y .  The fact  that  p r im it ive  ca p i ta l  markets 
acts as an obstacle is  important.  The existence of e f f i c i e n t  money and 
c a p i t a l  markets a l lo w  the " I n t e r e s t  Rate P a r i t y  Theorem" ( 2 3 )  to  
e s t a b l i s h  forward r a te s  on the bas is  o f  the spot exchange rate of a 
p a r t i c u l a r  c u r r e n c y  th r o u g h  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  covered  i n t e r e s t  
arb i trageurs .  McKinnon (24) has shown that  covered in te res t  a r b i t r a g e ,  
although i t  does not e l i m i n e t e  r i s k  in  the fo re ig n  exchange market, 
helps  to  c r e a te  a g rea t  d e a l  o f  n a t u r a l  o f f s e t t i n g  o f  commerciel  
payments, meaning t h a t  in  i t s  absence the t o t a l  amount o f  r i s k  (or  
f o r e i g n  exchange exposure) would in c reese  sharp ly  fo r  a l l  market  
par t ic ipa n ts .  To a t rader ,  forward cover is  l ik e  funding receivables in 
the  currency to be rece ived  or booking currency ahead o f  t ime fo r  
a n t i c i p a t e d  pay m e n ts .  These f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  th e  
development o f  t ra d e  in any economy. The L i t e r a t u r e  on independent 
f l o a t i n g  in  d e v e lo p ing  economies g e n e r a l l y  agrees  t h a t  i t  i s  an 
undesirable pol icy to pursue (2 5 ) .  The reasons a r e : -
a) The ex ls ta n c e  o f  L imited  and rudimentary money and c a p i t a l  
markets;
b) Restr ict ions on c ep i ta l  flows and exchange controls;
c) Thin foreign exchange markets against the domestic currency;
d) Prevalence of real  external  shocks to primary commodity exporting  
economiesm, which would tend to hove a d r a s t i c  impact on the 
in te rna l  s i tu a t io n  o f  a small  open economy w ith  r e l a t i v e l y  few
products .
We saw e a r l i e r  in the case of  developed economies that the manegement of 
a currency cannot be a u n i la te r a l  decision on the p a r t  o f  one co u n try .  
To a large extent ,  the monetary au thor i t ies  of  a p a r t ic u la r  country have 
to  reac t  to the circumstances surrounding them. The f loa t ing  of major 
c u r re n c ie s  since 1973 have pushed t h e  governments o f  developing  
economies to reappraise t h e i r  o r ig in a l  currency management techniques  
and have made single currency pegs inappropriate .  To continue to peg to 
a single currency (which many developing countries did) -  usually e i ther  
to the U.S.  D o l l a r ,  the  French Franc,  or the  Pound S t e r l i n g ,  had a 
number o f  d isadvantages which we s h a l l  d iscuss when looking a t  the 
models o f  exchange r a t e  management in  developing economies b e lo w .  
Broadly speaking these disedvantages a r e : -
i )  Movements in  the pegged exchange rate of the developing economy 
w i l l  not r e f le c t  actual  developments in i t s  balance of  payments.
i i )  Fluctuations of  the exchange r a t e ,  s ince they are exogenous and 
independent of  government pol icy ,  may in te r fe r e  with the p u r s u i t  
of in te rna l  balance.
i i i )  The use o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c u r ren c ies  by developing  
economies in  the same area makes d i f f i c u l t  the promotion o f  
i n t re - reg io n a l  trede due to exchange r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  between 
these countr ies.
I t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  in  most cases where a s in g le  currency peg 
a p p l i e s ,  the currency 1s pegged to  e m a jo r  country with  s i z e a b le  
b i l a t e r a l  a id  programmes to  the developing economy in quest ion  and
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secondly t h a t  regions tend to peg to the same currency to overcome 
object ion ( i i 1 )  above. The exemples are  Latin American peg to the U.S. 
Dollar  and the C.F.A. Franc Area. Our prev ious arguments t h a t  f i s c a l  
su b s id ies  could j u s t i f y  common currency areas or f ixed exchange rates  
extend to the special  re lationships between major indust r ia l ized  nations 
and special  groups of  developing countries.
A few developing c o u n t r ie s  f e l t ,  a f t e r  the c o l la p s e  o f  Smithsonian  
p a r i t i e s ,  that t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  would be b e t t e r  served by some o th e r  
exchange r a t e  system than the  single currency peg (26 ) .  Malaysia and 
Singapore have had an independent f l o a t  s ince June 1973. Alger ia  has 
followed a pol icy o f  al lowing i t s  currency to move midway between i t s  
t r a d in g  p a r t n e r s .  Se vera l  countr ies  have adopted a pol icy o f  valuing  
t h e i r  cu rrenc ies  in  terms o f  a weighted basket o f  the currencies of  
t h e i r  major trade partners.  Morocco pegged to a basket  in  May 1973,  
Malawi in November 1973, A lger ia  in January 1974, F i j i  in A p r i l  1975 and 
Kuwait in  March 1975 .  In  the e a r l y  p a r t  o f  1975 s ev era l  countr ies  
decided to peg to the SDR b as ke t ;  these inc luded Burma, I ra n ,  Qatar,  
Saudi Arabia and eventually a lso  Malawi .  The phi losophy behind t h i s  
approach is  to  t r y  and s t a b i l i z e  the e f f e c t i v e  exchange r a t e  o f  e 
p a r t ic u la r  currency,  where the  e f f e c t i v e  exchange r a t e  is  a sui table  
average of market rates v i s - a - v is  the cu r ren c ies  o f  t r a d in g  p a r t n e r s .  
T h e re fo re  i f  the  s in g le  currency peg i s  no longer a p p r o p r ia t e ,  the 
question becomes to what should developing c o u n t r ie s  peg, end what 
c r i t e r i a  should be used to make these decisions.
There is  general agreement in the l i t e r a t u r e  on the optimal peg that  the 
choice of  a peg should be made to s t a b i l i z e  something r a t h e r  than to 
o p t im iz e  something, except in the case of  Connolly (27) whose aim is  to 
min imize  t h e  l e v e l  and v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  i n f l a t i o n .  Branson and
Katse li -Papaefstrat iou (28) suggest that the aim of  choosing a basket to 
peg to ,  is  to s t a b i l i z e  the terms of  trade o f  the country in  question  
since f l u c t u a t i o n s  1n the terms o f  t ra d e  are themselves an important  
source of income s t a b i l i t y .  L i p s c h i t z  (29)  argues, however, that  most 
developing c o u n t r ie s  are  "sm al l"  in  th e  sense t h a t  th e y  have no 
i n f lu e n c e  on t h e i r  terms o f  t rade end that  such an aim is  f u t i l e .  I t  
makes l i t t l e  sense f o r  d e v e l o p i n g  economies to  r e j e c t  p o t e n t i e l  
windfa l ls  le t  elone maintain a margin of  slack in normal times so as to  
be a b l e  to  improve t h e i r  terms o f  t rade  in bad t im es .  The usual  
argument is  that  a red u c t io n  in  the v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  income may j u s t i f y  
accepting a Lower mean income. Williamson (30) shows that th is  formula  
would only cut down the peaks in income without rais ing the f loors ;  the 
argument being that  there is  no way that  manipulating the terms of trade  
can raise mean income above the  l e v e l  t h a t  would be possibLe with an 
opt im a l  t a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e .  F landers  end Helpman (3 1 )  d is c u s s  two 
possible c r i t e r i a .  The f i r s t  is  to minimize the variance of  the balance 
of  t ra d e  sub jec t  to  the expected (or desired Level) ,  and the second is  
to minimize the variance o f  r e a l  income sub jec t  to the expected leve l .  
These two c r i t e r i a  a re  In co m p at ib le  since the f i r s t  r e q u i r e s  th e  
exchange r a t e  to  be pegged to  a b a s k e t  w e ig h te d  by und er ly ing  
e l a s t i c i t i e s  to s t a b i l i z e  the c o u n t r y 's  e f f e c t i v e  exchange rate (EER), 
while the second re q u i r e s  n e g a t iv e  weights  fo r  c o u n tr ie s  from which 
th e re  i s  a high import level  but with which there is  l i t t l e  competition 
since the appreciation of  the currency o f  these countries would lead to 
a worsening in  terms o f  t r a d e  and reduced r e a l  income at  home, not  
compensated for  by an increase in employment which normally would be due 
to  s t i m u l u s  o f  demand. Such an a p p r e c i a t i o n  would r e q u i r e  a 
d e p re c ia t io n  o f  domestic currency to stimulate output and real income. 
Williamson (32) argues that  the second c r i te r io n  of  Flanders and Helpman 
is unsatisfactory for s im i la r  reasons to the ones he extended to re ject
the Branson and Katseli -Papaef  st  r a t i  ou c r i t e r i o n .  He asks why would 
anyone wish to throw away a w indfa l l  gain in real income merely beceuse 
i t  i s  temporary ,  and r e f e r s  to consumption fu n c t io n  theory  when he 
states that  i t  is  expenditure rather  than r e a l  income which should be 
s t a b i l i z e d  based on e x p e c ta t io n s  or permanent income. C o n n o l ly 's  
c r i te r io n  described above (3 3 )  o f  m in im iz ing  the level and v a r i a b i l i t y  
of  the rate of in f l a t io n  br ings us to a c e n t r a l  c o n s id e ra t io n  in the  
choice of  a peg.
There are two d is t in c t  aspects to exchange rate policy which a r e : -
i )  the choice of a unit  to which to peg, and,
i i )  the choice o f  a p o l i c y  governing chenges in the vaLue at which
the currency is  pegged.
Connolly assumes t h a t ,  i f  you are  pegging, you would want to keep the 
peg f i x e d  f o r  yea rs ,  im p ly ing  t h a t  i t  i s  advantageous to peg to  a 
currency or basket  tha t  is  expected to have an i n f l a t io n  rate close to 
the domestic t a r g e t  (or e x p e c t a t i o n ) .  Conversely one could say that  
th is  type of  model assumes that  the domestic pr ice le v e l  i s  determined  
by a r b i t r a g e ,  with no scope for  deviations from purchasing power par i ty  
(PPP). Almost a l l  other models sssume that  arbi trage between the goods 
produced by d i f fe re n t  trading partners 1s imperfect and that changes in  
r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  goods demanded and suppl ied  by d i f f e r e n t  
countries take place 1n response to exchange rate changes. I f  PPP held 
then the developing economy 1n question should peg to the currency whose 
rete of  In f l a t io n  i t  l i k e d  b e s t ,  however as PPP r a r e l y  does hold  a t  
least in the short-term Connolly's recommendations are in v e l id .
The f i r s t  c r i t e r i o n  discussed by Flanders and Helpman (34) was however 
acceptable. A l l  approeches to the issues invo lved  in the question of  
the op t im e l  peg o th e r  than the ones discussed so f a r  resemble the  
F landers  and Helpman approach in t h a t  they a l l  involve pegging to a 
basket with the object ive  o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  some concept of  the e f fec t ive  
exchange rate (EER) or the real  e f fe c t iv e  exchange rate (REER). Stanley  
Black (35) bui lds a two-good model w ith  t raded  and non-traded goods 
where the  in te rn a l  balance is  represented by the market equil ibrium for  
non-traded goods and the e x t e r n e l  balance by the equivelence of  the 
trade d e f i c i t  and exogenous c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s .  He shows t h a t  exchange 
r a t e  p o l ic y  should be conducted with a view to minimize the variance of  
the domestic r e l a t i v e  p r ic e  o f  t raded  goods, and 1n the con tex t  of  
generalized f l o a t i n g  t h i s  would in v o lv e  the EER as the t a r g e t .  He 
de f ined  the EER as the trede-weighted everage of the b i l a t e r a l  exchange 
ra te s  w ith  t r e d in g  p a r t n e r s ,  u s ing  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t ra d e  r a t h e r  than 
currency of  denomination and e l a s t i c i t i e s  r a t h e r  than average r a t i o s  
(the precise concept of  the EER is discussed below).  The optimal basket 
in  the con tex t  i s  the basket  o f  currencies with the same weight as in 
the d e f in i t io n  of  the EER. In th is  sense Black recognises that  a single 
currency peg would require much g r e a t e r  reserves to absorb shocks, but 
that  intervent ion woud be more complex and require more s o p h is t i c a t io n  
in  the case o f  a basket  peg. Crockett and Nsouli (36) have a s im i lar  
object ive  to BLack in  t h a t  they aim to s t a b i l i z e  t ra de  and output by 
s t a b i l i z in g  the EER. But in t h e i r  case the main cost o f  pegging to a 
basket would be the negative impact on regional trade between developing 
c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  EER's.  C ro c ke t t  and Nsouli  recognize  a 
competing regional trade ob je c t iv e  and a t ra d e -o f f  between s t a b i l i t y  of  
the EER used to achieve s teble  output  and t ra d e  and the promotion of  
in t ra - re g io n a l  trade afforded by common pegs. They discuss the SDR as a 
common r e g io n a l  peg and as a proxy fo r  t h e i r  import-weighted basket.
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Their  argument in favour of import-wei ghts which we shall  discuss below 
when considering the precise concept of the EER n a t u r a l l y  Leads to the  
c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  the SDR as a reasonable proxy. The main contribut ion  
of  Lipschltz (37) i s  to have us consider  the r e a l  e f f e c t i v e  exchange 
rate  (REER), and d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s .  The va r iance  o f  the  
REER, which i t  1s L ipsch i tz 's  object ive to s t a b i l i z e ,  can be decomposed 
i n t o  a te rm  showing th e  v a r i a t i o n  o f  th e  EER, a te rm  showing  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n f l a t io n ,  and a th i r d  in te rac t ion  te rm:-
Var (REER) = var (EER) + var (RP) + 2 cov (EER.RP)
where RP = r e la t i v e  prices
In th is  c o n te x t ,  to  min im ize  the var iance  o f  the  nominal EER is  not 
synonymous with success, i t  is  bet ter  to a l low  the  EER to vary w ith  a 
view to o f fs e t  changes in RP. Bacha (38) goes in the same d irect ion  as 
L ip s c h i t z  on the REER but he r e c o g n is e s  t h a t  o f f s e t t i n g  e x t e r n a l  
i n s t a b i l i t y  only  g ives macro-s tab i  l i  t  y w h i l e  i n s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  
b i l a t e r a l  ra tes  against  p a r t ic u la r  currencies would remain. Lipschltz  
and Sundararajan (39) suggest m in im iz ing  the variance of the log of  the 
e l a s t i c i t y - w e i g h t e d  REER, so t h a t  where t h e r e  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  
covar iances between i n t e r n a l  pr ice  changes and exchange rate changes, 
the currency in  quest ion  gets a weight  sm a l le r  than i t s  e l a s t i c i t y  
weight.
Wil liamson (40) asks what the  r a t i o n a l e  i s  behind a l l  these models 
having the aim o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  some concept o f  the EER so the REER, and 
c i tes  the Bretton Woods phi losophy where countr ies  are supposed to aim 
at  continuous in te rna l  balance, but be content to ensure t h a t  e x t e r n a l  
ba Lance i s  s a t i s f i e d  on average over the medium term. Departures from 
the i n t e r n a l  balance would  i n v o l v e  w e l f a r e  c o s ts  w h i le  e x t e r n a l
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f in a n c in g  and reserve  v a r i a t i o n  i s  a lw ays  p o s s i b l e .  The models  
discussed above, however, are not a l l  relevant to developing economies 
and the important d ec id ing  f a c t o r  here is  the nature  o f  the in terna l  
balance that  each author concerns himself w ith .  Black and L ip sch i tz  in  
m in im is ing  the va r ian ce  o f  the re la t iv e  price of traded goods address 
themselves to a concept o f  I n t e r n a l  balance which involves a constant 
level  of  output of non-traded goods, which is  r e le v a n t  to developing  
economies. Concepts o f  the in te rn a l  balance involving some notion of  a 
natural  rate  of unemployment would be more relevant to a Keynesian-type 
model, since the appropriate d e f in i t io n  o f  in te rna l  balance depends on 
the model of  the economy which is  being used. In a Keynesian f ix - p r ic e  
v a r ia b le - o u t p u t  model, i n t e r n a l  balance can be i d e n t i f i e d  w ith  the 
natural rate of  unemployment modified by some margin adequate to induce  
a des ired  change in  the i n f l a t io n  ra te .  Higher unemployment than that  
involves a waste of resources t h a t  can never be f u l l y  recouped in the 
future:  t o d a y 's  unemployed cannot do to d a y 's  work tomorrow. Lower 
unemployment r is k s  an acceleration of i n f l a t io n ,  the reversal of  which 
w i l l  cost more in terms of  lo s t  output  in  the future than the benef its  
gained today.
In discussing the p re c is e  concept o f  the EER which we would want to  
s t a b i l i z e ,  the fol lowing points have to be taken into account:-
a) whether the weights should be based on imports,  exports or to ta l  
trade.
b) whether they should be average or marginal  ( e la s t i c i t y )  weights 
(where e l a s t i c i t y  is  the extent o f  change induced in the EER by a 
unit  change in one o f  the var iables in the basket) ,
c) whether they should r e f l e c t  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  t r a d e  or  th e  
currency of  denomination.
d] whether we should consider the EER or REER.
In  respect  o f  the f i r s t  p o i n t ,  C ro c ke t t  and Nsouli  hark back to the 
McKinnon "openness c r i te r io n "  (41] in viewing the import-weighted basket 
peg as the most helpfuL for developing economies in that  i t  reduces the 
p r ic e  i n s t a b i l i t y  a r i s i n g  out o f  f o r e ig n  exchange changes. T h e i r  
argument i s : -
" S i n c e  p r i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
homogenous, t h e i r  p r i c e s  w i l l  be s e t  in  world  
markets independent ly  o f  the p rec ise  geographic  
p a t t e r n  o f  t r a d e .  Thus, w ith  a given volume o f  
exports,  a deve loping c o u n t r y 's  fo re ig n  exchange 
r e c e ip t s  w i l l  not be a f f e c t e d  by changes in  th e  
exchange rates of  the countries to which 1t exports.
H o w e v e r ,  s i n c e  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c ts  a r e  not  
homogenous, no uniform in te rna t iona l  price p reva i ls .  
A c c o rd in g ly ,  changes in  th e  exchange ra tes  of  
in d u s t r ia l  countries v is -a -v is  a developing country  
w i l l  a f f e c t  the p r i c e  which the developing country 
pays for  p a r t ic u la r  in d u s t r ia l  products".  (42)
ALL other w r i ters  except C ro c k e t t  and Nsouli  argued in favour of  trade  
weights. But the idea t h a t  developing economies export  p r ic e s  are  
t y p i c a l l y  determined on world markets which underl ies the Crockett and 
Nsouli idea, does not take I n t o  account t h a t  many developing economies 
produce manufactures whose prices are formed and invoiced in c u r re n c ie s
o f  the t r a d in g  p a r tn e rs  and t h a t  currency f lu c t u a t i o n s  a f fe c t  world 
demand for  a primary product  even i f  i t s  p r ic e  1s determined on world 
markets. As we sha l l  see in the fol lowing section on the i m p l i c a t io n s  
o f  op t im a l  peg theory  f o r  Kuwait,  what may be true is  that  for  a very 
homogeneous commodity, ths weights  should r e f l e c t  t o t a l  world trade in 
that  commodity ra th e r  than the d i r e c t i o n  o f  t ra de  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l  
country concerned. Strangely enough Crockett and Nsoul i 's  discussion of  
t h e  SDR as a common peg i s  p r o b a b ly  b e s t  s e r v e d  by t h i s  l a s t  
o b s e r v a t io n .  In  c e r t a i n  areas exp o r t in g  a homogeneous commodity the 
t ra d e - o f f  between f in d in g  a common peg and s t a b i l i z i n g  the EER may be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduced by t h i s  i d e a .  Th is  argument 1s e s p e c i a l l y  
relevant to Kuwait and i t s  neighbours.
In  respect  o f  p o in t  (b) above, Wi l l iamson (43) argues for e l a s t i c i t y  
weights although he agrees with Crockett and Nsouli that  they may not be 
p r a c t i c a b l e .  I f  we c o n s i d e r  p o i n t  ( c ) ,  an o b j e c t i v e  o f  seeking  
continuous in te rn a l  balance in the sense of  the leve l  o f  a composit ion  
o f  a c t i v i t y ,  and a lso  an o b je c t i v e  of  external  balance, would suggest 
direct ion  o f  t ra d e  w e ig h ts ,  s ince  i t  i s  c u r r e n t ly -q u o t e d  prices ( fo r  
future de l ivery )  and not prices agreed in  past c o n t r a c ts  ( f o r  c u r r e n t  
del ivery)  that  Influence resource a l locat ion  and trade contracts signed. 
In  respect  o f  p o in t  ( d ) ,  W i l l iam son (44) beLleves that  the r e la t i v e  
price part o f  the REER can be e f f i c i e n t l y  handled by (crawling) changes 
in the value of the peg, leaving the choice of peg to be guided by the  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  the nominal EER. This would appear to be the 
most pract icable  approach to th is  issue.
v i )  THE MANAGEMENT OF THE CURRENCY
The Kuwaiti Dinar star ted l i f e  equal to Pounds S te r l ing  1 or 13.33 Gulf  
Rupees and as we saw continued as part of  the S te r l in g  Area u n t i l  1S67.  
In  1967,  the s t e r l i n g  devaluation had a drast ic  impact on the a t t i tu d e  
of the Kuwait government, mostly because the B r i t is h  government had been 
promising the Kuwaitis since 1964 that  there would be no devaluation and 
that  d iv e r s i f i c a t io n  of t h e i r  in te rna t iona l  reserves out of s te r l in g  was 
not necessary .  O v e rn ig h t ,  a f t e r  th e  d e v a lu a t io n  o f  s t e r l i n g ,  the 
in tervent ion currency became the U.S. do l la r  (qu i te  na tura l ly  i t  seemed 
to the Kuwait i  government s ince  the "posted pr ice"  of  o i l  was in U.S. 
dolLars) and the Kuwait Investment Board d i v e r s i f i e d  i t s  holdings into  
U.S. dolLars and European currencies. Since that  day, investment of  the 
note issue cover has been on a g lo b a l  bas is  and has been managed 
a g g r e s s i v e l y  using almost a l l  inst ruments  o f  p o r t f o l i o  management 
a v a i la b le .  For some time t h e r e a f t e r ,  however,  s t e r l i n g  remained the 
currency in  which the Currency Board, or  as i t  became in  1969,  the  
C e n t r a l  Bank, announced the d a i l y  buying and s e l l i n g  prices for  the 
currency, which, had the spread between the bid and the o f fe r  not been 
so wide,  would have led to  s i g n i f i c a n t  a r b i t r a g e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  as 
s t e r l i n g  f l u c t u a t e d  a g a i n s t  the U.S.  d o l l a r .  By 1971 ,  w ith  the  
development of more complex m arkets ,  the U .S .  d o l l a r  was not only the 
in te rvent ion currency but also the currency o f  q u o t a t i o n ,  and narrow 
spreads ( o f  say 2.25% e i th e r  side as required by I .M .F .  standards) were 
being applied to the quotations.
As i t  turned out,  the Kuwait i  D inar  did  not remain pegged to the U.S. 
d o l la r ,  and the a u th o r i t ies  t r i e d  to maintain I t s  p a r i ty  against gold in 
the period of  d o l l a r  weakness (1 9 7 1 -5 )  a l though e v e n t u a l l y  the  gold  
p a r i t y  i t s e l f  began to make the currency much higher against the U.S.
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d o l l a r ,  and the  aim o f  m ain ta in ing  par i ty  against gold was eventually  
dropped and the Kuwait i  D inar  reduced to a t  Least p a r t i a l l y  r e f le c t  
d o l la r  weakness. I t  is  not surprising therefore that when we decided to 
regress the Kuwaiti Dinar/SDR exchange rate against the U.S. dolLar/SDR  
exchange rate  fo r  the period January 1970 -  March 1975 we had an average
p
f i t  ( r  = 0 . 6 4 2 )  and a c o e f f i c i e n t  f o r  the explanatory var iable  (the 
U.S.  d o l la r /S D R  exchange r a t a )  w i t h  a t - s t a t i s t i c  which was not  
s ig n i f i c a n t .  Such revaluations as did take place (approx im ate ly  8% in  
1971 and 12% in 1973) ware, as would become typ ica l  of Kuwaiti currency 
management, in the in te re s ts  o f  the  r e l a t i v e  stabi Lity of the currency 
v is - a -v is  a l l  i t s  major t rading partners.  This can be seen by comparing 
the movements o f  the Kuwait i  D inar  w ith  those o f  o ther  c u r r e n c ie s .  
N e v e r t h a  l e s s , th e  Kuwait i  a u t h o r i t i e s  became concerned about the  
long-term re la t ionship  between t h e i r  currency and the U.S. d o l la r .  In 
1975, by agreement, the Gulf  c o u n tr ie s  (Kuwait,  Saudi Arab ia  and the  
United  Arab Em ira tes  p r i n c i p a l l y )  o f f i c i a l l y  dropped the U.S. do l la r  
peg. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pegged t h e i r  currencies  
to the SDR w h i le  m a in ta in in g  b id  and o f f e r  quotes in  U.S.  d o l l s r s .  
Kuwait was the onLy country in the Gulf  to take the posit ion o f f i c i a l l y  
that  i t s  currency should be pegged to a basket that  would r e f le c t  some 
kind of  trade-weighted index o f  the co u n try 's  balance o f  t r a d e .  The 
p o s i t io n  taken by the au th o r i t ies  that  the Kuwaiti Dinar basket should 
r e f l e c t  a t ra d e -w e ig h te d  p o s i t io n  should imply t h a t  the government 
viewed the exchange rate as a p o l ic y  t o o l  u s e fu l  mainly to f i g h t  o f f  
imported i n f l a t i o n  rather  than a f fe c t  re la t iv e  prices ( i f  we are ta lk ing  
about b i l a t e r a l  t ra d e  w e i g h t s ) .  A basket  was devised (supposedly on 
th is  basis) the contents of  which were never pub l ic ly  revealed and which 
we shall  show below changed from time to t ime.
The fact  that  the basket changes over time is  s ig n i f ic a n t ,  and the
reason for th is  must be discussed to understand the philosophy behind 
the management of  the currency. I f  the Kuwaiti Dinar/SDR exchange ra te  
i s  regressed a g a in s t  the exchange ra te  o f  the U.S. d o l la r ,  S te r l in g ,  
Yen, Deutschemark, Swiss Franc,  French Franc, Be lg ian Franc,  Dutch 
Guilder ,  I t a l i a n  L i r e ,  Norwegian Kroner ,  Swedish Kroner ,  and Danish 
Kroner, a l l  against the SDR, and given monthly data for the period March 
1 975 -  March 1982 then the fo l lo w in g  e l a s t i c i t i e s  can be obtained in 
order of  p r i o r i t y : -
Coeff ic i  ent t - S t a t i  st i  c
1. U.S. Dollar 0.13950 (6.56)
2. S te r l ing -0.02756 ( -2 .19 )
3. Dutch Gui Lder 0.02197 (2.60)
4. Deutschmark -0.02038 ( -2 .25 )
5. Danish Kroner -0.00669 ( -3 .70 )
6. Norwegian Kroner 0.00416 (2.19)
7. Swedish Kroner 0.00303 (1.90)
8. French Franc 0.000386 (0.18)
9. Swiss Franc -0  .000144 ( -0 .05 )
10. Belgian Franc 0.000281 (0.94)
11. Japanese Yen 0.0000844 (3.84)
12. I t a l i a n  Lire -0.0000122 ( -1 .75 )
The t - s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  the Swiss Franc,  French Franc,  Be lg ian  Franc,  
I t a l i a n  L i r e  and Swedish Kroner show t h a t  at  the  99.975% l e v e l  o f  
conf idence there is  no s ig n i f ican t  re lationship  with the Kuwaiti Dinar.  
However, a t  the  99.95% Level o f  confidence the I t a l i a n  L i r e  and the 
Swedish Kroner pass the t e s t .  The t - s t a t i s t i c  fo r  the Swiss Franc,  
French Franc Belgian Franc, however do not. C lear ly  the f i r s t  seven of 
the world's major currencies appear to be the most important in terms of
the Kuwait i  D inar  basket w ith  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which are  s i g n i f i c a n t .
However,  we s h a l l  see L a te r  w h e th e r  i t  i s  p o ss ib le  t h a t  we s h a l l
consider only the f i r s t  three as being relevant since currencies number
(4 )  to number (7 ]  could be considered to be e i th er  Linked to the U.S.
d o l la r  or the Deutschmark. Although when the Kuwaiti Dinar/SDR exchange
rate was regressed a g a in s t  the exchange r a t e  of  the twelve currencies
o
Listed above against the SDR, the f i t  was good (R = 0 .9 9 2 )  and a f t e r  
appl icat ion  of  the HiIdreth-Lu method autocorrela t ion was ruled out with 
a Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c  of  1 .97 ,  nevertheless, m u l t ico l len ear l ty  could 
s t i l l  be a problem and th e re  could be interdependence between the  
independent va r iab les .  This,  however, can be solved a p r io r i  by Looking 
at  the management o f  each o f  t h e  c u r r e n c i e s  in  the equation and 
determininlng whether the Dutch and Scandinavian cu r ren c ies  had a t  any 
time been Linked to the U.S. do l la r  or the Deutschmark.
These r e s u l t s  g ive  us the e l a s t i c i t i e s  in the Kuwaiti Dinar basket for  
the period March 1975 -  March 1982 but they do not give us any idea of  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  the b a s k e t .  T h e re fo r e ,  y e a r ly  t e s t s  were c a r r i e d  o u t .  
These tests  could not be carr ied out over twelve months based on monthly 
d a t a ,  due to  t h e  e x is ten ce  o f  twelve  independent v a r i a b l e s  and a 
resu l t ing  determlnacy problem. Therefore in each tes t  we took seventeen 
months, from March to the f o l l o w in g  June, f o r  each year from 1975 to 
1982. In  the seven tes ts ,  the U.S. d o l la r  had the h ighes t  e l a s t i c i t y  
f i v e  t i m e s ,  and in  t h e  o t h e r  two t e s t s  had th e  second h ighes t  
e l a s t i c i t y .  S t e r l i n g  had the  h i g h e s t  e l a s t i c i t y  once, the second 
highest once, three t imes had the t h i r d  h ighes t  e l a s t i c i t y  and once 
d i d n ' t  f e a t u r e  in  the top four  currencies. The Dutch Guilder had the 
second h ighes t  e l a s t i c i t y  once, the t h i r d  h ighes t  t w ic e ,  the fourth  
highest twice,  and twice was not in the top four.  The Deutschmark had 
the second highest e l a s t i c i t y  twice,  the th i rd  highest twice, the fourth
highest once and was not in the top four on two occasions. Despite th is  
apparent I n s t a b i l i t y  in the Kuwaiti Dinar basket the broad p r i o r i t i e s  
established in the o vera l l  regression f o r  the period March 1975 -  March 
1982 were m a in ta ine d ,  where the U.S. d o l l a r  was c l e a r l y  th e  most 
important  component, fo l low ed  by S t e r l i n g ,  the Dutch Guilder and the 
Deutschmark. Table 6:6 Lists the co e f f ic ie n t  results  of  the tes ts .  The 
highes t  four  e l a s t i c i t i e s  f o r  each t e s t  a r e  numbered,  and each 
c o e f f i c i e n t  whose t - s t a t i s t i c  shows th e re  i s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t  le a s t  a t  the 99.85% Level o f  conf idence i s  marked. 
However, although s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  in d ic a t e d  by an (S) following each 
coe f f ic ien t  to which 1 t  a p p l i e s ,  f o r  these s h o r t e r - te r m  t e s t s ,  t h i s  
should not be given too much importance, in that  a l l  that  the Lack of  
signif icance indicates is  the p o s s ib i l i t y  that over a number of  tests in 
the long-term, the re lat ionship  e s tab l ish ed  may not hold. Signif icance  
should therefore be read in the context o f  the o v e r a l l  t e s t  f o r  March 
1975 -  March 1982, as there are actua l ly  one or two surprising resu l ts .
The muLticoL l e n e a r i t y  problem p o s i ts  the ques t ion  o f  the pos s ib le  
r e la t io n s h ip  between the independent v a r i a b l e s .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  the 
results on the role o f  the Dutch G u i ld e r  in  the Kuwait i  D inar  basket  
have to be discussed in the context of  th is  probLem. Further instances 
of th is  problem may be the high e l a s t i c i t i e s  that  the Norwegian Kroner 
displayed between March 1975 -  July 1976 (second h ig h e s t ]  and between 
March 1976 -  Ju ly  1977 ( f o u r t h  h i g h e s t ) ,  and t h a t  the French Franc 
displayed between March 1975 -  Ju ly  1976 (fourth h ighest) ,  March 1977 -  
July 1978 ( fourth h ighest) ,  and in p a r t ic u la r  in the period March 1979 -  
July 1980 when i t  showed the h ighes t  r e s u l t  f o r  a l l  c u r r e n c ie s .  The 
Swiss F r a n c ,  which u s u a l l y  in  most t e s t s  d i s p l a y e d  very smaLl 
c o e f f ic ien ts ,  produced a high r e s u l t  f o r  the  per iod  March 1978 -  July 
1979 (the fourth highest e l a s t i c i t y ) .  C e r t a i n l y  t h i s  l a s t  r e s u l t  fo r
I348
the Swiss Franc i s  d i f f i c u l t  to e x p la i n ,  but a l l  the o thers  can be 
exp la ined  by v i r t u e  o f  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  c u r re n c y 's  
management in the period in question. The "snake" fo l low ed  by the EMS 
had grouped to g e th e r  the Deutchmark, Dutch G u i l d e r ,  Be lg ian  Franc, 
French Franc, and I t a l i a n  L i re .  T ra d i t io n a l ly  the Dutch Guilder and the 
Deutschmark have been the stronger o f  t h i s  group of  currencies and have
t h e r e f o r e  both been a t  the c e i l i n g  o f  the EMS "bands". The Dutch
G u i l d e r  has a lw ays  been s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s t r o n g ly  l ink ed  w ith  the  
Deutschmark, hence the s i m i l a r  a p p a re n t  importance o f  both in the  
Kuwaiti Dinar basket. Although the French Franc has o f te n  been among 
the weak currencies in the EMS group in the years 19?B, 1977 and 1979 i t  
p e r fo r m e d  w e l l  and m a i n t a i n e d  i t s  s t r e n g t h  in  the EMS group o f  
currenci es.
v i i )  IMPLICATIONS OF THE OPTIMAL PEG DEBATE FOR KUWAIT 
AND THE SDR AS A COMMON REGIONAL PEG
The Kuwait i  D inar  was o r i g i n a l l y  in tended ,  according to government 
s ta tem ents ,  to  be pegged t o  a b a s k e t  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  
trade-weighted posit ion .
" A f t e r  the second devaluation of the U.S. DolLar in
1973 and up to 17 March, 1975,  Kuwait continued to
peg the Kuwait i  D inar  to  t h e  U .S .  d o l l a r ...........
Because o f  t h is ,  the heavy depredat ion  o f  the U.S.
DolLar 1n the wor ld  exchange markets in the f i r s t  
quarter o f  1975 pul led down the value o f  the K D . . .
I n  o r d e r  to  a r r e s t  t h i s  t re n d  and to m a in ta in  
greater s t a b i l i t y  o f  the exchange value of  the KD, 
the Kuwaiti a u t h o r i t i e s  broke the KD's f i r m  Link 
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an independent exchange r a te  p o l i c y .  According to 
th is  new pol icy the exchange rate  for the d in a r  ha6
been determined by giving weight to the performance
o f  a basket o f  m a jo r  c u r r e n c i e s  through which 
Kuwait's main in te rna t iona l  transactions are carr ied  
out" .  (45)
We enumerated e a r l i e r  in the discussion on the optimal peg the var ious  
p o in ts  to cons ider  when determining an "e f fec t ive  exchange rate" (EER) 
f o r  the country  which would become the t a r g e t  to which to peg the  
currency. In determining the weights in a basket t h a t  would represent  
the EER we should consider: -
1) whether the weights should be based on imports, exports or both,
2) whether they should be average or marginal ( e la s t i c i t y )  weights,
3) w h e th e r  t h e y  sh o u ld  r e f l e c t  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  t ra d e  or the
currency of  denomination, and,
4) whether or not we should consider  an i n f l a t i o n  d i f f e r e n t i a l
factor  in  some form o f  " r e a l  e f f e c t i v e  exchange r a t e "  (REER) 
construct .
We sha l l  fol low the idea that  a re la t iv e  pr ice or in f l a t io n  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
content in the country's EER can be dealt  with by [crawling] changes in  
the peg. What we should decide is  the re la t iv e  sizes of  the weights to 
be used in  the basket o f  c u r re n c ie s  a t  any one t im e .  In  respect of  
point ( 2 ) ,  c le a r ly  e l a s t i c i t i e s  would be t h e o r e t ic a l l y  more appeal  l ing  
in  our c o n s t r u c t ,  but the lumpiness and e r r a t ic  nature of trade data
does not al low us to produce meaningful results on th is  basis.  We have 
therefore  made our calculat ions on an average basis although we look at  
and analyse weights  based on imports, exports, and b i l a t e r a l  trade and 
furthermore, both as d irect ion  of  trade and as currency of denomination.
Table 6:1 shows us what an import-weighted basket should be l i k e .  Japan 
and the United States, fo l lowed by the United  Kingdom and Germany, are 
the most important exporters to Kuwait over the period 1975-1982. Table 
6:2 demonstrates the s l ig h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  weighting and im p l i c a t io n s  fo r  
the op t im a l  peg t h a t  would resu l t  from an analysis of  the d is t r ib u t io n  
of  Kuwaiti exports.  Japan, fo l lowed by the United Kingdom and Holland,  
are  the th r e e  most im por tan t  c o u n t r ie s  in  t h i s  c o n te x t ,  but Japan  
con s id e rab ly  more so than any o t h e r ,  averaging as i t  did a share of  
between 39% and 68% o f  K u w a i t i  e x p o r t s .  I f  we are  to f o l l o w  the  
arguments o f  the proceeding discussion on the op t im a l  peg, and the  
conclus ions o f  t h a t  discussion, that a b i l a t e r a l  trade index should be 
the most e f f i c i e n t  basis for determining a set of  basket weights for  the 
Kuwaiti Dinar,  then Table 6:3 shows us tha t  the Leading trad ing-par tner  
o f  Kuwait i s  Japan, fo l lo w ed  in order  o f  importance by the U n i t e d  
Kingdom, HoLland, I t a l y ,  the United States, France and Germany. Table  
6:3 intends to show b i l a t e r a l  t ra d e  weights  f o r  Kuwait based on the 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  t ra d e  p r i n c i p l e .  I f  we a r e  to  use th e  c u r r e n c y  o f  
denominat ion,  and s p e c i f ic a l ly  assume that  each country invoices in i t s  
own currency while a l l  crude o i l  (and therefore a l l  exports) is  invoiced 
1n U.S. d o l l a r s ,  then the Un i ted  S ta te s  rep laces  Japan as the major 
trading partner .  We can see th is  in Table 6 : 4 .  However, we can a lso  
see in  t h i s  t a b l e  t h a t  Japan (fol lowed by the United Kingdom) remains 
the second most important t rad ing  p a r t n e r .  A remarkable feature of a l l  
the trade data 1s the s t a b i l i t y  of  the r e la t iv e  p o s i t io n s  over t ime of  
each o f  K u w a i t 's  t r a d in g  p a r tn e r s  whether in the im p or t ,  export  or
357
b i l a t e r a l  trade weight tab les .
Government statements at  the  t ime o f  the adoption of the basket (March 
1975] might have implied that  a b i l a t e r a l  trade index was the bas is  of  
the proposed Kuwaiti Dinar basket because the emphasis of  the government 
s t a t e m e n t  was a t  the t ime on the aggregate  f lows o f  the s a le  and 
purchase of d i f f e r e n t  currencies in  the  foreign exchange market fo r  the 
dinar .  A currency o f  denomination index might even be suggested by such 
a s ta tem ent .  C l e a r l y  the basket  was no t  i m p o r t - w e i g h t e d ,  s i n c e  
a c c o r d in g  to  a C e n t r a l  Bank s ta tem ent ,  In 1976 the Kuwait i  D inar  
performed b e t te r ,  v is -a -v is  the U.S .  d o l l a r ,  than i t  would have done i f  
i t  had been based on an import-weighted index, by a factor  o f  6.8% (46 ) .  
In  1977,  however,  the C e n t r a l  Bank noted  t h a t  th e  K u w a i t i  D i n a r  
performed less w e l l  than the import-weighted index (by 6.6%) in a year 
of  r e la t iv e  strength f o r  the Deutschmark, the Swiss Franc and the Yen 
(47 ) .
The results  of  our e a r l i e r  a n a ly s is  o f  the behaviour o f  the Kuwait i  
Dinar do n o t ,  however,  when placed in  the con tex t  o f  trade f igures ,  
allow us to reach any easy co n c lu s io n s .  Time ser ies  analysis o f  both 
currencies and trade did not unearth  complex t re n d s ,  on the c o n t r a r y  
p a t t e r n s  in  each case proved continuous and r e l a t i v e l y  steady. The 
d i f f i c u l t y  l ies  in r e c o n c i l i n g  the c e n t r a l  bank's  currency management 
policy with the concepts we have developed o f  t ra d e  weighted bas ke ts ,  
given t h a t ,  according to government statements, as we have shown, th is  
was the intent ion  behind the  break w i th  the U.S. do l la r  in March 1975.  
The apparent Ins ignif icance o f  the Japanese Yen 1n the composit ion o f  
the Kuwaiti Dinar basket seems to b e l ie  the centra l  bank's use o f  e i th e r  
Im p o r t -w e ig h te d ,  export-weighted or b i l a t e r a l - t y p e  baskets. Table 6:4  
attempts to analyse b i l a t e r a l  t ra d e  by currency of  denomination rather
than d irect ion  of  trade, assuming s im p l is t ic a l ly  that a l l  invoices would 
be denominated 1n nat ional currency of the exporter,  while assuming less 
s im p l is t ic a l ly  (more r e a l i s t i c a l l y )  that a l l  Kuwaiti exports,  which are  
mainly o f  crude and refined o i l ,  are invoiced in U.S. d o l la rs .  On th is  
basis the overr id ing importance given to the U.S. d o l la r ,  which is  not 
j u s t i f i e d  by a l l  the d i rec t ion  of  t ra de  concepts,  seems to gain some 
kind o f  b a s is ,  however the Japanese Yen would, by th is  system, have to 
have a g r e a t e r  weight  than s t e r l i n g  and the  Deutschmark. To make 
assumptions about currency o f  d e n o m in a t io n  1s ,  h o w e v e r ,  r a t h e r  
dangerous. I t  could bs that much of Japan export is  denominated in U.S. 
d o l l a r s .  What i s  more c e r t a i n ,  however, 1s that imports connected to 
pro jec t  awarded by the c e n t r a l  government o f  Kuwait a re  su b je c t  to 
Kuwaiti Dinar contracts.  Table 6:5 sets out the weights t h a t  would be 
accorded to each currency in  the op t im a l  basket i f  the argument was 
followed, which was discussed in the s ec t io n  on the optimal peg, th a t ,  
fo r  a homogeneous pr imary export  commodity, t rade -w e1  g h ts  in  t h e  
" e f f e c t i v e  exchange r a t e "  should r e f l e c t  t o t a l  world t ra d e  in  that  
commodity rather than the d i r e c t i o n  o f  t ra d e  of the ind iv idual  country 
concerned. Japan yet again proves to be an important fac tor  in th is  new 
context,  1n fact  a factor  almost equal to the United  S t a t e s .  C l e a r l y  
th is  scheme also does not apply to the management of  the Kuwaiti Dinar.
What was most r e v e a l i n g ,  however, in our analysis of  the movements of  
the Kuwaiti Dinar,  was th a t ,  whereas a l l  trade weights remain remarkably 
s t a b l e ,  the  e l a s t i c i t i e s  co n n ec ted  to  each o f  the w o r ld 's  major  
currencies in the Kuwaiti Dinar regression equations, are changing over  
t im e  w i t h o u t  b e in g  c h a o t i c .  Th is  " c h a n g e a b i l i t y "  f a c t o r  1n the  
management o f  the Kuwaiti Dinar existed well  before 18 March, 1975, when 
the concept o f  the "b ask e t"  was a d o p te d ,  when we saw the va r io u s  
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peg seemed to  meen e t  the t ime s k ind  o f  s ho r t - te rm  reference p o in t  f o r  
t h e  msnsgement o f  t h e  c u r r e n c y ,  b u t  n o t  s l o n g - t e r m  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
cu r rency .  There i s  no resson  why th e  same c o u ld  no t  be t r u e  o f  th e  
msnagement o f  th e  c u r r e n c y  i n  a p e r i o d  o f  b a s k e t -p e g g in g ,  where the 
we igh ts  a t tached to  th e  chosen c u r r e n c i e s  a re  a L te re d .  We have seen, 
however, t h a t  n e i th e r  the cho ice o f  the cu r renc ies  nor o f  t h e i r  w e ig h ts  
were L inked  i n  any s p e c i f i c  f a s h i o n  t o  t ra d e - t y p e  in d ic e s .  I t  would 
seem t h a t  a p o l i c y  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  " s t a b i l i t y "  o f  t h e  currency in  the 
face o f  f o re ig n  exchange f l u c t u a t i o n s  cont inued from the pre-1975 d o l l a r  
e ra ,  and t h a t  the U.S. doLLar, S t e r l i n g  and the Deutschmark were chosen 
as components o f  an i n t e r v e n t i o n  baske t,  s imply to  avo id  f o l l o w in g  the 
vagar ies  o f  one m a jo r  c u r r e n c y .  Even i f  t h i s  d i d  n o t  work v i s - a - v i s  
o th e r  cu r re nc ie s  the weights  could be a l t e r e d .
I f  we look a t  Graph 6:1 the s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  K u w a i t i  D i n a r / U . S  D o l l a r  
exchange ra te  by comparison w i th  the exchange ra te  o f  any o the r  cur rency 
w i t h  t h e  U.S.  d o l l a r  i s  d e a r .  Graph 6 : 2  shows ano the r  i n t e r e s t i n g  
f a c t ,  namely t h e t  the  s h o r t - t e r m  movements o f  th e  K u w a i t i  D inar /U .S .  
D o l l a r  exchange r a te  seems t o  be i n f l u e n c e d  by th e  movements i n  t h e  
SDR/U.S. D o l l a r  exchange r a t e ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  would seem to  be the case 
t h a t  the high U.S. D o l l a r  w e ig h t i n g  i n  the  Kuwai t i  Dinar  basket d id  not 
a l lo w  i t  to  be in f luenced  very much. The remarkable f a c t  t h a t  Graph 6 :2  
does show, however, i s  t h a t  the  Saudi R ia l  i s  even more s ta b le  v i s - a - v i s  
the U.S. D o l l a r  than  t h e  K u w a i t i  D i n a r ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  1975 t h e  Saudi  
government  d e c l a r e d  t h a t  i t  had t i e d  i t s  c u r r e n c y  to  the SDR. Th is  
b r ings  us t o  th e  p o i n t  abou t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  u s in g  t h e  SDR as an 
e f f i c i e n t  reg io na l  c u r r e n c y  peg .  C l e a r l y  i n  th e  case o f  Ku w a i t  and 
Saudi  A r a b ia  [as  we r e c a l l  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n s  abou t  the  poss ib i  L i t y  o f  
i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  the G u l f  c u r r e n c i e s  i n  C h a p te r  2) the re  i s  a great  deal 
o f  c o o rd in a t io n  in  cur rency management. However, they ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y
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Saud i -A rab ia ,  e v id e n t l y  d id  no t  f o l l o w  the SDR.
Let us ana lyse some o f  t h e  reasons  beh ind  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  th e  K u w a i t i  
government  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  cu r rency .  A number o f  p e r t i n e n t  remarks 
were made in  Khouja and S a d le r ' s  book on t h i s  issue .
"Whi le the compos i t ion  o f  th e  basket has never been 
d i s c lo s e d ,  i t  seems c e r t a in  t h a t  the d o l l a r  has th e  
most im p o r t a n t  w e ig h t in g .  Th is  has had s i g n i f i c a n t  
repe rcuss ions  w i t h  t h e  r e c e n t  f a l l  o f  the  d o l l a r .
Due to  t h i s  heavy w e ig h t in g ,  the  K u w a i t i  D in a r  has 
n o t  a p p r e c i a t e d  a g a in s t  the d o l l a r  as much as some 
o th e r  major  c u r r e n c i e s .  T h i s  seems t o  r e f l e c t  in  
p a r t  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  bank i n  a v o i d i n g  
m a jo r  r e v a l u a t i o n s  i n  the KD in  o rder  to  safeguard 
the f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  ban k ing  system which 
has s ize ab le  d o l l a r  h o ld in g s "  (48)
There are th ree  main reasons t h a t  we have i s o l a t e d  as b e in g  o f  m a jo r  
importance i n  the c e n t r a l  banks1 currency p o l i c y : -
i )  The need t o  encourage the p r i v a t e  sec to r  i n  Kuwait to  keep t h e i r
weal th  i n  Kuwait i  D inars  in  the Kuwait i  banking system.
11) The encouragement o f  f o re ig n  e n t i t i e s  to  borrow 1n Kuwait i  Dinars
through the  lo c a l  bond m a rke t  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  help develop an 
im po r tan t  l o c a l  f i n a n c i a l  i n d u s t r y .
i i i )  The p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  b a n k in g  sys tem,  wh ich  d e s p i t e  t h e  swap 
f a c i l i t i e s  o f  1978 ,  had a la r g e  f o r e i g n  exchange exposure in
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p a r t i c u l a r  i n  U.S. D o l l a r s .
P o in t s  (1)  and (11)  a re  s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y  i n  t h a t  a s t a b l e  c u r re n c y  
a t t r a c t s  r i s k -a v e rs e  in v e s to rs  and bor rowers.  C le a r l y  i n  the f i r s t  case 
we have a l ready seen t h a t  i t  was Kuwait i  government p o l i c y  to  encourage  
t h e  r e p a t r i a t i o n  o f  " K u w a i t i  D o l l a r s "  t h a t  had leaked  abroad  f rom 
e a r l i e r  schemes t o  d i s t r i b u t e  w e a l t h  such as land a c q u i s i t i o n  and to  
encourage  e x i s t i n g  w e a l t h  t o  remain  i n  K u w a i t ,  w h ic h  schemes t h e  
I .B .R .D .  had frowned upon as a system to  encourage development ( 4 9 ) .  We 
have  a n a l y s e d  i n  C h ap te r  4 t h e  reasons  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and 
encouragement o f  the s tock exchange in  Kuwait ,  which was a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  
o f  I .B .R .D .  c r i t i c i s m s  in  t h e  e a r l y  days 1961 -5 .  The s t a b i l i t y  o f  the 
cur rency was viewed as an element as im por tan t  as the Stock Exchange i n  
p r o m o t i n g  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  I n v e s tm e n t  i n  K u w a i t .  Whether  t h i s  i s  a 
j u s t i f i e d  p o l i c y  f o r  t h e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  a s t a b l e  c u r r e n c y  f o r  t h e  
c i rcumstances t h a t  Kuwa i t  f i n d s  i t s e l f  i n ,  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  q u e s t i o n .  
C l e a r l y  a r e p a t r i a t i o n  o f  K u w a i t i  d o l l a r s  leads to  an Increase in  the 
f o re ig n  exchange ho ld ings  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  bank o r  the commercial banks, 
and t h i s  i s  not a necessary aim o f  K u w a i t i  monetary  p o l i c y  g i v e n  t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  s u r p l u s e s .  However,  t h e  aim o f  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  p rodu c t i ve  base through p r i v a t e  sec to r  Investment does re q u i re  
t h a t  the wealth accrued t o  the p r i v a t e  sec to r  does no t  immediate ly  leave 
the coun t ry ,  and those balances inves ted  abroad be in c re a s in g ly  in ves ted  
lo c a l  l y .
A lso ,  a l though less im por tan t  and le s s  a conscious mot ive o f  government 
p o l i c y ,  i t  has been government p o l i c y  to  encourage f o re ig n  inves tment by 
Kuwait i  i n s t i t u t i o n s  1n Kuwait i  Dinar denominated s e c u r i t i e s  i s s u e d  by 
f o r e i g n  b o r r o w e r s .  Most im m ed ia te  as a p ro b le m ,  however ,  was t h e  
banking system's net f o re ig n  assets  which t r a d i t i o n a l l y  made the banking
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system v u l n e r a b l e  t o  f o r e i g n  exchange f l u c t u a t i o n s .  The n a t u r e  o f  
Kuw a i t 's  f i n a n c i a l  sec to r  as a s u r p l u s  e n t i t y  as we saw 1n C h a p te r  3 
m ean t  t h a t  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount o f  p lacem en t  o f  funds  abroad  was 
necessary.
The c e n t r a l  b a n k 's  c h i e f  c o n c e r n  up t o  1 978 had been t o  e x t r a c t  
l i q u i d i t y  from the system. I t  has t h e r e f o r e  encouraged th e  banks to  
c o n t i n u e  t o  Increase t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  tendency to  Inves t  abroad. From 
th e  s h o r t - t e r m  p o i n t  o f  v ie w ,  t h a t  o f  t h e  management o f  t h e  money 
supp ly ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  the elms o f  the government and thos e  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  
bank have been opposed 1n t h a t  the government 's o b je c t i v e  has been to  
max im ise  do m e s t ic  I n v e s t m e n t .  C h a p t e r  3 c l e a r l y  I l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  
c o n f l i c t ,  where  t h e  c e n t r a l  b an k  seems p o w e r l e s s  t o  a b a t e  t h e  
I n f l a t i o n a r y  consequences o f  government expend i tu re .  Some evidence o f  
these I n f l a t i o n a r y  consequences was p r o v id e d  In  C h ap te r  5 ,  where we 
quoted severa l  passages from the Cen t ra l  Bank o f  Kuwait Economic Reports 
to  demonstrate the extreme concern showed by the c e n t r a l  bank over  these 
Issues.  The repo r t  Issued In  1977 p l a i n l y  descr ibed the c e n t r a l  b a n k ' s  
main t a s k  as b e ing  t h a t  o f  l i m i t i n g  t h e  I n f l a t i o n a r y  consequences o f  
government  e x p e n d i t u r e  and t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  r a p i d  g row th  o f  c r e d i t .  
Meanwhile, the repo r t  o f  1976 makes d i r e c t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  f a s t  expans ion  o f  d o m e s t i c  l i q u i d i t y ,  1n the words o f  the r e p o r t ,  
"outpaces p r o d u c t i v e  economic a c t i v i t i e s  1n t h e  Loca l  economy". The 
re p o r t  o f  1975 re fe rs  to  " a l l e v i a t i n g  growing s p e c u la t io n " ,  even b e f o r e  
t h e  s t o c k  marke t  boom o f  1976 .  S i m i l a r  a c c o u n ts  o f  i n f l a t i o n  and 
specu la t ion  and t h e  c e n t r a l  conce rn  o v e r  th e s e  m a t t e r s  abound in  the 
r e p o r t s .  The f a c t  t h a t  government expend i tu re  through land a c q u i s i t i o n  
o r  s t o c k  m a rke t  s u p p o r t  i s  seen as the  main cause o f  these problems 1s 
a lways  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  as a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t .  The s t r u c t u r a l  
I n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e s  1n t h e  l o c a l  economy were c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n
commercial and r e s i d e n t i a l  r e a l  e s ta te ,  and as we saw e a r l i e r  1n Chapter 
4 (50) ,  t h i s  was the main cause o f  the s tock  market boom 1n 1976. These 
i n f l a t i o n a r y  p o l i c i e s  pursued by the c e n t r a l  government in  Kuwait  would 
have increased imports  th ro u g h  " w e s l t h "  e f f e c t s ,  which might have been 
as im por tan t  a f a c to r  i n  the r i s e  o f  I m p o r t s ,  as I n c r e a s i n g  n a t i o n a l  
Income.  Our a n a l y s i s  1n C h a p te r  2 ( 5 1 ) ,  based on J .R .  K in g 's  book on 
Kenya, showed t h a t  in  a coun t ry  w i th  a high p ro p o r t io n  o f  t ra d a b le  goods 
and where the dom es t ic  p r i c e  l e v e l  i s  m a in l y  I n f l u e n c e d  by the wor ld  
p r i c e  l e v e l ,  deva lua t ion  1s an impor tan t  t o o l  o f  ad jus tment.  But 1n the 
Kuwait i  con tex t ,  the f a s t  r i s e s  1n impor ts  never led t o  a s e r i o u s  need 
f o r  balance o f  payments ad justment  i n  the pe r iod  under s tudy,  due t o  the 
c o u n t r y ' s  high  (exogenous) s u rp lu s .
The s w i t c h i n g  o f  funds  f rom abroad to  the domestic Kuwait i  economy by 
the banking system, as lo c a l  l e n d in g  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  Increased and became 
more a t t r a c t i v e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w o r r i e d  th e  c e n t r a l  bank .  C o n t in u e d  
p lacem en t  o f  funds abroad by the banking system and ou t f low s  o f  p r i v a t e  
c a p i t a l  was in  t h e i r  eyes ,  t h e  b e s t  p o l i c y  t o  aba te  th e  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
consequences o f  monetary expansion.  But as we see 1n t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  
o f  C h ap te r  3 ( 5 2 ) ,  l o c a l  d o m e s t i c  c r e d i t  expans ion  had a much lower 
ex te rn a l  leak through in c re a s e d  im p o r t s  (and perhaps c a p i t a l  o u t f lo w s ,  
a l though,  f o r  the reasons o u t l i n e d  1n Chapter 3,  we c o n s id e r e d  c a p i t a l  
o u t f l o w s  t o  be exog enou s ) ,  th a n  might have been expected in  a coun try  
l i k e  Kuwait ,  w i th  such a h i g h  p e r c e n ta g e  o f  t r a d a b l e s  in  the N a t io n a l  
P r o d u c t .  I f  we look  t o  I m p o r t s  as th e  o n l y  endogenous l e a k ,  t h e n  
p e r h a p s  t h i s  ph e n o n e n o n  m i g h t  be e x p l a i n e d  by th e  c o u n t r y ' s  low 
popu la t ion  and the s a tu r a t i o n  o f  the  Local market w i th  im por ts ,  1n which 
case a l i n e a r  im p o r t  demand f u n c t i o n  m ig h t  n o t  be t h e  most accura te  
d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  import  p r o p e n s i t i e s  in  Kuwai t .
The s t e b i L i t y  o f  the Kuwai t i  D inar  might probably  have had more t o  do, 
1n th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n te x t  o f  the c e n t r a l  bank, w i th  p r o te c t i n g  the net 
f o r e i g n  a s s e t  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  b a n k s  t h a n  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  aim o f  
r e p a t r i a t i n g  "K u w a i t i  D o L l a r s " .  The o v e r a l l  p o l i c y  o f  r e p a t r i a t i n g  
" K u w a i t i  D o l l a r s "  was p r o b a b l y  a pr imary aim on ly  in  the years be fo re  
1973. Rapid m oneta ry  e xpa ns io n  a f t e r  1972 ,  and t h e  f l o a t i n g  o f  a l l  
major c u r re nc ie s  a f t e r  1973 probably  were the main fa c to r s  t h a t  p u t  t h e  
p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e ig n  assets  o f  the f i n a n c i a l  system a t  the top o f  
the L i s t  t h e r e a f t e r .  Also  1n some years,  no tab ly  1979/80, al though a lso 
1n p rev ious  years,  t h i s  s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  exchange ra te  worked to  d ra in  
l i q u i d i t y  f rom th e  system and t o  c r e a t e  c a p i t a l  o u t f l o w s  due t o  
s u b s t a n t i a l  I n t e r e s t  a r b i t r a g e ,  because lo c a l  I n t e r e s t  ra te s  remained 
f i x e d  i n  t h e  fa c e  o f  l a r g e  r i s e s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  
Borrowings would r i s e  and the funds would be exported to  take adva n ta ge  
o f  h igher  i n t e r e s t  ra te s  abroad, w i thou t  much anx ie ty  on the p a r t  o f  the 
s p e c u l a t o r  about the s t a b i l i t y  o f  the Kuwai t i  D inar .  A f o u r th  and la s t  
poss ib le  f a c t o r  to  be ment ioned i n  the management o f  the cur rency ,  which 
has not been quoted i n  any s p e c i f i c  p la c e  b u t  has been the s u b je c t  o f  
d i s c u s s i o n ,  1s t o  do w i t h  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank as a dep a r tm en t  o f  t h e  
c e n t r a l  government  and more s p e c i f 1c e I  l y , th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  F inance .  
Since, as we saw in  Chapter 3 ,  one o f  t h e  sources  o f  Kuwai t i  D inars  1s 
government expend i tu re  from f o re ig n  exchange reserves,  the va lue  o f  t h e  
Local cur rency w i th  respect to  these reserves may Indeed be an issue  f o r  
the  M i n i s t r y  o f  F i n a n c e .  C e r t a i n l y  th e  c h o i c e  o f  t h e  U.S. d o l l a r ,  
S t e r l i n g  and th e  Deutschmark  as t h e  m a jo r  components o f  a basket may 
r e f l e c t  to  some ex ten t  the c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  M i n i s t r y ' s  p o r t f o l i o s .  
S t a t i s t i c s  on th e s e  p o r t f o l i o s  a re  n o t  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b le  to  make the 
comparison, but t h i s  can be v iewed as a supplementary  c o n s id e ra t io n  to  
the p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the  value o f  the f o re ig n  assets o f  the banks i n  te rm s  
o f  the Local cu r rency .
I n  any even t  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  a s t a b l e  c u r re nc y  has not reduced c a p i t a l  
o u t f lo w s  as planned because the "exogenous" element o f  c a p i t a l  movements 
due t o  p o l i t l c e l  m o t i v e s  c a n n o t  be i n f l u e n c e d  by t h i s  and t h e  
"endogenous" element i 6  encouraged on occasions by the s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  
c u r r e n c y  when a r b i t r a g e u r s  r e a c t  t o  y i e l d  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  due to  the 
r i g i d i t y  o f  domest ic I n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  T h i s  has led to  d iscuss ion  about 
f l o a t i n g  the Kuwai t i  D ina r .  The a t t r a c t i o n  o f  doing t h i s  i s  immedia te ly  
obvious as i t  should,  i n  theo ry ,  i n s u la te  the monetary system f rom  t h e  
ba la n c e  o f  payments and reduce "endogenous" c a p i t a l  o u t f lo w s ,  and might  
t h e r e f o r e  a c h ie v e  th e  g o v e rn m e n t ' s  t a r g e t  o f  r e p a t r i a t i n g  " K u w a i t i  
D o l l a r s "  w h i l e  d i s c o u r a g i n g  a r b i t r a g e .  But t h e r e  a re  a number o f  
c ons ide ra t ion s  which make f l o a t i n g  the Kuwe1t1 Dinar  u n a t t r a c t i v e ,  apa r t  
f rom th e  i m p e r a t i v e s  immediate ly fac ing  the c e n t r a l  bank which we have 
j u s t  d iscussed above:-
a) M i l e s  (53)  shows t h a t  f o r  Canada i n  t h e  Pos t -W ar  p e r i o d ,  i n  
p e r i o d s  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e s  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  r e a c t e d  t o  
1 n t e r e s t - d 1 f f e r e n t l a l s .  When s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  on the supply  s ide  
i s  suspended, domestic and fo re ig n  cur rency (or  i n  t h i s  case t h e  
U.S .  D o l l a r  and the Canadian D o l l a r )  become s u b s t i t u t a b l e  on the 
demand s id e .  The Im p l i c a t i o n  o f  those r e s u l t s  f o r  Kuwait i s  t h a t  
f l o a t i n g  exchanges w i l l  not  e l im in a te  c a p i t a l  ou t f low s  based on a 
" t r a n s a c t i o n s "  o r  " p r e c a u t i o n a r y "  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  cur rency  
a l though they  m ig h t  m i t i g a t e  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  " s p e c u l a t i v e  
m o t i v e " .  I n  Kuw a i t  the "exogenous" element o f  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  i s  
based on a " p r e c a u t i o n a r y "  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  currency based on 
p o l i t i c a l  fea rs  where the p hys ica l  Locat ion o f  the money b a la n c e  
1s I m p o r t a n t ,  hence o c c u r r i n g  even under  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  f i x e d  
exchange r a te s .  No s p e c i f i c  cur rency regime t h e re fo re  can have a
r o le  In  r e p a t r i a t i n g  "Kuwai t i  D o l l a r s "  t h a t  have Lef t  the coun t ry  
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons.
b) P rope r ly  f u n c t i o n i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange m a rke ts  r e q u i r e  a broad
base to  ensure s t a b i l i t y .  An u n s t a b l e  d om es t ic  c u r r e n c y  w i l l  
encourage t rade  to  use fo re ig n  cu r re n c ie s ,  hence undermining the  
f u tu r e  o f  th e  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  and l e a d in g  us i n t o  a v i c i o u s  
c i r c l e .  The p r e - r e q u i s i t e s  to  s t a b i l i t y  o f  a f o r e i g n  exchange 
m a rk e t  s t i l l  on t h e  road o f  deve lopment  a re  (1 )  c e n t r a l  bank 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  and Ci1) e f f i c i e n t  forward markets.
c)  C en t ra l  bank i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  a s e n s i t i v e  na ture  can on ly  succeed
when a broad government  s e c u r i t i e s  m arke t  e x i s t s  so t h a t  t h e  
mone ta ry  a u t h o r i t i e s  can buy o r  s e l l  domest ic assets  on a d a i l y  
bas is ,  f o r  any amount, to  dest roy  or  c rea te  the domest ic cur rency 
needed f o r  the sa le  o r  pu rchase  o f  f o r e i g n  cur rency .  In  Kuwait 
the L i k e l ihood  1s t h a t  specu la to rs  would ra is e  the K uw a i t i  D in a r  
t o  u n r e a s o n a b le  h e i g h t s  and t h e  monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  would no t  
have t h e  nece ssa ry  d o m e s t i c  a s s e t  base t o  e f f e c t  s u b s t a n t i a l  
sa les  o f  l o c a l  cur rency to  s t a b i l i z e  the exchange r a te .
d) E f f i c i e n t  f o r w a r d  m a r k e t s ,  as we have seen i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,
depend on deve loped  c a p i t a l  m a rk e ts  and f r e e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e
s t r u c t u r e s ,  s i n c e  on t h e  i n t e r e s t  p a r i t y  p r i n c i p l e ,  i n t e r e s t  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  determine premia and d iscoun ts  from spot 1n va r ious  
m a t u r i t i e s  o f  the fo rward markets .
The above arguments lead us to  the conc lus ion  t h a t  i n t e r e s t  r a te  reforms 
should predate  any ideas about r e f o r m i n g  exchange r a te s .  Th is  does not 
mean t h a t  pegged exchange r a t e s  a re  recommended as p o l i c y  p e r  s e .
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I n t e r e s t  ra te  reforms would expand the  domest ic reserve asset r a t i o ,  and 
would form the bas is  f o r  the sale o f  f o r  ins tance the Cen t ra l  Bank b i l l s  
p roposed  i n  1978 t h a t  cou ld  form the nucleus o f  a government s e c u r i t i e s  
m arke t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  K h a t k h a t e  ( 5 4 ]  has shown t h a t  government  
tampering w i th  y i e l d s  on new issues o f  s e c u r i t i e s  has led to  the f a i l u r e  
o f  the market in  Taiwan. Free i n t e r e s t  ra tes  would make forward markets 
poss ib le  in  the  Local cu r rency ,  and an expanded domest ic asset base and 
government s e c u r i t i e s  market would make Cen t ra l  Bank i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  the 
f o re ig n  exchange market p o s s ib le .  An a d d i t i o n a l  bonus from such a reform 
o f  i n t e r e s t  ra te s  would be an a l l o c a t i o n a l  improvement in  sav ings i n  the  
economy in  the " c o n d u i t "  and " r e p re s s io n "  l i t e r a t u r e  sense.
We conclude t h a t  a p p ro p r ia te  p o l i c y  in  Kuwait would in v o lv e  a basket peg 
o f  t h e  b i l a t e r a l  type and f r e e l y  f l u c t u a t i n g  i n t e r e s t  ra te s ,  u n t i l  such 
t ime as t h e  f r e e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  reg im e wiLL have a l l o w e d  t h e  banking 
system to  develop to  the ex ten t  t h a t  i t  can manage a f l o a t i n g  c u r r e n c y  
i n  t h e  manner d e s c r i b e d  i n  p o i n t s  (a) -  (d) above. The f r e e  i n t e r e s t  
ra tes  would preven t  d i s r u p t i o n s  o f  t h e  b a n k in g  system as are caused by 
a r b i t r a g e  c a p i t e l  f lows  and would prov ide  the bas is  f o r  the c e n t r a l  bank 
d e v e lo p in g  a d o m e s t i c  a s s e t  base  t o  b a c k  t h e  m o n e t a r y  s y s t e m ' s  
" h i g h - p o w e r e d "  money base and f o r  i t  to  develop more c o n t r o l  over bank 
reserves .  Most im p o r t a n t l y ,  however ,  expanding Local money and c a p i t a l  
markets would enable  th e  c e n t r a l  bank t o  deve lop  a f o r w a r d  exchange 
m a rk e t ,  more a m b i t i o u s  th a n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  swap f a c i l i t i e s ,  t h a t  would 
a l low  the commerc ia l  banks t o  hedge t h e i r  f o r e i g n  exchange exposure.  
OveralL,  however, we must emphasise t h a t  the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
Kuwa i t  ( t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  the  ro le s  o f  the M in i s t r y  o f  Finance and the  
C e n t r a l  Bank) a u t o m a t i c a l l y  i n s u l a t e s  t h e  m oneta ry  sys tem f rom the 
balance o f  payments, and w h i le  "exogenous" c a p i t a l  f l o w s  c o u ld  n o t  be 
s to p p e d ,  f r e e  i n t e r e s t  ra te s  would greatLy reduce "endogenous" c a p i t a l  
f low s .  Given the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  we descr ibe ,  however, the re  i s  
no immediate reason to  f l o a t  the Kuwait i  D inar .
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